




THE



HISTORY OF CANADA.

BY

WILLIAM KINGSFORD, LL.D.

VOL. III.

[1726-1756.]

[WITH MAPS.]

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PREFACE TO THE THIRD VOLUME.

In publishing the third volume of this history, I feel called upon to explain, what at first sight may appear a non-fulfilment of the conditions of the prospectus issued by me in June, 1887. I then undertook in these volumes, to bring down the narrative to the conquest of Quebec by Wolfe in 1759. I have only been enabled to reach the destruction of Oswego by Montcalm in 1756.

It may be seen that two subjects have been introduced, which in my humble judgment, are indispensable to the completion of the work: the history of Hudson's bay to the treaty of Utrecht, and a brief account of Louisiana in its relationship with Canada. The space taken by these two subjects, 100 pages, has prevented me from including the events intervening to Wolfe's conquest. They consist of the capture by Montcalm of fort William Henry in 1757, and in the following year Abercrombie's failure before Ticonderoga, the capture of forts Niagara and Frontenac, the second conquest of Louisbourg and Forbes' advance upon fort Duquesne.

Although the capture of Quebec may virtually be considered the termination of French rule in Canada, the events of 1760 are of great importance: Levis' attack on Quebec with Murray's defeat in May, and the capitulation of Montreal on the 8th of September. It must also be borne in mind that Canada was held as a conquered country from 1760 to the peace of Paris, of the 10th of February, 1763. The history of these years has hitherto been briefly given under the term of military rule, as if to suggest that the government was unjust and tyrannical; accordingly, it is necessary that it be fully and dispassionately related.

In a previous volume I have endeavoured to give a narrative of the treaty of Utrecht, with its manifold complications. In the present volume I have related the events which led to the peace

of Aix-la-Chapelle, and so far as I have been able, the influences which determined the acceptance of its conditions by Great Britain.

It is equally necessary to record the events preliminary to the peace of Paris, and to review the conditions which, owing to the incompetence of lord Bute, or from whatever other cause, were admitted in favour of France. On the conclusion of this treaty the possession of Canada by Great Britain was recognised by France. The signature of the plenipotentiaries, however, simply affirmed the fact that the province had been held as conquered territory for upwards of three years; the district of Quebec from the 18th of September, 1759; that of Montreal from the 8th of September, 1760, to the spring of 1763, when the definitive treaty of the 10th of February affirmed the question of future sovereignty. These various subjects will form the contents of the fourth volume, and will close the period of the French government of Canada. A full index of names and events will be given.

One of the ablest, the earliest and the kindest of the critics of my earlier volumes, the *Saturday Review*, has pointed out that the reader would have been assisted by the presence of maps of reference. I greatly regret that I failed to furnish them; I hope, however, that I may be permitted the remark, that like many writers on history I trusted to the general knowledge of geography, and the almost universal possession of an atlas. I have, however, accepted the opinion of their necessity, and in this volume four maps are given to illustrate subjects to which they relate; they are specified at the end of the table of contents.

It is a somewhat delicate and dangerous duty to enter upon private matters; but I am impelled to place on record, that it is questionable, if this work would at the present date have seen the light, but for the personal intervention of two friends whose names I am not permitted to publish. I cannot, however, withhold my grateful testimony to the sympathy with my undertaking, which led these gentlemen to assist in the serious responsibilities incident to its publication. There was likewise the higher feeling that they desired to see an impartially written history of Canada given to the world, from the conviction that it will exercise a

beneficial influence on our present political life. I must personally express the deep sense I entertain of this kindness to myself. Moreover, I feel, if my labours have the least value, and if I have not entirely failed in carrying out my purpose, and in reaching the standard I have striven to follow, it must be generally felt, that these gentlemen with great disinterestedness, have endeavoured to perform a service to the commonwealth, deserving of the highest respect.


I append a list of the subscribers to these volumes, who have seen fit to give me their countenance and support.

An attempt has been made to follow the latest examples of typography in London and Paris. No pains have been spared to attain this result.

I look forward to the publication of the fourth volume in September, 1890.

W. K.

OTTAWA, ONTARIO,
28th September, 1889



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
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
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BOOK VII.

HUDSON'S BAY: TO THE TREATY OF UTRECHT.



THE HISTORY OF CANADA

FROM THE EARLIEST DATE OF FRENCH RULE.

CHAPTER I.

The first mention in Canadian history of Hudson's Bay is in the Jesuit Relations of 1660,* when the territory is spoken of as a geographical discovery; the following year an attempt was made by Père Lalemant to proceed thither by land from Quebec. As these waters attracted attention, the conviction became general that their possession was necessary to the preservation of French Canada; and the claim by England of sovereignty over them was considered as unwarrantable as it was undesirable. We are in possession of the arguments by which, in 1687, at the conference in London, each power supported its claim,† and by an examination of the statements advanced to sustain the pretensions of France, it may be seen, that no occupation of any part of the territory was ever attempted by that power until 1682. Two names are introduced, to which a fictitious renown has been given, those of des Groselliers and Radisson. These men were brothers-in-law.‡ We constantly find mention of them in French histories, *mémoires*, reports and despatches, as the discoverers who

* Page 10.

† See Report on Canadian Archives, 1882, p. 173. "Transactions between England and France relating to Hudson's Bay," 1687.

‡ Médart Chouart des Groselliers was a pilot, a native of Touraine. He arrived in Canada when young, and afterwards married Hélène, the daughter of Abraham Martin, King's pilot, owner of the property known as the "Plains of Abraham." Charlevoix tells us [I., p. 479] that he married Radisson's sister; doubtless his second wife. For the account of Radisson see note at the end of this book.

conferred the rights for which the French contended. They are put forth as the pioneers of discovery, as deserters from the French, and as selling their information to the English. If such information was originally obtained by an expedition under French colours, there must be some record of it; but none is known. The evidence shews that these men were not traitors to French, but to English interests; that they served on board the English vessels which made the voyage to Hudson's Bay; and that they carried the information thus obtained to Quebec to aid in the formation of a French company.

Nothing can be more plain than the English claim to priority of discovery and settlement in these northern waters. The northern part of America was discovered in 1497 by Sebastian Cabot, under a commission from Henry VII. In 1610, by the authority of James I., Hudson took possession of the Bay and Straits which bear his name. In 1612 Sir Thomas Button sailed to Port Nelson, which he so named after the commander of his vessel, and there erected a cross. In 1631 Captain Luke Fox, by command of Charles I., visited Hudson's Bay and Port Nelson, and re-established the cross, which he found had been defaced. In 1667 Captain Zachary Gilham arrived in what is now known as James' Bay, and built Charles' fort at the mouth of the river called by him Rupert River, in honour of Prince Rupert: in modern times known as Fort Rupert and River Nemiskau. In 1669 Captain Newland visited Port Nelson. In 1670 the charter of the Hudson's Bay Company was granted by Charles II. In a short time, in addition to Fort Rupert to the east of the Bay, Fort Hayes was constructed at the entrance to Moose River, on the west of the Bay: and some sixty-five miles north, at the entrance of Albany River, Fort Albany was founded. In 1682 an attempt was made to establish a factory at the mouth of the River Nelson, when those composing the expedition were assailed by the French, and forced to leave the country.

The enumeration of French pretensions in no form includes the proof, that any settlement was made previously to 1682.

The French refer the origin of their claim to the company of "One Hundred," which, in 1627, obtained the concession of New France to the Arctic circle; and it was contended that this right was fully recognised by England in the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye in 1633, when Canada was restored to France by Charles I.*

The statement has also been made that Jean Bourdon, in 1656, visited Hudson's Bay. There is a record of this voyage in the Jesuit relations of 1658, from which it is known that Bourdon went no further than the 55th degree of latitude, in an expedition to the Esquimaux to obtain furs.† The French sustained this statement by reference to an entry stated to be drawn from the "Conseil Souverain" of Quebec of the 26th of April, 1656. The Council was, however, only established on the 18th of September, 1663. It was likewise set forth that the French had built a fort in 1661, on Rupert River; a statement contradicted by the narrative of the expedition of 1672, by Père Albanel, the first journey made over land.‡ Until that date such an expedition had been held to be impossible. It had been undertaken three times, and abandoned; and the obstacles met with, had led to the opinion that success was unattainable.§

Père Charles Albanel was accompanied by a M. de Saint Simon, and another Frenchman, with some Indians. Albanel who had been appointed to the expedition by Talon, left Quebec on the 6th of August, 1671. On reaching the north of Lake Saint John in September, he heard from the Indians that two ships had arrived at Hudson's Bay; accordingly, he wrote to Quebec for further credentials. As it was already the middle of October when he received a reply, he determined to winter where he was. He continued his journey on

* The weakness of this claim was fully shown at the time when it was made. It was accompanied by the remark: "6. Chacun sait que les Colonies ne peuvent s'établir dans toute leur estendue qu'avec le tems et les soins que ceux qui en ont la conduite y apportent." Deuxième Mémoire, Archive Report, 1883, p. 191.

† Page 9. The entrance to Hudson Bay Straits is north of latitude 60°.

‡ Relations, 1672, pp. 42, 46, Que. Ed.

§ Relations, 1672, p. 56, Que. Ed.

the 1st of June, and on the 10th he reached the summit, where he found a portage of two *arpents* leading to the streams flowing into Hudson's Bay. On the 25th, he reached Lake Nemiskau.* He descended Rupert River, and near its mouth he saw a hoy with the English flag, in the neighbourhood of two empty houses. On the 5th of July, Père Albanel looked on the waters of Hudson's Bay. His mission of discovery being accomplished, he re-ascended the river to Lake Nemiskau, where he erected a cross on the 9th of July; on the 18th he reached the River Minahigousat, where he constructed a second cross. On the 23rd he arrived at Lake Saint John.

Shortly after the arrival of de Callières, he forwarded a memoir to de Seignelay setting forth "the encroachments by the English on the French colonies." It is undated; but there is internal evidence that it was written in 1685.† In this paper de Callières states that an overland journey was made by Dablon in 1661. The "Relations" have preserved his journal.‡ It is written from Nekouba, one hundred leagues from Tadousac, and about ninety miles north of Lake Saint John; the extreme point reached by him. Consequently, his own statement is in direct opposition to the assertion of de Callières. De Callières also mentions Couture, *Sénéchal* of Beauré, as proceeding to Hudson's Bay in 1663; no record can be found of the fact. Likewise, that Duquet, King's Attorney of the *Prevôté* of Quebec, with Jean L'Anglois, made the same journey, and he adduces the "Conseil Souverain" as an authority. No such entry exists. Indeed, Albanel, in 1672, distinctly asserts, that the journey was never made before he succeeded in reaching James' Bay.

De Callières is the one authority for the statement that des Groselliers and Radisson conducted the English to a place they called Nelson's River, implying their previous presence

* Lake Nemiskau is a large lake surrounded by mountains on the Rupert River, between 76° and 77° longitude. The mouth of the Rupert River is approximately at the 79th degree.

† De Callières remarks, "The Sieur Dongan wrote last May, 1684." N.Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 265.

‡ Relations, 1661, Que. Ed., pp. 13-21. "2 juillet, 1661."

there. As there is no account of a marine expedition from Canada, the conclusion has been formed that an overland journey was made by these parties to the west of Hudson's Bay proper. No relation, *mémoire*, edict or official despatch makes allusion to such an expedition. A journey of this character could not have escaped notice; had it been made, some corroboratory fact in connection with it could be produced.*

The evidence is directly the reverse. As late as 1660,† it is expressly stated that all that was known of Hudson's Bay was through the Indians. Mention is then made of the possibility of ascending a river from the north of Lake Superior

* It is difficult to find authority for the statement put forth of the original discovery of Hudson's Bay by des Groselliers and Radisson, on which so much stress has been laid. It cannot be traced to Charlevoix, who has been accredited with recording the fact. I deem it proper to repeat his precise words [Vol. I., p. 476.] "Il est vrai qu'en 1663, deux Transfuges François, nommés Chouart des Groselliers, et Pierre Esprit de Radisson, pour se venger de je ne sçai quel mécontentement qu'on leur avoit donné conduisirent des Anglais dans la Rivière de Nemiscau, qui se décharge dans le fond de la Baye, et que ceux-ci batirent, un fort a l'embouchure de cette Rivière qui fut nommé Rupert, que dans la suite ils en construisirent un second chez les Monsonis et puis un troisième à Quichichouane; mais on regarde en France & en Canada ces entreprises comme des usurpations."

The only allusion I can find to this matter is a memoir of M. de Denonville, addressed to M. de Seignelay, dated Quebec, 9 November, 1689. In his letter enclosing the memoir, he says: "I annex to this letter a Memoir of our Rights to that Country [the Iroquois], of which our registers ought to be full, *but no memorials of them are to be found*. I am told M. Talon has had originals of the entries into possession (*prises de possession*) of a great many discoveries that have been made in this country with which our registers ought to be loaded. Doubtless he will have given them to My late lord, your father." [N. Y. Doc., IX., p. 297, as translated.]

The "Memoir in proof of the right of the French to the Iroquois country and to Hudson's Bay," contains the following paragraph: "The settlement made by the English at the head of the North Bay does not give them any title, because it has been already remarked that the French were in possession of those countries, and had traded with the Indians of that Bay, which is proved still better by the knowledge the men named, Des Groselliers and Radisson, had of those parts where they introduced the English. *They had traded there, no doubt, with the old French Coureurs de bois.*" [As translated, N. Y. Doc. IX., p. 395.] The statement by M. de Denonville, that "no memorials could be found" at Quebec during his Government, is an important admission.

† Relation, page 10.

by means of which Hudson's Bay in eight or ten days' journey can be reached, at 55° of latitude; whence it is forty leagues to Button Bay, where Port Nelson is situate. This description is incorrect. There are two routes on the north shore of Lake Superior, by which rivers can be ascended to the height of land; both of the descending rivers discharge into James' Bay. One from Michipicoten, whence the portage leads to Moose River, having its mouth at Fort Hayes; the second from Lake Nepigon, whence the route leads to the River Albany, at the mouth of which Fort Albany is situate. The connection with Port Nelson could only have been made from Lake Winnipeg by Nelson River. The difficulties of this journey furnish the proof of its impossibility. The few miles of quiet water up the Kaministiquia are succeeded by a broken navigation of forty miles to Lake Kashabowie. A short portage leads to the waters descending to Hudson's Bay. Following a chain of lakes for one hundred and sixty miles, Rainy Lake and Lake of the Woods, one hundred and seventy miles across have to be reached. They are succeeded by the tortuous navigation of River Winnipeg into Lake Winnipeg, and thence by the River Nelson to Hudson's Bay; an expedition of greater magnitude and danger than de La Salle's descent of the Mississippi.

Although the Jesuits, Jogues, and Raymbault visited the mouth of Lake Superior as early as 1641, it was not until 1669 that the mission of Sault Saint Mary was established. The mission of the Saint Esprit at La Pointe, on the southern shore, the modern Bayfield, was formed in 1670. The Jesuits map, the first authentic information given to the world of this portion of the country, was published in 1671. In 1669 Jolliet had been sent by Talon on a mineral exploration to Lake Superior; in 1673, with Marquette, he discovered the Mississippi to the River Arkansas. No expedition to reach Hudson's Bay by land was undertaken previously to that of Albanel and Saint Simon, in 1671-72. The first known maritime expedition was in 1682, being that of the Canadian Company, "la Compagnie du Nord," principally fitted out

by de la Chesnaye. It consisted of two vessels under the control of Radisson and des Groselliers, and went to Port Nelson. The English contended that the men landed, took possession of the furs which were stored, and burned the buildings. The French that they arrived before the English, who came three days after them. There was a second expedition from Quebec in 1684,* when two ships started on a trading voyage, each containing from thirty-five to forty robust young men. It must have been these two ships which, on their return in 1685, seized an English vessel in the Hudson's Straits, and carried her with her crew to Quebec.†

The *Mémoire* of de Callières‡ sets forth that des Groselliers and Radisson, having obtained pardon for their service with the English, a Company was formed at Quebec, and in 1676 the two were sent to Hudson's Bay . . . where they founded . . . a settlement . . . on the River Bourbon. It was the year de La Salle arrived in Canada, the third year of de Frontenac's first government. There is no mention of any such event in his letters to the King, and it is not possible so important a voyage could have been made without being reported by him. On the other hand, "la Compagnie du Nord" was only formed in 1682, and the first expedition under its auspices was made in that year. It is therefore plain that these two men were bringing to Canada§ the information which they had obtained in the English marine.

* De Meilles to de Seignelay, 8 July, 1684. N. Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 229.

† "Petition of the Governor and Company of Adventurers trading into Hudson's Bay, 1687." Can. Arch., 1883, p. 174.

‡ N. Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 268.

§ The proceedings of the "Conseil Souverain" of the 10th of November, 1683, [II., 907] record the steps taken on the petition of des Groselliers and Radisson, to obtain registration of their letter of pardon. It is set forth that they had resided for some time among foreigners, to whom they had diverted the fur trade; that they had arrived in Canada in 1676 with the King's pardon, and had obtained recognition of it by the Attorney-General d'Auteuil, but that the latter had been unable to submit the matter to the Council, owing to its members not having met before Radisson returned to France. At that date, 1683, the parties had come back to Quebec from a voyage which they had made to the North, and had again applied for its registration: thus establishing that they took part in the expedition of 1682.

The French pretensions entirely depended on establishing the right of discovery by des Groselliers and Radisson, so that at the period, when the claims of the two countries were being discussed, great prominence was given to their names. But the slender support which the French derive from the facts by which their allegations are sustained, really shows that the English claim to priority of discovery is unassailable.

Jeremie's narrative* reads as a fable. It is that des Groselliers and Radisson wintered at Saint Thérèse, on Hayes River, in 1682, and that during a hunting expedition they heard that some Europeans were at the entrance of Nelson River. They proceeded thither, to find six Englishmen almost starved to death, whose account of themselves was, that they had been left behind by a Boston vessel. Subsequently the French heard of a party being established up the river: one night after a debauch, when the English were overpowered by drinking, fourteen of the French took eighty English prisoners, and so gained possession of the country.†

De La Potherie gives the history of the arrival of the French at Port Nelson in 1682, claiming for them the earliest settlement. Evidently he had access to the French documents of that date, and his account is founded upon them.

There is likewise a Memoir on the French dominion 1504-1706,‡ which repeats these statements. We learn in addition that the seizure by the French of the port and property was made a matter of complaint by the English Ambassador at Paris, on the ground that the English had been in possession of the territory for several years. Radisson maintained that he had taken possession of territory one hundred and fifty leagues from an English settlement.

As I have before stated, the English account relates that the earliest recorded voyage was made in 1611, by Button;

* "Recueil des voyages du Nord," Amsterdam, 1732, III., p. 305.

† This story is repeated by Robson, on the authority of Jeremie—"Account of six years' residence in Hudson's Bay, from 1733-1736, and from 1744-1747." London, 1752.

‡ N. Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 781.

subsequently the country was visited by Fox, and in 1667, a voyage was made by Zachary Gilham. Two years later, Captain Newland arrived at Port Nelson. After 1667, the voyages were frequent to Fort Rupert and Moose River, and it was in these expeditions that des Groselliers and Radisson first found their way to Hudson's Bay; being discovered holding correspondence with the French they were dismissed.* A map is extant, dated 1679, which shows that Louis Jolliet in that year made an expedition by land from Tadousac to Hudson's Bay.† I cannot learn that his narrative has been preserved. De Frontenac in his letter of November of that year, reported that Jolliet made a journey similar to that of Père Lalemant;‡ but the fact is without significance.

In 1680, Captain Draper in one of the Company's ships entered Nelson River for the purposes of trade, two years previous to the appearance of the French there in 1682. In 1681, in a memoir of the Western Indians, Duchesneau complaining of the advance of the English in Newfoundland and Acadia, describes the injury which their occupation of Hudson's Bay has caused, by drawing off the trade of Tadousac to the English forts in the Bay: viz., at Cape Henrietta Maria, and one at the side of the Assinibouetz. The remedy suggested by him, was to drive the English by force from the Bay, which he claimed as belonging to the French; or if that policy could not be entertained, to divert the trade by the construction of forts on the rivers falling into the lakes.§

In 1682, the collision took place between French and English interests at Port Nelson. We are told in Radisson's narrative of these events, that in that year one Bridger on the part of the Hudson's Bay Company was sent out permanently to

* According to Oldmixon, "British Empire in America," 1741, I., p. 549, des Groselliers in 1673 made a voyage to Fort Rupert, and in 1674 was sent to Moose River. We know that in 1676 he appeared in Canada with his pardon.

† "Cette carte montre le chemin que Louis Jolliet a fait depuis Tadousac jusqu'à la Mer du Nord dans la Baye de Hudson, et marque la uraye situation de la Baye et du Detroit. Ce qui est marqué par des points est le chemin pour [sic] ou il esté a fait, à Quebec en Canada le 8e novembre, 1679." Harris, p. 197.

‡ N.Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 795.

§ Ib., p. 166.

establish a factory at Port Nelson. A vessel, however, from Boston, commanded by Captain Benjamin Gilham, had preceded him. When des Groselliers and Radisson arrived with the expedition from Quebec, they entered what now bears the name of Hayes' River, but known to the French as *Rivière Sainte Thérèse*.^{*} Ten days afterwards, the new Governor, Bridger arrived, the elder Captain Gilham being in command of his vessel. Bridger not expecting opposition was without sufficient strength to assert undisputed authority. Without interfering with the French he established himself, and constructed a fort. The two small settlements continued for some time without interference on either side; there was no open discord. The younger Gilham likewise constructed buildings; but by Radisson's statement they were taken possession of by the French. Later in the season, Bridger's vessel was wrecked, and fourteen men with the captain, Gilham, were drowned. Finally, by stratagem the French made Bridger a prisoner, and the remainder of his men submitted to the demand of the French that they should leave the country. Accordingly, they were placed on one of the small vessels in which the Canadians had arrived, which carried them to James' Bay. The second of these vessels had been crushed by the ice.

Radisson and des Groselliers determined to return to Canada and for this purpose they took possession of the craft of the younger Gilham, who, with the Governor Bridger, was placed on board and carried to Quebec. She was loaded also with the furs which the French had obtained in trade, and those which they had seized from the English.[†] This was the vessel which de la Barre surrendered, for which he was reproved by de Seignelay.[‡] A few men were left behind in

^{*} The geographical position of these rivers is remarkable, their discharge into Hudson Bay being separated only by a point of land. Fifteen miles up the streams there is not two miles of space between them; their tributary sources are some hundred of leagues apart.

[†] See note at the end of this book on Peter Esprit Radisson, in which the account of these events is given according to his narrative.

[‡] N.Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 221.

charge of the fort, under the younger Chouart, the son of des Groselliers.

On the 15th of August, 1684, Port Nelson again came into the possession of the English. Des Groselliers and Radisson, discontented with the treatment which they received from the French, renewed their relationship with their old Company. They joined an expedition to Hudson's Bay, and the surrender of the fort was without difficulty obtained from young Chouart. It is not important to enquire if this young man was a party to the transfer; he had but few men with him, and was not capable of making much resistance. M. de Denonville tells us that, apprehending no danger, and proceeding to meet his uncle, he was made a prisoner with the other Frenchmen.*

The Canadian Company, in making application to France for assistance some years later,† complained of the loss they had sustained; and they then declared that the expedition of de Troyes in 1686 was resolved upon, on account of the injuries they then received. De Denonville, on the same ground, in his proclamation issued that year, justified that expedition; and in a subsequent letter to the Minister‡ he states that he did not order the English forts to be taken, but that the fort only where Radisson could be found, should be seized.

In 1684, the year the English regained possession of Port Nelson, two vessels left Quebec, it may be assumed, not knowing that the place had passed from French possession. On their arrival in Hudson's Bay they found that Captain John Abraham had previously arrived with supplies and stores. It would appear that both parties for some period carried on their operations peaceably; but hostilities arising, the French, who were the weaker party, retired to a River called by them "La Gargousse," where they wintered.§

* Proclamation, 8 September, 1686: "Son pernicieux dessein luy ayant réussi le 15 aout, 1684, par une trahison qu'il fit à Chouart son neveu, &c." Parl. MS., Vol. V., p. 490.

† "Mémoire de la Compagnie du Nord touchant le pillage commis par les Anglais à la Rivière Bourbon." 15 November, 1690, Parl. MS., 2nd Series, V., 156.

‡ Parl. MS., Vol. V., page 102. 10 October, 1686.

§ N. Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 800. Oldmixon.

In 1684, on de la Barre's recall, de Denonville was appointed his successor. He relates* that previous to leaving France he received a letter from London from young Chouart, to the effect that on two occasions he had been arrested, in order to prevent him leaving England; and that it was his intention, as soon as possible, to join de Denonville in Canada to undertake an expedition against the Hudson's Bay Company's fort. Thus when M. de Denonville left France for Canada, he was not without information with regard to Hudson's Bay.

There are few passages of history more obscure and more difficult to describe, than the events which took place in Hudson's Bay in the closing years of the seventeenth century. The names of two common-place adventurers have obtained mention in the chronicle of those days, to which they are in no way entitled; from the circumstance that they were brought forward by the French, for want of a better argument to sustain their pretensions to early discovery.

The period, however, had arrived when an expedition of a different character was to be sent from Canada, to obtain for the French, possession of the three forts previously held by the English in James' Bay; and to be the commencement of their almost uninterrupted possession of nearly the whole of Hudson's Bay, for upwards of a quarter of a century.

Shortly after the arrival of M. de Denonville in 1685, he received a communication from M. de la Durantaye, who commanded at Michillimackinac, informing him that two Frenchmen had passed overland from Hudson's Bay to Canada. Guided by Indians, they had ascended the Abbitibi River, to make the portage leading to the head waters of the Ottawa, and passing through Lake Temiscaming, they reached the mouth of the Matawan, whence they made their way to Michillimackinac. The importance of the event suggested that it should be reported to the Governor at Quebec without delay.

* De Denonville au Ministre, 31 March, 1685. Parl. MS., 2nd Series VI., p. 490.

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The events of the three previous years which I have described had attracted much attention to Hudson's Bay. The formation of "la Compagnie du Nord" in 1682, and its first success had been matters of exultation. On the other hand, the repossession of Port Nelson by the English, known in Canada in 1685 by the return of the vessels which had made the voyage the previous year, had caused great disappointment; even beyond the limited circle where the loss was felt. The interest taken in the northern sea had been further stimulated by the King's instructions, that the progress of the English in the settlement and in the possession of trade in Hudson's Bay, should be stopped.* Those who considered the geographical situation of Hudson's Bay in a political point of view, saw great danger to Canada being enclosed to the north by Hudson's Bay as English territory; to the south by New York, aggressively putting forth the claim to the southern shore of Lake Ontario; and Massachusetts encroaching on Acadia. Thus, by the north continuing an English possession, they considered that the national existence of Canada was imperilled.

The news therefore was in every respect welcome; it established the existence of a route open to an expedition to proceed over land to Hudson's Bay for the destruction of the English forts. It was accordingly resolved to strike a blow which should outroot them. No stronger advocates were to be found than the traders of Quebec and Montreal, who readily contributed to the cost. Indeed "la Compagnie du Nord" subsequently claimed that the expedition had been principally fitted out at its expense.† It was a period of

* Louis XIV. to M. de la Barre, Fontainebleau, 5 August, 1683. N.Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 200.

† Mémoire de la Compagnie du Nord: 1698, "qu'en l'année 1686 elle envoya sous l'autorité de M. le Marquis de Denonville un corps de Canadiens, lesquels après des peines inconcevables et avoir traversé ici plus de 300 lieues de pays par des chemins inconnus et impraticables se rendirent maîtres des Forts Monsipy, Rupert et Chichouen, et firent prisonniers tous les Anglais qui les occupaient ce qu'elle ne peut pas faire sans des dépenses extremes." Parl. MS., 2nd Series VIII., p. 265.

peace between the two countries, and excepting some trade dispute which had been referred to France* there was no injury calling for reparation, no insult to avenge: indeed, it was this condition which suggested that the attempt could be made. It was known that the forts on James' Bay were in each case held by a small number of men, engaged in trade, anticipating no hostile attack, and that no precautions were taken to guard against surprise. It was accordingly with truth considered, that an expedition boldly led and conducted with enterprise, could not fail of success.

The force organized consisted of thirty soldiers and sixty-eight Canadians. The Commander was de Troyes; Duchesnay and de Catalogne were in command of the troops; the Canadian militia were under the orders of Lanouë, and the three sons of Charles le Moyne, of Montreal, St. Hélène d'Iberville, and Maricour.†

The party proceeded up the frozen river on sleighs to the foot of the long rapid on the Ottawa, which they reached at the commencement of April, 1686, and taking to the canoes when the condition of the water permitted, they arrived at the mouth of the Mattawan, where the course of the Ottawa ceases to run directly from the north, and takes an easterly trend. Everything had been prepared for the ascent, and the expedition steadily paddled up stream. On leaving Lake Temiscaming they followed a tributary descending from the north-east, meeting many portages. On reaching the height of land, in a short distance they gained a small lake discharging into Lake Abbitibbi, whence they entered the rapidly descending stream of that name, to arrive at Hudson's Bay on the 18th of June. Two Indians informed them of the position of the fort. It was Fort Hayes, at the south-west

* Gaultier de Comporté. Parl. MS. Vol. IV., p. 227.

† "Receuil de ce qui s'est passé en Canada—depuis l'année, 1682." The writer of this Memoir was present in the expedition, and his account of it is the accepted authority. The presence of M. Gédéon de Catalogne [p. 6] being so included, is the ground for this work having been attributed to him. His identification rests on the expression, [p. 7] "*où les soldats étaient destinés que je commandais.*"

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corner of James' Bay: a palisaded fort, defended by four eight-pounders, one at each corner; an efficient defence against the Indians. They learned also that a vessel was in the neighbourhood. The party advanced to the attack at midnight, but surprised by the early approach of dawn, the assault was deferred. The following evening the attack was made. There was an absence of all precaution on the part of those within the fort. St. Hélène and d'Iberville were enabled to discover that the cannon were unloaded. The original plan was, however, adhered to; a party with axes was to cut its way through the palisades, while the entrance would be forced by a ram. The slight obstacles overcome, the block-house remained to be taken. It was about twenty-five feet high, framed of logs, with a flat roof, mounted with some two-pounder guns. The entrance was protected by palisading, which was quickly removed, and the door forced. The small garrison rushed to the opening and made an attempt at defence. There were fifteen English in the block-house. The attacking force consisted of eighty-three. The contest, nevertheless, lasted two hours, during which time the attacking party kept up a continuous fire through the windows and port-holes. The gunner was the only one killed; he was shot dead by St. Hélène when endeavouring to load one of the pieces with broken glass.

A ship lay aground in front of the fort; it had been that of some French traders of Quebec, and had been seized. It is not impossible that it had included in its crew the men who had found their way to Canada.

The party remained eight days at Fort Hayes; during the time many Indians came to trade. When the party first arrived in sight of Fort Hayes, a vessel was lying before the fort, but in the twenty-four hours which elapsed before the attack was made, she had left. It was now resolved to proceed to Fort Rupert, on the River Nemiskau, the first settlement made in 1669 by Captain Zachary Gilham.

From the situation of Fort Hayes on a point of land, it was possible to make a traverse of ten leagues over a bay which

was still frozen, by which the distance could be shortened thirty leagues ; but in the condition of the wind the passage was dangerous. The bay, over which it was necessary to pass, was full of floating ice, covered with an infinite number of seals and sea dogs. On the 27th of June the wind changed, and the ice becoming more packed, the march commenced. Three Indians were met, but they escaped from the advancing French on the belief that they were Iroquois. As they approached Fort Rupert, they saw the vessel moored in front of the fort. It was resolved that d'Iberville should attack the vessel with two canoes containing fourteen picked men, while the remaining seventy should remain until the signal was given that he was in possession, and then advance against the fort.

D'Iberville gained the vessel unperceived and climbed rapidly with his men on the deck. All the crew were below asleep. The only two on the deck were Bridger, the official of the Company, and the captain of a vessel which had been wrecked the previous season. The latter, seeing d'Iberville, attempted to seize him, but d'Iberville cut him down, and he fell dead on the deck. One man from below hearing the noise came up the hatchway half asleep and was killed. The remainder, unarmed and surprised, were made prisoners.


The signal was now given for the attack on the fort ; the inmates were asleep. The gates of the outer palisading were forced. The besiegers had brought with them two small cannon, which were turned against the door of the inner block house, and a continual fire was kept up against the windows and embrasures. A ladder had been left standing against the building, by which an ascent was made by two of the party to the roof, in which they cut an opening with axes, by which means hand grenades were thrown among the inmates. Among those present was a female, who had sailed in the shipwrecked vessel, possibly the captain's wife. She was seriously wounded in the thigh. There were fifteen persons in the fort, of whom five were killed and wounded. After the door had been forced there was little resistance.

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The vessel was taken possession of and manned ; a small schooner was also obtained, which was caulked and placed in repair to carry Bridger to Port Nelson, or to England.

The French remained four days at Fort Rupert, during which time the vessel was mounted with cannon, for it was resolved to attack Fort Albany, forty leagues to the north of Fort Hayes, on an island at the mouth of the River Albany. The ice had now left the bay, so the journey could be made by water. The vessel received what force it could contain ; the remainder of the party were embarked in canoes.

It was now entirely open water, but owing to a fog which made navigation difficult, the force arrived at Fort Hayes, the scene of their first exploit, with some irregularity. M. de Troyes was the last to appear, and on his arrival they started for Fort Albany. It took five days to reach this spot, to which the French gave the name of Fort Quiquitchiouan. M. de Troyes sent a demand, for the surrender of a Frenchman named *Peré*, who, according to the statement of the two men who had reached Canada, was detained a prisoner at this place, and threatened that in default of his surrender he would attack the fort. The Governor replied that *Peré* had been sent to France, and that the French had no right to attack him, as there was peace between the two crowns. The French, nevertheless, landed, and commenced the formation of a battery in the neighbourhood of the fort. They were themselves in a critical position ; their provisions were becoming scarce, for the vessel had not made such rapid progress as the canoes, which only had arrived. Batteries, nevertheless, were constructed, and it was a matter of some difficulty, for the earth was frozen and had to be cut out by axes ; but there were no guns to be placed in the embrasures. At length, on the 26th of August, the vessel with the guns arrived.

The fort was under the command of Henry Sergeant, with a garrison of thirty men, and it contained likewise the commandant's wife, his son, and a female servant. There was also a protestant chaplain present.

On fire being opened from the trenches, the besiegers

returned it, but their cannon was quickly dismounted, and the houses were destroyed. Shelter was for a short time obtained in a cellar, but at noon the clergyman appeared in a canoe with a white flag. The only condition obtainable was that the place should be unconditionally surrendered. The English accordingly left the fort, and d'Iberville was placed there with a garrison. He is accused of not having observed the articles of capitulation.*

The English present in the forts were shipped for England in one of the vessels which had been seized.

De Troyes, with the remainder of the force, started on his return for Canada.† The writer of the narrative tells us that no order was observed, and that they suffered from want of provisions, having on the journey to live on sprouted barley, with which the English make beer.‡

The news came to England during one of the most critical periods of her history. James II. was in the second year of his reign.§ There had been much dissatisfaction in England on the subject of the American possessions. The pretensions of France in Canada had been enforced with the full strength of arbitrary power; without diplomatic conferences, in violation of the peace which prevailed, and in disregard of English colonial claims. It may be said with full confidence, that France had acted as if it had been known, that no interference would take place on the part of the Court of St. James;

* Recueil, &c., page 11.

† There is a curious paragraph in the letter of de Denonville to de Seignelay, 11 November, 1686, New York Hist., Doc. IX., p. 307: "Sieur de Troyes is the most intelligent and most efficient of our Captains; he has that excellent tact required for the possession of all the qualities necessary to command others. Better conduct than that he exhibited in the Northern expedition is impossible, for he needed address in order to influence Canadians to do what he got them to perform, and to retain them in obedience." [As translated.]

‡ Recueil, &c., page 12.

§ It reads strangely in the notes of history left by M. de Belmont, that he records the fact of Charles II. having died a Roman Catholic. Charles had died in February, 1685, and by the news of the first ships M. de Belmont wrote: "Enfin de la Mort du Roy d'Angleterre et sa conversion." But as the French Minister Barillon had been the principal means of this event coming to pass, it could not fail to become known in the inner circle of Roman Catholic dignitaries.

and England had looked on passively, while the French governor had threatened an invasion of Indian territory claimed to be under English rule. It was not, however, known in London, that through French influence, English governors had been instructed to live in good intelligence with the French, while the Canadian governors had been urged vigorously to protect French interests. As there had been nothing to fear from the intervention of the King of England in America, the greater effort had been made by the French King to secure his possessions there.

He had continued to send troops to Canada, and in the beginning of 1687, there were 1,600 regular soldiers in the colony. He had determined to take possession of any disputed territory, and it was on this principle that the expedition to Hudson's Bay had been countenanced.

It was not only the period of profound peace, but steps had been taken to disarm all suspicion on the part of England. Professions had been made from Versailles of perfect amity; and in order to establish cordiality and alliance, a special treaty had been entered into, which was to secure perpetual peace between the rival nations in America.

There is a stern logic about dates difficult to explain away and impossible to resist. De Denonville landed in Quebec in 1685. In April, 1686, the expedition was organized under de Troyes which I have described. In November the latter had returned.

During this period negotiations were being carried on in London, not for peace, for the most perfect peace theoretically prevailed, but in order to establish the future relations between the countries, so that hereafter war might be averted in the possessions across the seas.

With the knowledge of what was taking place in America, we can only read with astonishment of the treaty of neutrality passed in London, on the 16th of November, 1686. It consists of twenty-one articles; it is signed by Barillon alone on the part of France; on the part of England by Jeffreys, Rochester, Sunderland, Middleton and Godolphin. Its exordium

sets forth that both monarchs having nothing more at heart than each day to establish more and more a common amity between themselves, and a sincere concord and correspondence between the kingdoms, agree to conclude a treaty of neutrality. There should be peace, concord and good correspondence on land and sea, without distinction of place. No vessels, great or small, were to be equipped; no damage, no act of hostility was to be committed, directly or indirectly. The domain each power held in America should be maintained in its full extent. No aid was to be given to the Indians on either side, either by men or provisions. Neither should carry on trade in the geographical limits claimed by the other; but the common right of navigation was recognised. The clause was added, that if war broke out between the powers in Europe, peace should be observed in America. The conditions of the treaty of Breda, on the 21st of July, 1667, were affirmed to be in full force and vigour.

While this treaty was under discussion, the French canoes, with armed men, ascended the Ottawa to attack the unsuspecting traders of Hudson's Bay, to take possession of their property, and to send them in a crowded vessel from the country.*

It was the remainder of those present at the forts, who had not been killed or made prisoners, who brought the news to London. There must have been about sixty men in the three forts at the time of the attack. Fifty of them were crowded into a small vessel, in which they made their way to England, and the wonder is that they ever reached port.

They must have arrived shortly after the treaty was signed.

* "the French of Canada, this Yeare, have in a Piraticall manner taken and totally despoiled the Petitioners of three of their Forts and Factories in ye bottom of Hudson's Bay, three of their ships or vessels, Fifty Thousand Beaver Skins and a great quantity of Provisions, Stores and Merchandizes laid in for many Yeares Trade; and have in a small vessell turned out to sea above Fifty of Your Majestyes Subjects, who then were in the Petitioners service, to shift for themselves or perish miserably besides those whome they have either Killed or detained Prisoners."

"The humble Petition of the Governor and Company of Adventurers trading into Hudson's Bay." Report in Canadian Archives, 1883, p. 174.

The Company without delay petitioned the King on the subject. The document is undated. It is, however, evident that it was presented at the close of 1686, for it speaks of Canada ships "this year arrived at Rochell." It is signed by no less a person than "Churchill, Governor," the future conqueror of Blenheim.

The document is important in many points of view. It states that the Company had been twenty years in operation, and had not in any way been disturbed or molested until 1682, when "one Monsieur de la Cheney, and other private merchants of Canada," sent out an expedition to Port Nelson, "and did burn their houses and rob them of their Trade there." Several memorials demanding satisfaction had been sent by Charles II. to France. In 1685 the French had seized a ship in Hudson's Straits commanded by Edward Humes, and carried her to Quebec. This matter had been referred to France, and a promise had been given that the King would examine into the matter, and order what was "just and reasonable." "Instead thereof Richard Smithsend and some of the crew were kept prisoners at Quebec for above Eleven months, and for ye most part were fed only with bread and water, and at last sent away as slaves to Martinico in the West Indies." Smithsend eventually made his escape. In February, 1686, the King was again petitioned for justice; the company received "from your owne Royall Mouth the assurance of Your Majesties Protection and Care to see them righted." They prayed the King to obtain from the court of France, that orders should be given to the governors in Canada to deliver up the forts of which they had taken possession, and in the future not annoy or molest the petitioners.

The scandal which this petition caused in the city of London, led to measures being taken which, at least, should have the appearance of extending justice. The Hudson Bay Company was now an important association. It had been obsequious in its loyalty, and had figured prominently among those companies which had presented addresses to the King, expressing submission to his will and pleasure. When James

ascended the throne, he had issued the unconstitutional edict that the customs duties, which had ceased to be payable at the late King's death, should be continued to be paid into the Treasury; thus creating law by his own individual authority. The Hudson's Bay Company, with other associations of its class, had pledged itself to the acceptance of the royal decree. The City of London has always been an important element in political complications; and it was not possible to leave the outrage without notice or examination, in face of the ample testimony of its commission, furnished by the returned vessel and its crowded crew.

On the other hand, it was difficult for James to make an embarrassing claim against the King of France, upon whom he was depending for support in the master-passions of his life: the government of England independently of Parliaments, and the destruction of the Protestant Church of England, by gradually introducing into the universities, and among her ministers, Jesuits of extreme opinions. None felt the danger of the situation, more than moderate and sensible Roman Catholics. They desired to be relieved from the tests which oppressed them; but they saw clearly that such a consequence could not be favourably attained, as events were proceeding. Those among them, possessing worth and patriotism, desired a different solution to the problem. They only saw danger in the arbitrary course being pursued by the King and the knot of Jesuits and French intriguers who were advising him; and they felt that in the end, the illegality would recoil against themselves.

If London was to be quieted, the Hudson's Bay difficulty had to be met. With Cromwell or William III., or a monarch worthy of sitting on the English throne, justice and reparation would have been demanded in the tone, in which the British races are wont to speak under a sense of wrong. The grievance, in its plain truth, would have been firmly set forth in respectful language; and neither evasion nor procrastination would have been admitted. Satisfaction and apology would have been demanded; in this case the more necessary, as the

ink was scarcely dry, with which the signatures to the treaty of neutrality, had been written.

What was done, was the submission of the case to a conference, the first meeting of which was held on the 18th of May, 1687. The English commissioners were Sunderland, Middleton, and Godolphin. France was represented by Barillon and Bonrepaux.

Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland, has left behind him one of the most unenviable reputations in history. He had been an envoy in France and at Versailles, and became the medium of the intrigue by which Charles II. accepted the position of pensioner to the French King. He was by nature, as by experience and training, well fitted to be the instrument of any phase of tyranny. His manners were polished, his abilities above the ordinary standard, but his cold heartless nature could recognise in the duties entrusted to him, only the opportunity of affirming his position, and of increasing his wealth. He was a pensioner of the French, receiving a regular income from Barillon. He had no love for wine, and had little susceptibility to the influence of women; his passion was to be the possessor of immense wealth. He became about this date a professed Roman Catholic, the merit of his conversion being attributed to the arguments of the King; and he had reached a stage in his career, when he was without a scruple on any point.

Charles, Earl of Middleton, had held high rank in Scotland. Shortly before James' accession he had been called to the Privy Council, and appointed one of the Secretaries of State for England. He was devoted to the King, and was prepared to favour the royal pretensions, when and wherever, asserted. He had rejected every attempt to lead him to change his religion. He had met the Jesuit sent to convert him with a remark, which had cast some ridicule on the ecclesiastic; that it was his duty to impress by the truths of his own creed, and not trouble himself about the present belief of his proposed neophyte. He adhered to James in his exile; it was his advice that the Prince of Wales should be bred a Protestant.

The defect in his character, otherwise honourable, was his readiness to side with the King's desire, at whatever cost to law and good government. The wish of the King was sufficient to guide his views in any direction, except that of religion.

Sydney, Earl of Godolphin was Chamberlain to the Queen. He had early conformed to Roman Catholicism, but to him all religions were the same; and all opinions, provided his fortunes prospered. His one theory was to advocate the views agreeable to those in power, provided the policy he followed gave him place and profit. In Queen Anne's reign, however, he exacts respectful mention from his administrative ability, and the zeal with which he prosecuted the war. But his vacillation of character, his want of moral courage, and the sensitiveness of his nature as shown in the prosecution of Sacheverell, detract from his admitted capacity.

Barillon had been for several years in England as Ambassador of France, and had been the dispenser of the money sent by the French King, and by many disgracefully accepted. No one knew better the inner intrigues of the English court, and the powerless condition of James to resent any injury on the part of France, even if he had the desire to do so. But it was the last thought of James II. to demand anything from Louis XIV., but money and support. Barillon's principal aim since the accession of James, had been to increase the ill feeling between James and his parliament. He possessed great credit with the English Court. A few months later, when William III. came to the throne, one of the King's first acts was to order Barillon to leave England within twenty-four hours. In vain the Ambassador pleaded for delay, but the command was unflinchingly enforced. He was escorted by a French protestant to protect him from insult, and at Dover placed on board the vessel which was to carry him to France. England had once more taken her place in Europe, never to relinquish it.

Bonrepaux had commenced life as a clerk in the marine department, and had early attracted attention by his ability,

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industry and his power of mastery of detail. He had been in England since 1685, on commissions of importance; among them, that of endeavouring to induce the suffering French protestants humbly to ask permission to return to France, in the belief that misfortune had broken their courage, and had led them to waver in their faith. But his mission failed; and the descendents of many of these families are still held in honour in England, where their ancestors, in poverty and suffering, remained true to their religion. Bonrepaux was not favoured by nature; indeed, his appearance was the reverse of prepossessing: but he had sense and penetration; and was gifted with the faculty of close and vigilant attention to business. He was now assisting Barillon in his attempts to keep England in the false position, into which the policy of the Stuarts had cast her since the Restoration.

CHAPTER ...

It was to this Commission I have described, that the outrage of 1686 in Hudson's Bay was referred. The attempt of the French was to establish a claim prior to that of the English, and to shew that in the expedition which was the matter complained of, the French had simply asserted their own rights against intruders. Nothing can be more weak than the specification of their pretensions; and from what was advanced on both sides, it is plain that the French had taken no steps to establish themselves at Hudson's Bay until 1682, when the buildings at Port Nelson were destroyed.

The result of such a conference might have been foreseen. A report was made on the 11th of September, 1687, the year previous to James being driven from the throne. The French commissioners proposed to return a reply on the points which they felt warranted in answering, and to receive the directions of the King regarding the others. It was proposed also that the subjects of both Kings should be restrained from hostility while the treaty was in force. The English commissioners submitted a memorandum, to the effect that they had received the King's orders to acquaint the French commissioners that "His Majty doth upon ye whole matter conceive the said Company well founded in their demands, and hath therefore ordered us to insist upon his owne Right and the Right of his subjects, to the whole Bay and streights of Hudson, and to the sole trade thereof, as also upon the demand of full satisfaction for the Dammages they have received, and restitution of the Three fforts surprised by the ffrench." They were equally empowered to enter into a treaty for the adjustment of the limits between the two crowns, and to remove all occasion of difference.

Nevertheless, in face of this declaration, the English com-

missioners agreed that until the 11th of January, 1689, [O. S.] and from that day forward, no governor in America should "Comitt any Act of Hostility against or to Invade the subjects of the other King," a decision virtually giving over Hudson's Bay to the French, for they were in possession. Before the expiration of the time named in the convention, James was in exile.

A circular, in accordance with this decision, was sent from England to the governors of colonies in America, dated the 22nd of January, 1688. It set forth, that as further time would be requisite to obtain the necessary information, owing to the distance of the places where it was to be obtained, an instrument had been sealed, by which all acts of hostility and violent proceedings between the respective subjects should be stayed.

Could instructions more paralyzing have been sent to those charged with the preservation of English interests in America? The probability is that had James remained a few years on the throne, all the territory west of Albany would have been bartered away by treaty to the French. The attempt would have followed to confine the English colonies to a strip on the seaboard. There would have been an organized attack on Boston to establish the southern frontier of Acadia. Such a project was often discussed, and it was not any want of will which stayed its execution; while the possession of New York was repeatedly advocated, as an acquisition essential to French interests.

But with all the chicane of Versailles, there was dissatisfaction with the results which it effected in America. Louis was much chagrined that the orders from London to the Colonial Governors were so imperfectly obeyed. He wrote to de Denonville* that he was surprised at the conduct of Dongan, the Governor of New York, and that he had given orders to Barillon to complain of him to the King.

The revolution of 1688, which ended in William and Mary ascending the English throne, led to hostilities between France

* N. Y. Hist. Doc. IX., p. 322, 30 March, 1687.

and England, and the convention of 1687 ceased to have effect. During 1688, the French remained in possession of the forts in James' Bay, and in 1690 they made an unsuccessful attempt against Fort York. An expedition was sent from Quebec under d'Iberville and Bonaventure, with two ships of eighteen and twelve guns. On their arrival at Hudson's Bay they heard that three vessels, one of forty guns, were before the fort, so they sailed out of the Bay.* Geyer was then governor.

It was not possible in the first years of the new reign to organize an expedition to recover the forts on James' Bay. The whole strength of the country was called forth in the effort of self-preservation. When the struggle in Ireland, which had been sustained by the presence of a large French force, was brought to a close by the treaty of Limerick of 1691, England could act with greater vigour and determination both on the sea, and on the continent with her allies. In May, 1692, the battle of La Hogue took place, in which the French fleet was almost entirely destroyed. It was then possible to send assistance to America; and in 1693 an expedition sailed to Hudson's Bay under Captain Grinnington, which, with little opposition, took possession of the forts in James' Bay; Mr. Knight being left governor of Fort Albany.†

The following year, in 1694, the French took active steps to regain Port Nelson. On de Troyes' departure in 1686, d'Iberville had been left in Hudson's Bay in command, and the forts were re-named by the French. Fort Hayes was changed to Fort Saint Louis; Fort Albany to Fort Saint Anne. The name of Fort Rupert was retained, and it may be said that only moderate importance was attached to it.

* "Mémoire de la Compagnie du Nord," 15 November, 1690. Parl. MS., 2nd Series, Vol. V., pp. 156, 151.

† Oldmixon. Bacqueville de la Potherie makes the same statement. "Ils vinrent devant Kichichouanne [Fort Albany] avec trois vaisseaux. Ils n'éprouvèrent point de résistance. . . . Rupert et Monsipi [Fort Hayes] suivirent." I., p. 165.

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Of the three forts, Fort Albany was principally held in consideration.*

D'Iberville must have returned to Quebec in 1687, for there is a letter from M. de Denonville in that year † which states that d'Iberville was about proceeding to Hudson's Bay in 1688, and it is on record that he was present there, remaining until 1689, when he again returned to Quebec with an English vessel which he had taken. ‡ He was at Quebec in the first months of 1690, and accompanied the expedition against Schenectady on the 8th of February. §

In 1691, an expedition organized against Port Nelson was

* There was by no means an identity of opinion as to the policy with regard to Hudson's Bay. The Company held that Fort York should be abandoned to the English, and the forts in James' Bay retained. [1698, Parl. MS., 2nd Series VIII., 265-273.] De Denonville's view was that Port Nelson should be occupied by the French, and the James' Bay forts given over to the English. [Letter to Minister, 10 November, 1686. Parl. MS., 2nd Series V., 308.]

† 31 October, 1687, Parl. MS., 2nd Series V., p. 509.

‡ There is a passage in the "Mémoire de la Compagnie du Nord," 15 November, 1696 [Parl. MS., 2nd Series V., p. 156], stating that in 1688 the English reached Hudson's Bay with three vessels and about one hundred men, and built a fort; that with seventeen men the French took the three ships and a fort named Churchill, garrisoned by eighty-five men.

What is now known as Fort Churchill was not built until 1718 or 1721; there was then no such fort. In 1689 d'Iberville returned to Quebec with one trading vessel. That there was such a story in Quebec is proved by the rambling letter of one le Sieur Pater [14 November, 1689; MS. V., 2nd Series, p. 53-70], who relates that he heard the story from a M. de Bellefeuille, who had arrived in June of that year, and was the author of this statement. It is difficult to establish the spot where the scene could have taken place. Originally the Hudson's Bay Company had seven Forts. [Memoir undated, Pownall MS. I., page 79.] Port Nelson held by the Company at this date; the forts in James' Bay; Rupert, Hayes, and Albany in possession of the French; Charleston Island, which the French had taken. There were also the two trading ports, mention of which is rarely made. One at Cape Henrietta-Maria, and New Severn, between Port Nelson and Fort Albany. According to Bacqueville de la Potherie, the English themselves burned New Severn to prevent it falling into the hands of the French. De Frontenac returned to Canada after the Lachine massacre, to find the country in a desperate condition; he would gladly have reported to the King any such fortunate event. There is, however, no allusion to it by him, nor is any to be found in any MS. No evidence exists to establish that this remarkable proceeding ever happened.

§ Ante Vol. II., p. 206.

not proceeded with. Du Tast in "le Hazardeux" arrived at Quebec, to represent that his vessel was old, and incapable of resisting the ice, and that his crew was wearied out, and without clothing to sustain the extreme cold. The matter was submitted to a board of naval officers and pilots; from their report, de Frontenac came to the decision* that "le Hazard-eux" could not be placed in condition in proper time for the voyage; Du Tast was accordingly directed to cruise in the gulf and the entrance to the river as a protection against the English privateers.

In 1693, a similar difficulty occurred. On the 7th of August, d'Iberville arrived from France in "Le Poli," with "l'Indiscret" commanded by Marin. It was proposed that with a company's ship, they should proceed to Hudson's Bay and winter there; and on the opening of the navigation seize the vessels as they arrived from England. The order, however, being positive that "le Poli" should return to France the same year, it was proposed to substitute the "Mary-Sara," an English vessel which had been taken by d'Iberville, and that she should accompany "l'Indiscret"; likewise to replace any seamen feeble from ill-health or advanced age by young Canadians to the number of fifty. The Company undertook to find the men, and to provide eleven months' additional provisions. D'Iberville, however, did not consider that "l'Indiscret," which was a twenty-four gun ship, in addition to her own crew of eighty men, could safely carry the fifty additional Canadians which were to be added to her strength, and an increased amount of stores. The "Mary-Sara" was a small craft of ninety tons, unarmed, a bad sailer, and would not have been able to keep up with "l'Indiscret." The matter having been referred to a board, it was decided that "le Poli" should be sent back to France, and that the other vessels being unfit, the expedition should be deferred.†

* "Décision prise par MM. de Frontenac et de Champigny au sujet d'une expédition du Sieur du Tast dans la Baie d' Hudson," 16 July, 1691. Parl. MS. 2nd Series, VI., 69.

† Lettre de MM. de Frontenac et de Champigny sur un projet d'attaque du fort Nelson, 4 November, 1693. Parl. MS., 2nd Series, VI., p. 247.

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In 1694 d'Iberville, in "le Poli," with "la Charente," commanded by de Serigny, reached Quebec; they left on the 10th of August, to arrive in Hudson's Bay before Fort York on the 20th of September. Whatever may have been the position of the forts constructed in 1682, and from the confused narrative of this date the fact cannot be stated, the fort which the French were to attack had been constructed by the English on the more southern of the two rivers, now called Hayes River, within less than six miles of its mouth. It was a wooden structure with four bastions, armed with six swivel guns and fifty cannon. Geyer, who was its governor, however useful in his commercial relations, was not a soldier, and utterly ignorant of the mode in which the defence should be conducted.

D'Iberville landed his force and commenced the siege. With a man of experience and commanding ability opposed to him, his position at that season would not have been without danger. Early in the siege his brother, de Chateau-guay, the fifth son of Charles Le Moyne, was killed in an attempt to repel a *sortie*. The attack was continued until the 9th of October, showing that neither Geyer nor his small garrison were wanting in courage. At this date d'Iberville demanded a capitulation. Geyer consented to surrender on certain conditions: that the officers should remain in the fort during winter, and their clothing and papers should be respected; and on the opening of the navigation, they should be taken to France, and thence carried to England. The capitulation was made on the 14th of October. The French changed the name to Fort Bourbon, and as the surrender took place on Saint Thérèse day,* they gave that name to the river.

The fort was well stored with provisions, and both the

* "Le Fort fut nommé Bourbon et la rivière sur laquelle il est situé fut nommée Rivière Sainte Thérèse a cause que le fort fut réduit sous l'obéissance des Français le jour de Sainte Thérèse le 14 Octobre." Relation, &c., par M. Jeremie, Recueil de Voyages au Nord, Amsterdam, 1732. This statement sets at rest all question as to the date when the French nomenclature was first applied. Subsequently Jeremie was in command of the fort for six years, and in 1714, after the treaty of Utrecht, ceded it to the English.

French and English were sufficiently supplied through the winter. The scurvy, however, appeared among the French, when Tilly, the lieutenant of "le Poli," ten of her crew, and nine Canadians died. D'Iberville wintered in Hudson's Bay, and did not leave for Quebec until July, 1695, having placed de la Forêt in charge of the fort with sixty-four Canadians and six Iroquois. At some period of his expedition he re-took the three forts of James' Bay ; thus at the close of the year 1695 the whole of Hudson's Bay was in possession of the French.

In 1696 an expedition left England to regain possession of these waters. It consisted of the King's ships, the "Bonaventure," Captain Allen, and the "Seaford." They sailed directly to Fort Nelson. The French commander could offer little resistance, and surrendered on the 31st of August, 1696. The French garrison was placed on the vessels and carried prisoners to England, among them the governor de la Forêt, and Jeremie, who was afterwards governor of the fort, and has left us a narrative of the events of those days. With the war vessels was a merchantman, named the "Deering."* Captain Allen also took the forts in James' Bay. On his way home the "Bonaventure" encountered the French privateer of fifty guns, the "Marie-Rose." Allen, the commander of the "Bonaventure," was killed in the action, and the "Marie-Rose" escaped. The whole of Hudson's Bay was once more an English possession.

The war had now lasted eight years, and the French king had made indirect proposals of peace. It was while these negotiations were being carried on that the French prisoners returned to France. Without delay a squadron was despatched to America, consisting of "le Pelican," "le Palmier," "le Wesp," "le Profond" and "le Violent." Its destination was Hudson's Bay, with the design of attacking Fort York. The ships reached Newfoundland on the 19th of May, 1697.

* The vessel so named is here spoken of as an ordinary craft ; in the engagement with d'Iberville of 1697 the "Deering" is described as having thirty-two guns.

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They found d'Iberville at Placentia. He had been sent by de Frontenac to effect the entire destruction of every thing which interfered with French interests, and to uproot all settlement on the island. The French only held Placentia, while the English were established at Saint John's and around the coast.

After taking Pemaquid,* d'Iberville had sailed from the Bay of Fundy to Newfoundland, where he was reinforced by fifty men sent from Quebec. At Placentia there were several vessels from Saint Malo, and it was resolved to attack St. John's. The place was without a soldier; it was taken and burned, and left in ruins. There were settlements of fishermen along the coast engaged in their occupations; scattered in knots of huts along the east shore, leading a life as primitive as can be imagined. Here and there were insignificant hamlets, in which some few families were gathered. The only difficulty and privation which d'Iberville experienced was in moving from place to place. No resistance was offered; the fishermen were unarmed and without organization. Many were slain, many prisoners were taken, the total number being named at some hundreds, but the prisoners could not be guarded, and a great number escaped shortly after their seizure; only a few of them were carried to Placentia.†

It was to this place d'Iberville returned to await the arrival of the expedition from France. It was directed principally against Fort York, which had now assumed much consequence, and was held of great importance to French interests, owing to its command of the trade west of Lake Superior. It furnished a second outlet to the furs obtained on the great plains which extend to the Rocky mountains, and in this respect created a rivalry to the route by Lake Superior. The force sent to take possession of Fort York might be considered irresistible. D'Iberville was placed in command of "le Pelican," de Serignan of "le Palmier;" "le Wesp" and "le

* Ante Vol. II., p. 378-9.

† Vide at the end of this book the narrative of d'Iberville's operations in Newfoundland between September, 1696, and March, 1697.

Profond," both war vessels, with a store ship, followed. They left Placentia in July, and found Hudson's Straits full of ice. The store ship was lost. The vessels became separated, and "le Pelican" made for the rendezvous at Port Nelson.

"Le Pelican" was the first to reach Hudson's Bay, and she came within a few leagues of Fort York on the 4th of September. D'Iberville, however, remained at some distance from the fort, waiting for her consorts; and guns were fired from the fort evidently as signals to his ship, as to that of a friend. On the morning of the 5th, three vessels appeared in the offing, which in the first instance d'Iberville supposed to be the other vessels of the squadron. He was soon undeceived, for his signals remained unanswered, and he at once conjectured, that the three vessels sailing towards him were those of an enemy.

D'Iberville had no alternative but to trust to his courage and seamanship. The strength of these vessels he could not tell, but he unhesitatingly determined to engage them. Indeed, no other course was open to him; he was between the fort and the advancing ships, and he had to surrender or fight. His stout heart never failed him for a moment.

D'Iberville's own account of this action is entirely at variance with the exaggerated statements which have been published in modern times. At half-past nine he raised his anchor, and sailed to meet the advancing vessels; an act of determination shewing his resolute character and his confidence in himself and in his crew. Seeing that they were English, he says: "I prepared to fight them." He tells us, that he had to meet a ship of fifty guns and two vessels of thirty-two guns. The "Hampshire" was undoubtedly a war ship of fifty guns. I can find no proof that the other two vessels were more than merchantmen, the "Hudson's Bay" and the "Deering." Le Roy de la Potherie, who was on d'Iberville's vessel, has likewise given a narrative of the action. He describes the "Hudson's Bay" as unable to make any attempt to save the crew of the "Hampshire" after she sank, as she had goods on board to the value of 15,000 crowns of furs. Oldmixon speaks of a

merchantman, the "Deering," present with the "Bonaventure" the previous year, when the fort was taken by the English. The two vessels were probably armed merchantmen, and if not formidable antagonists in themselves, might have rendered great assistance during the contest.

As the vessels came nearer, cannon shots were exchanged. We learn from d'Iberville that the shrouds and rigging of the "Pelican" were damaged, and that seven cannon shots struck her hull below water mark, causing serious leakage, kept down with difficulty, owing to two pumps having been broken in the engagement. D'Iberville relates that "at one o'clock in the afternoon, having reached the two ships of thirty-two guns, firing into them volleys at a very short range to cripple them, and to prevent them assisting the fort. The large vessel advancing to me, and I upon her under the two top sails, having difficulty in making use of the lee battery, I arrived to the leeward of her, all my guns pointed low, to sink the ship. Passing yard to yard, the shelter of his sails allowed my vessel to right herself. I fired my broadside, and sank her immediately, the vessel not passing onward three lengths. I first turned upon the 'Hudson's Bay' to board her, but she struck." The "Deering," although pursued, escaped: d'Iberville explaining his inability to overtake her by the damage to the rigging of "le Pelican." De la Potherie tells us from the fact that her mainyard was broken, pursuit was impossible. Moreover, d'Iberville desired to secure his prize, the "Hudson's Bay," which might otherwise have gained the entrance to the river.

The sea had been exceedingly rough during the action, and its condition was such that no boat could be launched; the explanation given why no attempt was made to save any of the crew of the "Hampshire."

Jeremie's account of the action is to the effect, that on "le Pelican's" first volley one of the vessels struck without daring to move. D'Iberville next ranged himself abreast of the Admiral, as he describes the "Hampshire," a ship of fifty guns, against which he sent a broadside so well directed, and

with such success, that before they had time to change tack, they saw the half of the sails of the English ship in the water, and she sank to the bottom.

I have no desire to detract from d'Iberville's gallantry and seamanship. No one but a man of great qualities, with his single ship, would have sailed to meet the three advancing vessels of an enemy, of the strength of which he must have been ignorant, and it is plain that he handled his ship as only a first-class seaman would do. I cannot, however, resist the evidence that the "Hampshire" was struck by a squall and capsized. Nautical men tell me that no broadside with the guns of that date could so instantaneously sink a ship of this size. I leave the question in the hands of those whose service and experience enable them best to determine it. This may be said: there was no desperately contested action as has been represented. The affair was only a matter of some minutes. One man was killed on board the "Pelican," and seventeen only were wounded.*

On the night of the 7th and 8th a furious storm followed. The cold was severe, the rigging was covered with hoar-frost.

* In the celebrated action between the "Shannon" and the "Chesapeake," off Boston Harbour, on the 1st of June, 1814, the fight lasted eleven minutes; four minutes afterwards the colours of the "Chesapeake" were hauled down. The "Shannon," out of a crew of 306, lost twenty-four killed and twenty-nine wounded. The "Chesapeake," out of a crew of 381, had forty-seven killed and ninety-nine wounded, the latter number was subsequently increased by nearly twenty men.

D'Iberville's account of the action is to be found in Parl. MS. 2nd Series, Vol. VIII., p. 240. It is addressed to the Minister, dated from Fort Saint Louis [Fort Hayes], 8 November, 1697. I give the original text: "A une heure après midi ayant arrivé sur les deux de 32 canons, leur donnant des volées de fort près pour les desemperer et mettre hors d'état de secourir le fort. Le gros venant à moy, et moy à lui sur les deux humiers, ayant de la peine à me servir de la batterie de dessous le vent, j'arrivai sous le vent de lui, tout mon canon pointé à couler bas passant vergue à vergue, l'abri de ses voiles faisant dresser mon vaisseau, je lui tirai ma bordée et le coulai bas sur le champ, ne faisant pas trois fois sa longueur de chemin. Je tournai d'abord aussitôt, et fus sur le Hudson-Bay, pour l'aborder, qui était le plus propre pour entrer dans les rivières, qui amena, ne voulant pas attendre l'abordage. Je chassai sur l'autre qui fuyoit au nord-est, n'étant encore qu'à portée de canon de luy, allant aussi bien que moi, qui n'osois forcer de voiles ayant plusieurs haubans coupés et beaucoup de manœuvres et sept

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The "Pelican" lay at anchor about two leagues from the shore. About midnight she broke in the middle, rapidly filling with water, and became a complete wreck. The "Hudson's Bay" shared the same fate. Both vessels were driven on shore, and twenty-three of their crews were drowned.

So soon as the remaining vessels of the French squadron arrived, which was on the 9th, steps were taken to attack the fort. The guns and bombs were landed. On the 10th batteries were erected, and for three days the fort was bombarded. It was mounted only by guns of slight calibre, and their fire was soon overpowered. Bayley, the commander,

coups de canon à l'eau, qui m'en donnaient plus que je ne'n pouvais pomper. Ayant eu deux pompes crevées dans le combat, je revirai de bord et fus amarrer le Hudson Bay."

Jeremie's account is found in the "Recueil de Voyages du Nord contenant diverses Mémoires," etc., etc., Amsterdam, 1732, III., p. 330: "Ensuite il preta le côté à l'Amiral qui était de 50 canons contre laquelle il fit tirer sa volée si à propos et avec tant de succès, qu'avant qu'ils eussent le temps de changer de bord ils virent la moitié des voilures de l'Anglais dans l'eau et couler à fonds devant un autre compatriote, qui ne pensa plus qu'à se sauver voyant un tel debris." Jeremie was present in "le Pelican."

De Bacqueville de la Potherie in his "Histoire de l'Amerique Septentrionale, 1722, writes as if he had been present in the action, and gives an entirely different account to that of d'Iberville, and describes the engagement as lasting three hours and a half. His account of the sinking of the "Hampshire" accords with the other authorities: "nos canons etaient pointez si à propos qu'ils firent un effet [sic] admirable, car nous ne fumes pas plutôt separez l'un de l'autre que l'Hampshire sombra dans la moment sous voile." The letter, however, in which the action is described [Letter IV., I., p. 89] is taken from the letter of Le Roy de la Potherie, Controleur de Montreal, "Fort de Bourbon, 18 septembre." [Parl. MS., 2nd Series, VIII., p. 119-134.] No record appears that such is the case; the fact, however, is established that while the remaining letters are addressed to "Mon-sieur," in this instance the prefix is "Mon Cousin"; and the writer proceeds to state the relationship: the father of de Bacqueville de la Potherie, Governor of Guadaloupe, having been his cousin. It is therefore on the authority of Le Roy de la Potherie that the narrative must be accepted.

Oldmixon in his "British Empire in America," 1708, tells us: "In the year 1697, the "Hampshire" frigate and "Owners Love" fire ship, two of the King's ships were lost in the Bay, and all the the men drown'd. Indeed, the ice renders it so dangerous that the commerce seems to be not worth the risk that is run for it. Whether these two ships ran against those frozen mountains that float in that sea, or foundered, is not known; but 'tis certain they were lost and all the men perish'd."

made what defence was possible ; but his position was desperate, and he could look to no assistance from England. The season was advancing into the months during which navigation in these northern waters is dangerous. Already, in the storm of the 7th and 8th of September, the cold had been intense. Bayley's one chance was that the French, in their desire to avoid the bad weather of some weeks later, and being unprepared to continue the attack during winter, would take their departure and abandon the siege. On the other hand, d'Iberville, anxious to return to Canada with the vessels, was willing to give more favourable conditions than he otherwise might have done. After having been three times summoned, the last time with the threat that the place would be stormed, Bayley surrendered on the 13th, marching out with drums beating and colours flying ;* it would appear unconditionally,† excepting this mark of respect being granted to the garrison. Originally the strength of this force was thirty-five, but it had been increased by seventeen of the crew belonging to the "Hudson's Bay," saved from the wreck. Thus the number which surrendered was fifty-two.

In the storm of the 7th and 8th "le Palmier" lost her rudder. As Hudson's Bay contains no hard wood by which it could be replaced, she wintered at Port Nelson ; a rudder was sent from France the following year. On the 14th the remaining vessels, "le Profond" and "le Wesp," left for home.‡ De Martigny, cousin of d'Iberville, was appointed Governor of the fort with thirty Canadian volunteers, under de Boisbrian, and twenty soldiers. Captain de Saint Denys was also in command of a company of fifty men.

The garrison and seamen, made prisoners, ninety-four in number, were taken to France.

During the period these events were taking place, the negotiations for the treaty of Ryswick were brought to a

* Roy de la Poterie.

† " Ils se rendirent sans Capitulation." Jeremie.

‡ D'Iberville found an old vessel, the " Albemarle," which he utilised to take to the ships the furs found in the fort, and to carry water and provisions. On one of her trips she sank, laden with beaver skins.

close. The treaty was signed the 20th of September, 1697. The principle was laid down [Art. VII.] that all countries, islands, forts, and colonies possessed before the war by each Power, and conquered during the war, should be restored. By Art. VIII., "the possession of those places which are taken by the French during the peace that preceded this present war, and were re-taken by the English during this war, shall be left to the French." "The capitulation made by the English on the 5th September, 1696, shall be observed according to its form and tenor; the merchandizes therein mentioned shall be restored, the Governor at the fort taken there shall be set at liberty, if it be not already done."

Except for this special provision, the whole of Hudson's Bay would have been ceded to the French. By the eighth clause they claimed the forts in James' Bay, taken in 1686. By the seventh they exacted Port Nelson, of which they were in possession. Thus by the treaty of Ryswick, "the Adventurers" of the Hudson's Bay Company held one fort only, Fort Albany, and shortly after the peace they addressed a memoir* to the Queen, in which they strongly expressed the opinion that their interests had been sacrificed. In King William's day they had asked that the boundaries between the two countries should be defined.† They proposed that the River Albany on the west, and the River Rupert on the east, should be the dividing line between the two countries. They had previously suggested‡ on the east coast "Hudson's River, vulgarly called "Canute River," which I assume to be the East, Main, or Stude River, north of the 49th parallel should be the limit. Commissioners had been named to adjust the differences as to the relative rights of the two Crowns. It is stated in this memoir

* Pownall, MS., I., p. 79. This memoir is undated. It was written after the Queen's accession in 1702, certainly before 1709. It is there stated "that the Company found their interest not comprehended in the treaty of Ryswick, which they are far from attributing to any want of care in that gracious Prince of his Kingdom's honour and trade, and rather think their right and claim was then overweighed by matter of higher consequence depending in that juncture."

† 10 July, 1701. Pownall MS., IV., p. 187.

‡ 20 July, 1701. Pownall MS., IV., p. 189.

that at the meeting of the commissioners, the Company "set forth the undoubted right of the Crown of England to the whole Bay and Streights of Hudson, against which nothing but sophistry and cavil were offered on the French side, and the matter remained undetermined."

In answer to these applications the company was directed* to lay before the lords commissioners for trade and plantations "whatever they may think fit to offer in relation to the trade and security of that place." These instructions were acted upon with the greater readiness, owing to the inimical relations between France and England. James II. had died at Saint Germain in September of the preceding year, and Louis XIV. had acknowledged his son as James III., king of England. Parliament had met the last day of December, and both houses had unmistakably shown the extent to which the national feeling had been aroused, by this impolitic and needless insult. The king was still ill, but his recovery was in no way generally despaired of. It was not until the last days of February, that a fall from his horse accelerated his death. The Hudson's Bay Company replied perfectly in accordance with this general feeling. After setting forth "the hardships they lie under by the late treaty of Ryswick," they add "that they may be said to be the only mourners by the peace." The members described themselves as "being by these and other misfortunes reduced to such a low and miserable condition, that without his Majesty's favour and assistance they are in no ways able to keep that little remainder they are yet possessed of in Hudson's Bay." Finally, they proposed that the French should be expelled by a force of three men-of-war, one bomb vessel, and 1000 soldiers.

We have in the above occurrences, another proof of the extreme folly of Louis's sentimental recognition of the young pretender as king of England. The French were at the time virtually in entire possession of Hudson's Bay; for they had taken means to make the ownership of Fort Albany of

* 9 January, 1702.

† 19 January, 1702.

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little account. They re-established the post of New Severn, on the 55th parallel, and they were making every exertion to divert the trade from the River Albany. The inference is, that in a few years the French would have so reduced the trade at that fort, that the post would have been abandoned, owing to its failure to be profitable; and the Hudson's Bay Company would have passed out of existence.

The only rights, then possessed by the company were those doubtfully conferred by the treaty of Ryswick; while the right of France was positively declared to the forts taken before the war, with the exception of the capitulation of the 5th of September, 1696,* which gave Fort Albany to the English. Fort York, held by the French since 1697, was claimed as a possession, held originally by the French, not as a conquest. It was so retained until the treaty of Utrecht. It was not until modern times that the fable of the discovery of Hudson's Bay from Lake Superior, or the Nelson River, by the early *coureurs de bois*, has been disproved.†

* I can find no authority for assigning the "Capitulation made by the English on the 5th September, 1696," to Fort Albany, and I have examined, I believe, every record at the public disposal in Canada. An examination of the dates sustains the view that it can have no other reference. The vagueness of the expression itself is also a source of difficulty. In my humble judgment the word "made" should read "granted." In 1696 the English were supreme in Hudson's Bay, and could not have capitulated a fort to the French. When d'Iberville, in 1693, with "le Poli" and "la Charente," took Port Nelson from Geyer, it was the only port in possession of the English. [Mémoire de la Compagnie du Nord, 1693, undated. Parl. MS., 2 Series, VI., p. 245: "ce seul port [Port Nelson] qui reste aux Anglois.] D'Iberville wintered in Hudson's Bay, and in the month of July, 1695, started for France, leaving de la Forêt in charge. In 1696, Allen with the "Bonaventure," re-took Fort York, the date being established by the articles of capitulation of the 31st of August. After the treaty of Ryswick the Company retained possession of one fort only, Albany. [Pownall MS., IV., p. 191.] I conceive, therefore, that the capitulation of the 5th September, 1696, can only be assigned to Fort Albany; and it was this fort which was specially excepted from the operation of the clause, which gave to the French, the places taken by them during the peace, that preceded the war. Otherwise, France would have held the whole of Hudson's Bay.

The fact can be established by the Hudson's Bay Company archives. The expectation in Canada, however, is that information cannot be obtained from its officials.

† The writer will venture the remark that he was the first to argue in confutation of this statement. "Canadian Archaeology, an Essay," 1886, pp. 29-31.

At this period the pretensions of the company were limited to the territory to the east of the bay. They asked that the boundary between the English and French should run, from a spot at the entrance to Davis Straits on the Labrador Coast, known as Cape Perdrix, in about $58^{\circ} 30'$ latitude, "to the great Lake Miskosinke at Misloveny, Lake Mistissinnie, dividing the same into two parts." This statement was put forth in 1712, during the period the negotiations for peace were in progress, after Menager had signed the eight preliminary articles.* No mention is made of the continuation of the boundary from this point. In 1714,† however, they asked that the line should run from the lake "into 49 degrees north latitude," and "that latitude be the limit." Such a boundary, after running north of the height of land from the 74th, to some distance beyond the 85th degree of longitude, strikes Lake Superior at Nepigon River, and thence passing north of Rainy Lake, meets the United States boundary at the Lake of the Woods. The matter was referred to the English commissioners, who reported "that the French Commissaries who are here, have not full power to treat on those matters."‡ No further proceedings are recorded.

These propositions on the part of the company evidently apply alone to the east and south of the bay. No consideration was given to the territory west of the bay. Indeed, for the half-century, from the treaty of Utrecht to the conquest, I can find no evidence that any steps were taken by the Hudson's Bay Company to colonize any portion of the country, or to control trade, except at its ports in Hudson's Bay.

During the negotiations for the peace, the company was active in its endeavour to obtain recognition of what it held to be its rights. As has been stated, at an early date after the treaty of Ryswick, the company brought its case before the government, and nothing can be more depressed than the account which was then given of its condition.

* 7 February, 1712. Pownall MS., IV., p. 199.

† 4 August, 1714. Pownall MS., Vol. I, p. 205.

‡ Letter to Lord Viscount Bolingbroke, 18 June, 1814. Pownall MS., IV., p. 204.

From 1709 the company was particularly active, and the memorials presented to the government were both urgent and frequent. These petitions were referred to the "Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations," and they reported that they "are humbly of opinion that the said Company have a good right and just title to the whole Bay and Streights of Hudson."* At the same time the lords recommended that their boundaries be settled, adding, "it will also be necessary that the boundaries between His Majesty's colonies on the continent of America, and the said French of Canada, be likewise agreed and settled."

The tone taken by the British plenipotentiaries during the negotiations with regard to Hudson's Bay was unmistakable; that "France should restore not only what had been taken from England, but also all that England has ever possessed." By the tenth clause of the treaty, Hudson's Bay was ceded to England, "no tracts of land or sea being excepted," as well as all buildings and fortresses, entire and undemolished, with cannon, ball and powder. The French domiciled there were permitted to leave with merchandise, goods and arms; it was likewise set forth, that in a year the limits of the respective countries should be traced by commissioners, beyond which British and French subjects should be forbidden to pass.

When the provisions of the treaty were known, the company addressed the government on the subject. Lord Dartmouth replied with little delay "that the places therein named, belonging of right to British subjects, Her Majesty did not think fit to receive any act of cession from the French King, and has therefore insisted only upon an order from that court for delivering possession to such persons as should be authorised by Her Majesty to take it;" by this means the title of the company was acknowledged.†

This course left the company precisely in the position it occupied previous to any disturbance of its possessions. Its rights were neither added to, nor diminished. The company

* Pownall MS., Vol. IV., p. 200. 19th of February, 1712.

† Pownall MS., V., p. 201. 27 May, 1713.

consequently appointed Captain James Knight and Mr. Henry Kelsey to take possession of this property. Captain Knight was named Governor of Fort York, and he received it from the hands of M. Jeremie, who had held it on the part of the French for the preceding six years.

In April of the same year the governor and company, "with the utmost gratitude, return to Your Majesty their most humble and hearty thanks for the great care your Majesty has taken for them by the Treaty," and they proceed to claim compensation for the injuries received in the time of peace.* The French commissioners, however, were without authority to treat on such a claim.

England was again mistress of the whole of Hudson's Bay. The French flag disappeared from its waters except for purposes of commerce until 1782, when "La Perouse" appeared with "Le Sceptre, 74," "l'Astrée, 36," and "l'Engageante, 36," with about 300 troops and artillery. He experienced no resistance in taking Fort Churchill and Fort York; and he carried away their inmates prisoners.

The forts were little more than trading stations. Even Fort York was at the mercy of any force sufficiently strong for the attack, with heavy artillery to destroy the imperfect fortifications. In the expedition of 1686 the French had only to encounter the number of sixty men divided in the three forts of James' Bay. So late as 1747 the whole number employed by the Company in every branch were a few men in excess of three hundred persons. The operations of the Company in Hudson's Bay have partaken of much of this character to the present day. The territory is an unpopulated wilderness, with a few Indians, visited only by whalers, and inhabited only by the men of the company clustered at the stations; the principal of which is Fort York, the early Port Nelson of the English, and Fort Bourbon of the French. The remaining posts are Forts Churchill and Severn; in James' Bay, Fort Albany and Moose Factory. There are also smaller forts at Martin's Falls, East Main, Rupert's House; and Fort Chimo, at the foot of Ungova Bay, in Hudson's Straits.

* Pownall MS., Vol. IV., p. 203. 14 April.

NOTE A.

The voyages of Radisson have been published by the "Prince Society," Boston, in the volume of 1885. They consist of three distinct MSS. The narrative containing the expedition of 1682-3 was purchased from Mr. Rodd, the 8th of July, 1839. It is the only portion of the work of value. It relates to the first settlement of Fort Bourbon by the French, and was possibly written from the dictation of Radisson. It is the account which I have followed in describing Radisson's career. It is of importance, for even with its confusion of narrative, it sets at rest much of the controversy which has arisen concerning this voyage.

The second MS. relating to the events of 1684 was bought by Sir Hans Sloane, from the collection of "Nicolai Joseph Foucault, *comitis consistoriani*." It is an admitted translation from the French, suggesting it was the language which Radisson wrote. It dwells upon the part taken by Radisson in obtaining the re-transfer of Port Nelson to the English by young Chouart, and may have been written to be submitted to Charles II. in Radisson's interest. There is little of special importance in this paper.

The four voyages from 1652 to 1664 is from a MS. in the Bodleian library, supposed to have belonged to Pepys, immortalised by his diary. On the theory of its genuineness it has been suggested that it was written for Charles II. and given by Sir George Carteret, treasurer of the navy, to Pepys. It is known that on Pepys' death his MSS. were dispersed. Many were, however, saved from destruction by the collector, Richard Rawlinson.

While this history of the MS. is given by the editor of the publications of the "Prince Society," in no way he establishes, that the MS. formed one of the "Pepys' Collection." But, whatever the fact in this respect, it is a document without value. It gives no information, and there is everything to suggest that it is the work of a writer of fiction, to be classed with Captain Jack and Moll Flaggon. The style is of a date antecedent to the time when the text is supposed to have been written, and is disfigured by a laboured affectation, the reverse of all that is natural, and is entirely different to that of the other narratives. The description of the places visited is unintelligible. At the period when this account is stated to have been written, the greater part of Canada was generally well known. Many places were then identified by name, and could have been so described; whereas it is plain, that the writer only copies such names as he would find on the maps to which he had access. His descriptions suggest no minute knowledge of the localities. Creatures are spoken of, which never existed in the valley of the Saint Lawrence. No names are given of prominent individuals. The manners of the Indians are presented differently to what we know them to have been: and the narrative is throughout deficient in that finite information, always to be traced in the most carelessly written, and ill-digested relation of genuine travel.

After having honestly gone through the two hundred and twenty-four pages of this dreary reading, I cannot adduce one fact which struck me, except that by his own account the writer had visited Turkey and Italy. As to the claim put forth that des Groselliers and Radisson discovered the West Coast of Hudson's Bay by the lakes and rivers of the North-West Territory, west of Lake Superior, there is not a sentence in the book, which furnishes ground for any such supposition.

PIERRE-ESPRIT RADISSON.

Radisson's own narrative establishes the reverse of an abandonment of French for English interests. He describes the several voyages made in the service of the Hudson's Bay Company from 1665 to 1674, by des Groselliers and himself, and we learn from him, that finding their services unappreciated, they resolved to return to France. In 1674, both he and des Groselliers received encouragement from Colbert to transfer to Versailles the information which they possessed. Some moi. / was given them, and they obtained pardon for their connection with the English Company; but no employment was offered them. In consequence, they went to Canada, where, Radisson tells us, de Frontenac received them unfavourably, through the influence of Canadian traders; Radisson accordingly returned to France* and joined the expedition under Comte d'Estrées to Guinea and Tobago. On his return, he revisited England, in the hope of regaining his position with the Company. Failing to do so, he went back to France, arriving in Brest the 12th of October, 1679. He had reason to believe that his wife remaining in England injured him in Paris. When in England, Radisson had married the daughter of John Kirke, one of the original incorporators of the Hudson's Bay Company. He was, however, referred to M. de Belinzany, who suggested that he should confer with de la Chesnaye, then in France, and actively engaged in the Canadian fur trade. De la Chesnaye saw the advantage of obtaining Radisson's services. As the latter has placed on record, "he proposed to me to undertake to establish the beaver trade in the great Bay, where I had been some years before on account of the English."† De la Chesnaye suggested that Radisson should visit England, to learn what was being done there, a proposition Radisson acted upon, as he "had some remainder of hopes to find the gentlemen of the Company somewhat better inclined towards him." He was disappointed, Prince Rupert being the only one who showed him kindness, and it must have been only a few months before the prince's death.‡ On Radisson's return to Paris, he found that de la Chesnaye had left France, so he followed him to Canada. On his arrival at Quebec, he was presented to de Frontenac, "who did not approve the business." Obtaining a pass to proceed to Europe by the way of New England, Radisson started for Acadia in a vessel belonging to the Governor, where he waited for instructions from de la Chesnaye.

An arrangement had been entered into, that de la Chesnaye was to find the capital, and Radisson make the voyage, receiving as his share one fourth of the beaver. In the spring Radisson went to Percé, where he was given a barque of fifty tons, with a crew of twelve men, and where des Groselliers had arrived in a barque of thirty tons, and a crew of fifteen men.

They started on their voyage on the 11th of July, 1682; the crew was

* His presence is alluded to by M. Dudouyt in his letter to Bishop de Lalav of 1679, in which he mentions the fact that the Sieur Radisson had obtained nothing; showing that Radisson's presence in Canada had attracted attention. By the same letter we may infer that M. de Belinzany was attached to the household of Colbert. Can. Arch., 1885, p. XCVIII.

† Prince Society, Vol. 1885, p. 256.

‡ Prince Rupert died 29 November, 1682.

mutinous and discontented, and doubts were felt as to the safety of the vessels. In the Straits they killed a large white bear, and the men, eating the flesh, were fearfully ill, "with headaches and looseness." By taking opium, then held to be a useful antidote against poison, and by sweating, the men recovered, but all the skin peeled off. Radisson reached the western coast of Hudson's Bay on the 26th of August; des Groselliers on the 7th of September. They sailed up the river fifteen miles, and placed their vessels in safety; des Groselliers constructed the buildings, Radisson explored the river. On the 12th of September, hearing the report of cannon, Radisson went to the bay and observed a tent on an island, shewing that there were settlers unconnected with his own expedition. He learned, on communicating with them, that they were from New England; the private venture of some traders. Their ship had just arrived under the command of young Gilham. Radisson claimed priority of settlement, stating that he was in possession of the country in some force. As he recognised young Gilham he gave him leave to remain. He describes his own boasting, patronising manner when so doing; at the same time forming the determination in his own mind, when opportunity offered, to seize the ship.

The following morning a second ship arrived at the second river, on which some distance up, the French were encamped. It belonged to the Hudson's Bay Company, under the command of the elder Gilham, having on board Mr. Bridger, sent out as Governor, with instructions to establish a permanent trading post. In the view of the Hudson's Bay Company, the younger Gilham was little better than a pirate. He had no commission, and he was visiting waters to which the Hudson's Bay Company claimed to have exclusive right. Radisson, however, recognised no such exclusive pretensions; he tells us that, when he knew of the arrival of Bridger, although he had only three men with him, he ordered Bridger to be gone, as the country had been taken possession of, for the King of France.

Radisson's narrative from this date is confused, and it is difficult to understand what took place between this time and the spring. He himself is made to figure in all pre-eminence. His first intercourse with Bridger could not have been unfriendly, for he dined on board the English ship. He, however, gave the Governor to understand "that there was a strong party of French present up the river." Bridger, nevertheless, commenced the construction of a fort, and was particular in inquiring, if he had not arrived at the spot visited in former years by Nelson.

Radisson went back to his settlement, to discuss the situation with des Groselliers; fourteen days later he returned to the bay. From the carelessness with which Bridger's ship was secured he predicted some misfortune to it. The New England captain had also built a fort, and told Radisson that he had greater fear of the Hudson's Bay Company than of him. Radisson promised his protection on condition that the captain would pass for a Frenchman. At the same time he informed the younger Gilham that his father was in command of the English ship, and even arranged a meeting between father and son, the latter going in disguise as the bearer of provisions.

The river was now frozen, and Radisson determined to seize the New England ship to prevent its falling into the hands of the Hudson's Bay Governor. He learned that some communication was taking place between the two ships, and

with the design of seizing as prisoners any men engaged in the negotiation, he sent out a party who brought in two men almost dead with cold, who had been despatched by Bridger to the other fort.

During this period, Radisson, who had been maintaining civil relations with Bridger, sending him provisions and game, learned that Bridger's ship, having on board the captain, lieutenant and fourteen men had been crushed by the ice, and all the crew drowned. Eighteen of the men were on shore. Radisson went down to Bridger and condoled with him on his misfortune, and offered to lend him "one of our barques" to convey him in the spring to James' Bay; but the offer was declined. From Bridger, Radisson went to young Gilham, and persuaded him to visit the French fort. After a week's residence, Gilham formed a true estimate of the strength of the French, which he had greatly overrated. Having no suspicion of ill-treatment, Gilham expressed his intention of commencing trade with the Indians in spring. He also, in a fit of passion, struck one of the men. All this was submitted to by Radisson, in view of the plans he had formed; but in an evil hour for himself, Gilham uttered some disrespectful words against "the best of kings. I called him," says Radisson, "pittyful Dogg." Hard words were interchanged, when young Gilham talked of leaving. Upon which," continues Radisson, "I told the young foole that I brought him from his fort, and would carry him thither again when I pleas'd, not when he liked." Young Gilham was a prisoner, and he then learned the death of his father. The following morning, he was told by Radisson that he had sent out a party to take possession of the ship and fort. The fort contained nine men, who, by Radisson's account, were glad to be free of the younger Gilham's rule. One of them, however, escaped, and notified Bridger of what was taking place. On that same night, Bridger made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the vessel. Radisson asked some explanation of the cause of the proceeding. There does not appear, however, to have been a quarrel: although, in a meeting in the New England fort between them, after Bridger had been drinking, both parties expressed themselves freely; but the dispute went no further. Finally, Bridger accompanied Radisson to his encampment, where he stayed a fortnight. Bridger's men also became discontented, and appealed to Radisson, who promised that in spring he would send them to France.

Spring came Radisson succeeded in persuading Bridger that his life was threatened by the Indians in the French interest. The latter had complained of the treatment received from the English, and likewise of the conduct of those stationed in the English trading posts in James' Bay. They were willing to attack Bridger's party, counting on French support. But Radisson restrained them. On the night of the 22nd, 23rd of April there occurred what is known as an "ice shove." The two small Canadian vessels were crushed, and the encampment narrowly escaped destruction. The vessel in which Radisson had arrived, was selected as the one to be rebuilt, with the design of shipping Bridger on this vessel, and sending him from the country.

Misfortune clung to Bridger's party; four died from want of proper food, two were poisoned by drinking some liquors in the doctor's chest, the men not knowing what they were taking. Radisson sent down some provisions, with brandy and vinegar. Without this help, we learn from Radisson, Bridger's men would have greatly suffered.

As there appeared to be a design on the part of Bridger against the New England fort, it was resolved to burn it. By its destruction the French party could be concentrated to resist attack. A message was then sent to Bridger asking him to come to the Canadian fort; on his appearance he was made a prisoner, and Bridger's buildings were burned. Radisson had now to carry out his own purpose, and obtain furs to send back to Canada. He experienced some difficulty, for there was dissatisfaction with the prices offered by him, but, as he states, it was necessary to be firm. So he adhered to his views, and obtained his cargo on his own terms.

Bridger had still a shallop, to which he proposed putting a deck, so that he could sail in her to the trading ports in James' Bay, for he was told that he must leave the spot. He preferred this course to accepting a passage to France in the Canadian vessel which was being rebuilt. The New England captain desired to sail with Radisson to Quebec, rather than accompany the company's governor.

Both des Groselliers and Radisson having to return with their furs to Quebec, resolved to leave young des Groselliers with seven men in charge of the fort.

On the 20th of July steps were taken for a start to be made, when Bridger, seeing the floating ice, considered it too dangerous to leave in his small decked vessel. All Radisson desired was, that Bridger should depart from the country, and he was indifferent as to the means taken. Bridger desired to take a passage on the New England vessel, but this arrangement was not accepted, and it was finally determined that he should sail with des Groselliers. On the 27th of July the Canadian barque went to pieces. There now remained only the New England barque and the decked shallop. There was at one time the intention of giving Bridger the latter; but owing to the fear that he would return to Port Nelson, and take re-possession of the country, it was resolved that he should proceed in the New England vessel to Quebec. The remaining members of the English crew were placed on board the shallop and sent to James' Bay.

On her arrival at Quebec, de la Barre, who was then governor, hearing of the circumstances under which the New England vessel had been taken, thought it right to restore her to her owners, for which he was reproved by de Seignelay.*

From Canada, Radisson proceeded to France. De la Barre had informed him that Colbert desired some account of what had taken place in the northern waters. Radisson, leaving his affairs in the hands of la Chesnaye, of whom he speaks slightly, left Canada on the 11th of November, 1683. On his arrival at La Rochelle he heard of Colbert's death. At Paris he learned that complaints had been made of his proceedings at Port Nelson, by Lord Preston, the English ambassador. Radisson's conduct, however, was approved by the court.

Such is the account from Radisson's own statement. I have given his narrative, because the names of these two men have obtained an unwarranted celebrity in Canadian history. They are confidently brought forward as the first discoverers of Hudson's Bay, and as bartering to the English the information which they possessed. Whereas the contrary is the case. It is not possible to discover the original authority for the fable of the discovery of Hudson's Bay by Lake Winnipeg, and what is now known by "the boat route to York factory:" but it is certain, that it has not the slightest foundation on fact, and is entirely disproved.

* New York Hist., Doc. IX., p. 221.

D'IBERVILLE'S EXPEDITION TO NEWFOUNDLAND, 1696-1697.*

Although d'Iberville's operations in Newfoundland do not form an integral part of Canadian history, in the view that they were suggested by de Frontenac, and the force was composed of Canadians, some mention of it appears to me to be called for. It is likewise in itself a remarkable record, shewing what can be achieved by a few disciplined men in full strength and vigour, led by a dauntless, resolute leader, fertile in resources, who proved equal to the most trying emergency in which he was placed.

Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville, the third son of Charles Le Moyne, of Montreal, was born at Montreal in 1662; he was then thirty-four years old.† He will ever remain one of the most prominent characters in Canadian history. He was a seaman of experience and skill, and by merit alone, obtained a commission in the French navy, which was looked upon, as one of the prerogatives of men of birth and influence; and given only to humbler persons, such as Jean Bart and Forbin, under extraordinary circumstances. In all his operations he evinced courage, determination, enterprise and judgment. Equally with his contemporaries, he was characterised by his ruthless indifference to human suffering, and the merciless destruction of his adversaries. No one leader can be mentioned as more remorseless in the duties assigned to him; he acted as if he looked upon the slaughter of an enemy as almost a religious duty.

D'Iberville's operations in the Bay of Fundy have been described.‡ With "le Profond" 44, and "l'Envieux" 44, on the 20th of June he met the "Newport" 24 and the "Sorley" 34 with a New England trader. After a fight of three hours and a half, the "Newport" was dismasted and taken. The "Sorley" and

* The authority of this narrative is the "Journal de M. Baudouin, missionnaire, d'un voyage fait avec M. d'Iberville, capitaine de frégate, de France en l'Acadie, et de l'Acadie en l'île de Terre-neuve. Juin 1696 à Juin 1697." Parl. MS., 2nd Series, VIII., pp. 33-93.

† The family of Charles Le Moyne also deserves mention, owing to the remarkable career of all its members. The eldest son, Baron de Longueuil, served with distinction. At the massacre of Lachine in 1689, he was carried back to Fort Remi with his arm shattered by a musket shot. The second son, Saint Helène, was killed at Beauport in 1690 during Phips' attack; d'Iberville was the third son; De Maricourt, the fourth son, is known by his constant exertion with the Iroquois, and died broken and worn out by the fatigues he endured. The fifth son, de Bienville, was killed at Repentigny, to the north of Isle Jesus, when de Vaudreuil surprised a party of forty Iroquois, destroying them all except one, who escaped.* The sixth son, de Chateauguay, was killed in Hudson's Bay when d'Iberville took Port Nelson from Geyer. The eighth son, Antoine, was an invalid, and died young; the ninth son was the second de Bienville, known for his distinguished services in Louisiana, the founder of New Orleans. There were two daughters, the eldest married M. de Noyan, *lieutenant de vaisseau*, whom she survived. The second was the wife of Major de La Cossaque, of the Marine force.

‡ Ante Vol. II., p. 378.

* Ante Vol. II., p. 251.

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the tender escaped to Boston. Proceeding to Saint John he was joined by one hundred and fifty of Saint John Indians, and subsequently at Pentagoet, by one hundred and thirty Indians, with Thury and de Saint-Castin. Pemaquid was next attacked and immediately taken.

When the "Sorley" arrived at Boston two English men-of-war were in the harbour. With the "Sorley," and a merchant vessel of twenty guns, they sailed to intercept d'Iberville. These vessels came in sight of d'Iberville, but he did not wait to receive the attack and escaped in the fog. D'Iberville's instructions were to proceed to Newfoundland, and await the arrival of a squadron from France, which he was to join and then receive further orders. In the meantime, he was to attack and uproot the English scattered settlements along the coast : for this purpose he was to receive a reinforcement of fifty men from Canada.

On the 12th of September, "Le Profond" arrived at Placentia, which was then the only French possession on the island. The Governor was absent, but he returned on the 17th of October. D'Iberville's desire was to proceed overland from the head of Placentia Bay to Carbonière in Conception Bay, and to take the place by surprise ; thence crossing Conception Bay by water reach Cape Saint Francis Peninsula, and descending the coast from the north by land, make a descent upon St. John's before his presence was even suspected ; attack only being looked for from the south by water.

The governor de Brouillan had been engaged in an unsuccessful attack by sea on St. John's, aided by several St. Malo privateers, and had come back much chagrined by his want of success.

Carbonière is accessible by land across the territory between Placentia and Conception Bays, within a distance of twenty-five leagues. In summer the journey could be made without difficulty. In winter, with snow on the ground, a land attack was looked upon as impossible, for snow-shoes were unknown in the island.* At this season few of the inhabitants went any distance from their domiciles. There was a stoppage of all communication, save what could be made by water. The scattered settlements along the coast consisted of rude huts inhabited by fishermen ; and a path ran along the coast which horses could follow, and to some extent was used by them in summer.

The inhabitants, with scarcely an exception, were engaged in fisheries and the commerce connected with them. The great majority had been born on the island, and for the most part were sunk in crass ignorance. The women are especially named as being unrestrained by any tie or principle. There was not a protestant minister of religion along the coast, if Father Baudouin be accepted as evidence. No soldiers were on the island, and there was no organization for defence. What arms the fishermen possessed were few in number, and of an imperfect character ; at every station there were only some old fowling pieces, required for daily use in the chase. Settlements of this character extended along the east coast from Cape Race to Cape Saint Francis at the north, thence along both shores of Conception Bay to Point de Grat, its most northern point, and thence followed both

* "Par les terres se jeter à l'improviste une telle nuit sur St. Jean pendant les neiges, dans un temps ou personne ne sort en cette ile n'ayant pas l'usage de raquettes." Baudouin MS., p. 42.

sides of Trinity Bay to Cape Bonavista. St. John's, on the eastern coast, was the principal rendezvous for shipping and trade, as it was of most ancient date. Its population consisted of 300 souls. The chief depots of trade in Conception Bay were Havre de Grace and Carbonière. The few houses in these places were among the best in Newfoundland. Some of the principal inhabitants are mentioned as being worth £4,000, a large sum for that community. During the winter some two hundred of the population went into the woods, as trappers to obtain furs.

The only possession of the French was Placentia.* The English settlements had no fear of attack from this quarter in winter; indeed, any such expedition was looked upon as impossible.

D'Iberville's policy was to sail to the north of Placentia Bay, and disembarking his force, to march across the country to Carbonière. In his view such a course was without difficulty, and gave every promise of success. He was the more desirous of so acting when he learned that there were eight vessels loaded with cod at Carbonière. On the other hand, the Governor de Brouillan was desirous that the attack should be made by the combined forces, as he had begun it. He was also unwilling to give over to d'Iberville the men of the Canadian re-inforcement: while d'Iberville stated that unless the Canadian contingent was placed under his command, he should return to France. On their part, the Canadians declared that they would only serve under d'Iberville; many went so far as to decline to recognise the authority of de Brouillan, who was unpopular, owing to the stern discipline which he had maintained with the men of the Saint Malo privateers.

There was an order from the King that the winter campaign was to be under the orders of d'Iberville. As de Brouillan declared that a land expedition at this period of the year was impracticable, and d'Iberville refused to abandon his pretensions, de Brouillan consented that the Canadians should be placed under d'Iberville's command. On his side, d'Iberville with reluctance agreed to abandon his plan of operations against Carbonière, and consented with his force to form part of de Brouillan's attack of St. John's.

De Brouillan embarked his force on "le Profond," and proceeded round Cape Race to Renowes, where he moored his vessel. D'Iberville's plan was to cross the peninsula from Placentia to Forillon; some leagues south of St. John's. Although at Placentia the march was looked upon as being dangerous and rash, d'Iberville with his force started on his journey on the first of November. The country was wet, being covered with moss; the swamps were not solidly frozen, and the men breaking through the surface ice often sank knee deep. The weather was very cold, especially the mornings, and after ten days of painful march Forillon was reached.

Such a journey in ordinary weather could have been made in five days, and many thought it would have been as well to have gone to St. John's, the distance being about the same. During the last two days provisions ran short. Fortunately, the men found a dozen horses, on which they lived until they could communicate with "le Profond" to the south. On the same day a boat came

* Called by the French, Plaisance.

from Renowes, where "le Profond" was moored, and opened communication with them. On the 11th an officer arrived with a party of three; he had passed over land from Placentia to St. John's, for the purpose of reconnoitering the place. His party originally consisted of six, but three had been killed and taken.

On the 12th d'Iberville joined "le Profond" at Renowes, and obtained some supplies, which he sent by water to his men. In his previous expedition de Brouillan had destroyed many of the settlements along the coast. He now completed the work of devastation. Cape Broyle was attacked and twelve prisoners taken. From them it was learned, that between that place and Forillon one hundred and ten men were scattered along the coast. The prisoners taken were sent to "le Profond;" one, a woman, committed suicide by throwing herself in the sea.

On the 21st de Brouillan arrived at Forillon with one hundred French, when he informed d'Iberville that "le Profond" was starting for France, and would not go to St. John's, and that the advance against the place must be made by their united force. A question arose as to the division of the spoil obtainable, of which de Brouillan claimed for himself and his men one-half. D'Iberville's column consisted of one hundred and twenty-four picked men. The latter were indignant, that the less number of one hundred men with de Brouillan should share equally with them. A dispute also arose relative to the command, de Brouillan, claiming to be supreme; a pretension which, in the first instance, d'Iberville refused to recognise. But neither the time nor place would admit of a personal quarrel. The French were in an enemy's country with a small force. With great self-control and good sense d'Iberville withdrew his personal claims; but he informed de Brouillan that he would bring the subject to the notice of the Minister, and if for the hour he was silent regarding his pretensions, it was with the design of having them hereafter considered.

Forillon is six leagues south of Bay Bulls, and the voyage was made there in boats. The morning following their arrival a party of twenty were sent forward toward St. John's. At the same time the woods in the neighbourhood were searched to discover if any men had taken refuge there. Several were made prisoners. A detachment was sent to Witless Bay, south of Bay Bulls, but the place was found to be deserted. The small force which went towards St. John's did not go beyond Petty Harbour, five leagues from Bay Bulls. Here they learned that three merchant ships were in St. John's Harbour.

Thirty-six men had been left to guard the ships at Forillon, and d'Iberville left for Petty Harbour with eighty-eight men. Proceeding northwards, he met a small detachment of about thirty English, who when attacked retreated towards a main body of sixty men. On the attack of d'Iberville they were also driven back retreating to St. John's. Their loss was thirty-six killed, and several prisoners.

It rained the following day, and the advance was not made until the 28th of November. The vanguard consisted of thirty Canadians. As they approached a *bois brûlé*, the remains of a portion of the forest destroyed by fire, covered with rock and boulders, they met some resistance. A party of eighty-eight men had been posted at this spot, but they were unable to make a stand against the French force. As the Canadian force approached St. John's, two small forts in advance of the town were abandoned, where thirty-three prisoners, with some women and

children, were taken. The remainder found their way to the main fort ; some of them reached a ketch lying near, and the wind being favourable, they sailed for Carbonière. The English in the struggle are represented as having lost fifty-five men ; and the French learned from the prisoners that there were two hundred and fifty undisciplined men in the large fort.

In the morning the fort was summoned, but the demand was not entertained. Consequently mortars, bombs, powder and shot were brought up by water from Bay Bulls. The houses in the neighbourhood were burned. On the 30th of November, Saint Andrew's Day, a white flag was sent by the defenders to ask for a cession of hostilities for twenty-four hours, to consider the question of surrender. An immediate capitulation was demanded. The fort surrendered on condition that two ships should be given them to proceed to Bonavista and to England, and that on leaving the fort their persons should not be searched. The capitulation on the side of the French was signed by de Brouillan alone. D'Iberville was not asked to append his signature, to the great indignation of Father Baudouin.*

In accordance with the conditions of surrender, the Governor of the town, with one hundred and sixty men, left the place, accompanied by their families.† They consisted of men engaged in the fisheries ; one only of the number was wounded. The fort was commanded by two heights, and the ditch was filled with snow. The position of those defending it had been pitiable. "They were without provisions or wood, and it was the 1st of December ; with little powder and but two dozen of shot, for on perceiving the French advance they had been unable to remove anything into the building. They had relied on the eighty-eight men, selected from the whole number, who had been sent out against the invaders. They had about one hundred bad muskets, such as are owned by fishermen, and people who do not know what war is. The Governor of the fort was a simple resident of the place, elected by the captains of vessels without a Royal commission."‡

The morning after the surrender, d'Iberville sent a party over land to Portugal Cove in Conception Bay, six leagues from St. John's, his object being to intercept fugitives making their way to Carbonière ; closely watching the woods in the neighbourhood to seize any fugitives. The following day a boat from Carbonière, endeavouring to obtain news of the attack on St. John's, was taken. D'Iberville now advanced along the coast north of St. John's to Cape St. Francis, and seized one hundred prisoners out of the wretched hovels, which in straggling settlement had been built some short distance from the coast during the summer, owing to fear of an attack from the Saint Malo privateers ; after which he returned to St. John's.

The first week of December was now over, the country was covered with snow, and any movement had to be made on snow-shoes. The Canadians set to work to repair, and place in condition those they had brought, and to construct such as

* "Je vous avoue, Monseigneur, cela me choque." p. 56.

† "Cent soixante hommes tout maitres qu'engagés pour la pêche, avec les femmes et les enfants." p. 56.

‡ Baudouin, p. 57. The above description is a translation of Père Baudouin's account of the garrison, and explains the imperfect defence made.

they required. One question, however, had to be decided. Now that St. John's was taken and the English driven out, what was to be done with the place? The first proposition was to hold it, garrisoned by troops from Placentia, and it was proposed to place le Sieur de Muis in charge. He asked that the Canadians should be left with him. Finally, it was resolved that the town should be destroyed. This decision was carried out on the 23rd of December, 1696, "after mass" when the town was burned, the batteries were levelled, and the guns thrown into the sea. One vessel containing two hundred and thirty souls sailed for England. A second vessel, with forty French and eighty English, left for France.

On the 28th of December, de Brouillan sailed to the south for Renowes, taking with him seventy-five prisoners. D'Iberville proceeded along the coast north of St. John's to Cape St. Francis, where he obtained some provisions, and took thirty prisoners. He had reached the northern limit of the eastern coast, exposed to the roll of the Atlantic Ocean. From this point he turned southward down the eastern shores of Conception Bay, passing through the poor hamlets of the fishermen, destroying their huts as he came upon them, and seizing such of their inmates who could not escape. These isolated settlements could make no resistance. Their inhabitants had but few arms, and of the worst description; moreover, the snow was impassable to them, except for a few rods from their dwellings. D'Iberville's men had proceeded from Saint John's to Portugal Cove on snow-shoes, to the astonishment of the ignorant fishermen. As has been before stated, the use of the snow-shoe was unknown in Newfoundland until this unfortunate experience. What fishing vessels d'Iberville met in his progress of destruction, he burned. By the 2nd of February, 1697, he had destroyed eighty; keeping ten for his own use.

It was the 15th of January when the main body reached Portugal Cove. A severe snow storm kept them at this place until the 16th, when the advance was again made. The snow was unusually deep and troublesome.* Pursuing the same course of devastation, they reached the bottom of the bay. All the small settlements were destroyed. D'Iberville's object was to take Carbonière on the western shore. As by following the undulations of the bay by land, the distance to be travelled would prove long and tedious, d'Iberville determined to make the journey by water, the distance being but seven leagues.

On the 23rd the party left in three boats. As they advanced, some vessels were seen, one of which was armed, and had been sent from Carbonière to learn the movements of the French. D'Iberville did not, therefore, proceed further than Point Grave on the west coast of Conception Bay. Here he found one hundred and ten men, half of whom were imperfectly armed, and several women and children. He disarmed the men, and obtained some provisions. From this point he turned southward to Brigus, where much the same scene presented itself, the men being disarmed. Most of the population, however, had left, owing to the report of what had happened on the opposite shore, and had found refuge at Carbonière. Several fugitives from Havre de Grace, Mosquet, and other harbours, together with those who had escaped from St. John's, had sought safety in

* "Le Canada n'a rien de semblable." Baudouin, p. 64.

this place. Their number amounted to two hundred souls. As the expedition was proceeding onward, de Montigny had seized and killed several who had endeavoured to escape; nevertheless, a great number did succeed in getting away, the prospect of a dreary captivity suggesting a desperate effort, failure in which was death. Such as these found their way, and it must have been with much hardship, to New Pelican, on the east shore of Trinity Bay. Their escape only deferred the accomplishment of their sad fate.

The Fortress of Carbonière is placed on an island with lofty precipitous sides. There is only one entrance to the harbour from the west, defended by floating batteries. Except during a calm, entrance was difficult, and even under favourable circumstances two vessels could only enter abreast.

Before, however, reaching Carbonière, Havre de Grace had been burned. At this place, and throughout the west shores of Trinity Bay, little had been found in the houses; everything capable of being taken away had been removed to Carbonière for safety. Settlement was much more frequent here than in any part of Newfoundland, and the fishing stations more continuous. They were all destroyed.

D'Iberville remained some days before Carbonière in the hope of taking it. It was the first place where he really had experienced resistance, for at St. John's little had been attempted, and those who had sought refuge, knew the fate which awaited them if taken prisoners. At this place there was some means of defence, and the glare-ice on the rocks made them more inaccessible than in their natural condition. These difficulties deterred him from any attempt at assault, without taking into account the determined attitude of the defenders. The surf likewise made landing almost impossible. D'Iberville remained in inactivity from the 24th to the 31st of January, when a *reconnaissance* was again made of the defences.

But his force was not idle; in the meantime parties had been sent out to destroy the neighbouring settlements. Salmon Cove, three miles north of Carbonière, was burned. Those present were without arms and without organization: there was no resource but flight.*

On the 1st of February d'Iberville left Carbonière. As he ascended northwards he destroyed Bay Verte, ten leagues north of the island. On reaching Point de Grates, the point of the peninsula between Conception and Trinity Bays, he descended along the eastern coast of the latter. He heard that at Old Pelican several ships with cargoes of fish were ready to start. On his arrival he found eighty men; such of them as possessed fowling pieces he disarmed. There he learned that at Bay Verte, in Conception Bay, there were large stores of cod fish, with cattle, pigs and sheep. He went back to Bay Verte to take what he required, and with his unconquerable energy returned to Old Pelican.

As they proceeded down Trinity Bay, the settlements between Old and New Pelican were found deserted. Proceeding to Hearts-Content they came upon a roughly constructed fort of plank, garrisoned by thirty men, which, after some slight resistance, surrendered. From Hearts-Content, d'Iberville crossed the country to Carbonière. The garrison had taken four prisoners, one Frenchman

* "Il n'y a de bras et de pieds que pour fuir." Baudouin, p. 71.

and three Irishmen, who had joined d'Iberville. Negotiations were commenced to obtain their release; the conditions asked at Carbonière were that one prisoner be given for the Frenchman, but three prisoners for each of the Irishmen. The conditions were accepted. The exchange was made, but d'Iberville, pretending that there was a want of good faith on the part of the garrison, seized two of the officers who were present, and carried them away prisoners; a proceeding most discreditable to him.

As the force ascended the bay, Port Grave and Brigus, which had been spared, were now burned; and such was the treatment of Carbonière, a small settlement on the main land, opposite to the island. The prisoners who had been taken, he determined to send to Placentia.

De Brouillan, who, after the destruction of St. John's, had started on his return to Placentia by land, found the journey too difficult, and on reaching Bay Bulls he had taken to his boats, and had reached Placentia by water.

D'Iberville now ordered that the prisoners he had taken, about two hundred in number, should be assembled at the head of Trinity Bay. They were taken over to Bull's Bay* a short distance from its head, and placed under the orders of de Montigny and de la Perrière. On the 1st of March d'Iberville, with nine men, started across the woods for Placentia, a distance of twenty leagues, and on the fourth day reached the settlement. From Placentia, d'Iberville proceeded to the head of the bay, Cromwell Bay, a short distance across the land to Bull's Bay on Trinity Bay. He was here joined by de la Perrière, who informed him that the prisoners were safe on Bull's Bay, that de Montigny's party had been increased by twenty Irish, who had joined the French.

He here formed a party to continue the raid along Trinity Bay. What huts were found were burned, and the inhabitants seized.

D'Iberville returned to Placentia in order to organize an expedition of one hundred men against Bonavista, the only place in Newfoundland, with the exception of the rock of Carbonière, remaining in the English possession. All the other settlements had been burned: at least, the attempt had been made to uproot them, and if any vestige of them could be found, it was not owing to the mercy of the destroyer. He also desired to hear news from France: it was important, in view of the operations designed against Hudson's Bay, that he should be present when the war vessels arrived.

But the end was not yet. On the 12th of March an expedition of sixty men was despatched against what remained of Old Pelican. Arriving there on the 13th they surprised a vessel of thirty tons loaded with provisions. The crew consisted of eighteen men, and the vessel is described as having twelve guns. The crew made a stout resistance, but they were outnumbered.

Carbonière was still watched, but it could not be attacked. Many even of the prisoners who had been carried to Placentia escaped and found refuge there. There were three hundred persons in the place.

There was a dispute about the plunder taken at St. John's. Much to the disgust of the Canadians, de Brouillan claimed his share of a second seizure at St. John's,

* There is Bay Bulls on the main eastern land, and Bull's Bay in Trinity Bay.

when neither he nor his forces were present. Father Baudouin is very indignant, and exclaims : "*Auri sacra fames quid non mortalia pectora cogis.*"* De Brouillan's authority appears to have prevailed.

While d'Iberville was considering what steps should be taken with regard to Bonavista, de Serigny arrived with the squadron from France. All projects, therefore, in connection with Newfoundland were abandoned, and d'Iberville took command of the Hudson's Bay squadron. Accordingly he recalled his men from Trinity Bay, and they were embarked on "*Le Pélican.*" The prisoners were placed in Placentia, but they could not be held there, and for the most part escaped.

Such was the celebrated expedition of d'Iberville in 1696-97. It was entirely carried out by him, and while a proof of the ruthless spirit in which war was then conducted, particularly favoured by Louis XIV. and by Louvois, it bears testimony to the genius and ability of d'Iberville. It was successful so far, that it swept away for a time nearly all trace of English occupation. But it was without result, for the attack was not followed by settlement, or by the establishment of forts by which the country could be held. For this neglect d'Iberville cannot be held responsible. The cruel duty entrusted to him, he carried out with wonderful success, with endurance, gallantry, and remorselessness. It was a march through a population whatever their numbers, as a whole, scattered in small communities, undefended by any protection from assault, imperfectly armed with old muskets, surprised, incapable of moving in the snow, cumbered with their wives and families ; while the Canadians, though not numerous, were organised, disciplined, and elated with success. It is seldom such a continuance of uninterrupted good fortune can be chronicled. But this temporary success is its sole record. In a short space of time the old localities were re-occupied, and the ancient course of English Newfoundland life was resumed.

This expedition stands out as the first of the attempts which took place in the succeeding ten years, during which Newfoundland was the scene of such attacks. The English were again driven out in 1708, when the French obtained temporary mastership. It was d'Iberville who in 1696-97 pointed out how the devastation could be best effected ; and of all the expeditions which followed, no one was in any way so thorough, as that which he conducted.

By the treaty of Utrecht, Newfoundland was ceded to the British. As early as 1709, in the negotiations for peace, Marlborough distinctly stated that the island must be ceded ; and the demand was never abandoned.

* The worthy father trusted to his memory. A Virgil could scarcely have been present in his scanty kit. The text runs :

Quid non mortalia pectora cogis

Auri sacra fames ?

Æneid III., 56.

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
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BOOK VIII.

ACADIA : NOVA SCOTIA.

FROM THE PEACE OF RYSWICK, 1697, TO THE DECLARATION
OF WAR AGAINST SPAIN, 1739.

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CHAPTER I.

The peace of Ryswick furnishes an argument to a class of writers, who lose no opportunity of accusing the mother country of sacrificing her American possessions in the promotion of her own interest. There is little attempt to sustain the assertion by fact, and it has been repeated until believed by many. It is true that this treaty effected no settlement of the disputes in America; but, at the same time, it abandoned no right. Its defect was that it left to the future, the definite adjustment of opposing claims, which, had it been possible, it would have been wise to settle. All that was attained was, that commissioners were to be appointed to determine the rights and pretensions to Hudson's Bay, and a general clause, the seventh, enforced on both sides the restoration of places taken during the war, leaving the original claims undetermined. But these rights were not unconsidered; for within three months from the ratification of the treaty, commissioners were to meet in London; and within six months to be reckoned from their first meeting, they were to determine all differences and disputes: the articles to which they should agree, to have "the same force and vigour as if they were inserted word for word"* in the treaty.

Everyone who, in a fair and impartial spirit, studies the negotiations, to which the treaty was the sequel, must admit that no other provision was possible. If the boundaries in America had to be definitely settled, the treaty would never have been signed, for the limits were scarcely definable. Indeed, one of the causes, which in after years led to war, arose from the conflicting claims advanced on this point. Setting aside this view, it is manifest that the concessions offered by Louis XIV. were of the greatest importance, and

* Clause VIII.

William at once saw the wisdom of their acceptance under the best possible conditions. Louis proposed to abandon the conquests made during the war, to cede Lorraine, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg; and to recognise William as King of England. Both England and Holland were of accord that under such conditions, peace should be accepted, for both countries required peace. The difficulties which impeded the negotiation arose with the Spanish Council, which claimed compensation for injuries received; and the Emperor, who desired to see the war prolonged until the death of the King of Spain, considered as certain in no long period. The intrigues of the Emperor were dearly atoned for. The treaty not being signed on the day appointed by the French plenipotentiaries, they withdrew the conditions they had offered; and naming the time when the signatures must be attached, they declared that they would be at liberty to demand additional modifications if further delay took place. The resolute statesmanship of William alone effected a settlement of the difficulty.

The French plenipotentiaries were Harley and de Callières, both men of ability. The latter was the brother of the successor to de Frontenac in the government of Canada, and it may be said, that the appointment of his brother to the position, was an act of acknowledgment of his own merit on this occasion, and Louis Hector de Callières became governor general. We may still read the *Memoir** which he wrote

* New York Hist. Doc. IX., p. 265, 23 February, 1685; p. 369, November, 1687.


I refer the reader to the concluding pages of the fourth volume of Macaulay's history, for an account of the difficulties and procrastination with which the negotiations were conducted. Louis made his proposition for peace in the winter of 1696. As early as February the 10th of the following year, a protocol, stating the conditions on which the French would treat, was drawn up. Owing to the hindrances attributable to the Emperor with respect to the place of meeting, the plenipotentiaries did not meet before the 9th of May at Ryswick, two miles from the Hague. Differences on points of etiquette arose among the allies. Previous to the meeting in the middle of April, the mediator, the King of Sweden, had died. The Swedish representative having to place his household in mourning, it was not until the 12th of June that the King's death was officially communicated.


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






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on the French possessions, or as he described them, the "encroachments" of the English on the French colonies in America. Armed with this definite information, and it was impossible that it was not considered, the French plenipotentiaries could have been at no loss in defending their pretensions; a position only to be met by the counter arguments which Massachusetts might have suggested. Thus the tangle must have become hopeless; and the dispute, one which no diplomacy could unravel. It was impossible to settle it on its merits, for the points of disagreement could

William determined to bring this trying delay to a close, and to test if the French King's offer of peace was sincere. In no event of his life is his ability as a statesman more apparent.

During the war, de Boufflers, when a prisoner, had frequently met Portland, and a friendship had grown up between them. William directed Portland to place himself in communication with Boufflers. Both were soldiers and knew what war was; both incorruptible and men of honour. The point to determine in the mind of Louis, was whether William was intriguing to prolong the war, or was truly desirous of peace. Louis being assured that the cause of delay alone arose with the Emperor, it was not difficult to establish principles on which the negotiation could be conducted. The remark of Harley, one of the French plenipotentiaries, in a sentence set forth the situation; that it was curious while the ambassadors were making war, that the generals should be making peace. The official conferences, however, still dragged along, impediments being created by the Emperor and Spain, when on the 10th of July the French plenipotentiaries repeated their offer of the terms of peace, with the intimation that after the 21st of August, Louis would not be bound by the same conditions. On that day the treaty was unsigned. In the interim, the news arrived that Vendôme had taken Barcelona, and that a French fleet, after sacking Carthage, had returned to France enriched with spoil. The French plenipotentiaries announced that their King had resolved to retain Strasbourg; and that if peace were not accepted by the 10th of September he would demand further modifications. The tone in which the demand was made, and the demand itself, were alike irritating to William. It was, however, evident to him, that the men of London, of Devonshire, and of Yorkshire, would not submit to privation and danger, in order to retain a German province for the Emperor, who was throwing obstacles in the way of peace for his own purposes. Spain, from the reverses she had experienced, no longer put forward the obstinate arrogance she had shown in the early negotiation. Consequently William directed the English ambassadors to sign the treaty on the day named. The Dutch and Spanish plenipotentiaries received the same instructions, and the Emperor was notified that he would be included in the treaty if he would accept it by the 1st of November. On the 10th of September, 1697, the treaty was signed.

not be formulated to common satisfaction. An arrangement could only be attained by mutual concession, and the appointment of commissioners, was the one course by which the solution could be obtained.

I have described the unfavourable articles of the treaty which gave over Hudson's Bay almost entirely to the French. In Acadia the provisions in favour of the French were not so apparent. They retained possession of Acadia, Nova Scotia, with which New England sought no relationship, except for the purposes of fishing and of trade with the Indians. Indeed, jurisdiction over Nova Scotia had been abandoned by Massachusetts in 1692.* On the main land the claim by New England to the disputed territory had been made by advanced settlement, which had reached on the sea coast to Casco, the modern Portland, pretensions which the French refused to recognise. The treaty was only made known in Canada in September, 1698. The following year an imperfect peace had been made by New England, with the Indians on her northern frontier.

Louis XIV., in March, 1698, informed de Villebon of the peace, and directed him to cause a "Te Deum" to be sung; at the same time, he gave definite instructions as to the policy to be followed. The English were to be permitted to occupy no part of Acadia. De Villebon was in no way to discuss the seventh provision of the treaty with any representatives of New England, and was to decline all negotiation with Massachusetts. The river Quinibiqui, the Kennebec, was declared to be the French boundary. On the other hand, the English held that all the country westward of the River Saint Croix belonged to them as being within the limits of the Province of Massachusetts. De Villebon was to act in accordance with the treaty of London of 1686, which the French king declared to be in force, and forbid the English to fish in Acadian waters, or carry on commerce with the French colonies. He was to prevent the Indians troubling

* Ante Vol. II., p. 374.

the English, so long as they abstained from troubling and disquieting the Indian.* A doubtful phrase, which depended entirely on its application; and on the assumption that the English were the aggressors, might be strained to meet any contingency. The English were not to be permitted to have dealings with the Indians, whose business relations must be confined to the French. Presents would be continued to the Indians. The re-establishment of the fort at the mouth of the Saint John had been resolved upon.

Father Thury was thanked for influencing the Indians in their devotion to religion, and to the service of the King.† De Bonaventure, who was in command of "L'Envieux," received instructions to prevent surprises on the part of pirates and others; and, notwithstanding the peace, to attack all found fishing, and engaged in commerce on the shores of Acadia.‡

The English, in the meantime, had continued at Pentagoet, on the Penobscot. De Villebon, then ignorant of the peace, had instructed Thury to excite the Indians against them; but the letter had been intercepted by two Frenchmen named Matthieu and Guyon, who, shewing the seal of the letter to the Indians, asserted that it was de Villebon's order that they should continue to carry on trade.§

On the peace being declared in Boston in 1698, de Villicu, then a prisoner, returned to Acadia. There was unfriendliness between him and de Villebon. De Goutin was at this period Judge in Acadia. He had been on bad terms with de Meneval, and had written to the Minister letters full of complaints. He now attacked de Bonaventure,|| charging him with dishonesty and profligacy. He likewise accused de

* "Ne fassent aucune insulte aux Anglois, tant que ceux cy s'abstiendront de les troubler et inquieter." Que. Doc., p. II., 296.

† Que. Doc., II., p. 299. Vide ante Volume II., p. 370, for the mode in which Thury performed these joint duties at the massacre at Oyster River in 1694.

‡ "Garder la bonne intelligence avec les nations, avec les quelles Sa Majesté a faict la paix, et neantmoins attaquer et prendre les forbans et mesme les pescheurs anglois," etc. Que. Doc., II., p. 299.

§ Que. Doc., II., p. 306.

|| Que. Doc., II., p. 308.

Villebon of allowing the English to trade. He repeated the petty scandal of de Bonaventure's amours, discrediting him and his family as debauched in their habits. It appears extraordinary that a Minister should read with patience that de Villebon had expended 112 lbs. of powder in the *feux de joye* for the peace; and that when drinking the health of his mistresses, he and his son-in-law, le Sieur Martel, had got drunk on the occasion; that his brother, le Sieur de Neuville, had an Indian mistress, Margot, "*sauvagesse*," to the great scandal of everybody; and that another brother, de Beaucourt, was particularly debauched. These contemptible narratives were, nevertheless, encouraged in France.

As early as October, 1698, de Frontenac had stated that in accordance with the peace the French prisoners had returned from Boston, and that the Abenakis, feeling much discontent that their territory had not been restored to them, would have continued their attacks unless he had restrained them. During the preceding autumn they had surprised several small settlements, killing and scalping the inhabitants.* The responsibility of these proceedings must be traced to the missionaries. The power of the priests over their savage neophytes was unbounded; the threat of abandoning them would have sufficed to check this bad spirit. The word of reproof had only to be spoken. That word during the succeeding years was never uttered; and these, so-called ministers of peace, were to the last foremost in urging on the work of death and devastation.

In 1699† de Villebon informed Stoughton, the Governor of Massachusetts, that he had been instructed to conform to the treaty of London of the 16th of November, 1686, and to maintain the River Kennebec from its source to its mouth as the boundary between New England and New France. He had no doubt but this limit would be observed, and in order to avoid painful consequences, that Stoughton would not act as if the Indians of the territory were British subjects.

In the endeavour to obtain peace New England had made

* Que. Doc., II., p. 310.

† 8th February. Que. Doc. II., p. 311.

an exchange of prisoners with the Indians at the mouth of the Kennebec. Peace with the Jesuit Bigot was the last thing to be desired, and he hurried to Quebec to report what had taken place. De Callières was at this period in Montreal. He always thought as a statesman, and was entirely opposed to the profitless massacres which the ecclesiastic favoured; considering that they led to nothing but bloodshed, hatred, and retaliation. He wrote to the Jesuit that he saw no obstacle to peace being made, especially as France was not then at war with the English.*

During the year the "Newport," the capture of d'Iberville of 1698,† appeared to protect the French fisheries; the New England fishermen were not allowed to fish in sight of land, and they were not to be permitted to approach the coast.

Small as the population of Acadia was in 1698, being only seven hundred and eighty-nine souls, there was anything but concord in the small colony. Settlement was entirely confined to the south of the Bay of Fundy. There was no population on the Saint John; indeed, thirty-five years later, only one hundred and eleven souls were established there; along the eastern coast southward, Indians alone were to be met as far as the Penobscot. The fort at the mouth of the Saint John had been temporarily re-established, but it was to be demolished when Port Royal was placed in a condition of defence. At Chedabucto there were only five Frenchmen and three Irish.‡ Several fishermen sent out by the Company had deserted; de Villebon reported that he had claimed them from Lord Bellomont, and had received a promise of enquiry into the demand. Notwithstanding this depressed condition, de Villebon had to complain to the King that the ecclesiastics were endeavouring to obtain control in civil affairs,§ while the clergy attacked the depravation of manners of de Villebon and his brothers. De Goutin sided with the clergy.

* De Callières au Ministre le 17 Mars, 1699. Que. Doc. II., p. 312.

† Ante Vol. II., p. 378.

‡ Que. Doc. II., p. 331.

§ Ib. II., p. 315.

De Villebon died July, 1700,* when de Villieu assumed the government. He applied to be permanently appointed to the position, setting forth that he had "served his Majesty since 1674;" that he had done duty in Flanders, Germany and Catalonia, and from having been held a prisoner in Boston he had obtained much information about the English.† De Villieu was not confirmed in his appointment. The position was given to de Brouillan, who had been Governor of Placentia and Newfoundland.‡

De Brouillan left Placentia on the 16th of July, to arrive at the River Saint John on the 14th of August, 1701,§ and on the 22nd of October, he reported his arrival at Port Royal. He advocated the re-establishment of the fort at the mouth of the River Saint John; he considered, however, that the site had been badly chosen, and he recommended its re-erection on another spot. He did not look forward to any settlement taking place in its neighbourhood, for owing to repeated inundations, many families had been forced to abandon their homes. He dwelt upon the difficulties of entering the port, owing to the rocks and shoals at low tide, and the undercurrent. He also brought to the notice of the King, that the English continued fishing in Acadian waters.

On de Brouillan's arrival at Port Royal, he called upon the inhabitants to aid in the re-establishment of the fort. The population in the neighbourhood amounted to 456 souls,|| of whom seventy were men. He experienced opposition to his demand, which the few *habitants* considered to have been made in the interests of a French Company, and they objected to give their labour gratuitously. Further, they plainly said that if called upon for such duty, they would prefer to belong

* The letter from the King to de Brouillan, dated 23rd March, 1700 [Que. Doc., II., p. 332] should be dated 1701. The fact is established by letters in the succeeding pages.

† *Ib.* II., p. 337.

‡ For some information regarding de Brouillan in Newfoundland, vide note, ante p. 51, in connection with d'Iberville's expedition of 1696-1697.

§ Que. Doc., II., p. 389.

|| Census of 1870-71, vol. IV., p. 45.

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to the English. De Brouillan managed to pacify them,* and on their consenting to perform the work, he sailed for the Saint John in "La Gironde." He demolished the old fort to the foundations, and brought to Port Royal such material as would be useful, in placing the fort at that place in good condition.

De Brouillan contented himself with reporting the presence of the New England fishermen, for he was not in a position to take an aggressive attitude. He, however, complained to Lord Bellomont on the subject. Although the relations of the two countries were extremely unfriendly, war had not been declared. In 1702 hostilities commenced, when de Brouillan urged an attack against Boston, pledging his head for the success of the enterprise, if sufficient force were placed at his command.†

Several memoirs are extant advocating this policy; and they are only of interest as shewing, that the part taken by Massachusetts against Canada, was not dictated by any desire of conquest, but entirely from motives of self-defence. It was to remove from her northern frontier an inimical power, which contained a numerous party always anxious for war, as it gave the young men employment, and obtained for them distinction: so that New England lived under the constant danger of being attacked.

There was a strong feeling of self-assertion in the character of de Brouillan; so much so that de Callières complained to France that de Brouillan failed to give him information, writing but seldom, and acting as if independent in his government.‡ De Brouillan had one misfortune to report: on the 10th of September, 1702, a vessel with despatches was attacked at La Have by pirates, as he calls them, and was carried to Boston; seven fishing vessels were also captured.§

* De Brouillan au Ministre, 30 octobre, 1701, "il trouva le moyen de les ramener." Que. Doc. II., p. 385.

† Que. Doc. II., p. 395.

‡ N.Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 738.

§ Ib., IX., p. 923.

In May, 1703, de Callières died, and was succeeded by de Vaudreuil. With the new government re-commenced the old system of Indian warfare. The responsibility of this unwise policy lies with de Vaudreuil and his advisers; and it was from its impolitic re-introduction that Massachusetts was excited to activity. After the peace of Ryswick, New England would have been content with the boundary of the Saint George, a small river between the Kennebec and Pentagoet.* Massachusetts was desirous of retaining her settlements, which had been made within this limit. The sources of this stream are not far distant from the Kennebec; while the mouth is some thirty miles from the height of land dividing them from the tributaries of that river.

In June, 1703, Dudley, the Governor of Massachusetts, held a conference with the Indians at Falmouth: he there met the Saco, Kennebec and Penobscot Indians. What passed at the interview, showed, that they were not unfriendly, and were inclined to remain neutral. The Abenakis, who might be considered French Indians, were absent; and neither the Saint John, the Saint Croix, nor the Micmac tribes attended. De Brouillan brought the matter to the notice of de Vaudreuil,† who sent Canadian partizan leaders among the Indians to destroy this good feeling, and to organize constant attacks along the frontier. They were successful; and Indian parties thus led, again appeared to devastate with fire and sword the English settlements. De Vaudreuil took credit to himself as the originator of these expeditions.‡ He is likewise

* "Il y a entre ces deux rivières de Quinibecquy et de Pentagoët un aultre petite rivière nommée St. George." [Que. Doc., I., p. 433.]

† 4 October, 1703. [Que. Doc., II., p. 404.] De Brouillan, in answer to the question of the Minister, what was the difference between the Canabas of the Kennebec and of Pentagoet, described the Indians of Acadia as consisting of three nations: "the Canabas, the Malicites and the Micmacs." The Micmacs occupied the country along the coast from the Bay of Chaleurs to Restigouche, Richibouctou, Bay Verte, Cape Breton, Canso and Cape Sable to Mines, and Beaubassin. The Malicites commenced at the River Saint John and extended to Pentagoet. The Canabas were domiciled along the Kennebec. [1st June, 1703. Que. Doc., II., p. 403.]

‡ Que. Doc., II., p. 405.

the authority that it was the Jesuit missionaries who prevented the treaty of amity being concluded. Indeed, no sooner was the death of de Callières known, than the Jesuit Rasle informed de Vaudreuil that the Indians were ready to lift the hatchet against the English.

There is nothing doubtful in the proceedings of de Vaudreuil; they clearly establish the difference between his character and that of de Callières. In the respect of courage and conduct in the field, de Vaudreuil was in no way wanting. But while de Callières' policy and tone of thought were those of a statesman; de Vaudreuil was one to meet the emergency of the hour by petty expedients, and by a policy which failed to attain the result he hoped for. De Vaudreuil's raids on the paths of bloodshed and suffering left the memorial of burned homesteads, and the bones of those killed, bleaching in the sun; their only effect being to awaken the dogged resolution of New England, and to create the unextinguishable sentiment, that the conquest of Canada was necessary to her national preservation. It was the spirit which prevailed from the days of Phips to those of Wolfe. The expeditions from Canada exercised no influence, for the settlement of New England remained unchecked. They gratified the malignity of the Jesuits, men of the calibre of Rasle, merciless in their purposes, who could not comprehend the stubborn resistance against which they had to contend. It was a policy mischievous and painfully troublesome to New England: but whatever individual desolation it inflicted, in no way it advanced the French cause.

De Callières' career shews how well he understood what was necessary for any permanent conquest to be effected. This desultory warfare he despised. His views were wisely conceived; and had a man of his genius been entrusted with their execution, with a sufficient force, it is hard to tell what might have been effected. He proposed to send a strong body of troops from Canada to seize Albany, and to attack New York by sea. Boston he would have approached with a large fleet. It is idle to speculate what the consequence

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might have been, if he had lived and obtained all that he considered necessary to his purpose. It was a policy which had a finite end. Even de Brouillan saw that the real attack should be directed against Boston: and Boston taken and held, the country north of it, could never have continued the home of the New England settler.

De Vaudreuil's views had no such breadth. In 1703, an expedition, led by de Beaubassin, son of de la Vallière, crossed the Kennebec. It consisted of five hundred Indians, attended by a Jesuit priest. De Vaudreuil, in a sentence,* describes this force as ravaging fifteen leagues of country, three hundred persons being killed or taken prisoners. There is always exaggeration in such statements. His object in the organization of the expedition is plainly set forth: de Vaudreuil considered that the service of the King, and the welfare of the colony demanded, that there should be perpetual irreconcilable enmity between the Abenakis and the English.

In order more fully to carry out this theory, it was proposed by the Jesuits that the Abenakis, who were on admitted English territory, should be induced to settle in Canada. De Vaudreuil was desirous of establishing them at Chambly. De Beauharnois withheld his consent, as Bishop de Laval had objected to the selection of the locality, on the ground that the Abenakis would be at too great distance to render aid to Port Royal. We have only to ask what such aid could be beyond the raids of bloodshed and destruction characteristic of that period?

The frontier attack organized by M. de Vaudreuil, to which I have alluded, was simultaneously made by different parties. It extended along the coast from Casco, now Portland, to Wells. Scarborough and Saco were likewise assailed. The New England account of this onslaught represents that one hundred and fifty were killed and carried away prisoners. Little is known of this sudden and unlooked-for attack, more than at Casco, where de Beaubassin was in command, the

* Que. Doc. II., p. 406.

arrival of Captain Southwick in an armed vessel prevented the fort, which had been reconstructed since its destruction by de Portneuf in 1690,* from being again taken. On his appearance, the attacking party immediately retreated. It was the policy of the French never departed from, only to attack when they felt certain of success; and to follow up their success by the destruction of all that lay in their path. Parties of Indians were lurking in all directions to find the prey on which they could swoop. It was unsafe for a crew of a vessel to land for wood or water, or to moor their vessel in a bay for safety, unless they were in force to repel an attack; and there was always risk of surprise from overpowering numbers.

The New England Militia was called out, and steps taken to repel all similar attempts. It was on this occasion that bounties were offered by the Legislatures of New Hampshire and Massachusetts of £20, for every Indian prisoner under ten years of age, and £40 for an older prisoner, or his scalp.

De Vaudreuil informed the King that this attack of the territory of New England had been made at the desire of the Abenakis.† In a subsequent letter‡ he explained that after the raid of de Beaubassin, several of the tribe, in an expedition of the English against them, had been killed, and application had been made to him for assistance. It is possible he had in view their future establishment at Chambly; for it was the point whence the expeditions started to ascend Lake Champlain. He resolved to commence his operations by an attack against the New England northern settlements, leaving to the leaders the selection of the point to be assaulted, as opportunity suggested. The route by which the territory could be reached was by the descent of the river Connecticut; an expedition more likely to succeed, as any attack in force

* Ante Vol. II., p. 339.

† 16 November, p. 904. N.Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 758.

‡ 17 November, 1705. This letter is dated 1704. Evidently a mistake of a year. For de Vaudreuil used the words "last year," when referring to the Deerfield expedition. The date undoubtedly should be 1705. N.Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 762.

was not looked for from this direction, owing to the distance from Canada, and the difficulties which the route itself offered. The project was more readily entertained by de Vaudreuil, not only that it accorded with his policy of desolating the New England settlements, but because such attacks had been rejected by de Callières.

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CHAPTER II.

On the party being organized the Christian Mohawks were appealed to, to join it, and its destination down the River Connecticut became known. The news was carried to their kinsmen on the Mohawk, by which means the report reached Albany. Notice was at once given to the New England Government. There was little difficulty in surmising that an attempt might be made against Deerfield, in Massachusetts, the most northerly settlement in connection with Squakheag and Northfield. The village had been established for thirty years, and from its advanced position had greatly suffered in the King Philip war. The memory is yet preserved of the affair at "Bloody Brook," five miles north of the town, in 1675, when Captain Thomas Calthrop and ninety men, escorting some grain, were surprised by several hundreds of Indians, and almost all killed. The place had been attacked in 1693 and 1694. The latter event is spoken of as having been directed by Castreen, evidently Saint Castin; on both occasions the assailants were beaten off. The town, to the extent of twenty acres, had in 1689 been enclosed within pickets; equal to a square of about one thousand feet to a side. It was built on a small tributary of the Connecticut, and the landscape was as attractive as the land was excellent. The village was prosperous, and for the last eighteen years had supported a resident minister, the Reverend John Williams. The news received from Albany had greatly impressed him, and on his application to the government of Massachusetts, twenty soldiers had been given as a guard.

The French force consisted of three hundred Canadians and Indians under Hertel de Rouville the younger, the father from age, being unable to bear the privation and exposure. Crossing from Montreal to Chambly, they ascended Lake

Champlain on snow-shoes till they reached the river Ouinousqui,* north of the present city of Burlington. They ascended this river to one of its sources; and on gaining the height of land they followed a stream descending to the River Connecticut. The force descended the main river to Deerfield. The journey, undertaken in the coldest time of a Canadian winter, must have called for great endurance. The country is broken and rugged, the route passing across a spur of the mountains running the length of the state of Vermont. The distance travelled was upwards of two hundred and fifty miles.†

On the last day of February, old style, 1704, they came in sight of Deerfield. They remained in the woods, lighting no fires. Up to a certain hour of the night the picket had kept watch, patrolling through the enclosure; and so long as they were on the move, no attack was made. About two hours before daylight, with the laxity of discipline which prevailed, the nominal watch retired to rest. On the scouts giving this information, the assault was determined on. In spots, the snow had formed against the picket fence in such heavy drifts, that the ascent over it was easy. Without opposition de Rouville's force obtained entry into the enclosure. The first place attacked was the guard-house; another party broke into the residence of the minister, Williams. He had always a loaded pistol by his bed. As the man entered he attempted to fire. Had he succeeded and killed his enemy, his own life would have paid the penalty; but his pistol missed fire. With his family, he was seized, disarmed and pinioned, remaining in his shirt in the cold. The house was then

* In the early days of English settlement, this stream was known as Onion River; of late years the Indian name has been restored.

	MILES.
† From Chamby to the Ouinousqui	75
Ascent of that River	50
Across height of land to the White River.....	4
Descent of the White River.....	35
Descent of the Connecticut River	90
Total....	254

plundered; two of his children and a negro woman were killed. His wife and five other children were given time to dress, and Williams himself put on some clothes. What happened on this occasion was an example of what took place elsewhere; those resisting being shot down.

Thirty-eight persons were killed in the assault; one hundred and six were carried off prisoners: at an hour before dawn the party decamped, leaving the settlement in flames.

When the news of the attack was known, a party was organized in pursuit. It consisted of the men of the place who had been able to defend themselves, and what reinforcement could be gathered in the neighbourhood. Some Indians had remained behind for plunder; they were driven out or killed. As the pursuers came on the main body, a skirmish followed; and in this fight in the meadows, the English lost nine men, whose names are preserved. As the French hastened forward on their return, finding themselves impeded by the pursuit, the Indians killed thirteen of their captives, and they sent back word by a prisoner, that if pursued, they would burn the whole number of those they were carrying away. We have a remarkable record of the return of the force to Canada, by Mr. John Williams, the minister of the settlement, carried away a prisoner.* It is a painful narrative of the treatment the wretched captives experienced, and sets forth the ruthlessness with which the French conducted their expeditions. It is war in its most barbarous form, to attack a peaceful community, and to seize all who are not killed, regardless of sex and age, subjecting them to such suffering and privation, that every fifth person succumbed, or was killed. It has no parallel in the warfare of the eighteenth century, and was discountenanced by the best men in France. In hot blood the English race is not scrupulous; but there is nothing in the British annals of this continent, of wilful and deliberate cruelty,

* "The Redeemed Captive" returning to Zion." It was published on the 3rd March, 1707, dedicated to Governor Dudley, of Massachusetts. It has frequently been reprinted, seven editions having appeared, the last of which was in 1853. The book is now out of print, and not easily obtainable. See note at the end of this Book.

in any way parallel to the expeditions directed by the French against the outlying settlements to the last days of their rule in America; both in Acadia, and in the valley of the Ohio. Nothing can remove the stain which this policy has cast on the French escutcheon. War must ever bring suffering on the population where it is being carried on; but such suffering is incidental and unavoidable, and not conceived as a deliberate policy of bloodshed.

Williams expected after the event to find "great exulting mirth." But he saw many wounded, and there were frequent burials. De Rouville told Williams the loss was eleven, three of whom were French. At Quebec Williams heard that the loss had been forty.*

Previous to starting, the Indians killed an infant at the breast. After the first day's march, owing to some of the spirits found in Deerfield having been freely drunk, one of the Indians killed Williams' negro servant. That night, an Englishman escaped, upon which, Williams was ordered to assemble his countrymen, and declare to them that if any more of them escaped, the French would burn the other prisoners. The march was continued under great privation. The captives, even the women, were scantily dressed, and it was the period of mid-winter. They had to carry packs, and to pass through ice cold streams, often knee deep, over the rugged bed of the river. They were only occasionally permitted to sit down to rest. They had no bread. Their food was moose flesh, which often they had to eat frozen, with ground nuts and cranberries. Their hardships in the twenty days of march were extreme; the prisoner who loitered was killed; there was no mercy. Men and women had to walk forward, or be butchered. Of the one hundred and six

* De Vaudreuil reported to the King, N.Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 762, that de Rouville had nearly two hundred men, that he took one hundred and fifty prisoners, men and women, having lost only three men, with twenty wounded. De Vaudreuil was not one to trouble himself as to the Indian casualties, so this statement applies only to the French. He describes the Deerfield fort as garrisoned by one hundred men. The prisoners taken were one hundred and six. Twenty militiamen were scattered in the several houses.

prisoners, nineteen were murdered on the way, independently of those who died from fatigue and insufficiency of food. Some of the French soldiers took pity on the children and drew them on toboggans. Indeed it was necessary to place their wounded on sleighs, and the provisions were so carried. Some of the prisoners were included with them.

The captives were divided amongst the Indians, and in some few instances the young children were redeemed by the French ladies in Montreal. For the most part they were placed in the Jesuit Indian missions, and were brought up with the young children to become as they were; to sink down to the type of the savage with whom they associated. Inter-course between parents and children was made impossible. Fourteen or fifteen of this class remained behind when the prisoners were sent back in 1706. So far as can be learned, of the one hundred and six seized on the night of the 29th of February, sixty-four only reached Boston. Twenty-four of the number had been killed on the march, or had died from their privations. Four died during the stay in Canada.

The attack on Deerfield awoke in Massachusetts feelings of rage and indignation, and it was resolved to act in a spirit of retaliation, and to send out an expedition, to be conducted with the remorseless spirit with which the French attacks were made. The duty of Massachusetts was to defend her territory, and the force which she organized, well officered, and judiciously disposed, would have been equal to the preservation of her settlements. The aggressiveness of France was intelligible; it was to make the settlement of the country, which she was unable herself to people, impossible. The expedition from New England of 1704, could only have been founded on the hope, that by a counter policy of terror, the Canadian authorities might be deterred from repeating their assaults. Otherwise it was without a purpose, further than to obtain prisoners and cause devastation. It was placed under the command of Colonel Benjamin Church, and consisted of nearly six hundred men, including the Indians, in fourteen transports, with thirty-six whale boats for landing

the troops. The force was convoyed by the "Jersey" 48, the "Gosport" 32, and the provincial snow, "Mary" a vessel of two masts and of fourteen guns.

Leaving Boston in May, Church sailed for Pentagoet, where he took several French and Indian prisoners, among them one of de Saint Castin's daughters and her children. At Passamaquoddy there was a small settlement, which he destroyed. The war vessels sailed for Port Royal, where they arrived on the 1st of July. Church proceeded to Mines, where there were about sixty families, consisting of three hundred souls. He burned the buildings, seized what prisoners he could take, and destroyed the dykes, so the marsh lands were overflowed. He is represented as having burned fifty houses, and killed thirty horned cattle.*

The war ships sailed into Port Royal, and on the 1st of July parties were landed, which pillaged some houses at the end of the bay. A proclamation was issued, signed by the three captains, whose names in the French documents are given as Esmit, Southack, and Rogers, the two former being Smith and Southwick. A surrender was demanded in twenty-four hours, threatening that in case of resistance no quarter would be given. Should any be offered by the inhabitants, their houses would be burned, their cattle killed, and their wives and children carried away captive. The reason assigned for the attack was, that the inhabitants had aided the Indians in their devastation of the northern settlements: they were now offered peace by an alliance with New England. This communication was brought to de Brouillan the Governor, by a woman who had been made prisoner. Some days previously, de Brouillan had sent a small craft to Boston with five prisoners, which had been taken by these vessels. Her captain found an opportunity to instruct this woman to inform the Governor, that there were not above seven hundred men who could be disembarked, and so to govern himself. In the proclamation of the naval officers, their number had been named at thirteen hundred.

* Que. Doc., II., p. 21.

The woman was sent back with a story, that on her route she had been seized by a picket of one hundred troops, the commanding officer of which had taken possession of the letter. In the meantime de Brouillan assembled the few men he could collect for the defence of the fort. There were but eighty-six men in the settlement. In 1705 the garrison consisted of one hundred and eighty-five men, and the probability is that, that number was present. De Brouillan used what means were at his disposal to place the fort in a condition of defence. A contemporary writer charges him with causing his men * unnecessarily to make entrenchments, and then to remove them, working them night and day. On the 13th, Church appeared with the remainder of the vessels.

On the 16th, the men of the fort were prostrate. By the French accounts little resistance could have been made, when on the 18th, to the surprise of the French,† the fleet sailed out of the harbour. There never was any design of conquest. A prisoner who had been taken and released, stated that the English had declared that they had no desire to possess the country; and that the expedition had been undertaken for retaliation, in order that prisoners could be obtained, so they could be exchanged for those, which the French had carried from Deerfield.

The attempt by the French, to establish a population in Acadia, had been irregular and of limited extent. Of late years their efforts had been directed by marauding parties of Indians to prevent settlement on the part of New England. On the other hand, from inability to furnish the force to hold the country, in 1692, Massachusetts had petitioned to be relieved from all obligation with regard to Nova Scotia. That Province had asked that national garrisons should be maintained at the Saint John and at Port Royal. The strain of the continental wars made it impossible for either England or France to furnish the soldiers required in America; and Massachusetts had no desire to extend her limits by con-

* Que. Doc., II., p. 422.

† Que. Doc., II., p. 424.

quest. Her one object was to preserve her own territory intact. The non-attack of Port Royal subsequently exposed Dudley to reproach. But, as after events proved, when Port Royal was taken, the conquest was not followed up by systematic occupation; and a quarter of a century was to elapse before an attempt was to be made, to give an English character to the Province.

From the point of view, that Port Royal could not be held, the non-attack of the place by Church may be looked upon as a part of the policy of the Boston Government, that the exhibition of New England strength might be recognised, when it had been felt. The question is not whether the policy was wise or unwise; but it is surprising that the fort was not attacked and destroyed, and the garrison carried away prisoners, for no effective resistance to Church's force could have been made.

The account of the injury inflicted on Mines* is described as forty prisoners taken, one *habitant* killed, one wounded. The church and all the dwelling houses, one excepted, were burned, having first been pillaged. Seven dykes were destroyed, by which two hundred *barriques* of grain were lost. Eight prisoners only are reported as having been taken at Port Royal.

On the 16th Beaubassin was visited, where twenty habitations were burned and one hundred cattle killed. No mention is made of anyone having been killed or taken prisoner.

One consequence of this raid was the affirmation of French feeling at Port Royal. Hitherto the sentiment of the inhabitants could not be relied upon, their inclination towards Canada was uncertain, and doubt had been cast upon it: it had only been maintained by the influence of the priests. One of the many proofs that expeditions, which have solely in view the infliction of injury and devastation, fail in their purpose. However successful in their mischievous results, they only call forth feelings of hate and enmity.

It was at the close of this year that the abortive attempt

* Que. Doc., II., p. 424.

from Canada was made against Northampton, which I have related elsewhere.*

In December de Brouillan went to France, leaving de Bonaventure as Governor. He never again resumed the Government. On his return in "le Profond," he died at sea at Chebucto on the 22nd of September, 1705. He was buried at sea; but his heart was brought to Port Royal.

The correspondence which took place between Dudley and de Vaudreuil, the narrative of which I have given,† occurred at this date.

De Bonaventure looked forward to be appointed to the Governorship, but the influence of the priests was exercised against him. He himself had described the ecclesiastics as acting against the King's authority.§ De Bonaventure was an excellent naval officer, and his public career was in all respects honourable to him. In spite of his disappointment, he loyally co-operated with de Subercase, who was named to the Government, and gave the latter his full and earnest support. De Bonaventure was plainly told that the complaint against his habits and morals was the cause that the Government was not given to him. His conduct, it was said, had been a public scandal, and he was called upon to amend it in future.||

Daniel Auger de Subercase, who was appointed Governor in succession to de Brouillan, was a man of eminence, and had been actively engaged for several years in Canada and Newfoundland. He had thirty-three years' service,¶ having arrived with de Vaudreuil in 1687. He is mentioned as being in command of a movable camp of two hundred men, and as

* Ante Volume II., p. 418.

† Parl. MS., 3rd series, vol. II., p. 655, de Bonaventure au Ministre, 30 Novembre, 1705.

‡ Ante Vol. II., p. 425.

§ Parl. MS., 3rd series, vol. II., p. 98.

|| Que. Doc., II., p. 472. His relations with a Madame de Freneuse are detailed with a fullness of scandal, which it is surprising a Minister would permit a subordinate to write.

¶ See his letter to Nicholson, 31 Oct., N.S., 1710. "I've served the King six and thirty years." Nova Scotia Hist. Coll. I., p. 72.

advancing to attack the Iroquois in 1689, during the massacre at Lachine, when he was ordered by de Vaudreuil to halt.* He was present at Quebec during Phips' attack in 1690. He accompanied de Frontenac in the campaign against the Onondagas in 1696. For his services on this occasion he was much commended.† He had a high reputation in the English Provinces, being mentioned as a "resolute soldier."‡ He had succeeded de Brouillan as Governor of Newfoundland, although there appears to have been an interval of some months, when the Government was administered by de Costabelle and Durand la Garenne. In 1703 he was Governor of Placentia, where he remained until October, 1706. Few men in the history of French rule were distinguished by higher qualities. But as is often the fate of men of truth and ability, he was not favoured by fortune. It fell to his lot to be the last French Governor of Acadia, and to sign the capitulation by which Nova Scotia passed from French power. He was little loved by the ecclesiastics, and as no scandal could be raked up against him, he was represented as being deficient in orthodoxy.

De Subercase arrived in Acadia on the 28th of October, 1705.§ He found the colony in great distress, in want of everything.|| He drew the attention of the French Government to the necessity of providing for the Indians, for their alliance was indispensable, and so long as they received merchandise from the French they could be relied on. He held it necessary

* Ante Vol. II., p. 183.

† N.Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 653.

‡ N.Y. Hist., Doc. V., p. 43.

§ The letter of de Subercase in the Quebec Documents, p. 462, dated Port Royal, 25 October, 1706, should evidently be dated 1707. During the whole of 1706 de Subercase was in Newfoundland. (Series 3, MS. Parl. Lib., Vol. IV.) On the 14th of October of that year he wrote thanking the Minister for his appointment to the Government of Acadia. (p. 583). The letter alluded to relates the events of 1706, not those of 1705, when de Bonaventure was administering the government. (Que. Doc., Vol. II., p. 462. 24 December, 1706.) This mistake of date places the assumption of the Government of Acadia by de Subercase, a year earlier than it took place.

|| "Dans une grande desolation parce qu'on y manquoit de tout." Que. Doc., II., p. 460.

to place a man of character among them, to retain them under control, and he recommended the younger de Saint Castin for the duty. He pointed out that the English had two vessels on the coast, one with fifty guns and a crew of two hundred men, one of twenty guns with a crew of one hundred and twenty, and he thought that they could be taken by vessels sent from Quebec or Placentia, which should lie in wait for them off Cape Sable.

De Subercase found that the priests in Acadia were desirous of taking cognizance of all matters, and of holding the balance in temporal as in spiritual affairs. The Minister, on receiving his report to that effect, instructed de Subercase to restrain the priests within their legitimate position. They were to be sustained in all matters affecting their office. If they went beyond their proper sphere, he was told to report the fact, and the King would bring them back to their duty.*

Massachusetts, now awake to the danger which threatened her commerce from the privateers which found refuge in Port Royal, determined to attempt the conquest of the place. The Bay of Fundy and the southern coast of Nova Scotia were seldom without the presence of such vessels of both nations; and although success in this warfare attended no particular side, the loss of Massachusetts was by far the greater, owing to her more extended trade, and the greater value of her cargoes, while the French vessels taken were generally privateers. Prisoners on both sides increased. There were voyages between Boston and Port Royal to effect their exchange. It has been stated that these visits furnished opportunity for much illicit traffic. One result, however, followed: knowledge of the situation and defences of Port Royal was obtained by the Boston mariners.

In order to remove the protection given to the French privateers, it was resolved that an effort should be made to capture this fort. Application was made to London for a force to assist in the enterprise; but it was not possible to send troops from the continent at that date. Massachusetts, con-

* Que. Doc., II., p. 476.

sequently, resolved to undertake the conquest, and New Hampshire and Rhode Island were induced to join in the attempt. Connecticut declined to take part in it. The expedition was placed under the command of Colonel March, and consisted of two regiments, under Colonels Wainwright and Hilton, the whole numbering some thousand men. There were only the "Deptford" man-of-war and a galley to act as convoy. The force left Boston on the 24th of May, 1707, and arrived on the 6th of June, before Port Royal.

There was a guard-house at the entrance of the channel, whence the alarm was immediately given by firing cannon. The few men who were at the post abandoned it, and made their way across the woods to the fort to confirm the news. The vessels sailed into the inner waters, placing themselves to the north-west of Goat Island, some three miles and a-half below the fort. March landed with seven hundred men on the south side: Appleton, with 300 men, established himself on the opposite shore.

Port Royal, the modern Annapolis, is situated on an arm of the Bay of Fundy, on the north-west of Nova Scotia. The entrance is about half-a-mile wide. In a length of less than a mile the sheet of water widens to a league. The fort of Port Royal on the south shore is about six and a-half miles from the entrance to the narrow inlet.

The fort was in bad condition, owing to the heavy rains which had fallen. De Subercase called on the inhabitants to aid in its defence, and placed them at work on its repair. He organized small parties to distress the invaders. In order to meet March's force, de Subercase placed himself at the Petite Rivière, to the west of the fort, with about two hundred men; they offered but little resistance to March's advance, and rapidly gave way. De Subercase's horse was shot in the attempt to rally them, and a retreat was ordered to the fort. The New England troops crossed the stream and established themselves in the houses on the Cape. As the French retreated they burnt what houses lay between the enemy and the fort; the besiegers themselves destroying several buildings.

A few days before the attack, sixty Canadians had arrived from the Saint John.* They had been sent from Quebec to complete the crew of the frigate "la Bisone"; a valuable accession to the strength of the garrison. Joined with some Indians this force commenced to harass the troops on the north side, with, however, but little effect, ten men only being killed in the skirmishes.

The invaders protected themselves by entrenchments, but remained inactive during the three days, the 10th, 11th, and 12th. There was an attempt from the fort to bombard them, but without effect, the shells not reaching the camp. On the night of the 13th and 14th the force advanced as if to storm the fort; some shots were exchanged, when the column retreated. The ships advanced nearer the fort, but only with the intention of receiving the troops. On the 16th the force re-embarked, the ships gaining the open sea on the 18th.

From the commencement the troops were without confidence in their own operations.† The New England officers were unenterprising and ignorant of their duty; the men without discipline. March on many occasions had given proof of his personal courage; but he was paralyzed by his want of knowledge of the duties he had undertaken. On the 11th of June, a Council of War was held, when it was resolved that "the enemy's well-disciplined garrison in a strong fort was more than a match for our raw, undisciplined army," and it was held that all that could be effected was to spread themselves over the country, and destroy the buildings and property of the inhabitants. Fortunately for the good fame of the leaders, this course was not followed; and it was resolved to abandon the attempt. The small fleet carried the troops across to Casco Bay; while Colonel Redknapp, who had some little knowledge as an engineer officer, and Colonel Appleton went to Boston for orders.

The loss in men had been so trifling, and the expedition had been so well provided, that Dudley could not restrain the

* Que. Doc., II., p. 477.

† William Dudley to Governor Dudley, 31 May, 1707.

expression of his disappointment. At Boston the dissatisfaction was intense. Success had been looked upon as certain, and popular indignation took the course of writing insolent anonymous letters to the discredit of the force, especially to March and Wainwright, accusing them of cowardice and misconduct, in language the most offensive.

It was difficult to recall March, and equally inexpedient to supersede him. The Governor accordingly sent three commissioners to Casco, bearing orders for the force to return to the attack. They were instructed to oversee and direct the operations and actively carry on the siege. They were popular nominations, made with the view of satisfying public feeling; Colonels Hutchinson and Townsend, with Mr. Leverett, who had been Speaker of the House. They took with them one hundred recruits with some deserters to increase the force.

On their arrival they found on the part of the men an utter aversion to resume operations. The force as reported by them was 743 officers and men. Some of the officers met and signed a round-robin refusing to proceed to Port Royal.* The ringleaders were, however, known, and were arrested; upon which the remainder submitted and the force re-embarked. They stopped at Passamaquoddy on the 18th of August, and when at this place, March declared himself incapable of continuing in command. His health was broken, and his mind was unequal to any further strain. Wainwright accordingly was placed in that position.

They crossed over to Port Royal on the 21st of August, and disembarked to remain before the fort ten days. The French threw up entrenchments on the north side, thus preventing them landing there, firing on the New England forces on all occasions. Nine men were surprised in a garden in an attempt to obtain some cabbages: they were surrounded by one hundred French and Indians, and all killed. The forag-

* Hutchinson, II., p. 168, states that he found this document among Colonel Hutchinson's papers, signed by a great number, in which they peremptorily refused to obey the order.

ing parties were so harassed, that the service could not be performed without a large escort. Illness depressed the troops, some suffering from fluxes, some from swellings in the throat. Their moral strength had alike deserted them.* No serious attack was made upon the fort. In this second attempt it cannot be called a siege, the French had but three men killed and wounded. Owing to the incessant attacks on the invaders, they were more engaged in keeping open their communications, than in carrying on any offensive operations. In this condition they re-embarked. The loss during the second landing was sixteen killed and sixteen wounded.

Although little damage was done to the fort, and the garrison had in no degree suffered, for scarcely a casualty is recorded, the inhabitants had not experienced the same immunity. Many were distressed by the destruction of their houses and property, while the seizure of the cattle entailed great loss to the owners. Families previously in prosperous circumstances owing to these injuries were cast into poverty; and although strong recommendations were sent to France that some indemnity should be given, none was ever granted.

Public dissatisfaction was strongly expressed on the return of the expedition. The principal officers were threatened with a court martial, but no proceedings were taken. Nothing indeed could have been more unsatisfactory. The men were willing to fight; the fault had been with the inexperienced leaders, who, impressed with a sense of responsibility, were incapable of determining the course to be followed. It was under this strain March broke down, for his courage was undoubted.

* Letters of Colonel Wainwright to the Commissioners of the 25th of August, given by Hutchison. The dates in the text are new style.

CHAPTER III.

In 1708 de Vaudreuil organized an attack of unusual extent against New England. One hundred Canadians were selected for the duty, and several officers of the regular force volunteered to accompany the expedition. Detachments were obtained from the Mountain and Sault christian Iroquois, joined with Algonquins and Abenakis. Hertel de Rouville was placed in command, with St. Ours des Chaillons as his lieutenant. The Indians were placed under Boucher de la Perrière.

The scheme of the campaign was that de Rouville and St. Ours, with the French portion of the force, should ascend the Saint Francis. They were to be followed by the Algonquins, and the Abenakis settled at Bécancour, with the Hurons from Lorette. De la Perrière, with the christian Iroquois, was to ascend Lake Champlain. These parties were to meet at Lake Nikisipique, at which place a large body of the Kennebec and other Indians were to join them. This lake is known in modern times as Lake Winipiseogee, in New Hampshire. The Jesuits were particularly active in exciting the Abenakis, and de Vaudreuil was complimented from France, for his energy in urging them to effort.*

Haverhill, on the Merimac, was particularly exposed to attack. In February, 1704, the fortified house of Bradley was surprised by a small party of Indians. One Johnson who was in the house, fired on the first who entered, and Mrs. Bradley, who had some boiling soap on the fire, threw a ladle full of the scalding fluid on his head. Johnson was shot dead. Mrs. Bradley, with four others, were carried off. Although advanced in pregnancy, she had to carry heavy burdens in the deep snow. Her child was born in the forest,

* N. Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 805.

to be killed on its birth. On her recovery she was taken to Montreal, and sold for eighty livres. The following year her husband went on foot to Canada, and ransomed her, and the pair returned to Massachusetts. A second attack was made the same year, when two men were surprised. It was not until 1708 that the more noteworthy attack was made, under the organization I have described.

The news of the expedition, as was usual, was carried to Albany by the christian Mohawks, and the information conveyed to the governor of Massachusetts. The difficulty was to know where the blow was to fall. The policy of the French had been established by many years' painful experience. It was known that the mischief was not threatened against a pre-determined objective point, which could be defended. It might be looked for as certain, that no well garrisoned place would be attacked. It was the whole frontier which was threatened; and it seems, as if it had been impossible to inculcate on the whole body of settlers, the necessity of continued watchfulness and unrelaxed vigilance. A few soldiers, however, were sent to Haverhill, and had they been disciplined and properly commanded, surprise would have been impossible.

The march from Canada did not take place until the 20th of July. As the party was starting to ascend the Saint Francis, one of the Hurons by some mischance was killed. The accident affected the remainder of the tribe. They looked upon the event as a bad omen, and they refused to proceed. A feeling of a similar character took possession of the Sault Indians, who were ascending Lake Champlain. Sickness broke out in their band, and they declared that they were unable to go forward; further, that it was dangerous for them to do so, for their malady would affect the whole force.

As the Algonquins and the Abenakis declared their willingness to continue, de Vaudreuil wrote pressing orders to de Rouville, to march forward even with the reduced forces, and not to return without having attempted some important enterprise. At Lake Nikisipique the French leaders were again disappointed. The Eastern Indians were absent; they

had been induced to make an attempt in another direction, and had not attended at the rendezvous. De Hertel determined, nevertheless, to persevere. His force consisted of two hundred and fifty Canadians and Indians. They had already passed over many leagues of forest, and they went onwards until in the neighbourhood of the outpost settlements. They had now to select the spot, which circumstances would suggest as one, they could successfully attack, and obtain prisoners with which they could return to Canada.

Haverhill was well known. Ten years previously it had been sacked, twenty-seven of the inhabitants slain and thirteen made prisoners. It consisted of about twenty-five or thirty houses, some of them fortified, and thirty soldiers were stationed there. Otherwise the village was undefended and was exposed to any well-directed assault; and when taken by surprise by a sufficient force was liable to be raided and destroyed. The salvation of the settlement depended on a watch being kept; and on the appearance of the enemy that the inhabitants should find shelter in the fortified houses, and there resolutely defend themselves.

At dawn on the 29th of August, de Hertel's force was discovered by a settler going to the woods, and the war whoop of the Indians soon awoke the inhabitants to their danger. The first victim was a woman named Smith, shot dead in attempting to reach a block house. The house of the minister Rolfe was attacked. Three soldiers were quartered there. Rolfe, awakened from his sleep, resolutely placed himself against the door, and called upon the men to arm and come to his assistance. They are represented as having been overcome by fear, pacing the floor in terror, and making no attempt at defence. A shot through the door broke Rolfe's arm. He retreated to the back-door to aid in the escape of his family, when he was shot dead. His wife was killed, his youngest child was seized and dashed against a stone. Hagar, a slave, rushed into the cellar with two children, covered them with tubs, and concealed herself. All escaped. Another woman successfully hid herself in an apple chest.

Although the Indians passed and repassed the spot, they remained unseen. The soldiers were killed. Of a family named Hartshorne, the father and three sons were killed outside their door, whither they had run on hearing the tumult. Mrs. Hartshorne with her children hid herself under a trap-door in the cellar, leaving a baby in bed. The child was thrown out of the window, to fall upon some boards unhurt. He grew up to be a man of extraordinary stature and strength.* The outlying houses were simultaneously attacked. In the assault sixteen inhabitants were killed, nine men, five women, and two children. Between thirty and forty persons of all ages were carried away prisoners.

The sun had now risen. The attacking party had alarmed the country, and it had to retreat without loss of time while possible to do so. Captain Ayer, with what force he could collect, endeavoured to intercept it. At first he had but twenty men, but the number was soon increased to seventy. The Canadians knew that every moment was precious. The force brought against them would soon become overpowering, and their one chance of escape was to press forward, while the strength brought against them was insufficient to hinder their advance. The struggle was desperate, but they made their retreat good; not, however, without sacrifice. They left behind nine dead, among them two officers, Hertel de Chambly and Jared de Verchères. Several of their prisoners also escaped. Their provisions, baggage and what booty they had taken, were abandoned, and they had difficulty in extricating themselves from their perilous situation. In accordance with their custom on such occasions, some of the captives were released and sent back with the message, that if pursued, the remainder of the prisoners would be immediately put to death, and all, that would be rescued, would be their corpses.†

* The first Era of the History of Haverhill. Mass., John B. Carless, 1881.

† Costabelle wrote from Placentia (3 October, 1708. Parl. MS. 3rd Series, II., p. 764) an exaggerated account of this expedition, that de Rouville had put every one to the sword in the fort that he had taken; and in his retreat being attacked in an ambuscade by two hundred English, he had defeated them, and

In spite of March's failure against Port Royal, and the circumstances connected with it so little flattering to the national pride, Massachusetts persevered with dogged determination in the policy she had formed, that for the preservation of her own political life it was necessary that the northern part of the continent should cease to be French. Although differently formulated, such a feeling was identical with the views with regard to New York and New England, entertained by the ablest men in Canada, who saw in the restless prosperity of these communities, threatened danger to French rule. For many years the conviction had become strengthened in both communities, that joint occupation of the Northern American continent by the two European nations was impossible; and to many the struggle for supremacy appeared inevitable.

I have related in a former part of the work* the attempt during 1708 to organize an expedition against Quebec, when Vetch proceeded to England to obtain aid from the Home Government; and that in 1709, while the Colonial forces were assembled at Massachusetts, and at Albany, they remained inactive, owing to the troops, which were to have been sent to America, having been despatched to Spain. In the autumn there had been a congress of governors, and representatives of the colonies held at Rhode Island, where it was resolved, that authorised agents should accompany Vetch and Nicholson, and urge the attack of Quebec. The British Government of that time considered the attempt of too great magnitude; but the Ministry consented that operations should be directed against Port Royal.

Nicholson arrived at Boston on the 15th of July (O.S.), 1710, in the ship "Falmouth," with several transports. A regiment of marines was on board and many English officers to aid in

only two or three escaped. De Subercase wrote to the Minister (Que. Doc., II., p. 499) that a party of Canadians and Indians had slaughtered from four to five hundred persons, without granting quarter. M. de Chevre appended the remark "That these cruel proceedings should be moderated. We may look for reprisals:" to which the Minister added, "to be forbidden, to write to M. de Vaudreuil, to know the truth of the fact and the reasons."

* Ante Vol. II., p. 444.

disciplining the new levies. The warships "Lowestoffe" and "Feversham" were ordered on the service from New York. Regiments were raised in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Vetch was appointed Adjutant-General. The whole force was under the command of Colonel Nicholson: the provincial troops being clothed and armed by the Queen.

The fleet left Boston on the 18th of September. It consisted of four ships of war, a provincial galley, a bomb-ship and tender, with thirty-six transports, hospital and store ships, and some few sloops; it sailed along the coast to Passamaquoddy Harbour. On the 24th of September the ships entered into Port Royal waters. The transport "Cæsar," the first to enter, got aground, and the wind increasing towards night, she went to pieces. Twenty-six men were drowned, twenty-four swimming ashore. The fleet followed, and anchored above Goat Island, having been led by the war-ship "Chester," with four French deserters on board. Shortly afterwards ten more men from the fort deserted to the fleet; while three Irishmen and a Dutchman went over to the French.

The garrison of Port Royal, which was to resist this imposing force, consisted only of three hundred and fifty men. The fort was much out of repair, but de Subercase counted upon the inhabitants giving their aid, and on the determination which he could impart to the garrison; especially as he remembered the failure of the former attack. He was, however, only supplied with a slender stock of provisions, and was without money to make further purchases: moreover, he was in poor credit, from the difficulty which had been experienced in payment of what was due on Government account. His soldiers were discontented, and desertions became so frequent, that de Subercase removed his canoes to prevent the continuance of this crime. Further, among the Acadians themselves provisions were scarce.

The British troops were landed on Monday, the 25th of September. Vetch, with drums beating and colours flying, took possession of some ground on the north shore. He

there entrenched himself. By four o'clock the remaining portion of the force was established on the south side. They were cannonaded from the fort without effect. The bomb-ship was advanced and threw shells into the fort and a picket of fifty men was pushed forward to the Petite Rivière. On the following day, the main body took ground within a mile of the fort. They were fired upon during their advance by the outlying pickets, and from the houses and gardens near which they passed; they lost three men. The British sentries were fired upon: a regiment was now ordered forward, which entrenched itself within four hundred paces of the fort. A sortie was made, but was beaten back. On Wednesday, the 27th, the guns were landed, and by Friday placed in position, in spite of a cannonade from the fort. In the afternoon, a flag of truce was sent by de Subercase asking protection for the ladies belonging to the garrison, that they might be received in the camp, some of them having taken refuge in the woods. Nicholson arrested this officer, and wrote that he had so acted, because he had failed to beat the *chamade* to know if he could be received, "such methods being observed amongst soldiers." De Subercase replied, that he was sorry that the officer had not caused the drum to be beaten in accordance with his orders. A curious correspondence took place between Nicholson and de Subercase, which extended over two days. Nicholson was desirous of showing every courtesy to the ladies, but refused to release the officer, whom he looked upon as a spy. One of the ladies, it was said, was in a condition, when it was feared that the noise of the bombs might be alarming. Nicholson offered her his protection. De Subercase's letters are in English, which, although not perfect, is well expressed; he asked Nicholson to write in French; at the same time he complained of his officer having been kept prisoner. Nicholson agreed to write in French and informed de Subercase that the officer sent was perfect in English, though he did not at first seem to own it, and Nicholson refused to send him back, as he considered him to be a spy. De Subercase's reply was an

offer of capitulation, stating that la Perrelle, the officer in question, could speak English, "for as to my part I understand it not."

On Sunday, the 1st of October (O.S.), firing had been commenced against the fort from the great guns and mortars, to which the French replied, and on receipt of de Subercase's letter, Nicholson summoned the Governor to deliver up the fort. De Subercase expressed his readiness to listen to honourable terms of capitulation, and asking for hostages that he might treat. Captain Reading, commanding the regiment of marines, and Captain Mathews, of the "Chester," were sent on the part of the British. De Bonaventure and de Goutin appeared in the English camp on the part of de Subercase.

After several amendments and alterations the articles of capitulation were drawn up and signed on the following day, the 13th of November (N.S.). The garrison was to march out, drums beating, colours flying. Ships should be furnished to carry the garrison to France; a passport being given for the ships' return. Six guns and two mortars were to be taken from the fort.* A vessel to be provided to carry the "privateers" to the West Indies. Those desirous of going to Placentia, in Newfoundland, could proceed by the nearest

* These pieces were afterwards purchased by Nicholson for the Queen. De Subercase's receipt for the money is extant, 24 October, (N.S.), "7,459 livres, twelve sous" [Nova Scotia Hist. Coll. I., p. 87]. The necessity of selling these guns was entailed by the clamorous conduct of the Acadians, to be paid for the provisions he had purchased.

It is set forth in the *résumé* of the letter of de Subercase [Que. Doc. II., p. 529], that the inhabitants of Acadia, who are greatly disappointed, having wished to cause him trouble for the payment of the bills he had given, for what is due by the King, in order to pay them, he was forced to sell to the English the mortar and six cannons granted by the capitulation, which, in connection with his own plate, his furniture and effects, had enabled him to pay the debts of the King. The almoner had not appeared. De Subercase thought that he had deserted, and that he had incited the inhabitants to take flight. De Subercase gives a bad account of the garrison, setting forth the pitiable condition in which they were placed, which was but too true, and that several had deserted. His engineer, de Labat, had shown an unwillingness to embark, and desired to join the English, so he had sent him to France as a prisoner.

passage ; Canadians and others having liberty to do so during the space of a year.

The fifth clause, of importance in view of future events, I give in full : " That the Inhabitants within Cannon shot of the Fort of Port Royal, shall remain upon their Estates, with their Corn, Cattle, and Furniture, During two years, in case they are not Desirous to go before, they taking the Oaths of Allegiance and Fidelity to Her Sacred Majesty of Great Britain."

A memorandum was attached explaining the words " within cannon shot " as " three English miles round the fort." The inhabitants within this distance were to have the benefit of the article. The names, " male and female," of those comprehended in the article amounted " to 487 persons."

On the 14th the French ladies came to the camp and breakfasted with the English officers, Sir Charles Hobby* leading in Madame de Bonaventure.

Seventeen " New English prisoners " were surrendered to the victors. They came to " our camp all in Rags, and several of them without shirts, shoes, or Stockings."†

Perfect courtesy was observed between the two commanders. On the 16th de Subercase notified his intention to give over the fort, and asked for Monsieur Vetch to be sent to arrange the proceeding. " I wish you a good morning," writes de Subercase, who in this difficult position was true to himself, " and I pray you to believe," &c., &c.

Two hundred British troops marched to the fort and formed line. The General, and his staff, with the hostages de Bonaventure and des Goutin, were met half way on the bridge by de Subercase, and the two British hostages ; de Subercase addressed Nicholson in characteristic language. " Sir," he said, " I'm very sorry for the misfortune of the King my master in Losing such a Brave Fort and the Territories adjoining ;

* Hutchinson II., 153, remarks that Sir Charles Hobby was " knighted some said for fortitude and resolution at the time of the earthquake in Jamaica, otherwise for the further consideration of £800."

† Nov. Sco. Hist., Doc. I., p. 84.

and count myself happy in falling into the hands of so noble and generous a General, and now deliver up the keys of the Fort and all the magazines into your hands, hoping to give you a visit next Spring.*

Vetch received the keys from Colonel Nicholson; he had been appointed the first governor.

The French force marched out with their national gaiety, saluting Colonel Nicholson as they passed him. The first guard was mounted in the fort under Captain Mascarene, hereafter to pursue a distinguished career in the now British province of Nova Scotia. Two hundred marines and two hundred and fifty New England volunteers remained in the fort.

A cruiser which had been sent out returned with a ketch of de Saint Castin's. She endeavoured to escape, and the crew had run her ashore and fled to the woods; but de Saint Castin was taken. His services a few days later were brought into requisition.

After a solemn day of thanksgiving for the success of the expedition, the troops commenced their preparations for departure; not, however, before they had experienced hostility from the Indians, some of whom, concealed in the woods, fired upon a party engaged in obtaining water for the ships, but without inflicting injury.

On Friday, the 24th, the French troops embarked on the transports which were to carry them to France; the "Frigot," the "Four Friends," and the "John and Anne:" the total number, officers, civil and military, the garrison and inhabitants, was two hundred and fifty-eight.†

After the surrender the French prisoners had been placed on the English vessels, and we find de Subercase writing from the "Falmouth." Nicholson liberally supplied the transports with every requirement. He ordered to be put on board "four pipes of wine, four casks of Jamaica sugar," and "several

* *Ib.* p. 85.

† According to de Subercase's report, 26 October, Que. Doc. II., p. 529, only one hundred and fifty-six marched out of the garrison, "tous nuds," to whom the English had to furnish food, "n'y en ayant plus dans leurs magasins."

sorts of spice for the women and children." Likewise a hogshead of rum in the place of beer. He sent to de Subercase from his own stores, wine, beer, and provisions. He called a council of war, so that the question could be asked if the articles of capitulation had been fulfilled; and if it was considered there had been failure, to point out what was wanting. The message was sent by an officer, who returned with the acknowledgment of de Subercase that the articles had in every respect been observed, with his and the hearty thanks of his men for the mode in which they had been carried out. Two more letters were exchanged. Nicholson wished de Subercase a happy, prosperous and speedy voyage, and offered to be of service to him in Great Britain in any way. He added, in a postscript, "With this I send two barrels of beer, one of each sort, understanding you want some." De Subercase replied in the same spirit. One sentence of this letter, in view of the subsequent pretensions of the Acadians, is important: "I hope that you have given Col. Vetch an order to be as just and as good as you have been, and that he do Justice to those French that remain behind as has been done to those that now are going away.* De Subercase promised to write to Nicholson in London. On the 26th, the English fleet of transports sailed out of the basin, and on the 6th of November the vessels arrived at Deer Island, and the leading officers proceeded to Boston.

As previously to the departure of the expedition a fast had been proclaimed, so on the return of the troops a general thanksgiving was held throughout New England on the 27th of November, for the result of the campaign.

On his departure Nicholson issued a proclamation, declaring that Annapolis Royal, for such name was now given to the conquered country, was the only place where trade could be conducted. He resolved also to send Major Livingstone† with de Saint Castin to Quebec, with a letter to M. de Vaudreuil,

* Nova Scotia Hist. Collections, I., p. 93.

† Philip Livingstone was connected with Vetch, by marriage of the latter with Margaret, Livingstone's aunt. Some of Vetch's descendants through his daughter are still living in New York. See *International Review*, November, 1881.

informing him of the taking of Port Royal, and he obtained a pass from de Subercase for them to proceed overland. The council of war pointed out that the inhabitants of the whole country, save those who were within cannon shot of the fort, "are left absolutely prisoners at discretion," and de Vaudreuil was informed if he continued to practise his barbarities on the frontier settlements of New England, the English would retaliate in Acadia.* They hoped that de Vaudreuil would give no cause for such reprisals, and would exchange the prisoners held by the Indians: among whom the daughter of Williams, the pastor of Deerfield, was demanded; threatening that if these prisoners were not returned the inhabitants of Acadia should in the same manner be "made slaves among our Indians."

The journey was marked by hardship and danger. Livingstone did not arrive at Quebec until the 12th of December. At one spot his life was threatened by an Indian, and only saved by the intervention of de Saint Castin. De Vaudreuil's answer was that he had never known the French to be charged with inhumanity, and that they did not ill-treat their English prisoners. On the contrary, they often redeemed them. He was quite ready to exchange such prisoners as were with the French; he could not control those of the Indians. As to the menace of retaliation of delivering the Acadians to the New England Indians, he could act similarly to the prisoners who would fall in his power.†

* "that as we are informed you have often formerly made incursions upon some of the exposed Fronteers of Her Majestys Colony's of New England, New York, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, by your savagely Barbarous Indians and French, to the inhumanly murdering a great many poor innocent People and children. We do, therefore, make known to you by these presents, that in case you shall after this comes to your hands, either by your French or Indians, directly or indirectly, commit any Hostilities, as murder, depredations, or otherwise whatsoever, that we will upon notice thereof make the same Military Execution upon the chief of your people in this country, L'Accadie, or Nova Scotia." Letter from the Council to de Vaudreuil. Annapolis, 11th of November (O.S.), 1710. Nova Scotia Hist. Coll. I., p. 99.

† De Vaudreuil's denial of his responsibility for these barbarities can in no way be accepted. From the earliest day of his government, in 1703, during the succeeding twenty-two years until his death, he was incessant in organizing

The French could never be brought to recognise the barbarous injustice of their policy, in allowing the Indians to retain as slaves the prisoners taken in an expedition organized at Quebec, of which the Indians formed a part.

De Vaudreuil communicated the capture of Port Royal to France,* and endeavoured to throw blame on its defence. Admitting that the garrison had been overpowered by a superior force, de Vaudreuil complained that de Subercase had failed to pay attention to the notices sent from Canada of the certainty of his being besieged. Such vague accusations can always be made. It is a slight accusation to make, that de Subercase had failed to retain at Port Royal seventy men sent as a reinforcement for Canada, and that he had ordered away seven officers and fifteen soldiers. If there were ground for dissatisfaction that de Subercase had failed to transport in sacks, the provisions which were at the Bay Verte, it would be a more serious charge. De Vaudreuil does not specify the means de Subercase possessed for performing this duty. De Vaudreuil likewise reported his correspondence with Nicholson, stating that the French remaining in Acadia would find themselves utterly at the mercy of the conqueror.

De Vaudreuil's statements are often at variance with fact. It is the character of his assertion that a number of French soldiers had been unwilling to embark with de Subercase, and had found their way to the Bay Verte. This circumstance

attacks against the New England frontier, either openly or by intrigue, holding in utter disregard the obligations of the treaty of Utrecht. Such attacks were justified by him in his correspondence. In 1708, he wrote [30 May. Que. Doc. II., p. 487] "I continue to send out parties in the government of Boston in order to make prisoners, so by these means I may be informed of the enterprises against Acadia or this country, Canada." He was upheld in this course by the French Minister. The latter expressed his dissatisfaction (Que. Doc. II., p. 489) at de Vaudreuil's inactivity, with the force at his command, after all he had written of causing ravages against the English of Boston. De Vaudreuil was told, "The King absolutely desires that you send out parties against them, and you seize the first opportunity of going yourself to attack their posts when you are sure of success."

* 25 April, 1711. N.Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 853.

is not stated by de Subercase or in the English accounts. In his difficulties de Vaudreuil had recourse to those on whom he could rely ; the missionaries. He charged them to tell the Acadians he would afford them all the aid in his power. His attention, however, was more seriously directed to the probability of an attack on Quebec, of which he had received intelligence.

Projects for the repossession of Port Royal were immediately formed. The younger de Saint Castin received a commission on full pay in the Colonial corps, and was appointed commandant over the whole of Acadia.* His instructions were to maintain the Indians in the French interest, and to urge unceasing war against the English. He was to represent that it was their interest more than ever to ally themselves to the French, for the English desired to reduce them to slavery, with the view of their entire destruction.

In order to prevent trade between Port Royal and the Indians, de Saint Castin was directed with what French and Indians he could collect to pillage the English who were taking goods into the woods, and to harass whoever of the French of Port Royal and of Acadia were trading without Canadian permits. If resistance were offered, he was to kill such as opposed him ; otherwise he was to make prisoners of them, and to spare them as much as possible. De Vaudreuil never wrote a despatch of this character without some mean attempt to anticipate responsibility falling upon himself ; but he was without a scruple as to the misery he would cause, and de Saint Castin was directed to organize as many attacks as possible against the English of Port Royal and those of Boston, and personally to lead them, and on all these matters to act in concert with the Missionaries.

* Instructions 18 January, 1711, Que. Doc. II., p. 534.

CHAPTER IV.

These instructions were the first of the series of orders from Canada to attack the British in Nova Scotia. Except at Pentagoet, there was not a French family south of Passamaquoddy. On the main land the attacks were to be made by the Kennebec and other Indians, in connection with Canadians from the Saint Lawrence. In Acadia there was the native population to appeal to, and every effort was to be made to awaken their fears and hatred against the English. The Acadians were without schools: few could read or write. Without amusements, their principal occupation beyond their daily labours was the indulgence in quarrels and disputes as to the boundaries of their lands, and regarding trifles of little account. Litigation supplied the place of more pleasing distractions. One of the first duties of the superior officers of the Port Royal garrison was to constitute a court to settle the interminable disputes of the *banlieu*. In the submission of these difficulties the *habitants* shewed no dissatisfaction with their condition. They expressed no regret for the French, and except for the intrigues which had their origin in Canada, and the influence of the ecclesiastics in awakening religious susceptibility, the few Acadians then in Nova Scotia would have glided into quiet acceptance of the new government. Their whole number could not have exceeded 1,600 souls. In 1714 they consisted only of 305 families, of 1,773 souls. In 1707 they were less than 1,500.

The period was one of war; and in a national crisis it is not the policy to look too closely, or too scrupulously to the means devised to obtain an advantage. The age was without humanity or mercy, and the end in view was the one point regarded. That the French should desire to retake Acadia was the natural feeling of a proud, gallant people. De Suber-

case in accepting his defeat had thrown down his challenge ; he hoped in a few months to revisit Port Royal with a force to retake it. It was to be looked for, that emissaries would mingle with the population to keep awake their national sentiment. That deep founded love of country, based on pride in her history, and satisfaction with the institutions under which life had been passed, identification with her glories, and her position in civilization, the French Acadian did not know. There was one point only on which he could be appealed to. He had been bred up in the Roman catholic religion, with the belief that all who were not in the fold, were atheists or worshippers of the devil. He was taught to look upon the British as the embodiment of evil, and that submission in any form would be the total annihilation of that faith, to the dogmas of which, from first infancy, he had given an unreasoning, undoubting submission. The first history of Nova Scotia is a chronicle for forty years of determined hostility on their part. They refused to furnish supplies for the English garrison, and were ready to enter into any plot for the destruction of its members in small parties, and to make away with them individually when in any way unprotected.

We have an account of the early days of the possession of Port Royal by the British from the pen of Paul Mascarene, who fills so prominent a page in Nova Scotian history. He was of French birth, of a huguenot family driven from France at the revocation of the edict of Nantes in 1685. Born in 1684, at this time he was twenty-seven years of age. He entered the army in 1708, and having obtained a brevet majority after the taking of Port Royal, his rise had been rapid. He was a man of commanding ability and unblemished honour. Like many others who have served their country chivalrously and unselfishly, he received but slight reward. In the natural course of service he rose to the rank of Major-General. He died poor, having only the half-pay of his lieutenant-colonelcy to sustain him at Boston, where his wife's family resided. If the intriguing politicians of his day

in their struggle for office neglected his just claim to consideration, his place in history is assigned among the most honourable names it can record.*

The feelings of the garrison of Port Royal towards the *habitants* of the *banlieu*, who, by the terms of the capitulation, were to remain in possession of their property for two years, was that of friendliness, and they were desirous of treating those in the other settlements with every consideration. In the middle of November Mascarene was sent to Mines with a party of fifty-nine men and a surgeon, one half of whom were marines. He had received written instructions for his guidance. On his way he met a French sloop, which by force or persuasion returned with him to the settlement. Vetch claimed that he had given the settlements not included in the capitulation his protection. He therefore "expected of right due to him" "a very good present to the value of 6,000 livres," money or peltry, "with a contribution of twenty pistoles† per month, towards maintaining his table from the day the fort was surrendered." The people of the *banlieu* to pay as much. Mascarene was to make this proposal in general terms, and to learn what could be given; in any case, he was to state what Vetch expected. The people were to be informed that they could trade with Port Royal, but it was the only place where they could do so, and they were not to traffic with vessels or parties not having a written permission.

Mascarene on the 12th (N.S.) issued a proclamation, calling upon the inhabitants to assemble at a place most convenient for him to land, in order that he could carry out his instructions; they were not to take umbrage at his landing with armed men, for they were brought only for his own protection.

Mascarene, on the 13th, at noon, was received by one hundred and fifty of the inhabitants "with demonstrations of joy." His instructions had been that the men every night should sleep on the vessel, but he found this arrangement to

* "Memorial to His Excy. Francis Nicholson, Esq., &c., by Paul Mascarene, Boston, New England, Nov. 6, 1713." *Nova Scotia Historical Coll.*, IV., pp. 69-89.

† 200 livres.

be impossible. The brig was anchored three leagues distant, and the tide only permitted entrance into the creek for an hour and a half each tide. Accordingly he quartered his men in four of the houses, and appointed a sergeant's guard to prevent surprise. A meeting was held, and Mascarene stated his business. Those who were present asked to be allowed to select some few parties to represent the whole number. Mascarene consented. Six persons were chosen for Mines, one for Chignecto, one for Cobequid; eight in all. Mascarene plainly told his mission. The *habitants* were much concerned, and pleaded great poverty. They represented the misery of the people by what they called "the tyranny of de Subercase, who was wont to oppress them." It was impossible, they said, to make up the sum demanded, for one third of their number were beggars, and they asked to be permitted to raise half the amount. In the meantime they would "petition the governor, that in consideration of the miserable condition they were in," he would remit the other half. They desired to be furnished with some show of power to oblige the meaner part of their number to contribute. Mascarene complied with their wishes. The amount in furs was collected with apparent cheerfulness, and placed in the hands of John Landry, the master of the sloop, to take to Annapolis under convoy of the brigantine.

Before his departure Mascarene asked if there was any complaint against the soldiers. The inhabitants praised their civil behaviour; he himself paid sixteen livres for the expenses of himself, the lieutenant, and surgeon. He marched his party three miles overland to take the boats sent for them, and embarking on the brigantine, reached Annapolis on the 1st of December (N.S.).

Landry presented the furs, which were estimated to be worth between five and six hundred livres, and submitted the petition to be released from payment of the half of the contribution, and of the twenty pistoles per month. The full sum named was never paid. There were subsequent payments in furs, wheat and peas; also in bills drawn by de Subercase, and endorsed by Vetch. They must have been bills in

payment for the cannon sold by de Subercase; they were plentiful in the community, and remained current some time. According to Mascarene, no steps were ever taken for the monthly payment of twenty pistoles. There was an attempt to obtain an equal amount from the *habitants* in the neighbourhood of the fort. To judge by subsequent events, not much of it could have been received; on this point there is no information.

The winter set in cold. The fort was overcrowded, and in order to obtain more room, the chapel was turned into a barrack. Owing to the frost, the chimneys could not be built, and for a time some privation was felt. Wood could only be obtained on the opposite bank of the inlet at a crown a cord; and it had to be carried across in flat-bottom boats, with labour and at some risk. Provisions were scarce. There were beef and pease, but neither flour nor pork. A small supply of corn was purchased from the *habitants*. Capon,* an officer of the garrison, at the invitation of a few of the *habitants*, was ordered to go up the river and make an attempt to obtain supplies. He landed at the house of one Peter Le Blanc, nine miles above the fort. While they were at supper, a party of men entered with loaded arms cocked, and called upon Capon to follow them, threatening death to whosoever should offer resistance. They were hurrying their prisoner through the woods, and had halted at a house, when they were overtaken by Le Blanc, who persuaded them to release Capon on the payment of twenty pistoles, Le Blanc finding the money.

It was the first outrage the British garrison experienced. It may be said the first consequence of de Saint Castin's instructions. A proclamation, offering a reward for the apprehension of the men concerned, was issued. The French made great show of sympathy, but no arrests were made. Difficulties also arose as to the supply of Indian corn from

* Peter Capon, lieutenant of the company of Matroses, was gazetted by Nicholson previous to the departure of the force. He is named in a communication to de Subercase as Muster-Master of Marines. The Matroses were soldiers attached to the artillery, who worked in the service of the guns and formed a guard for the sutlers' waggons.

Mines. Little grain was raised in the *banlieu*; the inhabitants obtained what they required from Mines. There were disputes as to the quantity the garrison should receive, which caused "clamour and noise." In January, however, a sloop arrived from Boston, which "brought everything to rights."

Vetch took steps to shew, that such proceedings as the assault upon Capon, could not be carried on with impunity. With a party of fifty men he arrested four of the principal *habitants* and the priest, and for a time held them as hostages until the perpetrators of the outrage should be discovered.

The insecurity of the fort called for serious attention. The walls were incapable of sustaining the fire of the guns placed upon them; and there were numerous breaches in the fortifications, the repair of which was absolutely necessary. It was determined to sustain their imperfect condition by placing timber against them. A carpenter was sent along the river to examine the number of trees available, and during his examination the ill-will of the *habitants* became strongly manifest.

Nevertheless, with all this antipathy to the British garrison, it was to Vetch that "the perpetual complaints of the French against one another in their private feuds and quarrels" was referred.* This litigation became so frequent, that Vetch appointed Major Forbes, Captain Abercromby, with Capon, and Mascarene, as most versed in the French tongue, with two of the inhabitants, Chouet and St. Scene (*sic*), justices of the peace to meet twice a week and decide the cases. "There never arose out of the expenses of the Court so much as to suffice for paying of a clerk."

Vetch sailed for Boston, leaving Sir Charles Hobby in charge, and to carry out the repairs to the bastions and curtains of the fort. Vetch took with him the priest, one Père Justinian, who was *curé* of the *banlieu*, and also a prisoner who had been insolent.

The *habitants* who had been called upon to furnish the number of trees required, had professed to be willing to aid the

* Nova Scotia Hist. Coll., I., p. 77.

garrison, but had evaded the performance of the service. They assigned as a reason that their cattle were weak from want of fodder, and that the ice in the creeks had prevented the descent of the rafts. Every excuse was made to avoid compliance with the requisition. When these excuses were no longer possible, they declared that when making the attempt to haul the trees to the water, the Indians had threatened to kill them, if they carried one stick to the English.

Hobby, seeing that it was necessary to act with decision, sent a party up the river with Mascarene, who acted, as he states, with temper and judgment, "without any wrong molesting the inhabitants, and paid for everything I had of them." He sent for those who were known to be of the most mutinous spirit, and plainly told them, to use the words of Hobby, they would no longer be "fooled." He obtained attention to his request, and for a limited time the trees were brought down. Men in the fort were set to work on the repairs, receiving "18 pence a day, Boston money."†

The policy of the French was to keep alive the spirit of disaffection. The British garrison endeavoured to conciliate the *habitants*, and acted with the justice and forbearance which for the last two centuries have been the distinguishing mark of the British soldier in the field, amid an unfriendly population. The influence on which France depended was her missionaries. One Gaulin, the priest at Mines, boasts how he interfered to prevent this conciliatory conduct, by influencing the Indians and Acadians; and in order to destroy all hope of accommodation, he encouraged the Indians to attack the English, and openly oppose delivery at the fort, of the

* Nova Scotia Hist. Doc. IV., p. 79.

† Le Sieur Gaulin au Ministre, 7th septembre, 1711. "Les Anglais qui ont toujours regardé les sauvages comme un grand obstacle aux étab^{ts} qu'ils veulent faire à la côte de l'Acadie lui firent au commencement de l'hiver plusieurs propositions pour porter ces sauvages à se mettre de leur parti, il l'a non seulement empêché, mais a encore détourné toutes les négociations qu'ils ont voulu faire pour y parvenir; même pour leur ôter toute espérance d'accommodement; il a engagé ces sauvages à faire des courses sur eux, et à s'opposer ouvertement au transport des bois que le Gouverneur Anglais obligeait les habitants de fournir pour rétablir les fortifications." Parl. MS., 3rd Series II., p. 893.

timber, which the English Government had called upon the inhabitants to furnish.

During the extreme cold weather of winter a woman landed at Port Royal: Madame de Freneuse. She was accompanied by a young lad, her son, and an Indian. She arrived in a birch canoe, and her story was that she had crossed from the other side owing to the perfect destitution of the Penobscot Indians: from starvation she had been driven to the necessity of applying to live under the new government. She was received "very kindly by Sir Charles Hobby," and the liberty was granted to her to remain.

This was the same Madame de Freneuse who had been mentioned by the Minister* to de Subercase as having thrown the glamour of her charms over de Bonaventure for the preceding years during which she had been his mistress. He was reported to have had children by her, and nobody knew what had become of them. It was said that de Bonaventure, finding himself embarrassed by the threat of her being arbitrarily sent out of the colony, had had the weakness to exclaim that if they pushed him to extremity, they would force upon him the "*mauvais coup*" to go to Boston. De Subercase, on being ordered to make the woman leave, was directed to watch de Bonaventure. The report came from the ecclesiastics, in which they were sustained by des Goutin.† Madame de Freneuse now appeared as a Magdalen‡ to assist in the intrigues against the English garrison.

The fort of Annapolis, when taken possession of by the British, was in the worst possible state.§ The barracks were filthy, and had to be thoroughly cleaned. There were no beds. There was great trouble in getting wood for fuel, as

* Que. Doc., II., p. 491, 6 June, 1708.

† Vide Parl. MS., 3rd series, Vol. II., pp. 701, 832-843.

‡ Des Goutin wrote on this point, 23 December, 1707, *Ib.*, p. 744. "Il (de Subercase), m'a répondu positivement, que les prêtres en étaient contents et charmés de sa conduite."

§ "I forgot to mention how nasty we found the garison, and what pains wee were att in cleaning it." Mascarene, Nov. Sco. His. Coll., IV., p. 100.

has been stated. The sea coal being consumed, an attempt was made to obtain charcoal from the *habitants*, for the Indians harassed the men at the garrison engaged in making it. The ovens, bakehouse, and windmill had all to be repaired. The drains had to be made anew, and the ramparts, which were crumbling away, had to be repaired by trees.

As delay in the delivery of the trees was taking place, Vetch, who had returned from Boston and again assumed command, determined to send a party up the river to obtain the timber. Vetch had more than an ordinary motive for so acting; many circumstances had given rise to the belief that the fort would be attacked. A few of the inhabitants had taken the oath, and such as these were reproached for their conduct, and had been told that on the French reconquering the fort, which would soon come to pass, their conduct would cause their ruin. The priests threatened them with ecclesiastical vengeance for their subjection to heretics. Vetch well understood the policy which should be followed; the territory should be occupied by a force sufficient to dictate the terms, on which the French inhabitants should be permitted to remain, and in failure of their non-acceptance of them, they should be forced to leave the country.

In this emergency the engineer officer, Major Forbes, a man of high character and of great merit, applied for a party to proceed up the river to overawe any interference of the Indians, and by enforcing compliance from those unwilling to assist, give the well-disposed an excuse for being on good terms with the garrison. Seventy men were placed under the command of Captain Pigeon; Forbes accompanied the force generally to aid in the operation. Pigeon was to promise punctual payment for the timber delivered. If he found the *habitants* averse to furnishing the timber, they were to be threatened with severity. He was to abstain from violence. His men were not even to kill hogs, but to make a show of doing so. They might kill some fowls, but the fowls were to be paid for before they came away. Among those who were present was a Captain Bartlett.

has no
feel, as
1711.
†
Boston
Gaulin
Doc. I

The party proceeded up the river in two flat-bottomed boats and a whale boat. Resistance must have appeared impossible, for the party was sent out in secrecy. Mascarene knew nothing of it until ten o'clock the previous evening, when Bartlett, who occupied the same room with him, came and took leave of him. Whence did the intelligence of the design come? Doubtless from Madame de Freneuse, whose story had imposed on the officers of the garrison, who had received her with pity and kindness. Her presence can only be explained by her having undertaken the office of a spy.

The force proceeded to their destination nine miles up the river, carelessly, without precaution; half way they landed, on account of the tide. The whale boat, in which was Major Forbes and Ensign Coxsedge, rowed forward, and was a mile in front of the other boats. They had reached a narrow part of the stream, when they were fired upon by a force in ambush. The whole of those who were in the whale boat were killed, except Coxsedge, who received seven wounds. The other boats were not in sight, and on hearing the firing hurried to their comrades' relief. The attacking party consisted of one hundred and fifty Penobscot and Mines Indians, with some of the tribes from Canada, it was afterwards said, who had but a few hours landed. They fired rapidly on the boats as they pulled straight to the spot "right upon the fire," where they could see nobody, the enemy being covered by rocks and trees. The firing was continued as they landed on the beach, by which time sixteen were killed and nine wounded. Of the officers Major Forbes* and Elliott were killed, and Captain Bartlett and Coxsedge wounded. The remaining men, surrounded by Indians, could only surrender.†

* . . . "Our Vast Lost, Especially in Major Forbes, than whom the Queen has not a better Officer of his Employment, whose Loss we already Sensibly feel, as Indeed of them all." Vetch to the Governor of Massachusetts, 24 June, 1711. Nova Scotia Hist. Coll., IV., p. 96.

† The prisoners were afterwards ransomed. Captain Bartlett paid £50 Boston. Vetch paid £10 for each private, which was given "in goods to the priest Gaulin, sent by the Indians to receive them" [Mascarene]. Nova Scotia Hist. Doc. IV., p. 82. Gaulin reported [lettre des Goutin, au Ministre, 17 novembre,

Some of the *habitants* brought the news to the fort, and asked that a surgeon should be sent to the wounded men. They stated that there was but one Frenchman in the party. Vetch, however, in his report, declares that there were many Acadians painted like Indians. One of the sons of Madame de Freneuse was said to be present. She herself was removed the night following the attack, from the neighbourhood of the fort.

The rumour reached Vetch that six hundred men were on their way to besiege the fort. He quite comprehended that the report of such an attempt was to influence the Acadians not to join their interests with those of the British, and to delay the restoration of the crumbling walls. "Thank God," wrote Vetch in June, "it is now defensible." News also came that a French squadron was immediately to arrive. The consequence was that the French workmen engaged on the works left, and the *habitants* of the *banlieu* abandoned their houses. The priests on their side had not failed to invent narratives of the French successes at home. Those who are familiar with the events preceding the treaty of Utrecht, know the deplorable condition which France was, when these successes were reported. Vetch, like the Acadians, could only imperfectly learn the truth; but he had little doubt, but that the Acadians as a body were ready to join in hostilities against him. Gaulin relates how he and de Saint Castin had assembled the *habitants* and Indians with the view of organizing an attack.*

Accordingly Vetch called a council of war, which was held on the 15th of June (O.S.) After the late loss, the garrison had not two hundred effective men. There had been many deaths and much desertion. Originally the garrison consisted of two hundred marines and two hundred and fifty of the New

1711 Q. D. II., p. 547], that there were forty Indians, commanded by the Pentegoet chief, Simouret; that the expedition was proceeding up the river to burn the houses of the *habitants*; and that Simouret had written to tell him that he would burn the prisoners unless the fort was surrendered. Gaulin's statements, especially of his own merits, claim little attention.

* Que. Doc., II., p. 548.

England force. Taking into account the loss of the 10th of June, these numbers establish that there had been two hundred and ten casualties from death and desertion ; in May Vetch had reported the number to be one hundred and sixteen.

The council of war resolved that application should be made for a reinforcement of one hundred men well officered : it was pointed out that there was no one among the *habitants* who would give intelligence of a threatened attack. In order to complete the fortifications, the presence of Colonel Redknapp was asked to replace Colonel Forbes, and an application was made for the "Chester" frigate to be stationed in the harbour. On the 24th of June, Vetch submitted a plan of defence for Annapolis, recommending that a regiment of twelve companies of fifty-four rank and file should constitute the garrison. He added a postscript pointing out the pillaging and attacks of the Indians, and asked that one hundred of the Five Nation Indians should likewise be attached to the garrison.

The Acadians at this time changed their attitude ; from being "humble and apparently obedient they became haughty and imperious.* They threatened that the fort would be taken and everyone put to the sword. The garrison daily expected attack, and "nothing was left undone to guard against surprise." Half of the force was nightly on guard, and the remainder of the garrison slept in their clothes. The ammunition and the other requirements to carry on the war were obtained at Placentia from de Costebelle. De Saint Castin sent over the reverend Father Gaulin to procure powder and arms. Gaulin left about the 24th of August in charge of the munitions of war de Costebelle could give, "which," writes de Costebelle to de Saint Castin, "I am persuaded you will use to the destruction of our common enemies."† Fortunately for himself, Gaulin did not take his passage on the vessel which carried these arms and munitions, for she was captured by a privateer, and this incident may have been one of the influences which prevented any system-

* Nova Scotia Hist. Coll., p. 82.

† 24 August, 1711. Que. Doc., II., p. 542.

atic attack being made. In the middle of this strain, news came of the arrival at Boston of the fleet for the attack of Quebec, and Vetch received orders to join the expedition. He left Annapolis on the 6th of July, leaving Sir Charles Hobby in command.

The Acadians continued to blockade the fort, and to harass the garrison. One morning, they fired from a house upon the guard, proceeding to an outer post held for the protection of the shipping. They killed a sergeant and two men. The officer in command, Lyndesay, retired in good order. A party was sent out to sustain him, but the French were present in such numbers, that they could not be attacked.

The garrison was reinforced by two companies of the Massachusetts regiment, and their arrival so operated upon the garrison, that the men became clamorous for attacking the French, who still hung about the fort. A detachment was sent out by night, under Captain Lyon. He is represented as not acting with discretion, and found himself opposed by a large force. Reinforcements were sent to sustain him, when the French were entirely routed, many being dangerously wounded. This success acted so upon the men, that they asked to be led against the house which the French made their headquarters. The command was entrusted to Mascarene, and the place was burned without resistance. In September Mascarene, with other officers, was ordered to join the expedition against Quebec, and at this date the account, he has given of these early days, ceases.

I have already described the disgraceful mismanagement of this expedition,* and its ignominious failure. It had, however, the effect of making any attempt against Port Royal impossible, for the troops were kept in Canada for the defence of the Province. In Nova Scotia the knowledge that it was taking place had a paralyzing effect on the Acadians, and the strength put forth by the British led them to become outwardly more submissive. The *habitants* of the *banlieu* even entered into

* Ante Vol. II., pp. 453-468.

some accommodation with the garrison. De Saint Castin wrote one of the letters characteristic of the period, of which the effort was to keep in activity the old animosity.* He hoped the British were sincere, and that this reconciliation would not make the *habitants* responsible for the attacks which the Indians would make upon the British and upon themselves, to prevent the projected work being performed. The Acadians were exposing themselves to ruin, for the Indians desired no reconciliation, and they would ever repay with reprisals the cruelty they and theirs had received. At the time when the Acadians imagined that no Indians were present, and that they could in security perform the work of the British, they would find themselves seized by the Indians, who would kill their cattle, and take them prisoners as enemies of the king; they would then think themselves only too fortunate if they and their children escaped with life.

As de Castin was unable to write such a letter, there can be little doubt whence it came. It must have been the work of his clerical associate. In the letters of de Vaudreuil,† de Saint Castin is mentioned as being at the head of the Indians, and his endeavour was to retain them in their feelings of hate. But all was not prosperous with de Saint Castin, for in November of this year his vessel was seized with all his effects. He appealed on the subject to the Minister, who simply wished him better fortune; evidently considering that his commission as a lieutenant, with promises for the future, should satisfy him.‡

De Saint Castin obtained leave to proceed to France in 1712. We learn that in September, 1713, he started to winter among the Acadian Indians, with instructions to keep them in "good disposition."§ This duty is more particularly described by M.

* De Saint Castin to the *habitants* of the *banlieu* of Port Royal, 3 September, 1711. Que. Doc., II., p. 543.

† 7 November, 1711. Que. Doc., II., p. 564.

‡ Lettre à M. de Saint Castin. Mardy, le 21 juin, 1712. Que. Doc., II., p. 550.

§ Le Ministre à de Saint Castin, 17 mai, 1714. Que. Doc., III., p. 3.

de Vaudreuil,* as necessary to prevent the Indians attending to any summons from Nicholson. To some extent they appeared to be passing from the control of the French. Neither de Saint Castin nor the missionaries could influence them, and it was feared that they might go over to the side of the British. It was in this letter that de Vaudreuil pointed out that grace required human assistance,† and that the Abenakis were indispensable to the future power of the French.

* 16 September, 1714. Que. Doc., III., p. 5.

† Ante II., p. 509.

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CHAPTER V.

The treatment of Vetch during his service in Annapolis was unjust in the extreme. He received nothing for his additional expenses as governor, and no allowance had been granted to him for equipment in taking command of the provincial troops in the expedition of 1711. While the government of Harley and St. John loaded with honours men of the character of Hill, and their other partizans, placing them in positions of trust, so that the jacobite policy of Bolingbroke could be carried out, the bills drawn by Vetch for the paying and victualling the troops were left unsettled. Vetch could with difficulty obtain credit in Boston. In his letter to London he represented the injury caused to the public service, and the loss to those who had furnished the provisions. It is inexplicable that this neglect of the garrison should have taken place, except on the theory that in the event of an attempt being made in favour of the pretender, in order to obtain help from Louis, concessions would have been offered to him in America ; among which the abandonment of Acadia would have been included. Had the Queen lived another year it is difficult to surmise what might have taken place. The body of the English people, although desirous of seeing a prince born in the country on the throne, and no little affected by the extravagance of the high church clergy in their declamation on the divine right of kings, were, nevertheless, passionately opposed to the rule of another Roman catholic. Bolingbroke had endeavoured to fill every responsible office with jacobites. No other explanation can be given for the neglect of Nova Scotia, and the abandonment of her defenders.

Vetch, nevertheless, persevered in the discharge of his duty. He saw that one sure means of fighting the French Indians

was by obtaining the aid of the Five Nations of New York. A party of them had accompanied the expedition to Quebec, and Vetch had obtained an order for their being retained at Annapolis, but they had been carried to Boston and disbanded. Vetch's nephew, Major Livingstone, received instructions to organize one hundred men, and they were sent to Annapolis in 1712. They proved most effective, and constructed a fort for themselves a quarter of a mile from the main fort.* On one occasion, when half of this force was absent at the wreck of the "Faversham" and three transports, from one hundred and fifty to two hundred Canadians and Indians hung about the fort to seize stragglers. Meeting a small party, they killed two soldiers and carried off twelve prisoners. The Indians remained until May, 1713.

The neglect in which the garrison was left, led to the belief that Acadia was to be given back to the French, and news, indeed, came from Newfoundland to this effect. It was known that peace negotiations were being carried on, and the terms on which peace could be obtained could only be surmised. It was all important to Massachusetts that the country should not again be possessed by the French. Vetch at this date proceeded to Boston, and returned immediately with his wife, the one occasion when she accompanied him. The officers drew up a memorial of the treatment they received. They had obtained the narrowest limit of official recognition; no consideration was taken by those living at home at ease, of the increased expense entailed on them for every necessary of life. Captain Armstrong was sent with the memorial to London. The garrison had been cruelly neglected. The men at this time were without clothing and bedding, with the prospect of shortness of provisions. The agents had been ruined by the non-payment of the bills

* A writer in the Nova Scotia Hist. Coll., IV., p. 41, Rev. George Patterson, D.D., New Glasgow, to whose memoir on Vetch I am desirous of owing my obligations, remarks: "It seems to me strange that, so far as I know, none of those who have written on the history of Nova Scotia have ever referred to this employment of the Iroquois; nor do any of them seem to have been aware of this fort."

which Vetch had drawn, and he himself saw little hope of relief.

Vetch succeeded in getting provisions, and the year 1712 was passed in the same distressing dilemma. In October Nicholson arrived in New England, appointed to the governorship in Vetch's place, with full powers to examine into the proceedings of all governors. Early in 1713 he superseded Vetch, and placed Caulfield in authority. In December of that year Vetch arrived in Boston, and never returned to Nova Scotia.

In February, 1714, Vetch was called upon to attend a meeting of the council, when Nicholson declared that he did not think the queen in any way concerned to make satisfaction for Vetch's bills, at the same time calling upon the latter to explain the public accounts, and not to leave America before doing so. Vetch only attended another meeting, and in April, without leave, started for England.

Vetch's future career has no bearing upon the events I am attempting to describe, but the part he played in Canadian history warrants allusion to them. He obtained no consideration during the queen's life; but his letters are extant, to shew that three months after her death he was appealed to for information relative to Nova Scotia, and on points connected with British rule in America. On the 20th of January, 1715, he was again appointed governor of Nova Scotia. He held the office for two years until the appointment of General Philipps in August, 1717. The last twenty years of his life were passed in England. He had claims against the British government for his pay and disbursements. His application was eventually lowered to obtain the half-pay of a captain, so it may be surmised that his appeal was in no way successful. It is unknown if he ever returned to New York. One painful fact is recorded; he died a prisoner for debt in the King's Bench the 2nd of May, 1732. He was then sixty-four years old.*

The treaty of Utrecht by which France ceded Acadia to

* Bradford's New York Gazette, No. 353.

England was now in operation. Never was cession more indisputably made. As early as July, 1711, Prior had asked for the abandonment of Newfoundland and Hudson's Bay,* each power to keep the possessions they held at the time of the peace. Hovenden Walker's fleet was then in commission, and had sailed in April. Its destination was well known in Versailles, and the conquest of Canada was looked upon in London as certain. Prior's demand virtually embraced the abandonment of Canada. When Ménager went to London in March, 1711, he was instructed to ask for the restoration of Port Royal and its dependencies.† The answer he received from the British minister was that the matter must be left for future conference. One of the first propositions of the British plenipotentiaries at Utrecht was the cession of the island of St. Christopher; of Newfoundland including Placentia, with the other islands in these seas; together with Port Royal and its dependencies. The French king's instructions were, that if Port Royal was not obtainable for France, Acadia could be given over to the British; but Cape Breton was absolutely necessary for entrance into the waters of Canada, and must be possessed by France. As an alternative, however, it was proposed that Acadia being ceded to the French, the British might hold Cape Breton; and to prevent the rupture of the negotiations, the abandonment of Cape Breton was even unconditionally authorised.‡

With these secret instructions, the French plenipotentiaries made every effort to retain Acadia. The islands of Saint Christopher, Saint Martin, and Saint Barthelmy were offered as an equivalent. But the English representatives were

* "Précis de ce qui s'est passé pendant la négociation de la paix d'Utrecht au sujet de l'Acadie que les Anglais ont nommé la Nouvelle Ecosse." Parl. MS., 3rd Series, Vol. II., pp. 899-932.

† "Et toutes ces dependances."

‡ There is no misunderstanding the French King's instructions on this point: "Cette proposition dont l'effet serait très contraire au bien de son service ne doit être faite que lorsqu'il n'y aura d'autre moyen de conclure un traité avec les Anglais, et d'empêcher la rupture des négociations. Il est si important de prévenir un pareil inconvénient, que le Roi veut bien céder et l'Acadie et le Cap Breton si cette cession peut faire la paix." Parl. MS., 3rd Series, Vol. II., p. 901.

instructed to break off the negotiations rather than abandon the claims they had advanced. The French, however, obtained Cape Breton, with the power to create such establishments as the King held expedient,* and the right of fishing in Newfoundland, as was the custom.

In August, 1712, Louis renewed the attempt to gain possession of Acadia, but only to meet the same demand for its cession. In November the British Ministry offered to establish the boundaries between the two countries, but the proposition was not entertained. The British plenipotentiaries claimed the territory of Acadia to include the country between the River Saint George, the sea, and the gulf of Saint Lawrence; and in December they submitted that the French could only carry on their fisheries thirty leagues to the south-east of Acadia, and within ten leagues to the north-east.

A distinction was drawn between the restored countries, such as Hudson's Bay, and the ceded countries as Acadia and Newfoundland. In the former the British were to regain the property of which they were possessed on proof, and the French subjects were bound immediately to depart. In the ceded countries one year was granted for their departure to such French inhabitants as desired to keep to their allegiance: at Placentia the houses and land could be sold.

The conditions of the treaty are stated in plain language, and the perusal of them will only make more apparent the continual intrigues followed at Quebec, to set them at defiance. For a series of years every art was practised by the priests, who were allowed to perform their religious duties in Acadia. With scarcely an exception, these ecclesiastics were unceasing in their attempt systematically to mislead the ignorant population with which they had to deal, practising the lowest arts which chicane could suggest. From the conquest of Port Royal in 1710, to the latter part of 1713, the attempt to regain Acadia may be explained, and even justified. There was a belief that France would again enter into possession of

* "Avec la faculté d'y faire tels établissements que votre Majesté jugerait à propos."

the country. It was a time of war, and there was the hope that by keeping in activity the national feeling of the Acadians, and encouraging them to hate the British, they would be active participators in any attempt to drive out the garrison.

The treaty of Utrecht changed this condition. The country was then definitely abandoned by France. It might have been foreseen that the continuation of this resistance to British authority, which extended over forty years, could only end disastrously for a population which refused to recognize the political position in which it was placed, and which during the last fifteen years acted in open unrelenting hostility to the government.

In 1714 a petition was presented to de Vaudreuil, on the part of the Acadians, marked by the exaggeration of documents of that period. It sets forth their number at 4,000. In the same year Vetch estimated them at five hundred families, of five a family, which would give 2,500 souls.* The census of this date gives only three hundred and five families, and 1,773 souls.† De Vaudreuil was then at Cape Breton, and forty Acadians went to him to say that in spite of the offer of Great Britain to leave them their lands, houses, and property, they preferred to abandon all, and remain French. They asked for vessels to carry them with their cattle to Cape Breton. They complained that the authorities would not allow a foreign vessel to approach to take them away, and that they would not furnish rigging for the vessels built by the Acadians. They asked for an order to be obtained from the King of England for ships to be allowed to receive them, and that rigging should be obtained for their own craft; adding that their stay in Acadia would be prejudicial to religion, the glory of the King, and the new colony.

In June of the previous year the French Minister informed the priest Gaulin,‡ who was filling the post of a political agent, that the duc d'Aumale, the French Ambassador in

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 5.

† Archives of Paris. Census of Canada, 1870-71, IV., p. 49.

‡ Parl. MS., 3rd Series, Vol. II., p. 897.

England, was endeavouring to obtain liberty for them to sell their immovable goods, although that provision was not in the treaty, so that they would be able to proceed to Cape Breton. It was from this application the letter of Anne was issued two months after the conclusion of the treaty. It was published in the belief that the King of France would release the Protestants sent to the galleys on account of their religion; a condition but imperfectly carried out, for according to a modern historian,* thirty-six only were set free.

The letter† gave permission to the Acadians leaving the province, who desired to remain in allegiance to France, to sell their lands, and guaranteed the possession of them to those who were willing to continue as the queen's subjects.

Nicholson arrived at Annapolis in August, 1714; he remained there only a few months. The accounts we have of his proceedings speak but little of his judgment. Caulfield was the lieutenant-governor; an appointment he held until 1717, when General Phillips was named governor. We learn from his reports that Nicholson, obliged many of the French to leave the country, that he shut the fort gates against them,

* Henri Martin.

† ANNE R. "Trusty and well beloved, we greet you well. Whereas our good brother, the most christian King, hath, at our desire, released from imprisonment on board his galleys such of his subjects, as were detained there on account of their professing the Protestant religion. We being willing to show by some mark of our favour towards his subjects how kind we take his compliance therein, have therefore thought fit hereby to signify our will and pleasure to you, that you permit such of them as have any lands or tenements in the places under our government in Accadie and Newfoundland, that have been or are to be yielded to us by virtue of the late treaty of peace and are willing to continue our subjects, to retain and enjoy their said lands and tenements without any molestation, as fully and freely as other our subjects do or may possess their lands or estates, or to sell the same, if they shall rather choose to remove elsewhere. And for so doing this shall be your warrant, and so we bid you heartily farewell. Given at our Court at Kensington, the 23rd day of June, 1713, and in the 12th year of our reign."

By her Majesty's command. Signed, Dartmouth.

To our trusty and well-beloved Francis Nicholson, Esq., &c., &c. Nova Scotia Archives, p. 15.

Some attention has been drawn to the words "his subjects," a modern writer, italicising them; it is difficult to understand with what purpose.

and declared that the Acadians who were remaining were traitors to the crown of England.* As no court had been established to adjudicate on the disputes which continually arose among the Acadians, Caulfield had taken steps to settle them, as Vetch had done before him. Nicholson, in place of approving this conduct, asked where Caulfield's commission gave him authority to execute justice in civil matters. Caulfield's reply was that he had acted as his duty had suggested to him.

Nicholson showed great rancour towards Vetch, taking steps to lead to his ruin. He declared that the country was worth nothing, and he made no effort to affirm its possession; conduct which suggests that it was Bolingbroke's design to have abandoned Nova Scotia, if policy had made it necessary.

There is no record of a further attempt to administer the oath until the death of the Queen. In January, 1715, George I. was proclaimed at Mines, Chignecto, River St. John, Passamaquoddy and Penobscot. Capon, who has been previously alluded to, was sent upon this duty. He was to learn the state of feeling in these places, and endeavour to obtain provisions for the garrison.

Cape Breton at this time was thoroughly established as far as emigration was directed to it. The advantage to Canada of a port on the Atlantic open at all seasons of the year had long been recognised as essential to the development of trade. Objections, however, were always entertained against any step which might interfere with Canadian prosperity. Fears were felt that British power might be so increased, that Canada would be unable to resist it, and that the loss of the province would prove the destruction of New France. The depressed condition of the country awoke the attention of the government, and in 1706 the younger Raudot drew up a memoir upon the condition of Canada,† in which he pointed out the policy necessary to the advancement of the colony.

The fur trade was yearly becoming of less importance.

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 8.

† Parl. MS., 3rd Series, V., p. 1180.

The income of 650,000 livres annually was insufficient for the support of a colony of from 18,000 to 20,000 souls. Of this amount 300,000 livres was given by the king of France, with 50,000 livres for the payment of some personal grants for the bishopric and seminary. The beaver furnished 100,000 livres; other furs 180,000 livres; fish, oil and other provisions 20,000 livres.

What was especially needed was the encouragement of trade in the productions of the Province: timber, planks, pitch, tar, salted meats and fish, fish oils, flax and hemp; such importations being sent to France in payment of European manufactures, the latter would be obtained at less cost.

From the depressed condition of the province, Raudot tells us, distress had forced the *habitants* to work, for, generally speaking, they did not at all like labour, and preferred a roving life. It was only by encouraging them, and making everything easy to them, that they could be drawn from this sloth and idleness, which partook of the nature of the Indian.* The *habitants* were without proper cloth. Those were fortunate who in the severity of winter were clothed with coarse drugget; some were clad in deer skins, the *habitants* not having the means to buy four ells of coarse cloth to make a coat. They had corn and cattle, but there was no outlet for it. The beaver had fallen in price: it had been able to furnish subsistence for a few people, but not to sustain a colony. There was no money in Canada. The letters of change of the last two years sent to France to purchase merchandise, had taken all the specie there. Raudot did not believe that there were a thousand silver crowns in Canada, when in former days there was a great amount. There was no trade but in furs; and those engaged in it were often ruined, for they purchased at a higher price from the Indians, than they could sell. There was little progress in agriculture:

* "La misère de tous les habitants de ce pays les a pour ainsi dire forcés de travailler car généralement parlant, ils n'aiment point le travail et aiment beaucoup à courir, et ce n'est qu'en les encourageant, en les facilitant toute chose, qu'on les tirera à la fin de cette oisiveté et paresse qui tient un peu du sauvage." Parl. MS., 3rd Series, V., p. 1180.

day labour was dear, owing to the limited population, the idleness of the inhabitants, and the high price of merchandise from France. The *habitant* asked twenty-five sous a day, equal in modern money to about seventy-five cents, refusing to work for less, although almost naked; complaining that he wore out his clothes to a greater value, than he received for his work.

One of the leading requirements in the development of this trade was an open port throughout the year, and no place was considered more fit than Cape Breton, from its central position. It was accessible from the West Indies. Foreign trade could be easily conducted thither. The productions of Canada could be transferred to this spot in smaller vessels. It would furnish a central point for the fisheries. The harbour would form a refuge for vessels in search of provisions, and in stress of weather. If fortified, it could be sought in war time by vessels chased by the enemy; and, as in the case of Dunkirk, it would be the home of privateers to come forth to prey on British commerce, while the presence of a few frigates would entirely control the fisheries.

We have here the true reasons why France so pertinaciously battled for the possession of Cape Breton. The faith which the British plenipotentiaries possessed in the activity and energy of the colonies of New England and New York, and their confidence in the power of the royal navy to defend British territory and to guard the national interest, may have blinded them to the mischief of the demand. But the success of the French privateers from Dunkirk ought not to have been forgotten, and a moderate perseverance on their part would have led to the abandonment of French pretension to its possession.*

In the autumn of 1713, M. de la Potherie, then governor of Placentia, was notified that the island had been ceded to Great Britain,† and that the necessary arms had been given to equip

* Parl. MS., 3rd Series, II., p. 901.

† Que. Doc., II., p. 565, 27 S. 1.

vessels necessary to carry the inhabitants to French soil, but owing to the lateness of the season, the transport would not be made before spring. In accordance with the treaty, the forts were to be given over to the officers sent by the queen of Great Britain, the British flag should be displayed and justice administered in the queen's name.

He likewise received instructions to cause the Indians to leave Acadia, and establish themselves in Cape Breton.* De Costabelle pointed out that it would be necessary to assist them to establish themselves in their villages, to furnish them with corn, arms and munitions, and to make them other presents. It would cost a considerable sum to lead the Indians to abandon their fields to cultivate lands elsewhere. The English, moreover, gave them goods at half the price of the French, and on that account many had joined the English. De Costabelle complained that the missionaries often perverted the gifts of the King to the Indians, exacting that they themselves should be paid for them in furs, and thus turned what was a gratuity, into a matter of trade. Among this number le Sieur Gaulin is named.

On the 20th of November an English frigate entered the harbour, with letters for Colonel Moody, the new English governor, who had left some six weeks before the frigate. The situation was embarrassing; de Costabelle had not received the instructions of September: the captain, however, determined to await Moody's arrival. The matter was adjusted by the subsequent appearance of the vessel: and in 1714 the place was given over to the British. De Costabelle carried to Cape Breton the garrison and inhabitants: many of the latter left with reluctance, and would willingly have conformed to British rule. He included also the fishermen on the island of Saint Pierre. Some few remained behind; this small number are described as not being of good character; an epithet, which it is easy to understand in such circumstances would be applied. About one hundred persons, principally fishermen, proceeded to Louisbourg, then known

* Que. Doc., II., p. 566, 24 October.

as Havre à l'Anglois, the new name being given in honour of the French King. They arrived with their families and established themselves there; but some few went to Baleine and Scatari, and other fishing stations. In all cases they were supplied by the government with their requirements. De Costabelle sent Major l'Hermite, and de Saint Ovide to report upon the harbours, and he appealed to the missionary priests among the Acadians to keep the population loyal to France, and antagonistic to the British.

The best harbour in Cape Breton was admitted to be Sydney; but it was objectionable owing to the difficulty in fortifying it, a condition indispensable in a port of the newly created province. Saint Anne, north of Maniche, the entrance to Bras d'Or lakes, was recommended as being defensible by a single fort. Louisbourg in the first instance, did not attract great attention; indeed, it was stated that its entrance was marked by insufficiency of depth. De Costabelle, who was established at Louisbourg, was the first to perceive its natural advantages, as most accessible from the Atlantic, and never frozen; while Saint Anne, during some months of winter, was unapproachable owing to the ice. The name of the island was changed to Ile Royale: a nomenclature to last for thirty-one years, until the period of the first conquest; and eleven years from the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, to its second conquest: from that date to disappear from modern history.

The early policy of France undoubtedly was to remove the Acadians and Indians to Cape Breton. In 1714 a direct appeal was made in their behalf. In November of this year, de Ponchartrain informed d'Iberville, then secretary of the embassy in London, of the proceedings of Soubras, who had been sent to Annapolis. On his arrival Soubras found the Sieur de la Ronde, who had received his instructions from l'Hermite, and Capt. de Pensens: the latter had been ordered there by Saint Ovide, lately appointed governor of Cape Breton.

Nicholson, at the request of the French officers, agreed to summon the *habitants* to learn their determination: whether

they would remain in Acadia as subjects of the king of Great Britain, or abandon the province and continue in loyal devotion to France. Notice to the inhabitants of the *banlieu* of Annapolis reached them on the 25th of August, the *fête* of Saint Louis, a red-letter day, when they were all at church. One of the officers, attended by Mascarene, was present. The resolution was adopted for a deputation to proceed to the fort. A formal meeting was held in the presence of the Governor, the officers of the garrison, the French officers, and the three priests, Justinian, Gaulin, and Bonaventure. The French officers submitted to those present the offer made by the French king to those willing to continue in their allegiance; land would be ceded them from the crown without seigneurial dues; vessels would be sent to convey them, their families and property, to Cape Breton; a year's provisions would be furnished, and there would be exemption from taxes for ten years. There was nothing new in these offers to those to whom they were made. The *habitants* had been previously prepared for them by the priests, and doubtless they had been often discussed.

The *habitants* expressed their intention of continuing in allegiance to the French, of abandoning their lands, and proceeding to Cape Breton. A document was drawn up, to which all subscribed as they were able, for the exceptions among the Acadians were those who could read and write; a fact in no way to be lost sight of. To the last they remained in this condition of ignorance, which exposed them hopelessly to the machinations of those who advised them, and directed their consciences.

This paper sets forth their satisfaction with the conditions they had accepted, and at the same time acknowledges the generosity of the British governor in permitting them to make the choice. The signers declare that they wish to live and die subjects of the king of France, and pledge themselves and their offspring to settle at Cape Breton.

The same proceedings were taken in the other parts of Nova Scotia inhabited by the French. There were three

hundred signatures and marks attached to these documents, it is estimated, representing fifteen hundred souls.

The same liberal treatment was granted by the British authorities in admitting, that the year, allowed to the Acadians leaving the Province to arrange their affairs, should date from this declaration, Saint Louis' day, 1714. The officers representing the French government asked for nothing more. It followed, that if at the expiration of that period the migration had not been made, the conditions granted in connection with it, could no longer be looked upon as being in force.

In his letter to the secretary of the French embassy, de Ponchartrain stated that the inhabitants required permission to transport their corn and cattle; that they desired to build vessels to carry away their effects, and to obtain the necessary tackle and rigging. The French officers had asked for the publication of an ordinance allowing the Acadians to sell their property. The reply of Nicholson was, that that matter must be referred to the queen, and the French minister wrote to obtain a settlement on the point.

Queen Anne having died in August, the communication was brought before the government of George I. Lord Townshend referred it to the board of trade, and Vetch, who was then in London, was asked for information on the subject: he estimated that there were 2,500 souls in Nova Scotia; and in Cape Breton five hundred families, with seven companies of soldiers. The French king to encourage emigration was giving the inhabitants eighteen months' provisions, and salt to cure their fish, and had assisted them with ships. Vetch dwelt on the impolicy of allowing the French to sell their properties, as it would stop settlement. No one would buy land in a new country where it could be had for nothing. He held that it would be a breach of public faith with regard to the royal instructions, by which lands were promised to the captors, and there was no article in the treaty which laid down such a principle. His opinion was that the Acadians would not have desired to leave, unless they had been threatened to be treated as rebels to the French crown if they

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remained.* He advocated the policy of retaining the French inhabitants if possible, for in the event of their departure the country would revert to a state of nature.

When we consider the practical bearing of the concession by queen Anne's letter to the Acadians to sell their land, and we ask who possibly would be the purchasers, the unavoidable conclusion follows, that there could only be the British government to take that position. On what policy was it possible to advocate that that government should pay large sums of money to lead to the expatriation of a population it was desirous of retaining? The permission was purely illusory, for where there are no buyers the liberty of sale is without value. The Acadians were offered under the treaty security of property, the practice of their religion, the protection which a subject can look for from his rulers, and the advantages resulting from peace and order, on the condition of being loyal to the rule under which they lived; never at any period did they act with honesty and fidelity towards it.

In this stage of the history of the Acadians the British government may for the succeeding year be left out of consideration. The Minister at Versailles had obtained from them a declaration of their willingness to leave their lands, with the expression of their devotion to France. His representatives had undertaken to send vessels to transport them to their new homes; all that was now required was for the engagement on his part to be carried out; for ships to arrive and the Acadians to embark. In this interval the British authorities could only be passive.

Some modern writers have endeavoured to throw blame on the governor of Annapolis that he did not furnish the boats and the rigging required. It was not incumbent on the British to do so by treaty; it was not a moral duty on their part to find ships for the French king's subjects, as they

* "Nor would the inhabitants have offered to go, had they not been not only importuned, but threatened by the French officers in the French King's name to be treated as Rebels if they did not remove."

Vetch to the lords of trade, London, Nov. 24th, 1714 [Nova Scotia Archives, p. 5].

declared themselves to be, to leave the country in accordance with their own wish. It has even been made a matter of reproach that each *habitant* did not receive the money for the farm, which each had solemnly declared he would abandon within twelve months. The means of transport depended on the French court alone. It was never furnished. No vessels came, and the Acadians made no effort to obtain them for themselves.

Did the authorities at Cape Breton really desire the Acadians to leave their settlements? Had it been their policy, the migration might easily have been effected. Many of them did go to the Isle Saint Jean, the modern Prince Edward Island, and to Cape Breton. But they found the life unpalatable, and in many cases they returned to their own homes. The Acadians had redeemed the farms they possessed on the Bay of Fundy by dykes. They had not cleared the land from trees and bush. It was work they disliked. They shrank from the labour of hewing their way in the forests of the new country where they were proposed to be transplanted. In the capacity of settlers struggling to obtain a subsistence for themselves, years must elapse before they would be of actual usefulness to France. During this period they would be poor producers; provisions, indeed, would have to be furnished to them until some extent of land was cleared and it was under cultivation. So long as they remained on their farms in the Bay of Fundy they presented a different character. They could furnish the corn and cattle needed in the new province, on which France was setting such store. In this respect, their value as a population was undeniable. They were accordingly permitted by France to continue in Acadia, and were supplied with missionaries, whose duty was to appeal to their passions and bewilder their judgment. As a community they were not competent to judge the true situation in which they were placed. They were constantly taught that they owed no allegiance to an alien king, or the heretical people who were in possession of Annapolis. They were urged to deny them supplies, to induce the

Indians to harass them, and with cunning and chicane to suggest the hope that they might eventually acknowledge allegiance to their conqueror. One of the ridiculous pleas afterwards advanced by them was that Nicholson by his presence on Saint Louis' day, 1714, when they elected to leave the country within a year, recognised them as French subjects, and became a party to their oath by which they were bound, and which their conscience would not permit them to violate. With a people of intelligence and education, the influences by which the Acadians to the last were led, would have been without force; and those who exercised this influence must be charged with the sufferings the Acadians underwent.

There was no attempt to administer the oath until the proclamation of the accession of George the First. Five years had elapsed since the conquest of Port Royal, and for five years the obligation had been avoided. In May, 1715, Caulfield reported * that the inhabitants would neither take the oath nor leave the colony. Instructions had been sent from Cape Breton to the missionaries to influence the *habitants* not to abandon their properties, or accept the position of British subjects. In some localities to the east they had even declared for the king of France. Caulfield was embarrassed how to act. Some commotion was taking place at Mines, where supplies had hitherto been obtained; and he was obliged to send a vessel to Boston for the provisions he required. He did not consider that the French should be encouraged to leave. Although little was to be expected from the present generation, there was the probability that the children might be brought up under the constitution, and there were many well-meaning people amongst them. He suggested that some English labourers should be sent out, tar and pitch makers, carpenters and smiths, and it would be necessary to protect them against the Indians. He pointed out that there was no royal magazine at Annapolis, to encourage trade, as was the case at Cape Breton: the

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 7.

Indians accordingly preferred going to that place to frequenting Annapolis.

No one can read the frivolous excuses on which the oath was refused, without tracing the intrigue continually at work to prevent the Acadians accepting their condition. The people of Beaubassin when called upon to swear allegiance, replied, that they could give no answer to the request, until the kings of France and England had agreed, regarding the articles submitted by their deputies. They had been led to believe that the rule of England would be short. The organization was being made in France for the expedition of the pretender of 1715; and the Acadians were told, that the friend of the king of France, the Roman catholic king James III. would immediately ascend the throne of his ancestors.

As Caulfield became better acquainted with the situation, he saw that there was no dependence to be placed on any statement made by the Acadians. Many who had left for Cape Breton returned. It was plain to him that the French would leave their settlements with reluctance; and if they remained they would give no guarantee for their good behaviour. On the contrary, they threatened to become a dangerous population.

In 1717 General Richard Philipps was named governor of Nova Scotia: an office he held until the foundation of Halifax in 1749. He had been a strong supporter of William III. at the revolution of 1688, and had served at the battle of the Boyne, and had continued his military career until the peace. In accordance with the system of those days, his appointment to the governorship by no means assured the performance of the duties of the office. He did not appear in Annapolis until 1720, Doucette acting as his lieutenant-governor. In February, 1722, Philipps returned to England, and he did not reappear in Nova Scotia until 1729; in August, 1731, he went back to London. He was again in Annapolis in November, 1732, remaining there until 1734. After that date he lived in England until he was replaced by Cornwallis.

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Doucette, on assuming authority in 1717,* having heard that there had been no acknowledgment of the king of Great Britain, called upon the inhabitants to swear allegiance. A new excuse was now found. They were ready to carry into effect this demand, if they could obtain protection against the Indians, otherwise they exposed themselves to have their throats cut. None knew better than those who occupied the fort, the falsity of the excuse. The Acadians had intermarried with the Indians, and lived in amity with them: and by their influence on the Indian he might easily have been reconciled to the British. The garrison was weak in number, ill supplied with stores; the fort was in a ruinous condition, and there was no power to repress a disloyal movement. The condition of the garrison was a strong argument advanced by the priests, of the certain reoccupation by the French. Doucette sent home an earnest expostulation on the subject, and it is a stain on the memory of Townshend and Stanhope, then the heads of the ministry in London, that they took no steps to relieve the Annapolis garrison from its embarrassment, and to obtain instructions from Versailles to restrain the governors of Canada and Cape Breton. No great effort was necessary to attain this result. Much more complicated questions had been settled between Cardinal Dubois and Stanhope, and the regent had plainly shewn that it was his policy to entertain friendly relations with Great Britain. On the 4th of January, 1717, the convention between England, France and the Hague had been concluded, which affirmed the conditions of the treaty of Utrecht. There can be only the opinion, that British interests in America were regarded not simply as secondary, but as unimportant by the ministry of that date. In the first years of George the First's reign, an exhibition of statesmanship and determination would have settled the difficulties in Nova Scotia. The problem was not in any way complicated. The Acadian population had to be forced to carry out their determination of leaving the province, or, if remaining, to accept the duties incident to their position.

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 12.

Otherwise the trouble year by year became more complex, widely to increase in magnitude. English politics had exacted the attention of ministers to the exclusion of affairs in Acadia. The South Sea excitement had turned the heads of half the leading men in public life. The attempt of the pretender of 1715 had taken precedence of all other matters; and on the continent, the disputes in which Hanover was involved with Sweden, had distracted attention from America.

The contrast of this neglect with the unceasing efforts of the French to regain Acadia was very great. Their attempt, to prevent the French settlers and the Indians from accepting the rule of Nova Scotia, was unceasing, and no influence which would aid in carrying out this result was unappealed to.

In 1718 a correspondence took place between Shute, then governor of Massachusetts, and Saint Ovide. Shute brought to his notice that some French fishermen had established themselves at Canso, and called upon Saint Ovide to enforce their departure. Shute informed him that he had sent a ship of war to compel the withdrawal of the French ships in the harbour. Saint Ovide replied that he did not recognise the provisions of the treaty with regard to the right of fishing in the same light; but he would remove the French ships conditionally on the English vessels also leaving, and in the meantime would refer the matter to his court. Smart, the commander of the English ship the "Squirrel," who had been sent to Louisbourg on this mission, returned to Canso, and took such measures that the owners of the vessels complained to Saint Ovide, and he addressed Shute on the subject. The disputed points were courteously discussed by the two governors. But Smart acted with vigour, and seized the French who would not leave and carried them to Boston. The statement of the interpreter who accompanied Smart to Louisbourg sets forth * that on Saint Ovide replying that he could not give orders for the withdrawal of the French ships, the English admiral "openly protested," and that there were no assurances of satisfaction on his part, but only the ordinary

* Testimony of Rawlings, Que. Doc., III., p. 36.

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civility of taking leave. This statement is corroborated by Captain Southwick. Denial is made likewise that the French received ill-treatment. We learn by the subsequent correspondence* that orders were sent from England to make restitution of what was seized; and we hear no more of the matter. One Dominicié, a Basque captain, who made a specific declaration of the wrongs he suffered, was the bearer of a letter of civility from Philipps to Saint Ovide, in which he enclosed a copy of the proclamation issued by him to the French inhabitants of Acadia.†

There was no want of information on the part of Philipps with regard to the condition of the country. He was in Boston in 1720, whence he wrote to the lords of trade.‡ He alludes to the negotiations which he had heard were carried on with France "for the peace and safety" of Acadia. He declares that the difficulty arises from the priests and jesuits encouraging the French and Indians not to submit to the English, and mentions two ecclesiastics, Vincent and Felix, who had introduced into their sermons invectives against the British. He saw that the best argument which could be used would be the reinforcement of the garrison; for the Acadians had declared that they would neither leave the country nor swear allegiance. The garrison at that time consisted of only two hundred men. There were about twelve English families which lived under the protection of the fort. The French had their settlements on the isthmus joining the eastern and western parts of the province. The four colonies contained about five hundred families. There were one hundred families at Annapolis; Philipps described the latter as daily inciting

* Que. Doc. III., p. 45.

† Que. Doc. III., p. 43. 2 May, 1723. This letter as it appears in the Quebec documents has many serious omissions; it is identical with Philipps' letter given in Nova Scotia Archives, p. 27. The complaint of Philipps on the conduct of the Acadians, "who have been alwayes taught by their Priests to look upon themselves as subjects of France, and to observe the direction & Council of the Isle Royale;" his appeal to Saint Ovide to take measures "to preserve the peace & tranquillity," with much otherwise of importance, has been suppressed.

‡ Nova Scotia Archives, p. 16.

the Indians to robbery and murder, "to the destruction of trade and hindrance to the country." Their dealings were with Cape Breton and the island of Saint Jean, while they refused to supply the garrison.

Philipps reached Annapolis early in April, and issued a proclamation enforcing the oath. Three days after his arrival he was visited by the priest at the head of one hundred and fifty lusty young men, as if with the design of appearing formidable. The priest when called upon to read the proclamation said "that the King was very gracious, but they were not at liberty to swear allegiance, because, that in General Nicholson's time they had sett their hands unanimously to an obligation of continuing subjects of France, and retiring to Cape Breton;" moreover, "they were sure of having their throats cut by the Indians whenever they became Englishmen."*

Philipps answered this rhodomontade "very fully," for it was easy at that date, as at present, to reply to it. But, as Philipps put the matter, "argument prevails little without a power of enforcing: for the case is thus, they find themselves, for several yeares, the only inhabitants of a large country, except the small garrison of this place, which, haveing been so much neglected, they make no acco't of."

A meeting of the council was held in April, when the inhabitants of each place were called upon to send representatives to Annapolis, and the priest Justinian was directed to append the proclamation to the church door. Justinian, however, left the place without notice. Philipps called upon him to explain his conduct, and expressed surprise that he should have absented himself. On the deputies of Annapolis attending, two of them, not being freeholders were objected to, and the inhabitants were directed to supply their place. It was too convenient an opportunity to be permitted to pass. During the progress of these events, the effort of the Acadians was to postpone the crisis and obtain delay, and they refused to comply with the request.† Justinian's absence

* Nova Scotia Archives, 26 May, 1720, p. 31.

† Nova Scotia Archives, p. 25.

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is explained by the light of the documents we now possess. He had been absent in Cape Breton to submit to Saint Ovide a letter of the inhabitants, in which they informed him that they had preserved the purest sentiments of fidelity to their invincible monarch, and that the time had come when they needed Saint Ovide's protection. They had been called upon to take the oath within four months, or leave the country, taking only two sheep with them. They asked for counsel, and that an officer of note should be sent to speak for them.

The inhabitants of Mines declared that they could not comply. It would expose them to the fury of the Indians if they violated the oath taken in the presence of Nicholson. They claimed that queen Anne had ordered their properties to be valued and the money paid for them. They declared that it was impossible for them to do anything else than remain where they were. The letter was exceedingly humble, and contained the promise to be as faithful as they had hitherto been and not commit any act of hostility against his Britannic majesty.

We may read in these proceedings the whole history of the attempt to bring within the control of British authority the Acadians, who by their conduct never omitted to suggest the hope of future submission. Their letters were written by the priests, according to the tone suggested by the governor of Cape Breton. Among themselves, there were none who ventured to depart from the general line of conduct followed, although many desired to accept the situation. But the terrorism created by religion, and by national sentiment, made any independence of conduct impossible. Thirty-five years were to elapse before the British authorities took the extreme step of resolutely meeting the difficulty. It was well known that compliance and conciliation were looked upon as weakness; but the garrison was without strength; the representations of the officials were disregarded in England; and Nova Scotia was permitted to drift to apparent ruin under the influences which were paralysing her strength.

The priests admitted into Acadia arrived with definite instructions as to their conduct. They were sent as political agents, to effect a purpose, with the aid and under the guise of religion.* They were without a thought of the well-being and happiness of the *habitants*, whose ignorance and passions led them to be willing believers in the false promises made to them. The difficulty with England was to obtain priests, who in Nova Scotia would confine themselves to their religious duties. For the first half of the eighteenth century every English Roman catholic priest was a jacobite. The Roman catholics in England were few in number, as a political party unimportant, and they had no direct influence on the policy of the country. In France persecution still raged against the protestants. As late as 1724, after nine years' government of the regent, a law was passed, that all who met to worship in the protestant faith, even in their own homes, could be seized and sent to the galleys for life, and their goods confiscated. The protestant minister performing any act of service could be condemned to death; and a witness failing to denounce him could be sent to the galleys for life. A protestant sustaining by his exhortation a dying friend, or child, or connection, to die in the faith, did so at the risk of the confiscation of his property, and life-long penal servitude. A protestant minister was, on account of his religion, hanged in Montpelier in 1728, and as late as 1745-1746 nearly three hundred protestants as such were sent to the galleys. So great was the power of the church that it could extort from the regent this legislation, to sustain him against the party of which the Duc de Maine was the nominal head: the party desirous of perpetuating the traditions of Louis XIV. With this legislation of the parent state, we cannot wonder at the persistent opposition against

* "Catholicism, indeed, can never be looked upon merely as religion. It is a great and highly organized kingdom, recognising no geographical frontiers, governed by a foreign sovereign, pervading temporal politics with its manifold influence, and attracting to itself much of the enthusiasm which would otherwise flow in national channels." *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, M. E. H. Leckey, chap. II., p. 296.

British rule in Nova Scotia by the obscure priests, whose names occur in the history of Acadia.

It was this difference of religion which seriously affected the British government; even in the church of England the non-jurors were avowedly disloyal; and in no direction was greater difficulty experienced than in the appointment of catholic priests admitted into Acadia. Those in power must have felt, that on the whole they ran the least risk by receiving them from Quebec and Cape Breton, owing to the political alliance between the two countries: and it was also in the power of the governor of Nova Scotia to send out of the country any priest whose conduct was contumacious.

The main policy to be observed by Great Britain, was to have established garrisons where required. Sustained by a sufficient force, the government might have succeeded in inducing the priests to act as ministers of religion, not as incendiaries. A few years would have given quiet to the country. It was owing to the clerical control over the *habitants*, many of those exercising it being reckless in respect to their future, that eventual retribution fell on the unfortunate Acadians in the terrible crash which expatriated them. The contingency was long foreseen; but every British official shrank from its execution. The home government of George the First cannot be absolved from the sternest censure, for failing to furnish the military strength to put down the spirit of political insubordination. A firm just rule, sustained by force, which was required over those who had to be coerced, there is no other word to denote the policy called for, would have avoided the painful episode of 1755: an episode not to be explained away and related in the tone of apology, but to be plainly stated with its antecedent facts, with the repelling features of its execution, for at that date no other policy was possible.

CHAPTER VI.

The people of Mines asked permission to send two deputies to Cape Breton to obtain counsel: Philipps consented to their doing so, as it gave him an opportunity of writing to Saint Ovide. Expressing his surprise that there was not quiet submission to the terms of the treaty, he stated that it was plain that the French inhabitants of Nova Scotia were endeavouring to disturb the peace of the province, by practising with the Indians. As they were applying to Saint Ovide for advice, Philipps called upon him to remember "the strict alliance, defensive and offensive, between the two crowns," and only to use his power to "persuade them to take such measures as may tend to their own good." *

Saint Ovide was a veteran intriguer: nevertheless, this direct appeal to him must have been embarrassing. He knew quite well the truth of Philipps' complaint, and that it was by the government over which he presided, that the springs of agitation were moved. Two courses were open to him: to remove the Acadians from Nova Scotian territory to Cape Breton or to the present Prince Edward Island; or to have plainly told the *habitants* that by treaty the country had passed from French rule, and that they had ceased to be French subjects. It had not been the principle of the French government to consider the individual happiness of any people, and the phantom of national glory was still put forward, as the light to guide the policy of every official. It was still hoped that Acadia could be recovered: Saint Ovide knew the extent to which he could use the missionaries, and there can be little doubt, that to enhance the importance of their position they exaggerated the probability of their success. Saint Ovide replied to the appeal of Philipps with

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 27.

the disingenuousness which marks his correspondence.* He affected to believe that Philipps' proclamation was not in accordance with the treaty; that he had understood the people were to be treated as those of Placentia; and that owing to the want of assistance in their emigration and the obstacles placed in their way, the inaction of the inhabitants of Acadia ought not to be imputed to them as a crime. He did not stop here. He knew well that the French government had failed in their eagerness made six years previously to find shipping to carry away the *habitants*; that every stipulation on the part of the British crown had again and again been fulfilled; that there was no obligation assumed to buy the land of those leaving. Likewise he knew well, that the supplies of which he was in great want were obtained from the Acadians; that it was an advantage to his government to retain them where they were; and at whatsoever suffering to them, to keep them in their feeling of devotion to France and of hatred to the English as heretics. Few documents throw more light on this episode than the paper sent by Saint Ovide to the missionaries to be communicated only to the most faithful. We have here the French governor endeavouring by intrigue to set aside the treaty, which France was pretending loyally to observe. It contained the answer which he suggested should be made to the demand to take the oath.

That they had sworn allegiance to the king of France since the peace, in presence of general Nicholson and two French officers. They had been unable to leave, because Caulfield had forbidden them to take their property with them, in opposition to the treaty and the queen's letter, and that they expected to be paid for their property, as at Placentia. That Nicholson had objected to French vessels arriving to take them away, or rigging to be sent. If Philipps had the king's orders to obtain from them an avowal of their determination, they were in the same sentiment as when like propositions were made by Nicholson: nothing could turn them from this feeling, being desirous of dying Roman cath-

* "Le Canada Français" Documents inédits, p. 121.

olics and subjects of the king of France. They were ready to execute the request to leave the country in less than a month, when the conditions of the treaty of Utrecht were observed.

Who can wonder at the infatuation of the inhabitants in defying the power of the British government, when counselled by one in the position of Saint Ovide, even when every national obligation on the part of France had been ignored?

Ten years had now passed since the conquest, and seven years since Nova Scotia was ceded to Great Britain by treaty. All that was possessed of the country, was the decayed, and almost indefensible fort at Annapolis, held by a garrison of a few score of men; and a block house at Canso, to give a semblance of protection to the fisheries; the original population avowedly disloyal to the government, refusing to furnish the garrison with provisions, and on pretexts the most frivolous and unwarrantable avoiding the oath; nevertheless claiming the right to hold their property, and refusing to leave the country.

No assistance of any kind was given from London. The struggles of the politicians of the reign of George the First, and his successor, were for place and power. A class of politicians subsequently talked of conquering Canada in Europe, and there are English writers who quote approvingly the phrase. A few hundred men sent to Nova Scotia, the construction of a few forts, and the resolute treatment of the inhabitants, would have brought the issue clearly to the front. It was long foreseen that no other policy could be followed than to insist on the oath of allegiance being taken, or that those refusing it should abandon their lands: and in the event of non-compliance, to use force, as subsequently was necessary. The priests, the cause of the mischief, should have been summarily dealt with: but the province remained uncared for amid the confusion of home party struggles.

No one in Annapolis but felt that the Acadians were powerless to withstand the force which could be appealed to, and that it was madness on their part to oppose the irresistible progress of events. The misery which an extreme measure

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would entail upon them was foreseen; its execution was delayed from month to month, and from year to year, in the hope that it could be avoided. There is no where a record of a conquered people being treated with greater goodness and forbearance.

Philipps did not fail to state the case clearly to the government in London,* but without effect. He laid bare the intrigues of the priests, and he sent home letters from officers in Cape Breton, in which the *habitants* were told that for form's sake they might apply to Philipps, but if their request was not granted they might follow their own inclinations. Many did desire to remain on their lands and accept the new order of things: but they were told that the power of France was able to protect them, and that the promise of permitting them to profess their religion was a chimera. The English government of Stanhope would give no aid.† They would not even grant an armed sloop to visit the settlements: and at the time the office of the master of the horse was kept vacant, that its profits might be enjoyed by the king's somewhat portly mistress, Herrengard Melsina Von Schulenberg, duchess of Kendal.

If any attempt had been made to settle the country, and proper protection given to new comers, they would have arrived from New England, and prosperity and peace would have followed. The fear of the Indians expressed by the French was simply ridiculous. There were a thousand full grown Acadians at this date, who could easily have kept them in subjection, had the Indians shewn any hostile feeling: and the latter were a part of themselves. Many of the Acadians had intermarried with them, and as the Acadians themselves the Indians were under the control of the priests.

Although the main occupation of the Acadians was cultivation of the land, they were not good farmers. They had recovered the marsh from the sea by dykes, but they objected to clearing forest land, only a small area of which was prepared

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 35.

† Stanhope died 25 January, 1721.

by them for agriculture. Their farms were favourable for grazing cattle and the pasturage of sheep. They also made oil from the white whale. The coal mines were but little worked. Cobequid, the modern Truro, was the centre of Acadia. A road ran along the coast from Chignecto; and Mines, at the south of the bay of Fundy, communicated with Cobequid by water. The descent of the river Shubenacadie led to within a few miles of the harbour of Chebucto, Halifax. A road was cut through the forest to the Bay of Verte, about fifty miles in length, and here trade was carried on with Cape Breton. Some of the population forced its way to Prince Edward Island, Ile Saint Jean. The first inhabitants were fishermen, who in 1719 arrived at Port la Joye, Charlottetown, and Havre Saint Pierre. In 1720 four ships arrived with two hundred families to erect a fort, and to settle on the land. In 1726 additional settlers came, and many "clearings" were made. In 1723 there were 330 souls, the principal inhabitants being at Havre Saint Pierre, where there were 138 souls. In 1735 the total population was 542 souls.

Philipps must soon have discovered how hopeless it was to expect support from the home government. We have no record to shew that interest was taken in his representations, or that they were even considered. In vain he pointed out that the rule of Great Britain had been no more than a "mock government;"* in vain he sent resolutions of the council asking for aid. He reported that a trading sloop, sailing into Mines, belonging to Mr. John Alden, had been plundered by the Indians, "flushed with their former success, and applauded by the priest." Philipps summoned the deputies to Annapolis to explain their conduct on the occasion. They did not appear, sending excuses for their absence. "The jesuitical form of the letter," writes Philipps, "plainly discovers it to be of the priest's composition, there not being one inhabitant in the country capable of such performance." The deputies of Mines, as was their custom, avoided extreme disaffection ;

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 51.

they sued for pardon, and pledged themselves to pay the damages: an obligation which was not kept.

A deputy collector of customs was sent to Mines to observe the trade with Cape Breton; he was told by the *habitants* that he could not be protected there, and that it was necessary for his safety he should leave, intimating that if he remained he would be assassinated. They even refused him a guide to return to Annapolis. The Indians were encouraged to set up a native claim to the country, and they were urged to attack the garrison; but they were too cunning to accept this dangerous advice, and declined to act unless the French joined them.

The board of trade gave some momentary attention to the necessity of constructing forts, but the board of ordnance made objections to the plan proposed,* and could not be prevailed upon to change its views. It would be worth while to examine into this official interference of home subordinates, which has so often proved disastrous in colonial history. Philipps, nevertheless, reiterated the necessity of constructing the forts, in which he was sustained by the council, but the paralyzing influence of routine prevailed, and nothing was done.

The recommendation of the council was that six hundred men additional should be sent out: a garrison of two hundred to be established at Canso to protect the fisheries, one hundred and fifty at Mines, and the same number at Chignecto, with a sloop of war and two small craft of fifty tons to visit the settlements. That the home government was awake to the emergency, is shewn by the letter of the board of trade,† in which it is stated that, if the Acadians will not become good subjects, they must be removed. But no such attempt was to be made until the forces, which had been promised, should arrive, and without positive orders from his majesty. Some time previously Philipps had pointed out that no presents were

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 54.

† Board of Trade to Philipps, 28 December, 1720, Nova Scotia Archives, p. 58.

given to the Indians. In this communication it was promised that they should be distributed.

In 1722 Philipps proceeded to England and did not return to Nova Scotia for some years, until 1729. One of his last acts was to call the Mines deputies to account, for failing to keep their promise to make good the loss by the Indian outrage on Alden's sloop. At Canso, he arrived in time to inflict severe chastisement on the Indians who had attacked vessels engaged in the fisheries. The assailants were a mixed mass of Indians, the majority from the mainland. I have included the narrative in the history of the events which happened in the territory north of Boston.

Doucette continued as Lieutenant-Governor until 1725, when he was succeeded by Colonel Lawrence Armstrong, of Philipps' regiment. He had been for some years in Nova Scotia, and was a member of the first council of 1720. He came to America in 1711 in Windresse's, now the first Hampshire battalion, the 37th regiment of the line. He took part in the unfortunate expedition against Quebec, and was on board the "Isabelle Anne" transport, which was wrecked, he being one of the seven or eight survivors, losing his baggage and money.* On the return of the expedition he was quartered at Annapolis, and was selected by Vetch to proceed to England with a memorial to the secretary of state on the imperfect condition of the fortifications, and the want of provisions and clothing. In his letters he represents that he experienced great difficulties in his endeavour to obtain supplies for the garrison, and that during his term of office he contracted debts for the support of the troops; debts which he felt he could never discharge. The friction caused by his official duties was not uninterrupted, for Philipps was in Annapolis from the autumn of 1729 to August, 1731; and from November, 1732, until 1734. Whatever the cause, Armstrong's mind gave way from the stress upon it. On the 6th of December, 1739, he was discovered dead in his bed with five wounds, evidently self-inflicted, his sword by his side.

* Ante Vol. II., pp 459-464.

The record of Armstrong's government establishes that he acted with sense and decision. He complained to Saint Ovide* that the Indians, supplied with powder and ball by the French, and encouraged by them, attacked the English, who suffered "from daily insults and massacres." Saint Ovide denied the fact. Armstrong likewise called upon him not to permit the missionary priests to leave Cape Breton, and enter Nova Scotia without Armstrong's authority. It was of little avail; for shortly afterwards a priest and another person were taken who were travelling with Saint Ovide's pass. These matters were reported to London, with the account of the rapid continuation of the fortifications of Cape Breton.

The works at Louisbourg were commenced in 1720, and from this date the population had rapidly increased. Several officers were sent out with a large number of mechanics and labourers to carry out the elaborate plans for the defence of the place. For twenty years the fortifications were constantly extended and perfected. Great energy was shewn, for Cape Breton was the keystone of the future policy of Versailles. It was the centre, whence expeditions were to be directed for the reconquest of Nova Scotia, and for the destruction of the capital of New England. Much of the material used in the buildings came from Massachusetts. The trade was contraband; but that circumstance had little weight with those who were engaged in it.* Shute, then governor of Massachusetts, recommended that an act should be passed prohibiting such intercourse: but the legislation was unpopular, and was not accepted, for the trade was too lucrative to be put down by law. When Newton and Bradstreet were sent by Armstrong in 1725 to complain of the outrages committed in Nova Scotia with the approval of Saint Ovide, during their short stay in Louisbourg, they counted fourteen colonial vessels chiefly from New England, with cargoes of boards, timber and bricks, and much of such material was used in the works. Every effort was made to establish population. In order to prevent the fishermen who came out each year from

* 5 Sept., 1725, Nova Scotia Archives, p. 62.

returning to France, the masters of vessels, according to tonnage, were compelled to carry a given number of men bound to remain in the colony for three years; and it was found that most of them continued in the country after their period of service.

In 1726 the attempt to administer the oath was repeated. The *habitants* in the neighbourhood of the fort were first called upon; they were told that they must comply with the demand or leave the province. On Sunday, the 25th of September, they assembled at the flag bastion, Annapolis, when the desire was expressed that a clause, whereby they were not obliged to carry arms, might be inserted. The Governor, with the advice of the council, caused "the same to be writ upon the margin of the French translation in order to get them over by degrees." With this addition the oath was sworn, the king's health drunk, and promises of loyalty liberally given.*

Consequent on these proceedings père Gaulin, whose activity in stirring up the Acadians to mischief, has been recorded, as Armstrong describes him, "that old mischievous incendiary,"† made his submission to the council. He promised not to "intermeddle in the government." He had been arrested, and Armstrong had determined to send him to England; but the inhabitants had asked that he should return among them, and it was considered politic to grant the request on promise of his good behaviour.

The presence of Gaulin worked the old results. The oath was refused at Mines and at Beaubassin; and a new reason for opposition was given, that Armstrong had no power to administer it. A prominent promoter of the sedition was one Gam-

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 67. Whatever the oath which was administered at Annapolis, it is not included in the published papers, and it is represented as unknown. It was not approved by the secretary of state in England. There had been a modification in the oath of allegiance at home on the accession of William III. In Charles II.'s day the words had been introduced, "that I, A.B., do declare and believe that it is not lawful on any pretence whatever to take up arms against the king." These words were then omitted.

† Nova Scotia Archives, p. 69.

mell, who had been a lieutenant in the army, and had connected himself with some New England traders who found it profitable in their intercourse with the *habitants* to pander to their prejudices. There was no attempt to use force, for the garrison was powerless outside the fort walls. Armstrong wrote them an expostulatory letter, and summoned the deputies to appear at Annapolis, with Gaulin the priest. Armstrong had lately ordered a road to be cut; both of these instructions they refused to obey. He, however, could place an embargo on trade; and it was resolved, that while the inhabitants of Annapolis and Cape Sable should have full liberty, those of the other settlements should be debarred from trading and fishing; permission being given for vessels to proceed in all directions except to the bay of Mines.

In 1727, George the First died, when it was resolved to exact the oath of allegiance to his successor. No additional support was given to those who had to perform this duty. The powerless condition of the governor to enforce compliance was understood in the French settlements. It might have been foreseen, that with no greater exhibition of strength to exact submission, the same unsuccessful result would follow. Much stress has been laid by some French-Canadian writers on the concessions granted on this occasion. These concessions made without authority, were immediately repudiated by the council, and declared to be null. Even, if the modified form in which the allegiance was sworn, did not make it imperative on the Acadians to take up arms for the defence of the province, they were bound to observe a loyal attitude towards the government, to abstain from attacking it, and not be a party to the machinations of the Indians. The fact must not be lost sight of that the Indians of Nova Scotia were numerically less than the Acadians. The slightest show of enmity by the Indians towards the Acadian could have at once been stamped out, and to assign fear of their attack as a reason for non-compliance was as ridiculous as dishonest.

When the course to be followed was discussed, Armstrong informed the council that as the people of Mines had refused

to admit the form proposed at Annapolis, he had determined to ask no other oath but that of allegiance. At Annapolis the deputies appeared with a paper signed by seventy of the *habitants*, and when tendered the oath, refused it. There had been a meeting, at which it had been resolved not to swear allegiance. There is no record of what happened; but it may be inferred much contumacy was shewn, for three deputies were arrested and laid in irons. One Bourg, an aged person, was permitted to leave the province. The deputies remained some days in confinement, and were subsequently admitted to bail.

Ensign Wroth was selected to carry out this policy at Mines and Chignecto. His one qualification was knowledge of French; for he acted with singular indiscretion, and in no way understood the political significance of the concessions he took upon himself to admit. The conditions granted by him were immediately declared by the council to be null, and the Governor was called upon not to confirm them. For years they furnished the argument for the exemption of the Acadians to take any other oath.†

The instructions given to this officer were carefully drawn up, even the route which he was to take was prescribed. He was to proceed to the river Saint John, and land some Indians; thence to Mines, to Cobequid, Truro; to Pisiquid, Windsor; and to Chignecto. If encouraged by the inhabitants, he was to ask them to sign the proclamation and then to tender the oath.* They were to be assured the free exercise of their religion, to which otherwise they had no title, and to do every thing for his majesty's honour and service. Wroth was not to depart from his instructions unless circumstance and place so required.

Wroth went with his three Indians to the Saint John, when

* Nova Scotia Records, p. 75.

† It is only lately that the documents setting forth the proceedings of Ensign Wroth have been published. They appear in "*le Canada Français*," of October, 1888, pp. 175, 188, edited by Mgr. Hamel. "Documents inédits." These papers are stated to be copies from Col. Records, Nova Scotia, Vol. I. Public Record Office, London.

George II. was proclaimed ; there " were but few to solemnize so glorious a ceremony." The Indians signed the proclamation, and Mepomoit, a chief declared " that the French were great obstacles to their Happiness's, that they were continually Insinuating story's in their Ears, which they Really believed were false." From the Saint John, Wroth went to Chignecto : he was received by the deputies and chief *habitants*, and placed in the " Vicaridge," as he called the priest's house. He invited the deputies to supper, and having assembled the people, informed them, he would proclaim the king's accession on the Monday. On the Sunday the deputies dined with him, and in accordance with his instructions he told them that " by the death of my late master of Glorious Memory, Divine providence had miraculously given them an opportunity of Retreaving the false steps hitherto made." His listeners expressed their readiness to acknowledge the new king, but asked delay until Tuesday. In the morning they had requested permission " to hoist a small dirty white ragg, as a signall to attend Divine Service." Wroth replied that he was not come to obstruct their religion, and that they might proceed as usual.

On Tuesday the proclamation was made in the presence of one hundred of the *habitants*. The four deputies and about eighty of the population brought their muskets and fired *feux de joie* with " Lou'd husas," frequently " Drinking to his Royal Health." The proclamation had been signed by the deputies and several of the *habitants*, when Pier Ybert,* one of the deputies, entreated that one Vero, " who is the only fellow amongst them that can read or write," should publicly read the proclamation. Wroth asked what he had " to alledge to the people, and since he was so good a scholler, he had no more to doe than to sign," Vero stated that he was ready to sign as a witness, and that the same should be inserted in the proclamation. Wroth told him that he was disaffected, and " opinionated. Poor Banditts as he was, who had not a Foot of Land in the Country, were always Ready to Incite sedi-

* Probably Pierre Hébert and Verréault.









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tions," and "such wretches as he" should not be permitted to sign. Vero, according to Wroth, in the spring in the absence of the chief persons, with the assistance of the priest, had written an insolent letter to the governor.

Wroth invited the leading people to dine with him, while the remaining number were entertained in other houses. On his tendering the oath of fidelity, they desired leave to retire in order to consult together, with an assurance that they would return to his satisfaction.

At sunset they came back with Vero, who presented the oath with the conditions they desired to be added. The demand commenced with "Wee, the underwritten," and was unsigned. Wroth "Emediately shewd all the Resentment I was capable of." He asked who made Vero the representative of the settlement. Ybert answered that Vero was the only person amongst them who could read and write, and they had requested him to write the paper; their demands being granted, they would sign. Wroth turned himself at once upon his heel, and told them "the Lyquor had prompted their impudence at daring to propose any conditions to so an Indulgent an Oath." He "hoped that after they had slept they would be sensible of their bad conduct; & therefore, Expected their answer in the morning."

It might have been looked for that after all this bombast Wroth would have refused the oath, and rejected the modifications claimed; that he would have proceeded to Annapolis to report to his superiors, and ask for instructions. On the contrary. His own words best relate his proceedings.

"They accordingly came and still insisted upon the same Demands, and after having seriously weigh'd them, and not judging them Repugnant to Treatys, Acts of Parliament and Trade, I granted them as an Indulgence, and by reason of their Diffidence of my authority, I was obliged to Certfye the same in the Body of the Oath."

These conditions were as follows:—

1. That they should have the free exercise of their religion,

and Apostolic Roman catholic missionaries in the necessary places to instruct them.

2. That they should in no way be obliged to take up arms against any one soever, and without obligation in what regards war.
3. That they should remain in the true possession of their property, which should be granted to them and their heirs, to the same extent that they have hitherto enjoyed it, and on paying the same accustomed taxes of the country.
4. That they should be free to retire when they desired, have the power to sell their property, and carry the proceeds away with them without experiencing difficulty; conditionally in all cases on the sale being made to the natural subjects of Great Britain, and when out of the territory of his Majesty, they should entirely be discharged from the signature to their oath.

The same proceedings happened at Mines and Pisiquid. At Mines the *habitants* objected to the word "*obeyeray*," so Wroth changed it to "*je seray sincère et fidèle*." At Pisiquid nothing is recorded. He returned to Mines, where on his own responsibility he gave permission to a priest to remain at Chignecto, without reporting himself to the government. Wroth did not reach Cobequid, but he sent on the proclamation, with orders that it should be nailed to the church door.

On Wroth's return to Annapolis, he submitted his journal, and reported the proceedings; and they must have caused some surprise, for it was moved that his instructions should be read, together with the oaths taken by the inhabitants, whereupon it was resolved "that the said articles and concessions are unwarrantable and dishonourable to His Majesty's government, and consequently null and void, and that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province be desired not to ratify and confirm the same."

When Wroth was asked how he came to grant such articles, he answered that he had acted to the best of his knowledge.

Such was the oath administered by Ensign Wroth, con-

trary to his instructions and without authority, of which so much has been said, and which was immediately annulled. It was considered, however, that the *habitants*, by signing the proclamation of the accession of George II., had obtained the rights and privileges of British subjects. The motion was made that any one desirous of taking the oath of allegiance should be admitted to do so. It requires no elaborate explanation to shew that Wroth's concessions neither conferred a single right, nor extended a solitary privilege. In no way they altered the relation of the Acadians to British authority, and any pretension founded upon them is unwarrantable and fallacious.

In 1729 Philipps re-appeared in Annapolis, and early in 1730 he summoned the Acadians to swear allegiance. Whatever influence he exerted, he succeeded in obtaining the general acceptance of the oath by all the population from sixteen to sixty. There were some few families which could not be visited. In his letter to the Duke of Newcastle, he assigns his success to the difference experienced in his government, and that of his lieutenants; that he obtained his success through his personal popularity, having travelled from one end of the province to the other. He even conciliated the Indians. He at first found them threatening, but by reasoning and presents he had brought them into satisfaction.

The Acadians subsequently maintained that they had taken the oath with the understanding that as British subjects they were not to bear arms against the French or Indians. There is nothing in Philipps' despatches to sustain this view. They are written with some self-complacency, and it would not be extraordinary if it could be established that Philipps did make some concessions, as has been claimed. There is no proof, however, of any such compromise. On the contrary, Philipps expressly states that he had made no use of threats or compulsion, or that he had prostituted the king's honour in making a fraudulent capitulation in his name, and contrary to his orders, as has been done by one, "Ensign Wroth of my regiment."

Possibly compliance with the oath may have been suggested by the form: "I promise and solemnly swear on the faith of a Christian that I will be thoroughly faithful and will truly obey his Majesty George II."† This phraseology immediately attracted attention at Whitehall. Secretary Popple wrote‡ that it was a "simple promise of fidelity, without saying to whom," and the jesuits might explain the ambiguity, so as to convince the people that they are under no obligation to be faithful to his Majesty. A new form of oath was drawn up.§ At the same time it was stated that it would "not be amiss" if new grants for the land should be taken out, a nominal quit rent being enforced. Philipps defended his oath, and thought it as binding as any other; indeed, he believed that none could be administered which could not be explained away.||

Armstrong was again named lieutenant-governor on Philipps' departure for England in 1732. If Armstrong hoped for greater peace and quietude than had marked his former administration, he was grievously disappointed. On notifying the Acadians of his position, he asked what wheat and peas could be obtained from them, and stated his desire to purchase sheep and black cattle. No answer was received to his letter. After the interval of three months he desired

* Governor Philipps to the Duke of Newcastle. 3 January, 1730. Nov. Sco. Archives, p. 83.

† The oath is given in Nova Scotia Archives, p. 83. The signatures to its acceptance at Annapolis are 227 in number. Of this number only 49 could write.

‡ 20 May, 1730. Nov. Sco. Archives, p. 84.

§ "Je Promets et jure sincèrement en foy de Chrestien que je servirs entièrement fidèle à Sa Majesté le Roy George le Second, que je reconnais pour le Souverain, seigneur de la Nouvelle Ecosse, et de l'Acadie et que je lui obeirais vrayment." Nov. Sco. Archives, p. 85.

|| "I thought I had made it stronger than the original English by adding the words *en foy de chrétien* and *que je reconnais*, &c., the word *fidèle* is the only one I could find in the dictionary to express allegiance, and am told by Frenchmen that both it and *obéir* govern a dative case, and the conjunction *et* between makes both of them refer to the Person of the King, according as I have learned grammar, and I humbly conceive that the Jesuits would as easily explain away the strongest oaths that could be possibly framed as not binding on papists to what they call a Heretic." Nov. Sco. Archives, p. 88.

the deputies to learn whether the inhabitants would, or would not comply with his order. He informed the deputies of Pisiquid that it was advisable for their own sakes, that their lands should be surveyed, for better preventing the disputes and other contentions which daily arose among them. No answer was given to this communication, although nothing was required but what was proper and equitable. He also stated that he desired to be furnished with some grain for which punctual payment would be made.

A question arose as to the authority of the seigneurs who laid claim to large tracts; in consequence of which it was feared that the land would remain wild, as no seigneur fulfilled the conditions which would have been exacted by the French king. Not a farthing was paid by the French inhabitants towards the support of the government; but although they refused to recognise British authority, they did not fail to resort to it in their interminable disputes. The council was "daily employed and harassed with their affairs, there being no other court of judicature." Armstrong asked that a table of fees should be established and stationery and sealing wax allowed in this duty.*

As the *habitants* objected to take out new grants for their lands, Armstrong suggested† a careful survey of them, and that all French grants should be recorded. "They are a very ungovernable people," he wrote, "and growing very numerous, and the method of treating with them upon any subject is by their deputies." He thought, if an assembly could be constituted, in time they might be led voluntarily to give greater support to the government. He was also of opinion that civil magistrates and justices of the peace, with inferior offices, should be appointed from among them. He had had several applications for grants of land near Chignecto. Later Armstrong wrote ‡ "it will be a difficult matter to bring these

* Nov. Sco. Archives, p. 92.

† Governor Armstrong to the Lords of Trade, 5 October, 1731, Nov. Sco. Archives, p. 91.

‡ Ibid., 16 November, 1731, p. 94.

people to any reasonable terms of obedience to His Majesty's Government, or even to any matter of good order or decency among themselves; for tho' they are a litigious sort of people, and so ill-natured to one another as daily to encroach upon their neighbor's properties, which occasions continual complaints, . . . yet they all unanimously agree in opposing every order of the Government, tho' never so conducive to their own interest."

There was no law. The inhabitants were guided by the "Coutume de Paris;" they followed the directions of the bishop of Quebec and his priests, and acted upon the instructions they received from Cape Breton. Among the priests was one de Godalie, who harboured deserters. Armstrong sent him out of the province, and applied to Saint Ovide for a priest of probity and character, to supply the vacancy at Mines, "through the Default of De Godalie, who has not only acted and behaved himself Basely, But to Excuse himself, have in his letters Given himself the lye." *

It was resolved to construct a magazine at Mines, and Major Cope was directed to carry out the plan. Three Indians came to the house of one René Le Blanc, where Cope was, and after grossly insulting Le Blanc and his brother, one of the Indians asserted himself to be king of the country, and ordered the officers who were present to be gone; that they had no business there. Nothing could be done; there was no force to sustain any vigorous action. All that came within the power of the council was to declare that the building of the magazine at the place chosen would in no way infringe the rights of the inhabitants.

Some French *habitants* had settled on the Saint John. Being summoned, they took the oath, and accepted the grants; but they would not answer for the safety against attack from the Indians, of any person who might be sent to survey the lands.

Towards the end of 1732 Philipps returned, and he had again to report to the Duke of Newcastle on the condition of

* Nov. Sco. Archives, p. 96.

the province. Three years had now passed since he had been enabled to state that the oath had been taken. One of the first unsatisfactory facts he had to learn, was that the inhabitants were trying to distress the garrison by raising the price of provisions and of fuel, and acting as if independent of all authority.* There had been twenty-one years of English government, which, as Philipps described it, "may be said to be imaginarily only." The Indians on their side contended that if a surrender had been made of Annapolis, Mines had not been conquered. In accordance with this view, they attacked the colliery at Chignecto, which was beginning to be worked, and destroyed a house and magazine, on pretence that the rent due for the liberty of mining had not been paid to them. In a word, the settlement of the province was deliberately impeded both by the Acadians and the Indians, acting on the instructions of Saint Ovide, who told them, that if they permitted the establishment of the English the province would be lost to France. In vain did Philipps appeal to the duke of Newcastle for advice and aid, and he was left to grapple with his difficulties as he could best meet them.

No man appears on the scene of English history in more offensive contradiction to what a statesman should be, than this duke of Newcastle. It was said of him that he was a living caricature; his gait was a shuffling trot, his utterance a stutter, he was always in a hurry, never on time. He was ignorant, treacherous, and never so dangerous as when bestowing a caress; he was jealous of his colleagues. His passion was power, and he could be false to the last degree, in order to obtain it, and could assume every phase of conduct. Without ability, or patriotism, or truth, he was forty years a minister; thirty years as secretary of state, and ten years as first lord of the treasury. His fortune was large, and he was the head of a powerful family, all the members of which depended upon his support; hence his powerful parliamentary interest. His self-assertion was equal to his folly, his cunning to his ambition. He obtained power only to misuse it, and he is

* Nov. Sco. Archives, p. 100.

one of those mainly responsible for the abandonment of Nova Scotia.* The neglect of America was continued until the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Pitt was then paymaster of the forces, although not in the cabinet, and disregard of America had become a principle of government until he rose to power. Pitt's career as first minister of the crown is probably the most brilliant page of English history. Stanhope gave no aid. There may be explanation for this indifference in the complications on the continent, that disturbed the good understanding which during his government existed with France. Walpole became all powerful in 1722, and when first minister followed without change the traditions of his predecessors. James Craggs continued as secretary of state, an office which he had held from 1718; he had succeeded Addison, having previously been secretary of war. In 1721 Craggs died † from small pox, his health being doubtless affected by the charge of peculation, he could not rally from the attack. During his term of office Nova Scotia received

* Horace Walpole tells us of the great ignorance of English public men at that date of the affairs of America. He says: "The Board of Trade during Sir R. Walpole's administration had very faultily been suffered to lapse almost into a sinecure, and during all that period the Duke of Newcastle had been Secretary of State. It would not be credited what reams of paper, representations, memorials, petitions from that quarter of the world lay mouldering and unopened in his office. . . . He knew as little of the geography of his province as of the state of it. When General Ligonier hinted some defence to him for Annapolis, he replied with his evasive lisping hurry, "Annapolis, Annapolis! Oh, yes! Annapolis must be defended, to be sure Annapolis should be defended. Where is Annapolis?" *Memoirs of George II., I., p. 396.*

† It has been customary with English writers to record the praise and censure of Swift and Pope as sufficient to embalm or vilify a reputation. In my humble opinion no more misleading sentences occur in literature; especially those traceable to the artificial nature and vindictive disposition of Pope. Of the thirteen epitaphs written by him, one is to James Craggs, "*principis pariter ac populi amor et delicias, vixit titulis et invidiis major.*" Then follow six lines describing a perfect man, Johnson tells us "not originally intended for his epitaph . . . torn from the poems which first contained them." Craggs, his father, the postmaster-general; Aislabie, the chancellor of the exchequer; and the Earl of Sunderland were all accused of peculation in the report of the committee of investigation. Aislabie resigned his office, but he was unanimously expelled from the house of commons and committed to the tower. The greatest part of his property was seized. Sunderland was subsequently pronounced innocent by a vote of the

the least share of his attention. He was replaced by lord Carteret; and on the quarrel of the latter with Walpole, the duke of Newcastle became secretary of state.

Newcastle accordingly had been eight years in office when Philipps' appeal reached him. It experienced the neglect which every such letter had received. Walpole's well-known maxim was *Quieta non movere*: it certainly influenced his administration with regard to America, and was perfectly acted upon by Newcastle.

Philipps again brought before the home government * the necessity of building forts sufficiently garrisoned, so that a new set of people could be invited to settle, who could be protected. "As to the present Inhabitants," wrote Philipps, "they are rather a pest and incumbrance than of an advantage to the Country, being a proud, lazy, obstinate and untractable people, unskillful in the methods of Agriculture, nor will be led or drove into a better way of thinking, and (what is still worse) greatly disaffected to the Government. They raise (tis true) both Corn and Cattle on Marsh land that wants no clearing, but they have not, in almost a century, cleared the quantity of 300 acres of Woodland. From their Corn and Cattle they have plenty of Dung for manure, which they make no use of, but when it increases so as to become troublesome, then, instead of laying it on their Lands, they get rid of it by removing their Barns to another spot."

Towards the close of 1734, Philipps again left the province, and Armstrong resumed his duties as lieutenant-governor. His letters continue to trace the bad condition of the country. He described the apparent submission as a mere matter of policy, and the inhabitants as constantly exciting the Indians to hostilities. There is a record of a curious scene before the council on the 18th of May, 1736. The Indians had com-

house of commons, 223 against 172. Popular feeling in his disfavour was, however, so strong, that he retired from office, to be succeeded by Walpole. The elder Craggs, under the weight of the accusation, died from poison. Walpole said that he had hinted his intention of taking his life.

* Governor Philipps to the Board of Trade, 3 Aug., 1734, Nov. Sco. Archives, p. 102.

mitted depredations apparently at Cape Sable on some vessels, and had carried away the sails and other effects. The priest who officiated there was one Cheavereaux ; the *cure* of Annapolis was St. Poncy, and they were summoned before the council. One of them was requested to accompany Mr. Charles Dentremont and Lieutenant Amherst, to obtain restitution of the property. Both behaved insolently and declined to act. They were asked if they refused to obey the commands of his majesty's government. Cheavereaux, with an offensive gesture, replied that he was there on the part of the king of France.* St. Poncy acted in the same manner. The governor told them, that for their conduct he had a good mind to send them back to France. They laughed and insolently answered "with all their hearts," and went out of the room, slamming the door. It was therefore determined to order them to leave the province. When they reappeared they continued their offensive manner, called for chairs to sit down, saying that they did not attend as criminals, that they had no business with temporal matters, and had no orders to receive there.†

Although these two priests for their contumacy were thus removed, Saint Ovide approved of their conduct. It seems scarcely credible, but he actually instructed St. Poncy to return to his mission. Even with the weak garrison to sustain him, Armstrong would not submit to such insolence. St. Poncy was forbidden to exercise his ministerial functions, and was ordered to depart on the first opportunity.

Armstrong continued for the following three years to administer his government under these trying circumstances. His letters show that he had a high sense of duty, and endeavoured to fulfil the obligations of his position. Like his predecessors and those who followed him, he received no countenance at St. James. I can see no ground for the opinion which has been expressed, of the peevish and melancholy temper of Armstrong. There is no trace in the acts of his government of an ill-balanced mind. There is not a line

* "Je suis ici de la part du Roy de France." Nov. Sco. Archives, p. 103.

† "Nous n'avons point d'ordres à recevoir ici," Ib. p. 104.

in his published despatches to suggest that his nature was weak, or one to sink under responsibility. In cases of death similar to his, for Armstrong died by his own hand, it is difficult to trace the hidden causes which shatter a strong intellect, and destroy every vestige of hope. There is no stain on his public career. He was an earnest, efficient officer, in all respects conciliatory, and cannot be accused of harshness of conduct, or of unnecessary severity in the attempt to carry out his orders. His death will ever remain one of the problems which are impenetrable: many such, unfortunately, have to be related, and as a rule the record is all that is possible.

The government was assumed by Mascarene, whose distinguished career I have already alluded to.* It was fortunate for British interests, that so able and devoted a soldier was placed in this position of responsibility. It was evident that peace could not be much longer continued. The difficulties with Spain were becoming more complicated, and in October, 1739, war was declared with that power. It was the commencement of bad feeling with France; although four years were to elapse before it took the form of positive hostility.

From this time the history of Acadia is interwoven with the narrative of the events in Canada, and from the government of Mascarene it may be related *pari passu* with them. I have felt it my duty to allude to these thirty years in some detail; many readers may consider with some tediousness. In my humble judgment, the knowledge of them is indispensable to the correct and comprehensive understanding of the subsequent history of the French Acadians. Adventitious circumstances have drawn attention to the passage in the chronicles of the American continent, in which the fate of the Acadians is related. Erroneous opinions have been formed, based on a narrative of romance entirely at variance with truth. The hexameters of a popular poet have been accepted as history; but every shade of fact has been discoloured to give a false character to events, in themselves sufficiently painful and

* Ante page 107.

unfortunate. The ideal and untrue picture presented by the poet must receive the most unqualified contradiction. There are many instances of such interweaving of fable in the world's annals. Those whose sympathies and prejudices lead them to the side which is thus distorted, may there find a solace for the disappointment which the stern teaching of the past must create. No such special treatment can set aside the unalterable logic of circumstance and truth. They must ever remain the twin guides of the human mind to govern it, however much casuistry and prejudice may strive to turn it astray from the right path. The one principle to lead our judgment must be "truth's simplicity :"* if we possess the patience and honesty to investigate the facts by which truth can be established, our judgment is seldom bewildered.

* Troilus and Cressida, III., 2.

CHAPTER VII.

I have now to relate the events which took place in connection with Canada in the territory north of Massachusetts, during the period embraced in the narrative of what happened in Nova Scotia.

Instructions were sent from France in 1715 * to de Ramesay, then administering the government for the missionaries, to prevent the Indians accepting any benefits from the English, and to retain them in the "true religion." The French policy, even in peace, was not to allow the enmity of the Abenakis to become dormant. It was the distinctly avowed principle of de Vaudreuil to prevent all intercourse with New England.† The Indians were encouraged to declare themselves to be the allies of the French, so "he would not be held responsible for their conduct;"‡ and he complacently relates that in 1715 they had seized twenty fishing boats. He asked that powder and shot should be given them, and six hundred muskets annually distributed, those of Tulle, which the Indians preferred; and indirectly he suggested the posts they should occupy.

In spite of de Vaudreuil's intervention, some tribes showed no desire to quarrel with the English. At Panaouamské two Englishmen in a quarrel had killed two of their tribe, but the chiefs contented themselves in complaining to Boston. Père Laureyat did his best to promote a hostile spirit, nevertheless all that was asked was, that the aggressors should be removed from amongst them, and it was declared that there was no desire to break the treaty of peace.§

* 10 July, 1715. Que. Doc., III., p. 13.

† 6 September, 1716. Que. Doc., III., p. 19.

‡ "Afin de n'être pas responsable de leur conduite."

§ 31 October, 1718. Rapport de Monsieur de Vaudreuil. Que. Doc., III., p. 31.

There can be no doubt that the Abenakis would, in a few years, have accepted the authority of Massachusetts, had it not been for the persevering endeavour to excite their hatred to New England, and by flattering their hope that they could repossess their ancient territory, free from all interference on the part of the white man. The principal actor in this attempt was Sebastian Rasle, a jesuit priest, on whose memory the attempt has been made to cast the aureole of martyrdom. The custom of some writers is to speak of him as the venerable man, but at his death he was in his sixty-seventh year. Born at Franche-Compté in 1657, he came to Canada in middle life as a missionary, and in 1698 commenced his labours with the Canabas. No one could be more earnest and devoted to French interests, which he advocated without a scruple, and no one more callous to the suffering he caused. He kept before him the two objects of his life : the supremacy of his country, and the exclusive establishment of his creed, and to advance them, there was no policy which he was not prepared to follow. He had established himself at Norridgewock on the Kennebec, situate between fifty and sixty miles from its mouth.* It was from this place as a centre he made his influence felt, and he was a man of commanding ability.

Colonel Shute, the brother of Lord Barrington, was then governor of Massachusetts. He was of a Nonconformist family, and had passed some years of his youth in New England, and afterwards went to the university of Leyden. King William gave him a commission : under Marlborough he reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and was deservedly respected in the army.

In August, 1717, Shute met the Indians at Arrowsmith Island, when he offered them a bible and recommended to their attention Mr. Baxter, a missionary. They refused the bible with the remark that they had their own missionaries.

* The French records speak of this place as Narantsouak. I have followed the English spelling of that date, which has been retained in modern times by the present town in the State of Maine.

† Throughout the Quebec Documents the name is spelt Raslé, which certainly is incorrect.

The Indians acknowledged the right of the English to the lands west of the Kennebec, not to the east. Shute produced the title deeds to the territory, declaring that the English would not part with an inch of what belonged to them. The Indians took offence and immediately left the conference, leaving behind the English flag given them by the governor. In the evening they returned with a letter from Rasle to the governor, stating that the king of France did not admit, that by any treaty he had ceded to the English, territory belonging to the Indians. Shute was indignant at the insolence of the priest, and made immediate preparations for leaving. The Indians were in dread of war, they knew that they could not be sustained directly by the French; moreover, they were unwilling to leave their villages at Norridgewock and on the Penobscot to make a home in the woods.* Accordingly, they sent back two of their number to acknowledge that they had behaved rudely, with a request again to be received. The governor declined to meet them until they had abandoned their pretensions to the territory belonging to the English. These terms were accepted by the Indians, and they asked that the English colours which they had left behind should be given back to them. Another conference was held, when there was no dispute about boundaries, and the Indians expressed their willingness, that the English should settle where other settlers had before been; adding that they desired to live in peace and to be supplied with the goods they required in trade. The treaty of 1713 was thus renewed.

Nevertheless the settlers were again disturbed, and the Indians commenced to kill their cattle. One of them wrote to Rasle, asking to be paid for the cattle killed, and telling him that unless the outrages would cease, he would complain to the governor. Rasle made a show of assembling the tribe to inquire who had killed the cattle, and he wrote back to the settler, "Complain as thou seest fit to the Governor. He is not my judge and has nothing to do with me. As for the payment for thy cattle, thou can'st ask it of him who told

* Hutchinson II., p. 220.

thee to build at the place." Nothing is more offensive than to use the second person in French: *tutoyer*. It was in this form this missionary of the gospel of peace fulfilled his obligations, and no one more persistently urged extreme measures during these years of trouble.*

In October, the chiefs attended at Quebec by Rasle's instructions. They informed de Vaudreuil, that they would not allow the English to advance as they had hitherto done on their river, and that they had pulled down a house lately constructed. De Vaudreuil never failed to assure the Abenakis that the treaty of Utrecht in no way affected their lands, which still belonged to them, and it was they alone who could cede them.† His letters establish his direct interference in stopping the progress of English settlement, and his callousness to the misery his policy entailed, so that Canada might possess territory ceded by treaty, and to which he declared the French advanced no claim.

This conduct was directly authorised by France. De Vaudreuil was called upon to prevent the establishment of the English in the territory. Money was given for churches to be built at the Indian villages, and Rasle was reported to Versailles as pre-eminent in encouraging hostility of feeling with the tribes.‡

There is an important *mémoire* from Charlevoix addressed to the Duke of Orleans on the limits of Acadia, written with his usual ability. It states the case clearly, and is of value, for it may be considered to present the opinions then entertained at Quebec. He describes the Abenakis as the only Indians hostile to the English and to the Iroquois; and Char-

* "Plains-toi tant que tu voudras au gouverneur, ce n'est point mon juge, et il n'a rien à voir sur moi. Pour le payment de tes bestiaux tu le demanderas à celui qui t'as dit de te bâtir là." De Vaudreuil, who records the fact, adds: "Voilà une réponse vigoureuse." Rapport de M. de Vaudreuil au Conseil. Quebec, 31 October, 1718. Que. Doc., III., p. 32.

† Que. Doc., III., p. 41.

‡ Quebec Doc. III., p. 43, 26 Oct., 1720. The Minister to de Vaudreuil and Begon. Numismatists will be interested in the fact that it was stated to be the intention of the King to send thirty-five medals for distribution to the Indians.

levoix points out that unless the French recognised or made a semblance of recognising their rights in the land they occupied, they would never join the French in a war against the English. It was the only means by which they could be retained in the French interest. They obtained greater commercial advantages from the English, and half of the tribe were in favour of making peace. Had it not been their religion which restrained them, they would have long joined the enemies of the French. It was the missionaries only who could influence them. There was nothing to fear from war; for the English could never resist the Abenakis when sustained by the French. There was no time to lose. The boundary with Massachusetts should at once be established, within which the English should be kept.*

The reports made to France by the French governors were founded upon information received from the missionaries: their statements depended on what they heard from Indians, and the stories lost nothing in their passage. We have here an explanation of the almost invariable exaggeration to be found in the narratives of the French. According to this authority, it was from the English that the Abenakis learned, that by the treaty of Utrecht their country had been ceded by the king of France, who thus abandoned them after fighting the battles of Canada. The Indians could not believe the fact, but the English offered to shew them the published treaty. The Abenakis with rage turned upon their missionaries and asked by what right France had given away their country. The missionaries answered by the falsehood that it was not included in the treaty.†

* 29 octobre, 1720 [Que. Doc., III., p. 79.] According to his letters to Madame la duchesse de les Diguères, Charlevoix arrived at Quebec 24 September, 1720: his memoir, written a month after his arrival, shews the strong feeling at Quebec on the subject of the Abenakis, and how actively the attempt was being made by aid of the missionaries, to make the provisions of the treaty of Utrecht nugatory. Owing to the few weeks Charlevoix had been in Canada, he could only have written from the information furnished him.

† "Alors les Abénakis s'emportèrent et demandèrent de quel droit le François donnoit un pays qui ne lui appartenait pas? Leur emportement eut

De Vaudreuil was at the time in France, and in communicating the news of the peace, wrote to Canada that it was intended to transfer the Abenakis to Cape Breton. Père de la Chasse, then superior of the jesuits in Canada, had long been connected with the Acadian missions. When called upon to carry out this policy, he at once condemned it as uselessly irritating to the Indians. He declared, moreover, they would not obey it, and would be converted by it into enemies; they were friendly to the French on the one ground of religion. It was necessary to protect the territory of the Abenakis, and, if necessary, even go to war to maintain them in its possession.

The policy of non-interference was accepted, and the missionaries became the instruments of carrying it out; but in spite of Rasle's intrigues, the destruction of cattle and the scarcely concealed priestly encouragement of outrage, English settlement unceasingly pushed forward.

After some years of fruitless effort, the abler chiefs thought it advisable to learn their precise position with France, and accordingly they sent a deputation to Quebec to make known to M. de Vaudreuil the difficulties they experienced, and to ask him who called himself their father, and whom they always considered as such, if he was ready to aid them in case of rupture with the English, as in similar circumstances they had sustained the French at the peril of their lives. De Vaudreuil replied that he would not be wanting in the hour of need. "What help will you then give?" asked the deputation. "My children," answered M. de Vaudreuil, "I will send you in secret * tomahawks, powder and shot." "Is it thus," replied the speaker, "that a father aids his children? And did we help you in this way? When a father sees his children at war with an enemy stronger than they, he himself comes forward and declares to the enemy that it is with him

même été plus loin si les missionnaires ne les eussent apaisés en disant, qu'on les trompoit pas un équivoque, et que leur pays n'entroit point, dans ce qui étoit cédé aux Anglois par le Roy de France." Que. Doc., III., p. 51.

* "sous main."

they have to deal." "*He bien!* my children," continued *M. le Gouverneur*, "I will prevail upon the other Indian nations to sustain you." The deputies laughed at him. "You should know," they said, "that if the Indian nations could so join together in union, it would be to chase away all those who are foreign to the soil, whoever they may be." De Vaudreuil, surprised at the reply, promised, rather than abandon them, he would march at their head against the common enemy.*

The Indians returned home dissatisfied with the treatment they had received, and there was a general feeling of discontent on their part. Begon thought that war should be commenced against the English, and that steps to lead to it should be deliberately taken. Charlevoix could only see dishonour and a wound to the national conscience in the policy of the French, unless they intended fully to sustain the Abenakis. Nevertheless, it was the policy deliberately followed by the authorities in Canada, until New England, by a show of strength, and by a wise policy of conciliation, obtained peace which lasted for some years. The argument advanced to lead the government of Versailles to further these views was, that the rapid progress of English settlement was being made, with the ulterior design of the conquest of Canada, and the loss of the colony would follow. From Norridgewock to the Saint Lawrence, as a bird would fly, is about one hundred and sixty miles.

These representations had the effect of causing a continuance of the order from France, that the Indians were to be supplied with munitions of war, and if attacked by the English "*contre raison*," whatever the words may mean, they were to be assisted.†

In 1721 Toxus, the Norridgewock chief, died, and in spite of Rasle's efforts, Ouikouiroumenit, who had always advocated peace, was chosen in his place. The tribe agreed to send

* "*Mémoire sur les limites de l'Acadie envoyé à Monseigneur le duc d'Orléans par le père Charlevoix, Québec, le 29 octobre, 1720.*" Que. Doc., III., pp. 49-54.

† 8 June, 1721. Que. Doc., III., p. 54.

four hostages to Boston as sureties for their future good behaviour. Rasle reported the matter to de Vaudreuil, who answered that he would send the Canadian Abenakis, with two Frenchmen and père de la Chasse as a reinforcement to Norridgewock, to shew the English, that it was not only with the Indians they had to do.* Only a few weeks were to pass before the promised intervention of de Vaudreuil was to have its effect.

In August, 1721, a body of two hundred Indians, with two priests, de la Chasse and Rasle, came to the English settlement of Georgetown, and after some parley left a letter for the governor, in which he was accused of taking the country, which God had given to the Indians. They carried the French flag, and many of the Canadian Abenakis from Bécancour and Saint Francis were present, led by two Frenchmen, Belleisle and de Croisnil. Although the organization had been made on the special instigation of de Vaudreuil, subsequently he pretended that de Croisnil had only attended as a witness to render a faithful account of what took place.

De Vaudreuil reported that these Indians left behind them two hundred beaver skins in satisfaction for the cattle they had killed, and that the settlers on the Kennebec, in their neighbourhood, were called upon to withdraw, also the demand was

* De Vaudreuil, 15 June, 1721. This was one of the letters seized in the attack on Norridgewock, when Rasle's papers were taken, as given in Hutchinson II., p. 262. The second letter is alluded to in Que. Doc., III., p. 78, 25 September. M. de Vaudreuil wrote in a time of peace. "Without a moment's delay I set out in order to apply myself to the business at Montreal; and from thence to Saint Francis and Bécancour, where I prevailed with the Indians of those villages vigorously to support their brethren at Norridgewock. . . . The Intendant and I have joined in a letter, to desire father la Chasse to take a journey to Norridgewock in order to keep those Indians in their present disposition, and encourage them to behave with firmness."

Begon wrote to Rasle. Hutchinson II., p. 263. "He (M. de Vaudreuil) thought it more proper to send the reverend father la Chasse than M. Croisnil lieutenant, and because the English can have no room to except to one missionary's visiting another, the treaty of peace not forbidding it; whereas if a French officer was sent they might complain that he sent Frenchmen into a country which they pretend belongs to them to excite the Indians to make war upon them. . . . in the meantime we shall assist them with ammunition, which they may be assured they shall not want."

made that the hostages at Boston should be set at liberty. The person in command, his name is not given, to whom the request was made, answered that in such a case they must be replaced by others, to assure adherence to the treaty. The Indians were indignant, and called upon de la Chasse to read their answer, which was their own not that of the priests. De la Chasse read the paper in Latin, and two of the chiefs in Abenaki. It was received by le sieur Penhale.* An answer in three days was asked for.

Consequent on these proceedings Shute sent back one of the hostages, with a reply that he did not accept the letter as written by the tribe but by the missionaries; in doing so he requested that the man should be replaced. Shute immediately strengthened the garrisons in the fort: he had not served under Marlborough to be dictated to by a few savages. As de Vaudreuil expressed himself, it was evident he intended to sustain himself by force of arms.†

It was with difficulty that the Indians had been induced to take this extreme proceeding: they knew how disastrous war in the end must prove to them, whatever success they might attain in carrying off prisoners in a sudden attack, and in killing some of their opponents. But the ecclesiastics were continually exciting them to enterprises of this character, leading them to believe that they would succeed in driving the English west of the Kennebec. Under such influences parties of Indians left their homes on expeditions, with the determination of continuing their attacks. But when brought face to face with the force of New England, and they saw the strength marshalled against them, they abandoned the attitude of uncompromising hostility.‡ De Vaudreuil and his advisers were ready to hurry the two countries into war:

* Penhallow.

† "Mémoire sur l'entreprise que les Anglois de Baston font sur les terres des Abénakis sauvages alliés de France." Que. Doc. III., p. 68.

‡ Hutchinson remarks, II., p. 261, that when the Indians returned home they gave the priests a narrative of the great firmness they had shewn in refusing to make concessions, and to this fact we may impute the erroneous relation of these treaties by Charlevoix and others.

repeatedly he asked for authority to sustain the Indians by force; but he received only such qualified instructions as to be powerless.

A correspondence took place in 1721-1722 between Shute and de Vaudreuil, nominally commenced to treat for the release of prisoners. Shute did not fail to complain of the event I have described: that two hundred Indians under a French flag, led by French officers, had entered an English town. He asked for the withdrawal of Rasle and other priests from British territory. Not having in March received a reply to his letter written in September, Shute, enclosing a copy of his first letter, expressed his mortification at the disappointment of the hope he had founded on de Vaudreuil's justice. Not only the hostilities and violence of the Indians had received de Vaudreuil's approbation, but the tribes had been incited by him so to act. Shute accused him of supplying munitions of war, and officers to lead the Indians, and likewise of suggesting the replies to the English expostulations. This high tone was taken by Shute from the knowledge of de Vaudreuil's letters and instructions which had come into his possession, having been found among Rasle's papers at an attack of Norridgewock. Copies of these compromising papers were enclosed by Shute, with the information that he was sending the originals to England.*

De Vaudreuil in the meantime had replied to Shute on the 22nd of December, but his letter did not reach Boston until April. De Vaudreuil stated that all the prisoners desirous of leaving, had left Canada, those who remained had become Roman Catholics, and were unwilling to return to New England. That the Abenakis had only proceeded to a territory which was their own, on which the English had constructed a fort against their wishes; and had been present in numbers to prevent their being unjustly treated. What the Abenakis desired was, that the English should withdraw from their land, and it was in this spirit they had written to the Massachusetts Governor, who had failed to attend a meeting at which he had

* Que. Doc., III., p. 70,

been expected. The only insult to the New England government was the form in which they stated their claim. De Vaudreuil ignored the treaties made by the tribe as the act of unauthorized men amongst them. The close of his letter was characterized by insolence, which it is only charitable to de Vaudreuil's memory to suppose was not his own act. He stated, which was false, that he had endeavoured to restrain the anger of the Indians, but he could not do so for the future. It was for the English governor himself to take measures to pacify the nation; for if they commenced war de Vaudreuil did not see how the English would extricate themselves from it. The next war would be more advantageous to the Abenakis than the last; moreover, they were under the protection of France, and he would not see them ill-treated. The Frenchmen who were present were private people. De Vaudreuil denied that the père Rasle and the other catholic priests were on British territory. He concluded by demanding the release of de Saint Castin,* and if not granted, steps would be taken to enforce it.

This gasconading letter, contrary to fact, and totally at variance with the fear of the future felt by the authorities at Quebec, had the contrary effect the writers hoped it would create. It was written within four years of de Vaudreuil's death. He was then seventy-six years old, shattered in health and mind, and Madame de Vaudreuil was his adviser.† There can be no doubt that the letter was the production of de la Chasse and the jesuits who influenced the *château*. Anything more impolitic cannot well be conceived. It awoke the strongest indignation in Massachusetts, and owing to the exertions made consequent upon the offensive hostility of its tone, the whole Indian village of Norridgewock, the centre whence came the expeditions of slaughter and desolation

* The death of de Saint Castin, who had been appointed supernumerary lieutenant, is mentioned as having taken place previously to June, 1721; the member of the family alluded to must have been a younger brother. Que. Doc. III., p. 55.

† Ante II., p. 517.

against the settlements of Massachusetts, was a short period afterwards entirely rooted out and destroyed.

In answer to this letter signed by de Vaudreuil, Shute sent the translation of the order signed by the regent for the release of the English prisoners, and asserted that they had not liberty to return, and that much art was used to dissuade them from so doing. What de Vaudreuil called an Indian village had been an English town for fifty years, which returned a member to the assembly. The Indians might disavow the treaty, by which the land seventy years ago had been ceded, but they could not so annul it.

Shute replied to the threat of an Indian war with a dignity of tone the opposite to the fatuous insolence which at Quebec had offensively suggested its possibility. He thanked de Vaudreuil for his advice. He knew its hazards, its misfortunes, its cost, and all the suffering it would cause. There was no desire to enter upon such a war. But if forced upon him, it was his intention to support and defend the inhabitants in their rights against any insulting attempt of the Indian; and with God's blessing, he hoped successfully to do so. He had orders from the king to sustain the garrisons in this part of the province. It was the first time that he had heard of the Norridgewock Indians being under the protection of the king of France, and he could not understand how such could be the case. Many of them had even placed themselves under British protection. M. Belleisle, who was present, might be a private person; but it was not the case with de Croisnil. Before the receipt of his letter, M. de Saint Castin had been released by order of the assembly, after humble submission on his part; and he had made a statement in writing acknowledging that he had given cause to be brought to Boston. Shute trusted that the sermons of père Rasle had made the savages better than they were before he came. But Norridgewock was in the territory of king George, and by the laws of Great Britain and of the province of Massachusetts, no jesuit or Roman catholic priest was allowed to preach, or even remain in the kingdom. He would

be glad to live at peace with the Indians, and would spare no effort to do so.

In his answer, de Vaudreuil made no attempt to deny the genuineness of his intercepted letters; all he could say was that the mode in which they had been obtained was disgraceful.* He repeated that he was under the obligation to support the Indians when attacked *mal à propos*. His letter was generally a repetition of his previous pretensions. The père Rاسle, he stated, was in neutral territory unaffected by the laws of Great Britain, and must not be ill-treated in his mission. In case of such attempt, he should make reprisals; and at the same time he affirmed that the Indians were independent of both crowns.

Those who were at Boston and read the correspondence, could not have failed to see that de Vaudreuil was without the power, or had not the will to intervene to rectify the difficulties on the frontier. The correspondence was sent by de Vaudreuil to the *conseil de marine*, with an assurance on his part, that in no way had he incited the Indians to act against the English.†

It was in consequence of the feeling that nothing was to be expected from Quebec but bad faith and intrigue, that the authorities of Massachusetts themselves determined to rectify the difficulties by which they suffered. It was from this feeling that at the close of the session in 1722 the expedition to Norridgewock was determined upon. It consisted of three hundred men. The Indians were to be called upon to deliver up the priests as fomenters of rebellion, and to give satisfaction for the damage they had committed. If compliance was refused, the principal chiefs were to be seized, and with Rاسle carried to Boston. The party proceeded to Norridgewock on the 13th of January, 1722. The Indians and the priest had fled, but Rاسle's letters and papers were taken possession of.

* "Vous ne vous expliquez pas Monsieur, sur la voie par laquelle vous avez eu les lettres dont vous m'avez envoyé les copies parceque vous reconnaissez sans doute que celle qui a servi à vous les faire avoir est tout à fait odieuse." Que. Doc., III., p. 79.

† Que. Doc., III., p. 89.

De Vaudreuil reported upon the event with affected moderation,* in no way in accord with the active interference he had carried on from Canada; his attempt was to justify the presence of the Canadian Indians in the territory. Most of the Indians were away hunting; Rasle had received notice of the proposed attack, and had only time to secure the church plate, and to take flight with the families who were left behind. In the May following the Abenakis for reprisal had pillaged several houses, and had taken sixty-five prisoners; men, women, and children. Sixty of them were sent back uninjured, five only being kept, whom they declared they would return when their hostages were set at liberty. A second expedition had been undertaken, when several houses were burned, cattle killed, and prisoners taken. The English had likewise surprised a party on the beach and attacked them; they killed five and wounded seven Indians. It was under this provocation that the Abenakis of the Kennebec had appealed to the members of their tribe at Bécancour and Saint Francis, and also to the Hurons of Quebec. Of these several tribes one hundred and sixty had proceeded to Norridgewock.

The House of Assembly, then in session at Boston, trusting in the good effect of expostulation, had sent an accredited agent to Norridgewock to obtain explanations, and to demand that the captives should be set at liberty. After the prorogation news came that the Indians had burned Brunswick, a village between Casco Bay and the Kennebec, and that Captain Harman had attacked some Indians and killed several, obtaining fifteen of their guns. On the 25th of July, 1722, the governor, by the advice of his council, caused a declaration of war to be published. It had been delayed in the hope that the government might obtain the liberation of the captives. When the house met, Shute asked for powers to be given to the council to carry on the war without interference. The house in an address concurred in the necessity of the declaration, and provided "all necessary and cheerful assistance."

* Que. Doc., III., p. 85.

Several acts of Indian hostility were committed. Sixty men in twenty canoes entered Merry Meeting Bay, and carried off nine families, but without injuring them; these were the captures related by de Vaudreuil. An attack was made on a fishing vessel, but the fishermen were armed and beat off their assailants, killing two of them. A boat from Nova Scotia putting into Passamaquoddy bay was attacked; the collector of customs, John Adams, son of one of the council, and some passengers going on shore, were seized; those on-board the vessel cut the cable, and she escaped. Several persons were also captured near the fort on the Saint George river.

Arrowsick was attacked on the 16th of September, by between four and five hundred Indians. Fortunately they were discovered by the guard, when the alarm was given, and the inhabitants had time to obtain shelter in the fortified building; the Indians failed in an endeavour to take the fort, but they killed one man. They were able to destroy fifty head of cattle, for the garrison was too weak to make a sortie. There had been but forty soldiers under Captain Robert Temple and Captain Penhallow. During the night Walton and Harman arrived with thirty men. An attempt was made to drive away the Indians, but, owing to their greater number, it did not succeed, and the troops retreated to the fort: on the ensuing night the Indians retired.

The constitutional disputes of the day belong to the history of Massachusetts. They turned upon the power of the legislature to control the operations in the field. The precise line which can be drawn, within which a deliberative body must confine itself in arraigning the conduct of the executive in exercising its functions, in governments analagous to that of Great Britain is determined by a parliamentary majority. So long as a ministry is sustained in its policy by a majority in the popular assembly, be it called what it may, it continues to perform the ministerial duties of an executive. An adverse vote leads to its resignation. No such elastic principle was observed in the old colonies, or in the present United States. On this occasion much contention arose as to the mode in

which the war should be carried on. The house assumed authority to determine how the force should be employed: the governor, on the other hand, claimed the sole command of the militia, and would not admit interference in the discharge of this duty. The house took no notice of this pretension, and called upon him to dismiss the commander of the force, Major Moody: the governor met their demand by engaging to investigate the ground of their complaint. In reply to this message, the house appointed a committee to examine into the abuses said to be prevalent in the force. After some opposition the governor consented to the inquiry, on the condition that the report should be made to him: but the house asserted the right of directing the policy of the province, without the concurrence of the council, and demanded that its instructions should be obeyed, independently of any orders given by Shute. When Major Walton appeared on a summons before the house of assembly by the governor's direction he declined to answer the questions put to him. Walton was subsequently brought before the council, when Shute notified the house, that the members could attend and ask such questions as they thought proper, and that Walton's journal could be produced. This course the house did not find it expedient to adopt.

The Norridgewock and Penobscot Indians had great disinclination to commence the war. Rasle had difficulty in inciting them to hostilities, and without the aid of the Abenakis and Hurons sent by de Vaudreuil, they would have remained comparatively passive. The Canadian Indians were free from the risk of the destruction of their homes, and the same might be said of the tribes on the Saint John river. But their passions were now awakened; and in all directions Indian parties were on the alert to cut off settlers exposed to attack and to surprise any ill-defended place.

In July, 1722, a large body of these Indians, in connection with the Indians of Nova Scotia, not far from Canso, had obtained possession of sixteen fishing vessels belonging to Massachusetts. Philipps, who shortly afterwards arrived

there on his way to England, on hearing of these outrages, manned two sloops, mostly with volunteers taken from the vessels in port, which were being laden with fish. He placed them under the command of John Elliot, of Boston, and John Robinson. Elliot, cruising along the coast, saw several vessels in a bay, which he entered to reconnoitre. He concealed his men, excepting four or five who remained on deck. On approaching the vessels, he perceived that they were manned by Indians. The Indians thought it was another prize for them. They cried out, "Strike, you English dogs. Come on board, you are all prisoners." Elliot answered that he would make all the haste he could. As he shewed no sign of fear or hesitation, the Indians became suspicious, and cut their cable. But Elliot was too quick for them, and boarded their vessel. The Indians made a stout resistance, but it was of no avail. Some jumped into the hold, upon which Elliot threw hand-grenades among them. Many, in consequence, endeavoured to save themselves by taking to the water; but they were shot from the deck, and five only reached the shore. Elliot was badly wounded, as were several of his men: one was killed. Seven vessels, with some hundred quintals of fish were regained. Elliot learned that many of the prisoners had been sent away: nine had been killed in cold blood. Robinson took two vessels and killed several of the tribe on board of them. Five vessels had been moved up the bay above his reach, and he had no force for land operations.*

The Indians, enraged by these attacks, determined to kill the prisoners who had not been rescued, about twenty in number, when Captain Blin arrived in a sloop as they were preparing to carry out their purpose. He had once been a prisoner in their hands, and had obtained their friendship; some signals had been agreed on, by which in any crisis he should make himself known. On his displaying the signal on this occasion, some of the Indians came on board, and their presence led to negotiations for the ransom of the prisoners and vessels.

* Hutchinson, II., p. 295.

In October de Vaudreuil again addressed the governor at Boston.* At this date Shute had left for England, and Dummer was the lieutenant-governor. Shute's position in Massachusetts had become intolerable. The house of assembly opposed him in every measure he attempted to carry, and in place of voting him £580 for his half-year's income, they would only pay him £180. It was an effort to make the governor's stipend dependent on his official consent to the acts voted by the legislature. The majority objected to an address made by him to the Iroquois being in his own name, as was the case with the governors of the other provinces, instead of that of the general court. They attacked in every possible form his prerogative as governor, and his personal position. The consequence was that he became exceedingly unpopular: On one occasion a bullet passed through his rooms not far from his person. Accordingly he obtained the king's permission to proceed to England, that he might there discuss the controverted points. Without taking formal leave he went on board the "Sea Horse," Captain Darell, lying at Nantucket, bound for Barbadoes. But the wind not proving favourable he left in a private vessel, the "Anne," on the 1st of January, 1723.

De Vaudreuil's letter was an appeal on behalf of the Abenakis, that they might be left in possession of their lands, until the boundaries were established by commissioners appointed under the treaty, and from his letter to the minister,† it is evident that this demand was made owing to instructions from France. He repeated his old arguments in their favour. Dummer replied as Shute had done, that the Abenakis were rebels to the crown of England, and that he would bring them to reason, and it was owing to the counsels of the missionaries that they had revolted, and it was the French who were exciting them to war. De Vaudreuil had himself complained of de Ramesay having received an envoy from the Iroquois of New York, who had visited the St. Louis and

* 2 October, 1723. Que. Doc., III., p. 89.

† 6 October, 1723. Que. Doc., III., p. 91.

Two Mountain Indians, in order to dissuade them from joining the Abenakis, and he had asked the minister to reprove de Ramesay.

De Vaudreuil's instructions from France* were that he should not actively interfere with regard to the Abenakis: he was to excite their jealousy. The same policy was to be practised with the Iroquois; and while these instructions were continually repeated, reports were sent to France of its success.

Massachusetts on her side determined to carry on the war with activity. In 1724 Colonel Westbrook, with two hundred and thirty men in small vessels and whale boats, sailed along the coast as far as Mount Desert. On his return he ascended the Penobscot thirty-two miles and burned the Indian village surrounded with pallisades. There were twenty-three wigwams, with a church sixty feet long by thirty broad, "decently furnished," with the priest's house. The attempt was made to reach Norridgewock, but, owing to the floods, it did not succeed. Negotiations were also undertaken to obtain the aid of the Six Nations of New York, but without effect.

Parties of Indians wandered through the territory to ravage any settlement they were able to attack. They killed and took prisoners eight persons at Scarborough and Falmouth; they killed several of the inhabitants of Berwick, Wells, Scarborough, Saco, Northfield, Rutland, Cohecto, and Arundel. The attempt on Muscongues on the Saint George failed, owing to the resolute conduct of Kennedy in charge of the post. One party of thirty English and four Indians under Captain Josiah Winslow was attacked by a hundred Indians. They fought desperately, and every Englishman was killed. The Indians seized a schooner with two swivel guns. They beat

* Que. Doc., III., p. 101, *Décision des Ministres sur le Rapport du Canada du 14 octobre, 1723.* "Versailles le 18 janvier, 1724. Les François ne doivent pas paraître entrer dans cette guerre; mais ils doivent sous mains inspirer aux autres nations d'aider l'Abénakis, en leur faisant connaître que l'idée de l'Anglois est de se rendre maîtres de tout le continent."

off two small vessels sent after them. After taking eleven vessels with forty-five prisoners, twenty-two of whom they killed, they disappeared. At Dover they attacked the house of John Hanson, and made his wife, maid and six children prisoners. Hanson followed them to Canada, whither they had been carried. He redeemed his wife, three of his children, and the maid. Two of his sons had been killed. His eldest daughter was seventeen years of age. He was permitted to see and to converse with her; but the Indians would not part with her, and she was left in their hands.

Such were the atrocities encouraged by the French rulers in Canada. It was only a year before the death of de Vaudreuil, and the knot of jesuits at Quebec were the advisers of his wife.

De Vaudreuil forwarded reports to France of the successes of the Abenakis; it was an argument for the continuance of his policy. Towards the end of 1724 he relates that the Saint John Indians had joined themselves to the Micmacs, and had burned five or six houses near Port Royal, and had killed eight or ten English, making as many prisoners. They had also obliged some troops to retire. They had intended to attack Canso, but too many vessels were present for the attack to be made: it had accordingly been deferred. Eight Indians had taken a bark, after having killed the crew. The Indians of the village of Pannaouiâmsqué, who had been passive for three years, led on by the Canadian Abenakis, sent by de Vaudreuil in spring, had killed and taken one hundred English with fourteen vessels laden with salt.* The Indians of Saint Francis and Bécancour, with some Loups, had engaged in the war since 1724. They had been joined by the Hurons of Lorette. Several Iroquois of the Sault and Mountain mission had taken up arms, and he looked forward that the whole

* "Ceux du village de Pannaouiâmsqué qui depuis trois ans que la guerre a commencé, n'avaient encore rien fait, excités par nos Sauvages domiciliés de St. François qu'il y envoya au printemps ont tué et pris 100 Anglois avec 14 barques chargées de sel et de poisson."

De Vaudreuil au Ministre. Quebec le 25 octobre, 1724. Que. Doc., III., p. 108.

population of the village would espouse the quarrel of the Abenakis.

There was much exaggeration in the statements of de Vaudreuil as to the results which his policy achieved ; none as to his continual efforts to induce the Indians to commit constant depredations.

This desultory warfare causing in each case great individual suffering, in the aggregate amounted to serious loss of life and destruction of property. The Indian mode of attack was to waylay and kill, and leave the victim where he fell, and when possible to carry away prisoners. Whatever course was followed, it was determined by the condition of being the most feasible, and giving the least risk.

It was under a sense of these discouraging attacks that an expedition was organized against Norridgewock.* In August, 1724, a force left Richmond fort on the Kennebec to reach Taconick up the stream, where they left their whale boats in a temporarily fortified camp, under a lieutenant and a guard of forty men. With one hundred and sixty-eight men the column started for Norridgewock. In the evening two women were seen, and on the troops firing upon them, one was killed, the daughter of chief Bomazeen ; the other, his wife, they took prisoner ; and from her they obtained some information of the position of affairs at Norridgewock.

It was noon of the 12th of August (O.S.) when the column

* I follow Hutchinson's account of the expedition, from the conviction that the narrative is honestly given by him. He says, II. p. 311 : " Not satisfied with the journal alone, which was given in by Captain Harman, I took from Captain Moulton as minute and circumstantial an account as he could give of this affair." Charlevoix gives an exaggerated narrative of the event. He estimates the attacking force at one thousand men, and he describes those remaining in the village as being fifty in number. Rasle is represented as drawing attention on himself to save his flock, and as falling dead at the foot of the cross he had erected, seven Indians who had endeavoured to protect Rasle with their own bodies being killed by his side. It was only on his death that the Indians took flight. The wigwams and the church were burned. The vessels and host were profaned. The body of Rasle is described as shot in a thousand places, his scalp taken, and his skull broken to pieces with the blows of hatchets ; his mouth and eyes filled with mud ; the bones of his legs fractured, and all his members mangled in a hundred different places, and that he was buried at the spot where the altar stood.

approached the place. The force was divided ; Harman, with eighty men, went round by some fields ; Moulton marched upon the village, which he reached at three. The Indians were in their wigwams. The English force was ordered to advance in silence. An Indian coming out of a wigwam accidentally looked round, and, seeing the English, gave the war whoop. There were sixty warriors in the village, and they formed to resist the attack. The old men, women and children fled for their lives. Moulton had given orders to his men to keep steady, and on no account to fire until they had received the discharge from the Indians. The latter, surprised and excited, came hastily together, fired hurriedly, and, as was foreseen, without effect. The English, keeping their ranks, returned the volley with terrible effect. Those of the Indians who had not fallen, fired a second shot and made for the river. Some tried to ford it, some to swim across, some took to canoes ; but not fifty of the whole number who were in the village gained the other side of the river, and several were shot before they reached the woods.

Those of the force who had followed the Indians to the river, on their return to the village found Rasle in his house firing upon the men in front of it. Moulton had given orders not to kill Rasle, and that he was to be taken alive. One of the men being wounded, Jaques, the lieutenant, forced open the door. His story was, that as he was entering Rasle was loading his gun, and would neither give nor take quarter, so Jaques shot him dead. Moulton expressed his disapprobation that Rasle had been killed. He allowed that Rasle had given some answer to provoke Jaques, but he did not believe that it was of the character Jaques had stated.*

Mog, a chief, having from his wigwam killed a Mohawk, the brother of the latter in rage forced open the door and shot him dead. Some English followed him, and a poor squaw and her helpless children were killed.

* Hutchinson states that Rasle had an English boy about fourteen years of age in the house with him, who had been taken six months previously. This boy Rasle shot through the thigh and afterwards stabbed in the body, but by care of the surgeons he recovered. This statement was made by Harman on oath.

The village was plundered, including the church plate and ornaments. Harman did not come up until night, when he bivouacked in the village, throwing out a guard of forty men. Twenty-six bodies were found, independently of that of the jesuit; one woman and three children were prisoners. Among those who fell were some noted Chiefs, Bomazeen's, Mog, Job Carabesett, Wissememet, and Bomazeen's son-in-law. The village of wigwams and the church were burned by the Mohawks. Norridgewock, so long the centre of active intrigue and undisguised enmity to New England, ceased to exist. The force took its way southward. At Taconick they found their boats with the guard in safety, and some anxiety had been felt regarding them. The dead had been scalped, and the scalps were carried by Harman to Boston. There is no record that Rasle's remains escaped this penalty which, with Indians in the field, a corpse of a slain enemy had to suffer. The probability is that his dead body in no way formed an exception to the custom, but it certainly received no indignity. Harman, the commanding officer, who had not been present in the fight, was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Moulton, who deserved what credit was due, obtained no reward.

In spite of Rasle's persevering hostility to New England, and his never-ceasing attempts to embroil England and France in war, for a small extent of border territory, which to-day is but imperfectly settled, he demands our sympathy from the high qualities which he possessed. Had he been placed in a wider field of action, where his energy could have been exercised, and by experience and contact with the world he could have learned to overcome his prejudices, he might have been remembered in history by the side of Richelieu, Mazarin, or Alberoni. Great powers always command respect, especially when allied with those less brilliant traits of character which impress us by their physical, rather than by their moral force. To Rasle's high ability he added unflinching courage and self-reliance; and it was by no means in disaccord with his character that he refused to give or take quarter. In his

young years he had been an earnest student of polite literature ; at the jesuits' college he had been distinguished by great application. He was an elegant Latin scholar. Throughout his life, and he had been a missionary for many years living with savages, he retained these tastes. He had obtained a perfect knowledge of Abenaki, and had attempted to give it some grammatical form. He had taught several of this people to read and write, and he delighted to correspond in their own language with them. He is said even to have written Indian poetry. He knew the Dutch language to speak it ; English only imperfectly. He had a hatred of everything English, the people, their language, their protestantism, their mode of life, and accordingly his manners were often offensive. There was no deceit on his part in his enmity, it was openly expressed ; and Rasle by the side of a ruffian like Le Loutre appears a saint.

He had determined that English settlement should never pass a certain mill. If any new comers went beyond this boundary which he had seen fit to establish, he incited the Indians to destroy their cattle, and to molest them even to death. The fact is, that for sixty years possession of this land had been held by Massachusetts, and improvements made upon it. The flimsy ground of argument which the French saw fit to advance, that the country belonged to the Abenakis, and every English settler was an intruder, could have been applied to the whole continent. The territory in question had been obtained by treaty and purchase, although much of what was to the north and to the east was claimed by conquest, as ceded by the treaty of Utrecht.

In recording the death of Rasle, de Vaudreuil simply states that he had been shot dead, and that one hundred and fifty of those who belonged to the village had fled to Canada, and had arrived in great distress.* De Vaudreuil asked for 2,000 *livres* to assist them. The minister directed that the sum should be taken from the 4,000 *livres* granted to the general hospital of Montreal ; an arrangement which found little

* Que. Doc., III., p. 113.

sympathy with the ecclesiastics, for in that city the interference of the Canadian Abenakis did not find favour.

The reverses suffered by the French cause at Norridgewock had for a time a paralyzing effect. Colonel Westbrook went from the Kennebec to Penobscot without meeting an enemy. Forces were placed in the field in other directions, not always with success. A party of fourteen leaving Dunstable in search of two missing men, fell into an ambush, when six of them were killed and three taken prisoners.

In order to excite general activity in volunteering, so that the war might be brought to a close, Massachusetts offered a reward of £100 for every Indian scalp. One Leverett organized a company to profit by the proclamation. On one occasion he took two, on another ten scalps. But it was a life of danger, and was to bring its retribution. With thirty-three men, on the 3rd of May, he fell into an ambush to receive the fire of eighty Abenakis. Leverett with his two officers fell dead; eight were wounded, of whom two reappeared, and eighteen only could make good their retreat. A reverse which discouraged the effort of carrying on war as a trade, in the true sense of the word.

The death of Rasle removed the great impediment to peace; for the influence which his personal qualities had obtained, with the religious sentiment which he could instil, would have made negotiation difficult. The mischief of Rasle's efforts can be read in the peace which followed; and his memory must be held responsible for the massacres which led to the war, and the stubborn spirit shewn by the Indians. Had he lived to influence this spirit, he would have still urged them to fight for the territory which Rasle desired to possess for France.

In spite of these complications, there were men in Massachusetts who were attempting to carry on trade with Canada; and provided an operation was profitable, the trader of the time was regardless of the national obligations he violated. On the 20th of December a New England vessel reached Rimouski.* The crew was from Massachusetts, with a Cana-

* 182 miles below Quebec.

dian pilot named Pierre Grouard. The articles for sale were contraband, and the profit on them was large. The vessel and cargo were seized, the pilot arrested, on the ground that trade was a pretence, and that the real purpose was to obtain soundings of the river. There was no evidence against him of any kind, nevertheless he was thrown into prison, and the intendant Begon gave instructions to prosecute him.* I cannot learn the fate of the unfortunate pilot.

In 1725 Dummer, the lieutenant-governor of Massachusetts, sent two commissioners to Montreal, Samuel Dexter and William Dudley. They went by the way of New York, Albany and Chambly, and arrived at Montreal on the 13th of March.† At the first interview, the commissioners asked that the prisoners taken by the Abenakis then in Canada should be released; on the second, that the assistance given to them in breach of the treaty of Utrecht should be discontinued. They received the reply that the Abenakis were under the protection of the king of France. if they made war, the English had only themselves to blame, as they had given cause for its necessity. The Abenakis desired to maintain themselves in their own country; they were likewise attached to their religion, and looked upon the governor of France as their father. The commissioners set forth that the country had been ceded to them by treaty. De Vaudreuil desired to introduce the Abenakis who had taken refuge in Canada into the negotiations, but the New England deputies declared that they had no authority to treat with them.

Dexter met some of the tribe at Montreal. There was always the difficulty with the Abenakis, that when subject to French control, they acted differently to the occasions when they were freed from this influence. De Vaudreuil arranged a meeting, but the English declined all discussion, their business being with de Vaudreuil. The Abenakis nevertheless set forth their grievances in three heads: their land had been taken from them; prisoners of the tribe had been carried to

* Que. Doc., III., p. 116.

† Que. Doc., III., p. 117.

Boston and Port Royal ; and their religion had been attacked and the missionaries killed. They claimed all the territory east of the river Saco, and demanded that the English should retire from within a league of Port Royal. "Why not claim Port Royal also?" asked Dudley. They likewise demanded satisfaction for the destruction of their church and the death of Rasle. The English contented themselves with promising to report what they had heard.

De Vaudreuil received instructions to continue his protection to the Abenakis,* and money was promised for the purpose: it was to be distributed by the jesuits, and given in their name. The expenditure was to be kept secret. French officers were to be employed in carrying out the policy, to be conducted in concert with the superior at Quebec. The principle laid down in all its plainness was to foment war as much as possible. It was held important that the English should not obtain possession of the Abenaki territory, as Canada would be exposed to the danger of invasion should the English become established there. It was the point on which de Vaudreuil endeavoured to awaken the jealousy of the French Court, a fear perfectly unfounded, by representing the consequence involved at variance with its true character. No such risk existed. The one end in view was to prevent English occupation, so that when feasible, the country could be taken in possession by the French, when there would have been little thought of Abenaki rights.

It was with the Penobscot tribe that the disposition to peace was first expressed. In the winter of 1724 an Indian hostage and a captive were permitted on *parole* to return to their homes, and on the 9th of February, 1725, they appeared at Fort Saint George with two of the principal chiefs. In the interval a Captain Heath, knowing nothing of these conferences, in an expedition, coming upon a deserted village of fifty wigwams, burned it. All feeling of confidence was thus destroyed, and the Indians did not return. In June, however, having understood that peace was really desired, the governor appointed Mr.

* 15 May, 1725. Que. Doc., III., p. 124.

John Stoddard and Mr. John Wainwright to proceed to the Saint George to reopen negotiations. A truce was agreed upon: shortly afterwards four Indian delegates went to Boston and signed a treaty of peace. The following year the lieutenant-governor and many of the council, with the lieutenant-governor of New Hampshire and Paul Mascarene, attended at Casco when the treaty was completed.*

The Indians continued in a pacific temper for many years. They had long been desirous that posts of trade should be established, where they could barter furs for necessities. This arrangement had been promised by Shute at the treaty of Arrowsick, but the house of assembly would make no appropriation for the outlay. The lieutenant-governor Dummer now renewed the engagement. Storehouses of this character were erected at the Saint George, Kennebec and Saco, at which the Indians obtained merchandise, not only cheaper than they could obtain it from the French, but also from private traders. At the same time it was made unlawful for private parties to trade with the Indians. The principle of selling goods entailed some cost on Massachusetts, but it was generally regarded as a well-made expenditure.

When the peace was first discussed, the terms in which it was proposed, were that the Indians would receive the peace as a grace; acknowledge themselves British subjects; and not destroy any forts constructed by the English, who by the treaty of Utrecht claimed the coast-line from Boston to Cape Breton; and that they should cause all the other tribes to join in the peace, including those in Canada. One of the Indians brought these conditions to Quebec, and saw de Vaudreuil regarding them. He told the messenger that the war did not affect the French, but the Abenakis themselves; and that they ought to prevent the English taking possession of their lands. He was surprised that they would listen to any terms of peace. After his death de Longueuil and Begon wrote that the Canadian Abenakis and Hurons had refused all

* The peace was ratified at the conference held at Falmouth in Maine, and was fully signed and concluded on the 17th of August, 1726 (N.S.)

offer of accommodation, and they would continue to harass the English, and as the Abenakis were good Catholics, they would be guided by their missionaries.

The missionary Gaulin at this time had counselled the Micmacs to accept peace.

De Beauharnois, on his appointment to the government in 1726, received the same instructions which had been given to his predecessor: to foment discord in New England. The Indians were not to be permitted to accept the "shameful peace;" they were to be encouraged to carry on the war.* In Canada there was strong hope that it would be of short duration. The letters sent to France indulged in prophecies of seeing it soon broken. Père Du Parc, superior of the jesuits, was strong in the hope that the Abenakis, although apparently desiring peace, would soon be joined by the other tribes, and with them march against the English. On his side he received instructions† to exhort his clerical brethren to foment war against the English to the greatest extent they were able, and the new governor de Beauharnois was called upon to give the jesuits his protection when so acting. Père d'Avaugour, *procureur* of the Jesuits, forwarded a *mémoire* from the père Aubry, missionary of the Canadian settlement at Saint Francis, stating that his flock alone were prepared to sustain the war.

The duplicity of the French authorities revealed in contemporary documents may have many parallels in history, but certainly has never been exceeded. This statement is not a matter of surmise, but established by official papers, in which the purpose is deliberately avowed of encouraging the devastation of northern New England. The principal instruments in these outrages were the Roman catholic priests.

* Que. Doc., III., p. 128.

† le Ministre à de Beauharnois, le 13 mai, 1726. "J'écris au Père Du Parc Supérieur des Missions de recommander à ses confrères de fomentier le plus qu'ils pourront la guerre contre l'Anglais. Je vous prie de leur accorder toute la protection dont ils ont besoin, et de ne laisser échapper de votre part aucune occasion pour exciter ces Sauvages à ne point discontinuer leurs courses." Que. Doc., III., p. 133.

There is no disputing the fact. The necessity of the proceeding is justified on the ground, that the possession by the English of the country, at least one hundred and fifty miles from the Saint Lawrence, was a threat against Canada. If the French had pretensions which they could sustain, the remedy would have lain in the establishment of a boundary line. The French desired to draw this line at the Kennebec, the English at the Saint Croix. Wherever the boundary, the northern limit had to be determined; and it could have followed the summit high lands, or have been traced by an arbitrary parallel of latitude. But France desired no such termination of the difference. Both the parent state and the colony looked forward to regaining Acadia, and it was their false representations to the Abenakis which incited them to warfare. Thus it was hoped that the country would remain without inhabitants, so that at a convenient season the French could advance a claim to it.*

M. Saint Ovide was likewise called upon to continue his influence with the Indians of the river Saint John to effect the same purpose.

The peace was looked upon with great disfavour in France; but it was hoped that the Indians would be led by the missionaries to retain their attachment to the creed they had accepted, with the obligation of fidelity to Canada. Instructions were sent to discourage settlement above Montreal, on the principle that as the colony was more exposed to attack from the territory north of New England, it was there that

* While de Longueuil correctly reported the terms of peace proposed [Que. Doc., III., p. 125, 31 October, 1725.] The Missionary Lauverjeat wrote [Que. Doc., III., p. 135] that the Abenakis had been deceived, that the clauses of their submission; of acknowledging themselves to be the cause of the war for the last five years; of the renewal of former treaties; of their recognition of English law; of their acceptance of a league with the English; that all these clauses had been misrepresented in the translation made to them. In addition to his own signature, those of the two brothers de Castin, and of one Borgne de Belisle, their nephew, engaged with them are appended. Many who could not write added their mark.

The falsity of this statement is, however, made apparent by the clear report of de Longueuil and Begon.

population should be directed, and de Beauharnois and Dupuy were called upon earnestly to adhere to this policy.*

A promise had been made that a missionary should be sent to Norridgewock. It was not, however, carried out, from fear that the Abenakis domiciled in Canada would return to the Kennebec and abandon the settlements of the Saint Francis and Bécancour. The Abenakis made five journeys to Canada in order to have the appointment made. Finally, de Beauharnois sent père Sirene, with the understanding that if the members of the tribe in Canada abandoned their villages, he would be recalled.†

Of the Abenakis who remained on the Kennebec, several received commissions from the English at Boston; but their relationship with the French was maintained by aid of the missionaries. Some of this class visited Canada and expressed their determination to return their commissions. One only in 1736, brought his commission to de Beauharnois. The intention was formed by this governor of sending some Abenakis to France, where "having seen the power and magnificence of the king," their loyalty to France would be confirmed. The proposition was not favourably entertained. It was again made, when the promise was given it would be considered, with instructions that no engagement should be entered into with them on this point, without further orders.

From this date the struggles for the possession of the territory which forms part of the state of Maine, require no special chronicle. In the first war with France, which followed these events, French effort was directed to the conquest of Nova Scotia. After the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the attention of the authorities in Canada was, for the first time, seriously directed to the south shore of the Saint Lawrence, and to the Canadian lakes. The attempt by the French to seize and possess the Ohio followed, with the determination to make the Alleghanies the western limit of British American power. In the war which raged throughout the territory, the policy of

* Que. Doc., III., p. 140.

† *Ib.*, p. 153.

devastation was transferred from the east to the west, to the fertile valleys of Pennsylvania. The cunning and strength of the merciless Abenakis were again enlisted to make desolate some of the fairest scenes of nature, then commencing to bloom in all the beauty of civilization and culture by the labour of British industry. It was to prove the last effort of this barbarous warfare, foredoomed to end in failure and defeat.

THE REVEREND JOHN WILLIAMS OF DEERFIELD.

The narrative of the Reverend John Williams is in all respects worthy of attention. He was of a Norfolk family; his grandfather came from Norwich, and arrived in New England in 1638, the ancestor of the numerous family of Williams. He himself was born at Roxborough, in Massachusetts, in 1664; he graduated at Harvard at the early age of nineteen, and became the first minister of Deerfield in 1686. He must have possessed great force of character, with a fair share of learning; he had particularly studied divinity. The history of what he underwent during his captivity, which extended over nearly three years, is a record of many parallel cases. But his spirit rose equal to the trying occasion in which he was placed.

On the second day of the march he had an opportunity of saying a few words to his wife. She was very weak, for she had but shortly before been confined. Williams was called away by his master, and he never saw her again. The following day he heard that in crossing a stream her strength had failed her; her Indian master, finding her unable to continue on the route, killed her with a blow of his tomahawk. The tears which coursed down the poor husband's cheeks on hearing of this murder were made a matter of reproach to him.

After four days' march they rested. It was on a Sunday. Williams held a service. The Indians who looked on called upon them to sing louder. We may well conceive that the psalms were not sung very vigorously, but they did not interfere with the worship. Only on one other occasion such a meeting was permitted. "When we arrived in New France," Williams remarks, "we were forbidden praying one with another, or joining together in the service of God." Many of the captives had bibles, psalm books, and catechisms. After their arrival in Canada all possible endeavour was used to get possession of these books. "Some say the Bibles were demanded by the French priests, and never delivered to them, to their great grief and sorrow."

Williams' clothes, which were good, were taken from him, and replaced by worn-out clothing full of vermin, which added to his misery. One grief peculiarly affected him. The burden on his spirits was greater than the burden on his back, when he thought that his wife's corpse lay without burial, exposed to be devoured by wild animals and birds of prey.*

The march was continued with no intermission and little rest. One poor woman, her name is preserved, Mary Brooks, had a miscarriage on the ice. In her pain and grief she asked permission to see Williams. It was granted. She was too weak to move, and knew her fate. She was not afraid of death. "I can," she said, "through the grace of God submit to His will." She was killed that day.

If in any record of sorrow and affliction we are to look for the healthy sustenance of the protestant faith, we may find it in the unvarying trust in providence, which amid his afflictions was possessed by this brave-hearted man. In his greatest grief he found consolation. He tells how his youngest daughter, aged seven years, was

* The neighbours followed on the trail of the party for some distance from the settlement, and brought back the corpses they found, including that of Mrs. Williams, which they reverently interred.

"carried on the journey and looked after with a great deal of tenderness ; his youngest son was on four occasions saved from being killed by the Indians, when tired of the labour of carrying him ; in Montreal a " French gentleman redeemed him from the savages " ; the whole of the children when unable to travel were drawn on sleighs. The elder son, Stephen, then eleven years old, afterwards a clergyman of ability, remained eight months with the Indians before he reached Chambly. He also has left a narrative of his experience.

It was the custom with the Canadians and Indians after such assaults, as soon as possible to scatter into small parties. The prisoners were then divided and allotted to those who should possess them. They advanced to any attack in as large a body as they could gather ; the danger to their prey lay in their roaming about until they found a spot unguarded, and of strength insufficient to resist them, and where no force could be collected of sufficient strength in time to oppose them. In a few hours they committed their depredations and fled, carrying with them their booty and what prisoners they could seize. Their scalps could be hung by their side. They were content with a trophy from the crown of the head, of the size of the palm of the hand.*

In a week's time the party subdivided itself into these smaller numbers. Williams was separated from his children. The last day that the English remained together Williams performed service. He was now left with two children belonging to his neighbours ; one of whom, a child of four, was killed by the Indian, for " he could not carry the child and the pack too." His master, however, was fortunate in killing a moose, so they moved to the spot where the dead animal was, that they might feed upon his flesh. While here the Indian made a pair of snow-shoes ; and thus aided, although carrying a heavy pack on the first day, Williams marched twenty-five miles.

They moved rapidly down the Ouinou-ski, for they dreaded a thaw. Williams expresses surprise that he could accomplish the distances he made. On one occasion he started before daybreak, never sat down or stopped to eat the frozen meat he carried with him, and travelled until dark. To his surprise, he found that he was stronger in the afternoon than in the morning ; and he estimates that he made from forty-five to fifty miles.

At Lake Champlain the ice was rough, and walking over it was painful ; but a slight fall of snow came, which made " it soft to my feet ; Wonderful favours in the midst of trying affliction," he exclaims. After a day's journey they stopped at the lake, feasting on two or three wild geese. In another day they reached the river Richelieu. Finding it partially thawed, they made a canoe. On the 25th of March, at noon, they reached Chambly.

The soldiers of the garrison treated Williams kindly. One of the officers received him at his own table, and undertook to represent his case to the governor. That night the poor pastor slept on a feather bed. When at Chambly he met a young man and a girl from Deerfield, from whom he learned, that most of the captives, including two of his children, had already arrived, and had gone on to

* Scalping did not cause death : it was the almost invariable accompanying blow of the tomahawk which was fatal. Hutchinson tells us that many have survived the loss of the whole crown.

Montreal. The route was continued up the Richelieu to Sorel; they were joined on their way by a female prisoner. At Sorel a French woman, who herself had been a captive, received them. The prisoners called forth her sympathy. She placed them at a table for dinner, with a tablecloth and napkins. Giving the Indians something to eat, she told them to sit down at the chimney corner: they were so offended that they left. The party finally arrived at the jesuit mission of Saint Francis; it was here that the Acadian Abenakis had been established. To his sorrow, Williams saw several white children, who had been seized in Acadia, mixed with the Indians, brought up and in manners identified with them, in fact reduced to their level of barbarism.

The jesuits invited Williams to come to their church; he answered that he would say his prayers in another place, upon which he was threatened that they would compel his attendance. It ended in his being led there by force. Williams records his impressions, which are not in favour of what he saw and heard.

On one occasion an Indian woman, Ruth, at that time at Saint Francis, who had been taken prisoner during King Philip's war, came to visit Williams. She knew English well. She was attended by an English girl as a slave.

The latter could not speak a word of English, was dressed as an Indian, and had their manners. The two talked with Williams' master for some time in Indian, when the Indian ordered Williams to cross himself. Williams refused, although the order was several times repeated, upon which Ruth volunteered to remind Williams that the scripture saith, servants obey your masters, and that it was his duty to comply. The New England pastor was not wanting in a reply to this poor casuist. The Indian, however, became violent as Williams would not kiss the crucifix, but he contented himself in biting Williams' nail, and saying, "No good minister, no love God! as bad as the devil!" The jesuits refused permission to the English at Saint Francis to meet and pray together, and did what was possible to prevent communication between them.

The French officer at Chambly kept his word, and submitted Williams' case to M. deVaudreuil, and the governor ordered Williams to be sent to Montreal. On his arrival he experienced treatment very different, to that which he had undergone at the jesuits' mission. De Vaudreuil gave him good clothing and received him at his own table. The governor arranged that he should meet his children, and exerted himself to obtain their freedom. His eldest daughter was redeemed, and having suffered from her captivity, she was placed in the hospital and carefully tended. A Canadian lady paid the money to redeem another of his children. A few days afterwards the Indian returned and desired to obtain the child back, offering a man in his place, who would be more useful, for he was a weaver. The offer, it is scarcely necessary to say, was refused. The attempt to obtain the younger daughter failed. The governor directed an ecclesiastic in Montreal to use his influence for her release. Evidently he did his best, and wrote to the jesuits on the subject. They replied, that they would not allow the child to speak to, or see the father. De Vaudreuil, however, remembered that he was governor-general, and personally accompanied Williams to where the child was. There was an interview between the father and daughter, then seven years old, which lasted an hour. On Williams leaving he was accompanied to his canoe by a jesuit and some soldiers. Some of the wretched captives of the place had been per-

mitted by their Indian masters to come down to the river in the hope of saying a few words to their pastor. But the jesuit hurried him along, and none were permitted to come near him.

The governor-general exerted himself to obtain the freedom of the young child, and offered one hundred "pieces of eight," * a large sum to pay for such a purpose in those days. Madame de Vaudreuil personally intervened. It was to no purpose, the girl remained with the jesuits and was brought up a savage.†

The most rigorous care was taken to prevent any intercourse between Williams and the English captives. He was not permitted to pray with those who were in the same house with him; they were stopped by a guard at his door, and not allowed to speak with him. De Vaudreuil allowed him to leave the city on parole; he never did so without being followed by spies. On one Sunday, more than three of them met, and, interchanged greeting; Williams was at once called to account by a jesuit as having spoken something reflecting on religion. Williams appealed to de Vaudreuil, for he entertained the impression that the governor was opposed to what was taking place, and that much happened of which he was ignorant. Williams early learned that he would be sent home so soon as the privateer, Captain Baptiste, then held at Boston, was set free, and not before; and that he had been seized to obtain the privateer captain's liberty. Williams speaks of him as Battis.

All this conversation was carried on in Latin. Williams knew no French; and no one in Canada is mentioned as speaking English. Madame de Vaudreuil appears in his narrative in a pleasing light. At a dinner where Williams was present, an officer who spoke Latin acted as interpreter, Madame de Vaudreuil, on hearing of the difficulties which he experienced in seeing his children, herself went with him, and likewise took him with her to the hospital to see a sick Deerfield woman.

Williams records the unsuccessful expedition of Captain Montinug, evidently de Montigny, against Northampton, and adds, that there was a proposition to send seven hundred men, two hundred of whom should be French, against the

* The silver coin then in circulation in British America; the forerunner of the United States dollar. It was a rudely made irregular circular piece, which came from the Mexican mines. It is to the mint marks on this coin that the notation of the United States dollar may be traced. They consisted of the figure of 8 between two pillars, some initials and a date with specific mint marks. When contracts were made for payment to be made in silver it was set forth to be in "pieces of 8," and there is reason to believe that they were set forth by the sign ₞ . There were four different values, pieces of 1, 2, 4, and 8. The original United States dollar was approximately of the value of the "piece of eight." The piece of "one" being the equivalent of the York shilling. In those days, as imperial coinage only was permitted in the colonies, British America was without a distinctive issue of money. That folly with many others of colonial legislation has long passed away.

† This was the Eunice Williams, who, bred with the Indians, became one of them, and married a christian Iroquois. Hutchinson relates that he saw her in Albany, in habits and manners a squaw.

Connecticut settlements. Finally, Williams, in company of de Ramesay, went to Quebec, and was placed with one of the council, who shewed him great kindness.

Between the jesuits and Williams there was perpetual religious controversy. He relates modestly and sensibly what happened. Williams was a scholar with much varied information, and a controversialist. One can read in his book the arguments which were used on both sides. Whilst the jesuits were boasting of the special favours which their church received, and the extent to which the result of the war would establish its truth, Williams was comforted by hearing of the capture of "La Seine,"* with Bishop de Saint Vallier, and he says "twenty ecclesiastics, who were carried into England prisoners of war." He did not think that the event was in accordance with the theory expressed. One friend, however, he found in Quebec, the brother of the Intendant, whom he mentions as M. de Beauville. It was M. de Beauharnois, who was very courteous to all the captives. He lent Williams an English bible, and when he went to France, presented it to him.

The jesuits did not abandon the hope of including Williams in their fold. They proposed that he should stay among them and be of their religion, and have a great and honourable pension from the king every year, and his children given back to him.

From Quebec, Williams was sent to Chateau Viche, Chateau Richer. He was kindly received by the priest and those living there. Several priests came from time to time, and the old controversy was continued. Doctrinal books were placed in his hands. "They were taken from me," Williams says, "for they said that I made ill-use of them, they having many of them boasted of their unity in doctrine and profession, and were loath I should shew them from their best approved authors as many different opinions as they could charge against us." The *curé* was an exception to all this fussy persecution. He was of the school of which we have many yet in Canada, high-bred, cultured gentlemen, firm in their own convictions, which they do not, as a point of duty, inflict by fire and sword on those not entertaining them. He left Williams to himself; and looked with abhorrence on sending down the heathen to commit ravages against the English, saying that it was more like committing murders than carrying on war. It was here in October, that Williams had the sad satisfaction of learning that his wife had been decently buried.

Shortly afterwards Livingstone and Shelden arrived in Quebec † with letters from Dudley regarding an exchange of prisoners. On this occasion five only were carried back, among them Williams' eldest daughter. His son Stephen was at this time redeemed, and joined him almost naked. He had been very badly treated. On one occasion, on the complaint of a squaw, one of the jesuits had soundly whipped him. In August, 1705, Dudley and Vetch arrived, upon which Williams was sent to Quebec; but he was soon ordered back to Chateau Richer, owing to a dispute which he had with a mendicant friar, an Englishman sent from France to convert the English in Canada, who considered Williams might interfere with his success.

* Ante Vol. II., p. 421.

† Ante Vol. II., p. 425.

Williams felt it to be his duty constantly to write to his Deerfield parishioners. When his letters contained religious exhortations, they were burned. He had liberty to write to his children about indifferent things; but he was plainly told that if he entered into any religious instruction his letters would not be delivered. In all cases fathers were denied communication with their children. One travelled fifty miles to see his son; hearing the boy was in the woods, he followed him there. But the boy did not dare speak with him without his master's permission. When the latter came, leave was refused on the ground that the father had no letter from the governor. On another occasion he obtained his permission. The jesuits who received him told him the boy was absent, which Williams says was untrue.

Williams went again to Quebec in 1706. The September was unusually cold. He feared that owing to the state of the weather the report of the captives gaining their freedom would prove untrue.* He also heard that if, when the prisoners were brought, Baptiste was absent, he should be confined in irons.

At length he was cheered by the arrival of the vessel in which he was to embark. She sailed from Quebec the 25th of October, but owing to a storm had to return. She again started, and reached Boston on the 24th of November, 1706.

The vessel contained fifty-seven captives, two of whom were members of Williams' family.

Thus of the one hundred and six prisoners carried from Deerfield :

- 57 returned to Boston in 1706.
- 7 previously left.
- 5 died during their stay in Canada.
- 19 were killed during the journey.
- 4 (about) died from starvation.
- 14 (about) remained in Canada.

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106 Total.

At Boston the captives were received with all fondness and charity.

Williams returned to Deerfield, rejoined by all his children except Eunice, who became a squaw, and married a Caughnawaga Indian. Williams married again, a connection of his first wife. He died on the 12th of June, 1729, in his sixty-fifth year, having been for nearly forty-four years the pastor of Deerfield.

* Williams records the shock of an earthquake in March, which made the houses tremble, and was felt for leagues around. The assumption that Canada is beyond seismic influences is not borne out by fact.

BOOK IX.

LOUISIANA.

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CHAPTER I.

The determination of the mouths of the Mississippi in their relation to the upper waters, which had been reached from Canada by the rivers Wisconsin and Illinois, in a few years assumed a higher character than a geographical discovery. It obtained importance from the political consequences which were foreseen to be attainable. By colonizing the lower country, and continuing settlement northward to the Illinois, the English colonies might be restrained within fixed limits, and the western development of New York, Virginia and Carolina be made impossible. There never was so fair an opportunity for the foundation of an empire. That failure and discomfiture took the place of success and prosperity, may be attributed in a great degree to that act of bigotry and folly, the revocation of the edict of Nantes. France failed to form on the southern Mississippi a province strong in population, and with energy capable of expansion, from the want of men to send there.

Had Louis XIV. governed France in a statesmanlike spirit, and not raised to power the Delilah he lifted from obscurity, Madame de Maintenon, to cast the blight of her influence over the kingdom; had the toleration granted to the protestants by Henry IV. been continued; and an effort been made to direct emigration from this population to Louisiana; had this policy been followed, everyone must recognise how powerful France might have become in America. Fifty thousand huguenots, driven from France alone, found a home in England. Had half that number appeared in the valley of the Ohio and on the banks of the Mississippi, what formidable strength they would have given to French rule. These French colonies would have been unassailable on the side of the English. In a few years their strength would have given

them the power to be aggressive. What, in such circumstances, the history of this continent, west of the Alleghanies, might have been, cannot be surmised. As events shaped themselves, the possession of Louisiana at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, led to the attempt to seize the valley of the Ohio. From this policy sprang the events which drifted into war, and established the pre-eminence of the British race and language on the northern American continent.

On the return of d'Iberville from Hudson's Bay in 1697, he urged on the attention of de Ponchartrain the necessity of taking steps to establish a colony on the Mississippi. Modern writers have stated that the first settlers of Louisiana and Texas were French Canadians. There is no foundation for the statement. Except some *coureurs de bois*, who, in 1700, discredibly left the Canadian territory with the furs belonging to the Montreal traders, in the sense that the furs had been obtained by the money and supplies furnished from that city, there was no emigration from Canada to Louisiana. In this instance, the flight of these men with the property not belonging to them, called forth the strongly expressed reprobation of de Callières, and was a ground of complaint from him to Versailles that d'Iberville received them.* That any French Canadians reached Texas at this date, is out of the pale of probability.

The first attempt to direct population to the Mississippi was placing two thirty-gun frigates at Rochefort, "le Français" and "la Reconnée," under the command of d'Iberville and de Surgères. Two smaller craft accompanied these vessels, containing two hundred emigrants, among them some women and children. A large proportion of the marine regiment which formed the regular force, consisted of Canadians. In the war previous to the treaty of Ryswick, several Canadians had joined the regiment on service in Canada; and, after the peace, they returned with their regiment to France. Such as these were in this expedition.†

* Ante Vol. II., p. 395.

† "la plus grande partie de nos soldats étaient Canadiens de nation." Peni-

The ships left France on the 17th of October, 1698, to arrive at San Domingo in December, where they were joined by Chateamoraud in a 50 gun ship, who took command of the expedition. After remaining eleven days in communication with the governor Ducasse, the expedition sailed to Pensacola Bay, where it arrived in January, 1699. Pensacola had lately been settled by some Spaniards from Vera Cruz. Application was made to obtain wood and water. The commandant replied that the ships could serve themselves in this respect; personally he had received instructions to admit no foreign vessel in port. He, however, furnished a pilot to conduct the vessels into the bay, so they could obtain shelter if bad weather were experienced. Subsequently the Spanish governor requested the vessels to seek another harbour.

The ships reached the Chandeleur islands. As the soundings established that they could make their way through the intervening channel, the emigrants were landed on the main shore and huts were built. The Indians were of the Biloxi tribe, and were friendly; it was the name given by the French to the settlement. Several of the Bayagoula tribe also visited the ships and shewed themselves equally well disposed.

So soon as the new comers were established in what comfort could be obtained, d'Iberville, accompanied by his youngest brother, de Bienville, then in his nineteenth year, prepared to follow out one of the main duties entrusted to him: the establishment of the position of the mouths of the Mississippi. The recollect priest with the expedition was Anastase Douay,

cault, p. 567. "Relation ou annale veritable de ce qui s'est passé dans le pays de la Louisiane" [1699-1721.] MS. Par. Lib., 2nd Series XI., pp. 550-747. Penicault was a native of La Rochelle. When eighteen years old he entered as a carpenter on board the vessel of Comte de Surgères, and left France in d'Iberville's expedition. His history was written on his return to France in 1721; he was then suffering from threatened loss of sight. He left his wife and slaves behind him in Louisiana, with the intention of returning; his object in visiting France being to obtain some relief to his malady, and he hoped to receive a pension from the Comte de Toulouse. He states that his work was written at the date of the events he describes: "Cette relation que je donne au public je l'ay écrite chaque année pendant le temps que je demeurai à la Louisiane en qualité de charpentier pour la construction des vaisseaux de roi."

in whose mind the great river could only suggest the most melancholy associations. It was with this recollection that the unfortunate de La Salle exchanged almost the last words he uttered,* and who by his local knowledge it was thought would prove useful on this occasion. The party started in two boats known as "Biscayennes," with forty-eight men, and provisions for twenty days. The Indians met by d'Iberville had spoken of the river, under the name of Malbouchia. The Spaniards called the entrance the "Palisade." On reaching the spot d'Iberville discovered the explanation of the nomenclature. The river's mouth was bristling with the trees which the current incessantly carried down. Having found what he believed to be the river, he returned and reported his discovery to Chateamoraud, who had followed him with reefed sails; upon which the 50 gun ship returned to San Domingo.

As d'Iberville ascended the river, he was struck by the difference of the character of its banks with the description given by Hennepin: he also felt how little reliance could be placed on the narrative of Tonti. He so wrote to the minister, and Charlevoix tells us that he saw the letter. After ten days' ascent he arrived at the tribe of the Bayagoulas. He was received by the chief and conducted to the temple, which had the mark of civilization of being adorned with the figures of several animals painted in red and black. Higher up the river he reached the Oumas. Hitherto d'Iberville had been in doubt, if he was actually on the Mississippi; there was so much at variance with the published description of the river. This feeling, however, disappeared when a *livre de prières* was placed in his hand; it contained the name of one of de La Salle's companions. He likewise received from a chief the letter written by Tonti on the 20th of April, 1685, from Quinipissas, addressed to "M. de la Salle; gouverneur de la Louisiane." The remarkable fact that this letter had been kept in safety for fourteen years† satisfied d'Iberville

* Ante Vol. II., p. 156.

† Ante Vol. II., p. 160. Charlevoix II., p. 259, gives the first sentences of this letter: "Du Village des Quinipissas ce vingtième d'Avril, 1685. Monsieur, ayant trouvé les poteaux où vous aviez arboré les armes du Roy, renversés par

that he was indeed on the waters of the river of which so much had been heard.

D'Iberville, assured of his discovery, returned to the fort which had been constructed at Biloxi. Placing de Sauvole in command, with de Bienville as a lieutenant, he sailed for France with the frigates, leaving the small vessels for the use of the colonists.

Shortly afterwards de Bienville, accompanied by a Bayagoula guide, reached Lake Ponchartrain,* the district occupied by the tribe of Colapissas. On seeing de Bienville they assumed a hostile attitude. The guide learned that two hundred of the tribe of Chickasaws, headed by two white men, had shortly before attacked their village and carried away some prisoners, and the Colapissas supposed that the white men they now looked upon were of the same race. The guide, as he was bid, explained that de Bienville and his followers were French, the enemies of the white men who had attacked them, the English from the sea coast; it may be assumed, traders from South Carolina. De Bienville was well received, indeed he experienced friendliness from all the

les Bois de Marée, j'en ai fait planter un autre en deçà, environ à sept lieues de la Mer où j'ai laissé une Lettre dans un arbre à côté. . . . Toutes les Nations m'ont chanté le Calumet; ce sont des Gens qui vous craignent extrêmement, depuis que vous avez défait ce Village. Je finis en vous disant que ce m'est un grand chagrin que nous nous en retournions avec le malheur de ne vous avoir pas trouvé après deux Canots ont côtoyé du côté du Mexique trente lieues, et du Côté de la Floride vingt cinq, &c "

* Penicault, who was of the party, alludes to the shells which to this day are found at the entrance to Lake Ponchartrain, p. 573. "Son embouchure à l'entrée du lac a un quart de lieu de la large de la droite à la gauche; les deux cotés de cette entrée sont garnies de coquilles en si grande quantité qu'elles en forment des elevations, ce qui luy fait donner le nom de la pointe aux coquilles." In modern times they have been noticed by travellers. Lyell alludes to the road, from lake Ponchartrain to New Orleans, as made of "gnathodon shells, procured from the east end of the lake, where there is a mound of them a mile long, 15 yards high, and 20 to 60 yards wide." The writer visited the spot in 1857, and in a work published the following year gave a description of the road: "The superstructure is composed of shells which lie in myriads on the beach of the lake, and placed on the road bed, they are crushed into solidity by a heavy roller. Nothing can be smoother and better than this road, and hence it is the scene of the prowess of many a fast trotting horse. The shell is the *Gnathodon Cuneatus*."

Indian tribes. From Lake Ponchartrain he proceeded to the Mississippi, and returned by the same route to Biloxi.

An exploration was afterwards made by him to the east of Biloxi, as far as Mobile Bay. De Bienville found a large quantity of pheasants, wild geese, wild duck and teal. He visited the island now known as Ile Dauphin, near Mobile, and from the number of bones piled up according to the Indian ceremony, he gave it the name of Ile Massacre.

In 1700 d'Iberville returned to Louisiana, arriving early in January. Having determined to form a settlement on the Mississippi, with de Bienville and fifty men he ascended the river from its mouth to select a spot where there was no danger of inundation. The place chosen was about fifty-four miles from the sea. The fort was commenced at the end of January. D'Iberville continued the ascent of the river, and was successful in making peace between the two tribes of Bayagoula and Oumas. He reached the land of the Natchez, where the jesuit, Saint Come had founded a mission. This tribe believed in the divinity of the sun. During the stay of d'Iberville the temple was struck by lightning and set on fire. The one conclusion was that the misfortune had arisen from the wrath of the god, and the priests called upon the squaws by sacrifice to appease the divinity. The propitiation to be offered was that of their infant children. Several poor children were strangled and thrown to the flames before the French could intervene to prevent a continuance of the atrocity.*

From Natchez d'Iberville returned to Biloxi. The reports which he there heard were unfavourable to the location. The soil was bad, and the coast could only be approached with difficulty. The central position was the one favourable feature, being between the Spanish colony of Pensacola in Florida

* Some writers limit the number to four. Panicault, who was present, and describes the scene, says that seventeen were so sacrificed. "M. d'Iberville eut horreur d'un si cruel spectacle, et il commanda d'arrêter ce spectacle affreux, et de leur arracher ces petits innocents, ce qui n'empêcha pas malgré tous nos efforts qu'ils n'y en jettassent dix-sept, et si nous ne l'eussions pas empêchés ils en eussent jetés plus de deux cents au bout de trois jours," p. 593.

and the Mississippi. When there, he was visited by some *coureurs de bois*, who had left the Illinois with furs, which they bartered with him: they were the men to whom allusion has previously been made.* Charlevoix states that Tonti, accompanied by two Canadians, also arrived. He had heard that the French were established on the Mississippi, and he descended the river to learn the truth of the statement.

De Bienville with de Saint Denys, and twenty-five men, were sent to take charge of the new fort on the Mississippi. In their descent, at the spot which still bears the name of the "English turn," de Bienville came upon an English ship of fifteen guns, which had anchored owing to an unfavourable wind. The vessel was commanded by a Captain Bar, who informed de Bienville that he had left at the mouth of the river a consort of the same force. The vessels had been sent by one Daniel Coxe, of New Jersey, the then holder of the grant in 1627 of Charles I. to Sir Robert Heath. Bar explained that his business was to sound the approaches of the Mississippi, and to return with some vessels bearing emigrants, and found an English colony. Bar was uncertain if the stream he was in was the Mississippi, and he asked de Bienville if such was the case. De Bienville replied "certainly not," that that stream was further to the west, that the river was a dependency of Canada, and was held in the possession of the French, who had a fort and some settlers higher up. Bar accordingly sailed back to his consort at the river's mouth. It was from this event, that the spot obtained the name which it retains.

When de Bienville was on board this vessel, a French protestant engineer named Secon spoke to de Bienville regarding the French protestants settled in Carolina. Secon gave de Bienville a *mémoire*, with what authority it is not possible to say, in which he sets forth that there were four hundred French protestant families in Carolina, and that they were desirous of living under the French government of Louisiana, on condition that they could enjoy liberty of conscience. The memorial was forwarded to de Ponchartrain,

* Ante Vol. II., p. 395.

who replied that the king had not suppressed protestantism in France, for the protestants who had left the kingdom to form a republic in America.

From what d'Iberville had seen of the country of the Natchez, he felt a strong conviction that it was the place above all others favourable for the establishment of a colony; accordingly, he chose a site for settlement, and traced out a fort, which he named fort Rosalie, after Madame de Ponchartrain. On his arrival at Biloxi, he sailed for France to obtain reinforcements and additional emigrants.

An early report of d'Iberville to his government sets forth that in the opinion of men the most experienced in the commerce with America, trade should be unfettered in the new province, and open to all Frenchmen. Unfortunately, exaggerated reports had been spread of the mineral wealth of the country, and the possibility of obtaining unbounded riches appealed to the individual cupidity of those directing public affairs. Inexhaustible mines were supposed to exist west of the Mississippi. It was known that copper had been easily obtained by the Indians, and it was held that large returns would be gained by trained labour. The pearl fisheries were looked upon as promising the richest harvest. It was believed that much of the fur of the buffalo could be woven into cloth of the finest tissue and of the greatest value. With incentives to limit the number who would profit by this wealth, no project of free trade could obtain support. One by one, these hopes of wealth were doomed to disappointment; but they were not entirely without result, for they led to the exploration of the rivers by which it was believed that the mines could be reached. The Red River, the Arkansas, and the Missouri were examined towards their sources, and the geography west of the Mississippi to some extent became known.

No long time was to pass, before the influences proceeding from the English Atlantic provinces were to be felt in the French colony, owing to the old enmity and opposing interests coming into collision. Carolina had been established for

upwards of half a century. Indeed, the southern sea board had early attracted English colonization, although little was accomplished in the way of settlement for some years after the expedition sent out by Raleigh under Ralph in 1585. In 1629 Charles I. gave a grant of the territory, under the name of Carolina. The population increased but slowly. In 1653 North Carolina became the home of several Virginians, and in the following year some immigrants arrived from Barbadoes. In 1663 Charles II. gave a charter to a company, of which the leading members were the duke of Albermarle, the earl of Clarendon, and lord Ashley. The greater interest attaches to this effort of colonization, that John Locke was called upon to draw up the constitution for the new province. In 1731 the charter was abandoned to the crown; at that date the population amounted to 150,000 whites with 50,000 negro slaves.

The attempt, to colonize the river Saint John in Florida by a French huguenot colony, under Jean Ribault and Laudonnière, with its destruction by Menendez, furnishes a painful narrative in the chronicles of the sixteenth century. Menendez was a fit instrument of the brutal bigot, Philip II. of Spain. On his conquest of the settlement, he put the protestants to the sword, not as Frenchmen, but as heretics. The outrage was followed by a terrible retribution, at least, with regard to the instruments of the bloodshed. The vengeance of de Gorgues five years later on the Spanish garrison is too well known to be repeated in detail. The forts were taken. Every Spaniard was killed or hanged. Menendez was not of the number. He lived to die in his bed at Santander, in Spain.

It is not until a century later that we have any authentic accounts of the settlement of South Carolina. In 1670 Sayle landed at Beaufort on the Ashley river, and this expedition ended in the establishment of Charleston in 1680. Several of the French huguenots, when driven from France, sought a home in the Carolinas. There is no trace of any systematic emigration of the French exiles from England under the

auspices of the government. The movement was a spontaneous one on their part, in search of a spot where they could obtain freedom of conscience. Several left Holland, about one thousand in number, having obtained a frigate, so if attacked they could defend themselves; and if reduced to desperation by the prospect of being made prisoners, they formed the determination to blow up the ship. Arms were obtained at Utrecht. A vessel of fifty tons was chartered in England, and many went from Amsterdam to London to join such of their co-religionists as had resolved to embark for America. In 1687 six hundred left England for South Carolina, where three colonies were founded: Orange Quarter, on the Cooper river, Santee, and Charleston. There were also settlements of Irish, Swiss and Germans.

The struggle for sovereignty between the French and English thus extended to the south of the continent, and fears were expressed in Louisiana that some attempt from South Carolina would be made on the young colony. No land expedition could have been considered feasible; but it was probably a convenient argument to urge with the French court to obtain support. The strong naval force of d'Iberville is a proof that the danger was considered to lie from the ocean, and rather from Spain than from the English colonies. Indeed, a Spanish vessel visited the fort with the intention of driving away the French. But the force present suggested the impossibility of success. The captain accordingly contented himself with a written protest against French occupation, as the territory was a part of the government of Mexico.

Two years had elapsed since the arrival of the first expedition in Louisiana, and little had been done towards the development of the country. The necessary provisions had been obtained at San Domingo. Fresh meat was procured by fishing and hunting. The main expectation of those present was that wealth would be gained by the discovery of mines. Juchereau de Saint Denys penetrated to the upper waters of the Red river, and returned with but limited information. Le Sueur ascended the Mississippi to the falls of Saint

Anthony, and followed Saint Peter's river for one hundred and twenty miles. On attempting to ascend a river called by him the river Verte, he was stopped by the ice. He, therefore, built a fort, which, in honour of a receiver-general, one of his patrons, he called "Fort Thuiller." At the time he believed he had discovered a valuable mine. Leaving some men in charge, he descended the Mississippi. The attitude of the Sioux, who looked with disfavour on its establishment, eventually became threatening, and the fort was abandoned in 1704, the party arriving at Mobile in March.

The result of the non-cultivation of the land caused famine and distress. Disease also worked its ravages among the colonists. Many died, so that the numbers were reduced to one hundred and fifty. Among those who fell victims, was the commander of the fort de Sauvole, who died at Biloxi on the 22nd of July, 1701.

In this emergency food was obtained from Vera Crux. In the spring d'Iberville again appeared with reinforcements and provisions. He placed de Bienville in command at Biloxi, and de Boisbriant was left in charge of the Mississippi fort with twenty men. The dissatisfaction felt with regard to the establishment at Biloxi had greatly increased. The ill-health and suffering of those resident there had attracted greater attention by the death of de Sauvole. A change of location was resolved upon. The more favourable situation of Mobile, and belief in the greater salubrity of its climate and more fruitful soil, with which de Bienville in his exploration had become impressed, led to the establishment of that fort in 1701, and the government for the time was transferred to it. The site selected was on the east side of the river, proximately on the ground on which the city of Mobile now stands.

Towards the end of 1701 d'Iberville sailed for France, and returned to Louisiana the following spring. His health, however, was broken; at the end of the year he left the colony never to return to it. His last act was the establishment of Mobile. He partially recovered his health, and on the breaking out of the war he made a voyage to the West Indies;

but his constitution was shattered. He died in France on the 9th of July, 1706, in his sixty-third year.

When the declaration of war in 1702 became known, Moore, the governor of South Carolina, proposed an expedition against Florida; accordingly the attack of Saint Augustin was determined upon.

The Spaniards of Pensacola hearing of these threatened hostilities, appealed for aid to de Bienville, and at the same time a messenger arrived on a similar mission from Saint Augustin. De Bienville offered the governor of Pensacola arms and ammunition; to the defence of Saint Augustin he despatched one hundred men of his force.

The Chickasaw Indians, who were on the side of the Carolinas, sent men of their tribe to the Mississippi Indians, to ask them to take part in the war. They induced the Coroaes to attack the French. The latter killed a priest named Foucault and two Frenchmen. Two priests, fathers Davion and Limoge, were fortunate in being able to reach Mobile.

The attack on Saint Augustin failed, and the Carolina troops returned homeward: but the Indian tribe of Cherokees with some negroes, led by an Englishman, attacked the Spanish Indians. De Bienville felt considerable apprehension with regard to the attitude of the Alabama tribe. He was soon made to feel that his fears were well grounded. Being short of provisions he sent out a party to obtain some corn. It was attacked and destroyed, one man only returning to tell the story. At the same time he heard the bad news that a fleet under le Fèvre de la Barre, the former governor of Canada, had been beaten back in an attack on Charlestown by Sir Nathaniel Johnson, governor of South Carolina. One gleam of good fortune was experienced, the appearance of a vessel from France with provisions.

The hostility of the Indians, which extended even to the north of the Ohio to the Wabash, determined de Bienville to chastise the Alabamons. Accompanied by some Chickasaws, whom he had induced to join him, he left Mobile about the time of Christmas. He attempted a night surprise, but failed

in the attack, and lost three men. He, however, gathered some provisions in the expedition, which he greatly needed.

In the summer of 1705, a fifty-gun ship, under the command of de Chateauguy, arrived with seventy-five soldiers. Two grey nuns were on board. Five priests were also sent by the bishop who was administering the diocese in France. Twenty-three young girls accompanied the expedition, all of whom on landing found husbands. There were also supplies for the wants of the colony. Much of what had been brought was, however, stored in a fort lately constructed: a fire broke out, and the whole was consumed. Thus the want of food was again experienced, to which privation the disaster of a malignant fever was added, by which thirty-five of the settlers were carried off; and at the same time the hostility of the Indians increased.

The Indians began war between themselves. The Chickasaws commenced fighting with the Choctaws, who also attacked the Cherokees. The Tensas were driven from their lands by the Yazoo, and in their turn the Tensas attacked the Bayagoulas, who had received them in their distress. Some Hurons from Detroit, who had descended the river against the Arkansas, were defeated, and those taken prisoners were burned.

Nevertheless, with all these difficulties, there was an attempt to form social life on a basis of law and order, and on New Year's Day, 1707, père Bourgoing arrived with the powers of vicar-general, thus being the head of the ecclesiastical establishment. But his presence was somewhat alloyed by his being the bearer of the bad news that père Saint Come and three Frenchmen had been killed in an Indian attack.

The colony had been established ten years, and it was an event in its history that a Spanish vessel came from Havanah to trade with the inhabitants. There were only buffalo hides and furs to be obtained, with some lumber cut in the neighbourhood. The *coureurs de bois*, who had abandoned Canada, collected their furs, storing them in the few missions, and when a sufficiently large quantity was gathered they were taken to Mobile to be exchanged for European goods. The vessels

from San Domingo and Martinique brought to Louisiana molasses, sugar, and rum. The settlers cultivated vegetables, and they raised poultry, by which means they obtained money in specie, otherwise scarce in the colony. Flour and salted provisions formed the payment for what was furnished to the king's stores. It was early discovered that wheat could not be grown. On the other hand, the attempt to obtain cotton, indigo, and tobacco had been successful. But there were no labourers to work in the fields; the few inhabitants round the fort found an indolent pedlar's life easier and more profitable.

In 1708 a change took place in the government of Louisiana. Owing to the distance of the colony from Quebec, it was deemed expedient to constitute it a separate province, in independence of that government. De Muys, an officer of some reputation who had served in Canada, was appointed governor-general, and Diron d'Artaguet was sent as "*commissaire ordonnateur*," with instructions to inquire into the government of the last ten years. Complaints had reached France against de Bienville, and De Muys was the bearer of an ordinance to the effect, that letters having been received, that de Bienville had betrayed his trust, and had applied to his own use the king's property, if on enquiry, the fact should be established, de Bienville should be arrested and sent prisoner to France. The friends of de Bienville at court had communicated to him the accusation, and accordingly he had asked permission to return home. On the fact becoming known in Mobile, the inhabitants petitioned that he should be sent back as soon as possible.

The new governor-general died on his passage out. D'Artaguet, however, arrived. His instructions were not to communicate to de Bienville the accusations against him. The latter, consequently, wrote to France that he was unable to justify himself. D'Artaguet remained in Louisiana until 1710, when he returned to France. Owing to his unfavourable report on the condition and prospects of the colony that the proposals of Antoine Crozat were entertained: his application was to obtain the concession of exclusive trade.

The condition of Louisiana had little that was promising. The population consisted of 100 soldiers and sailors, paid by the crown, the garrison numbering 102 persons, with a population of 157 souls, of which 28 were women with 25 children, and 80 slaves. There were likewise 60 Canadian *coureurs de bois* living up and down the Mississippi, whose lives were alike a scandal to the community and profitless to the settlement. The missionaries complained bitterly of their conduct, and with justice. There was no attempt to cultivate the soil. The small population in excess of the troops gained their bread by ministering to the necessities of the latter, by following their trades, and in keeping stores and taverns. There were groups of hungry Indians hanging about the place. Five forts had been constructed for the protection of the population ; Biloxi, Mobile, the fort fifty miles above the mouth of the Mississippi, and on the islands Ship and Dauphin, near Mobile.

The French had been unfortunate in the selection of ground for settlement. The soil around Biloxi was arid sand, sterile and forbidding. The stunted shrubs of the *flora*, on the islands selected on account of their harbours, disclosed the poor condition of the land. Mobile was surrounded by a barren district, and fear of the Indian had restrained settlement to the north. The fort on the Mississippi was of all places the most repelling : the clouds of mosquitoes, the croaking of the bull frogs, the cries of the alligators, made the stay there one of torment. There was, however, this advantage : the coast furnished excellent fishing grounds, and shell fish was plentiful. In the woods there were wild turkey and deer ; on the prairies buffalo. There was no attempt to clear the land by cutting down the heavy pines. Like the Acadians, the first settlers in Louisiana shrank from this labour. The ground would have given Indian corn and peas, but the cultivation of these crops was neglected.

Owing to the death of de Muys, de Bienville continued to hold his position until his successor should appear, but his difficulties were in no way decreased. The colonists would

not work in the cultivation of the land, and hence the distress periodically experienced. They clung to the hope of retrieving their fortunes by the discovery of mines, or by the success of their fisheries for valuable pearls. Their entire trust was in the providence of the government sending provisions to feed them.

In this emergency de Bienville proposed to obtain a negro population, by seizing Indian slaves, and sending them to the West Indies, to be exchanged for negroes, in the proportion of three of the former to two of the latter. The proposition was summarily rejected in France, and de Bienville was told that what negroes were required must be obtained from Guinea. So slight was the progress made, that in 1709 d'Artaquette found that only five or seven of the inhabitants were cultivating the land at New Orleans.

Small as was the population, and unsatisfactory the condition of the colony, there was no accord between those guiding its fortunes; the ill-feeling against de Bienville had not abated. Letters were still written to France calling in question his policy, and assailing his character. The distress was in no way less felt; de Bienville reported that he had been forced to send a portion of his men among the Indians to find subsistence, from his inability to give them food: anything more subversive of discipline and order can scarcely be imagined.

What Indian corn was obtained was eaten only by the men. To the few females, emigrants principally from Paris, it was distasteful, and they did not fail to send the expression of their dissatisfaction on this and other points to the bishop who had induced them to make the voyage.

At an early date Bishop de Saint Vallier had given his attention to the Mississippi missions, and placed them under the control of the "*Missions Etrangères de Quebec*."* Subsequently he restrained other ecclesiastics from undertaking the duty, giving authority for the establishment of a mission

* "Permission donnée au Séminaire de Quebec d'envoyer des missionnaires chez les Sauvages du Mississippi." 1 May, 1698. Mandement des Evêques de Quebec I., p. 377.

with the tribe of Tamarois, which occupied the territory between the Illinois and the Arkansas.* As by a pastoral letter from Paris the jesuits were forbidden to take part in the Mississippi missions,† it is plain that these privileges were not unchallenged. In 1717 the powers given to the Quebec Seminary were renewed.‡ In the interval, père Bergier, the missionary sent to this spot, had died, and had not been replaced by the Seminary; and it was in order to prevent the recognition of the presence of any of the orders that the powers of the Seminary were reaffirmed.

* "Permission concernant les missions du Mississippi Confirmée et restreinte aux seuls missionnaires envoyés par le Séminaire." 14 July, 1698. Mandements, &c., I., p. 380.

† "Nous n'avons pu leur (Pères de la Compagnie de Jesus) confier parce que nous en avions donné le soin au missionnaires du Séminaire des Missions Etrangères de Quebec." Lettres Pastorale écrite de Paris. 7 Mars, 1701. Mandements, &c., I., p. 421. It was particularly stated that the clause was not to be publicly read in church, but only in ecclesiastical assemblies.

‡ Confirmation de privilèges en faveur du Séminaire de Quebec pour les Missions des Tamarois. Quebec, 16 Oct., 1717. Mandements, &c., vol. I., p. 495.

CHAPTER II.

In 1706, the young colony of Louisiana was experiencing the fate which had attended the early establishment of the French government at Quebec. It was divided into the clerical and non-clerical parties. De Lasalle was the "*commissaire ordonnateur*," and having on his side the *curé* of Mobile, M. de la Vente, he directly attacked de Bienville. In a communication to the minister,* he described the brothers d'Iberville, de Bienville, and de Chateauguy as guilty of every species of crime, as being thieves and knaves who wasted the king's property. It was this letter and the influence sustaining it, which had led to the appointment of de Muys.

The *curé* threatened de Bienville that he would obtain his recall. De Bienville, on his side, obtained the support of the jesuit Grasier, who wrote to France in his behalf.

De Bienville, in this difficult position, acted with judgment and temper. He did not, however, fail to represent in France, that the garrison and the inhabitants alike required provisions; and being without oxen and negroes, the settlers were unable to till the land, and were painfully suffering from ill-health. The difficulties with the Indians were increasing, owing in some degree to the attempts of the English traders to obtain their alliance. The chiefs, with complacent Indian ignorance, asked if the population of France was equal to that of their own tribes; they were unable to understand why more effective troops were not sent out. Indeed, de Bienville himself made the complaint, that three parts of the soldiers sent him were too young to undergo the fatigue of the war. Begon, the intendent at Rochefort, had directed him to send back any Canadians who had found their way to Mobile. De Bienville stated his inability to comply with the

* 7 September, 1705.

request, as strong men and not youth were necessary in the service. From want of force to maintain the fort on the Mississippi it had to be abandoned. At the same time the Spaniard was shewing less friendliness. De Bienville complained of the conduct of de Lasalle, who in an insolent spirit of opposition had torn in pieces an order of de Bienville for payment of a sum of money to his brother, and had said now that d'Iberville was dead, there was no one to protect de Bienville.

D'Artaguet's report was in no way unfavourable to de Bienville; consequently, de Lasalle himself was removed. He returned to France to include in a common accusation all who had differed with him.

Crozat's charter, which was dated on the 26th of September, 1712, gave the right of exclusive commerce for fifteen years from the sea to the Illinois and the Wabash, under a distinct government to that of Canada. The administration was entrusted to a council, as in San Domingo and Martinique. On the 17th of May, 1713, a fifty-gun ship, commanded by the marquis de la Jonquière, arrived. The governor was de Lamothe Cadillac, who had previously held authority at Detroit. Duclos was the "*commissaire ordonnateur*." During the summer a vessel brought several emigrants, with provisions and goods.

The new form of government from its commencement failed to run smoothly. The new governor brought with him his family, which consisted of his wife, his son and some daughters.* He was in his fifty-third year, and looked with extreme disfavour on the disorderly life in the colony. Modern writers in Louisiana describe his government with severity.† Certainly Lamothe Cadillac has written in the

* Penicault, p. 624, MS., Par. Lib., 2 Series, Vol. XI.

† I have to express my obligations to Mr. Gayaré, who in his well-known history of Louisiana publishes several of the documents of de Cadillac. M. Gayaré is by no means sparing of his censure. I take the age of de Cadillac from the monograph of M. l'Abbe Verréault, who has traced the record of his marriage in the parish registers of Quebec, when de Cadillac was twenty-six years of age. M. Verréault conceives that he was the second son, and that only after his elder brother's

strongest language with regard to the population, and in this view he is sustained by the *curé* de la Vente. Unfortunately, there was a wide difference of opinion between himself and the "*commissaire ordonnateur*" Duclos, heightened by personal ill-feeling; and Duclos does not seem to have reproved the general spirit of discord, and is not free from suspicion of being implicated in it. Lamothe Cadillac found on all sides the absence of discipline and order. He represented that de Bienville and de Chateauguy had not served in the army to learn what discipline was, and that they had come to Louisiana very young; consequently, there was much which was irregular and objectionable. With his family relations to consider, the habits of the soldiers and the few traders must have been highly offensive to him, owing to the discreditable relations with Indian women purchased as slaves, which were general. De Cadillac did not fail to bring this demoralization to the notice of the government. I am sorry to have to say that de Bienville had the meanness to represent that de Cadillac quarrelled with him because he would not marry de Cadillac's daughter.

Any one who follows de Cadillac's career in Canada, must know that he did not err on the side of devotional extravagance. In Louisiana he even thought that the *curé* de la Vente, who sustained him in his views, was too strict and exacting on many points of religious discipline. It may easily be conceived that when a man of this stamp officially reports, the utterly irreligious character of a community, it could only be from the shock given to his feelings by the general misconduct. He has been blamed for personally making an expedition up the Mississippi to visit a mine near the Illinois. Some ore was placed in his hand, which contained silver, and he proceeded to the spot from whence it was said to have been taken, to discover whether or no it had been brought

death he took the family name. This contract is also mentioned as a proof, that among the old customs of French Canada the special ceremony of betrothment was observed. The *acte du mariage*, 25th June, 1687, contains these words: "Après les fiançailles et la publication de deux bans de mariage." "Quelques notes sur Antoine de Lamothe de Cadillac," p. 1.

from Mexico, and of which he had strong suspicions. It may rather be said, that he considered the importance of the discovery suggested a thorough examination of its genuineness. He found no such mine. The journey was one of labour and privation; and there is the strong presumption, that it was undertaken from the feeling that he had nobody about him he would trust with the examination. It certainly destroyed all illusions on the subject. Of one physical fact he became early impressed, the constant changes in the channel of the Mississippi.*

However unfavourably the character of de Cadillac has been viewed, he is not accused of dishonestly bettering his own fortunes. His reports convey the impression that he endeavoured to state the truth, and that he saw strong remedies were indispensable to the well-being of the colony. His censures were necessarily distasteful to those commercially interested in Louisiana. Crozat consequently obtained his recall. Both he and Duclos were superseded in 1716.

On the treaty of Utrecht becoming known, there was great activity on the part of the southern English colonists, in establishing trade relations with the Indians, and they were able to turn on their side the greater part of the Choctaws.†

When de Cadillac arrived many of the Mississippi Indians had come forward with offers of friendliness. The Alabamons

* "Outre qu'il change de lit tous les ans en sorte que c'est toujours une nouvelle découverte pour le chenal." *Memoire*, 22 June, 1716.

† Among the Indian tribes at the period of the settlement of Louisiana the Natchez held the first position. They were principally established at the spot which retains their name.

The Chickasaws, according to their traditions, came from the west of the Mississippi with the Creeks and Choctaws, and occupying the country west of the Carolinas had been connected with the traders from those provinces. They eventually formed a union with the Natchez, and ranged themselves on their side in their quarrel with the French, and were ready to attack French settlements when they could safely do so. Their numbers did not exceed five hundred warriors.

The Choctaws had their home in the gulf of Mexico, from the Mississippi towards the Atlantic. In the war against the Natchez they took the side of the French.

The Tuscoraras lived to the north of this territory. In 1711 they made an attempt to massacre the whites, and in 1713 were thoroughly defeated. They

also adhered to the French, and with their consent fort Toulouse was constructed on their river.

Shortly afterwards the Indians on the South Carolina frontier rose up against the English. The Yamases, the Creeks, and the Appalachians ravaged the southern country; the northern assailants were the Cherokees, the Congarees, and Catawbas. The governor Craven marched with what force he could collect against them. In the action which took place, the Indians were defeated and driven across the Savannah. This event greatly strengthened the position of the French. Reinforcements likewise arrived, and in 1715 de Bienville was appointed commander-in-chief. One of his earliest acts was to build a fort at Natchez, where there had been difficulty with the tribe. They had killed two Frenchmen, and plundered the canoes descending the river. De Bienville induced them to return the plundered property, and obtained their consent to the completion of the fort, and placed in it a small force, under the command of de Pailloux.

In March, 1717, three ships arrived, with the new governor, M. de l'Epinay, accompanied by three companies of infantry and fifty colonists. De l'Epinay brought the cross to de Bienville, who felt, nevertheless, dissatisfied that he was again superseded. Shortly afterwards Crozat resigned his privileges, and the charter was transferred to the celebrated Law, then at the height of his fame.

It has been said that the duke de Noailles commenced to fear the influence of Law, and hoped to draw him into some scheme which would lead to his ruin,* and that seeing in this project the chance he hoped for, he made the offer to Law of Crozat's charter. It was accepted; Law submitted the conditions to the principal capitalists with the most brilliant

made their way to the north, and became the sixth nation of the Iroquois. [Ante Vol. II., p. 166.]

The Alabamons extended from Mobile some distance up the river Alabama.

There were other tribes to the south, the Appalachians, the Creeks, and the Yamases; while adjoining the Chickasaws to the north and west were the Cherokees and the Catawbas.

* Henri Martin, XV., p. 40.

picture of the promise of prosperity and wealth. The offer included the condition that Law should obtain 2,000,000 *livres*, to be expended in colonization. Such was the power of his representations, that he obtained 100,000,000 *livres* nominal capital, divided into 200,000 shares of 500 *livres*, to be furnished on state notes. The shares were to bear four per cent. interest. This sum represented 30,000,000 *livres* of silver.

The new "*Compagnie d'Occident*" obtained the monopoly of trade in Louisiana and of the beaver in Canada for twenty-five years, and the ownership of the soil for ever, reserving existing rights. The *Contume de Paris* was declared to be the law. The colony was made free of all taxation for twenty-five years, and several important exemptions from duties were conceded.

Early in 1718 three of the company's ships arrived with three companies of infantry. They brought out the appointment of de Bienville as governor-general. One of his first acts was the foundation of New Orleans,* employing the services of the illicit dealers in salt, the *faulx saulniers*, who had been transported.

Crozat had formed the theory that he could carry on a lucrative trade with the Spaniards, but they refused admittance of the French vessels into their ports. By this time it was seen that any such expectation was groundless. The hope of obtaining the precious metals was equally illusory: the one resource of the country lay in the cultivation of its natural produce. It was suggested, that the best mode of carrying out this principle would be, by making large grants of land to men of

* Charlevoix visited New Orleans at the end of December, 1721, dating his first letter from there: "À la Nouvelle Orleans. Me voici enfin arrivé dans cette fameuse ville qu'on a nommée *la Nouvelle Orleans*. Ceux qui lui ont donné ce nom croyoient qu'Orleans est du genre féminin, mais qu'importe? l'usage est établi, et il est au dessus des règles de la grammaire . . . une centaine de Barriques placées sans beaucoup d'ordre, un grand magasin bati de bois, deux ou trois Maisons qui ne paroient pas un Village de France, la moitié d'un méchant magasin qu'on a bien voulu prêter au Seigneur."

As late as 1732 the Abbé Prévost, in his "Mémoires d'un homme de qualité," wrote "le Nouvel Orleans."

influence. Emigration was consequently directed to the country, and in a short time eight hundred persons arrived, but these new comers were separated at wide distances : a policy disadvantageous to the future of the colony.

War having been declared by France against Spain, on the 10th of January, 1719, de Bienville resolved to attack Pensacola. The place, being without the means of resistance, surrendered on a guarantee that the inhabitants should be sent to Havana. The first cargo of negro slaves was landed at Pensacola. While the fertility of the land in Louisiana was now recognised, the difficulty attending its cultivation had been felt on all sides. The white man was unable to work in the heat of summer, which continued to an advanced period of the year. The company accordingly sent two ships to Africa to obtain some of the unhappy population as slaves, and five hundred negroes were landed at this port, under the escort of thirty soldiers, who had accompanied them.

The vessels which carried the Spanish prisoners to Havana were seized by the captain general, the crew imprisoned, and the vessels manned by a force to attack Pensacola. Chateauguy, who was in command, had but imperfect means of defence ; his garrison was weak in number and mutinous. The place was surrendered by him to the Spaniards. They next turned their attention to Mobile. At Dauphin island they found de Serigny in force, and were repulsed in their attempt to land, losing several prisoners. Among them nineteen French deserters were taken, seventeen of whom were shot and two were hanged. Other Spanish ships shortly after arrived, and a landing was again attempted ; but a Canadian officer, Trudeau, at the head of some Indians, drove them off. The Spanish vessels, despairing of success, sailed away.

The arrival of three ships of the line, under count de Champmeslin, changed the fortunes of the war. Pensacola was retaken. The French adopted the plan afterwards followed with success in other parts of the continent, of keeping the Spanish flag flying, so that Spanish vessels, with

provisions, sailed directly into the port. Among the prisoners taken there were forty deserters, of whom twelve were hanged ; the remainder were condemned to hard labor for life.

Emigrants continued to arrive, among them several women. Many of the emigrants were convicts, but the presence of the negroes had made them less desirable. Accordingly by the edict of the 9th of May, 1720, the transportation of convicts was forbidden.

The *ordonnances* of the 8th of January and 12th of March, 1719, had enforced that vagabonds should be sent to Louisiana, and the edict of the 20th of March, 1720, authorised the tribunals to sentence vagabonds and beggars to transportation. The police charged with escorting them, behaved with neglect and barbarity. Many of the unhappy men died owing to ill treatment, and even from hunger. Those entrusted with the arrests are accused of laying hands on many persons, totally without the class, for the purpose of obtaining money by liberating them : and on occasions, from having been bribed to make arrests to satisfy private hatred. On the 3rd of May an edict was published to guard against such abuses. On the 9th of May the decree was rescinded, and no further criminals were to be sent to Louisiana. The earnest protest of colonists of character emigrating thither, against this policy, as a stigma on themselves, in a great degree was the cause of this legislation. But it did not extend to females, for in January, 1721, eighty girls arrived from the Saltpetrière prison in Paris.*

* Anyone having any acquaintance with French literature must be aware of the place which the work known as "Manon Lescaut" retains with French readers, and the singular fascination it still exercises over the French mind. It originally appeared in 1732 as the seventh and eighth parts of "Mémoires et Aventures d'un homme de qualité, qui s'est retiré du monde," by the Abbé Antoine François Prevost d'Exiles, born in 1697. In this episode his heroine is introduced as being sent as a convict to Louisiana ; and, accordingly, his description, written contemporarily with the events he narrates, may be accepted as characteristic of the treatment these poor women obtained. The title given to these two parts is "Histoire du chevalier de Grioux et de Manon Lescaut." The abbé writes : "La curiosité me fit descendre de mon cheval que je laissai à mon valet & étant entré avec peine en perçant la foule, je vis en effet quelque chose d'assez touchant parmi les douze filles qui étaient enchainées six à six par le milieu du corps il y en avait

The affairs of the company in no way prospered. The stock had rapidly fallen, and it was the commencement of the collapse of Law's system. By this date nearly four thousand emigrants had been directed to Louisiana. The agricultural population could not be induced to leave France; attachment to the place of their birth, or where their young years have been passed, has always been strong with this class. In this instance it withstood every appeal to seek for a happier fortune in Louisiana; and it was from the cities that the emigrants were obtained.

Some able-bodied young men were sent from the Palatinate, Law paying the Elector for permission to seek for them. The emigration was voluntary, and two hundred labourers were lured to leave their homes to work in Louisiana on the production of coffee and cotton.

In 1720 Law left Paris, the whole of France being convulsed in an abyss of monetary ruin and national bankruptcy.

De Bienville had for some time desired to move the seat of government to New Orleans, but the proposition had not been entertained. In 1722 authority for the change was granted. The city accordingly increased in importance, and in spite of a hurricane, which destroyed the church, the hospital, and thirty houses, its progress was rapid and assured. In 1727 several Ursuline nuns and jesuits arrived, and were established in the city.*

The same year de Bienville was replaced by Perrier, and left for France. Although the company had directed the fortunes of the province for eleven years, without doubt de Bienville greatly aided in obtaining the prosperity now dawn-

une dont l'air & la figure étoient si peu conformes à sa condition qu'en tout autre état je l'eusse prise pour une Princesse, [p. 343.] . . . mais figurez vous ma pauvre maîtresse enchaînée par le milieu du corps assise sur quelques poignées de paille, la tête appuyée languissamment sur un côté de la voiture, la visage pâle, &c. p. 513, Ed à la Haye, 1772.

* It was after the arrival of the nuns in 1728, that some poor girls, not taken from the jails, were sent to Louisiana. Being supplied with a small box or *casette*, with some few necessities, they were called *filles de la casette*. They remained with the nuns until husbands were found for them.

ing upon it. Generally, the attention of the settlers had been given to agriculture. At this period eighteen hundred negro slaves had been brought into the country.* There were eight hundred regular soldiers kept to garrison it; and there was every prospect that the province would advance in wealth and prosperity, on the lines which had been laid down for its government.

The province was not to escape the fate of the first colonies in America. A strong feeling of hatred arose with the Indian against the white man, so that where there was possibility of an outrage being committed, there was continual risk of such attack. In 1723 the Natchez shewed so bad a spirit that de Bienville, gathering a force of settlers and friendly Indians, advanced to their village in order to restore quiet.

The principal enemy the Chickasaws, were the most embittered against the French. They endeavoured to form all the native tribes into a hostile league, their design being the total destruction of the colony. They had not communicated their operations to the Illinois, the Arkansas, and the Tunicas, whom they looked upon as being in the interest of the French. The other tribes were pledged on a given day to attack the settlers in their particular neighbourhood: even the Choctaws, who had hitherto been on the French side, had been gained over.

Perrier had early seen the difficulties of his position. Except Mobile, the forts were without strength. He had found the men under his command insufficient for the necessary garrisons, and he applied for reinforcements asking for three hundred men. His representations met with no atten-

* The laws of France against the negroes were extremely severe, although originally they had protected the slave. By the law, 30th December, 1712, colonists were liable to fine for failing to feed their slaves, or who tortured them. After the death of the regent, at the period of the government of the duc de Bourbon, when the policy of the country was governed by Paris Duvernei, the law of March, 1724, dealt rigorously with the negro. Men of colour were declared incapable of receiving any legacy from a white man, and free negroes, who had assisted fugitive slaves, could be condemned to return to slavery if unable to pay the high fee imposed. Special legislation also limited the rights of free negroes and mulattoes.

tion in France; his fears were looked upon as groundless, and he was considered as being desirous of increasing the importance of his position.

Had the Indian tribes acted in perfect accord and observed the day and hour of the outbreak, the consequence might have been disastrous, and so serious an injury inflicted on the colony that the lost ground could only have been regained by the employment of a large force and at a sacrifice of life. Circumstances led the Natchez to anticipate the day. This proceeding was consequent on the conduct of Chepar, who commanded at fort Rosalie. He had desired to obtain a tract of land by treaty; failing to do so, he had taken possession of it by force.

The story is related that the destruction of every Frenchman was resolved upon at a council; the women and children were to be reserved as slaves. It was necessary to notify the other Indian villages the day when the outbreak should take place. Accordingly, bundles of sticks containing an equal number were prepared, which were sent to each village with instructions after the appearance of the new moon, to take away a stick every day, and the attack was to be made when the last stick was to be removed. One of the female priestesses of the sun discovering that something unusual was going on, took one of her sons into the woods and wormed out the secret. The sticks sent to her village being in the temple she watched her opportunity and removed one of them. At the same time she gave notice of the proposed attack to a French officer to whom she had access; he disregarded her story.

An event happened to precipitate the movement. On the 29th of November, 1729, some boats from New Orleans laden with merchandise reached the Natchez landing. The Natchez, deceived as to the day, and thinking the plunder of the boats an additional incentive, the assault was determined on. The Indians giving out that they were going on a hunting expedition, appeared armed without attracting attention. On a concerted signal each man shot down a Frenchman. There was no resistance, for no one had the least conception that

such an outrage was possible, and no one was armed. The slaughter commenced at nine : by noon two hundred and fifty French were killed, among them Chepar the commandant, a jesuit priest, and several prominent officers of the post. Two white men only were saved : a carpenter and a tailor. Ninety-two women and one hundred and ninety-six children were made prisoners. No negro was touched. During this massacre the head priest of the sun was placidly smoking his pipe, as the heads of the slain were brought and laid before him. Their bodies were left to the birds of prey. Women with child, and young children whose cries were troublesome were killed.

As soon as Perrier heard of the massacre, he despatched a sloop to France for succour, and he called to his assistance the Indians friendly to the French. The population of New Orleans was armed, the city surrounded with a deep ditch, and guards set in the principal streets. Perrier having collected three hundred soldiers and three hundred Indians, was proceeding to Natchez, when he learned that the negroes in the neighbourhood of New Orleans were disaffected. Many of the negroes at Natchez had joined the Indians. The black population of the colony amounted to two thousand, about half that of the French race ; and in the city their number was in excess of the French. Perrier, therefore, placed de Loubois in command of the force, and returned to New Orleans. He sent out an officer of the name of Misplaix to procure intelligence. His fate was, for his party to be fired upon, three of his men to be killed, and two others and himself to be made prisoners.

As de Loubois advanced on his way to Natchez his force was increased by the French settlers at the places through which he passed. The Natchez on hearing of his numbers sent some chiefs to meet him. They demanded hostages, and the most extravagant gifts for the ransom of the women and children.* After their envoys had started from Natchez they burned Misplaix and his two men.

* They demanded for the ransom of the women and children in their pos-

In making his preparations for defence, Perrier had sent an officer named Le Sueur among the Choctaws to obtain what aid he could collect. Le Sueur was able to organize a force of twelve hundred men of the tribe. His orders were to effect a juncture with de Loubois, and to act in concert with that officer. The news reached this force that the Natchez, not expecting any immediate attack, were entirely off their guard, and were passing their time in dancing and revelry. The intelligence spread through the camp, and Le Sueur was unable to control his men, who insisted on marching against the Natchez. On the 29th of January, 1730, the attack was made at daybreak. The surprise was complete. The Natchez suffered severely. The victors brought away sixty scalps and eighteen prisoners. They likewise liberated the tailor and carpenter, with fifty-one women and children and one hundred and six negroes. Leisurely retreating, they encamped on Saint Catherine's creek, to await the arrival of the advancing column.

De Loubois' force which now amounted to fourteen hundred men, arrived on the 8th of February, when the fort of the Natchez was again attacked. The troops from New Orleans had been increased to nine hundred men with five hundred Indians. For several days the siege was carried on with indifferent success, when proposals for peace were made by the besieged, with the threat that if they were not accepted the women and children would be burned. So fearful a contingency led to the acceptance of the conditions, and the Natchez were permitted to retire. Many joined the Chickasaws; a portion of the tribe ascended the Red River. Although one serious cause of anxiety was by these events much modified, the future was in no way free from dangerous complications. Several of the other tribes continued in ill-feeling towards the French; those in the neighbourhood of the gulf of Mexico

session two hundred barrels of powder, two thousand flints, four thousand weight of balls, two hundred knives, and as many axes, hoes, shirts, coats, pieces of linen and gingham, twenty coats laced on every seat, and as many laced hats with plumes, twenty barrels of brandy and as many of wine.

were extremely hostile. The tribes to the north, the Illinois, and the Arkansas on the Mississippi, remained in alliance with the French.

The numerous Natchez who had established themselves on the Red River continued to harass the planters. They surprised a fort, killed de Coulanges, and wounded de Beaulieu: of the twenty-five men stationed there, sixteen were killed or wounded.

One hundred and twenty men arrived from France; with this addition the French force in Louisiana did not exceed one thousand men, of which number two hundred were Swiss. Although a greater accession of strength had been looked for, it was determined to chastise the Natchez. There was uncertainty as to the extent to which the negroes could be relied on. They had been employed against the Chaouachas, a tribe which had their home in the neighbourhood of New Orleans and had become troublesome. In the expedition the negroes had acted with extreme ferocity, killing all that fell in their way, women, children and old men. On their return to their work, they showed a strong disposition to strike a blow for their own liberty; but the plot was discovered, and the leaders executed.

Perrier advanced with one thousand men against the Natchez. During a storm, the warriors of the tribe effected a retreat. The women and children, to the number of 427, were carried to New Orleans. About 65 male prisoners also surrendered, who were sent to Cuba and sold as slaves. The troubles, however, were far from ended, and the colony was greatly distressed.

In 1732, the company resigned its charter, and Louisiana became a royal domain. Perrier was recalled, and de Bienville was again named governor-general. He arrived in Louisiana, in the spring of 1733, and was accompanied by Diron d'Artaquette. The condition of the province was most critical. One great source of danger was from the Chickasaw tribe and their allies. It was with this tribe, that those of the Natchez who had not made their home at the Red River,

were incorporated. The Chickasaws were numerous and powerful, and in some respects bore some resemblance to the Iroquois. They were friendly to the English, although their relations with those colonies were by no means free from ill-feeling. Towards the French they were hostile, and their enmity had been much increased by late events. What was most feared by those charged with the fortunes of Louisiana, was that the English colonies might be extended to the Mississippi. In such a case, a foreign and unfriendly power would intervene between the two French provinces of Canada and Louisiana. The French perceived ample indications of the determination to extend English settlement in this direction. The establishment of Georgia under general Ogelthorpe, in 1732, increased the fears of the French, and they saw in this step ample proof, that the policy would be systematically carried out.

We may trace in the feeling to which these events gave rise the operations of de la Galissonnière in the valley of the Ohio. There was never any intention of settlement, for there was no population to send there from Canada, and no emigration to be obtained from France. The policy was to take possession of the country as the nearest route from Canada to Louisiana, and to make all English settlement on the Ohio impossible by the establishment of garrisons; by these means knitting together the two ends of the chain of French American possessions, and as occasion permitted, to send population to the intermediate territory. It was on the principle of the common interest, that Canada was called upon to give aid to Louisiana.

It was plain to de Bienville that so long as the Chickasaws possessed power there would be no peace on the Mississippi, and Louisiana would be threatened with constant danger. Accordingly, his first step was to demand from the Chickasaws, that they should deliver up the Natchez, who had taken refuge among them. The answer might have been looked for: the Natchez now formed one nation with the Chickasaws, and could not be surrendered. Had de Bienville possessed

the strength to permit him to resent the reply, he would have shewn his displeasure by an immediate attack on those who made it. But his force was inadequate to give vent to his feeling, and he took two years to complete his preparations for so doing.

D'Artaguette who commanded on the Illinois, was instructed with what troops he could collect and such Indians as he could induce to join him, to proceed on the 9th of May, 1736, to the territory held by the Chickasaws. Parties were also obtained from the christian Indians of Canada, and from the Senecas, to harass the Chickasaws in the *petite guerre*, to obtain scalps, or to take prisoners.

In the beginning of April, 1736, de Bienville assembled his troops at Mobile, and ascended the Tobique. In sixteen days he reached the fort of Tombechee* which he had ordered to be constructed. He was there joined by 1,200 Choctaws. Thus reinforced, he continued the ascent of the river. On the 25th of May the force disembarked. As was usual in such expeditions, a fort was constructed for the protection of the canoes, and placed under a guard. The main force marched towards the Chickasaws' village. On the 25th of May it was within a league of the fort, which they hoped to capture by surprise. But the Chickasaws had had news of their approach, and had adopted energetic measures for defence. Several English traders were amongst them, and had aided them in the construction of works. Two attempts to take the place by storm failed, the French losing thirty men. The field-guns had been left at the Tobique; and there was now no means of bringing them up, for the whole country was swarming with hostile parties. On the 29th de Belleville ordered a retreat. Two days later the Choctaws returned to their homes liberally rewarded with presents, and the artillery was thrown into the river.

Agreeably to his orders, d'Artaguette left the Illinois at the commencement of May: his force consisted of one hundred and thirty French and Canadians, one hundred Illinois with

* Cotton gin post, to the north in the state of Mississippi.

some Iroquois Indians, the whole amounting to four hundred men. The first village he came upon he destroyed. In the second affair, the result was disastrous. Evidently, he miscalculated the strength of the force opposed to him. The resistance was so determined, that the Illinois took to flight, carrying with them several of the French. Three officers were killed in the attack; d'Artaguette was himself wounded. The force was entirely defeated. Some few French and Canadians under the leadership of Voisin, then little more than sixteen years old, effected a difficult retreat, marching upwards of one hundred miles with scarcely any provisions. On the day of the fight, twenty French were burned on the ground, among them d'Artaguette and five officers, with the jesuit missionary père Sénac. The remaining prisoners were burned at the principal villages.

De Bienville, smarting under these disasters, resolved to avenge his defeat. He now determined to ascend the Mississippi, holding it to be a better basis of operation than to advance upon the Chickasaws by land. Distrusting his own strength, he wrote to France for orders to be sent to M. de Beauharnois to aid him with reinforcements. De Beauharnois instructed de Noyelles to obtain the assistance of the Hurons; but the latter would not enter into any project for attacking the southern tribes, which they distinguished by the name of the *Têtes-plates*. The Ottawas, the Pottawatomies, with the Ojibbeways, formed a force of 179 warriors.* The Canadians themselves, felt strong opposition against entering upon a campaign in Louisiana. A force, however, was placed under the command of M. de Longueuil, amounting to 440 men, half of whom were Indians. Passing by Oswego, several desertions took place from the Abenakis and Two Mountain Indians. The force ascended by the north shore of lake Ontario, and thence by lake Erie they gained lake Chatauque to descend the tributaries of the Ohio and by that river reach the Mississippi.

* They fell into an ambush, the Hurons having given information of their departure. One only escaped. The remainder were killed or made prisoners.

On de Bienville receiving reinforcements from France, he had ascended the Mississippi to the site of the present city of Memphis, where he built fort Assomption, and established his magazines. He was here joined by La Buissonnière, the commandant on the Illinois, with the soldiers of his garrison, and some Indians. Shortly afterwards the Canadian contingent arrived under the command of de Longueuil, with de Céloron and Saint Laurent, as captain and lieutenant. His Indians, independently of the Algonquins, now included some Hurons and Nipissings. De Bienville's force amounted to 1,200 French and Canadians, and upwards of 2,000 Indians and negroes.

Although many were suffering from serious illness and bodily depression, and many had died, de Bienville determined no longer to delay his operations. He selected the Canadians to commence the campaign. De Céloron was placed in command with 200 French and 300 Indians. On the 21st of February, 1740, he arrived at the first village, which he vigorously attacked. After the loss of thirty-six of the defenders, an offer of capitulation was made. Seven of the French only were wounded. The success of the attack with this small detachment, and the fear of bringing the whole force against them to lead to their annihilation, caused the Chickasaws to agree to the conditions of peace. These conditions of peace were vague and unsatisfactory. Although made at the request of the Chickasaws, no hostages were given, no conditions for the future were enforced, and the whole expedition was without any other result, than the unfortunate fact, that the French on their side had to record the death of five hundred of their own force and of their allies. Peace being obtained even on these unsatisfactory terms, the fort at Memphis was destroyed, the Canadians returned northward, and de Bienville proceeded with his force to New Orleans.


In 1741 de Bienville asked to be relieved from his government. He was replaced in 1742 by the Marquis de Vaudreuil, who was fated to be the last French governor-general of

Canada. From this date Louisiana has little relationship with the history of Canada, beyond the influence which the country exercised on the northern province. The wars which succeeded the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle arose chiefly from the policy of the French in endeavouring to hold what may be truly called the passes between the two countries.

De Bienville was the youngest, but one of the sons of Charles Le Moyne, of Montreal, and the second who bore the name. On his retirement from the government of Louisiana he was about sixty-two years old, having passed forty-four years of his life in the province. A man of courage and enterprise, he possessed in a great degree the instincts of a statesman. Few more difficult positions can be imagined, than the government of a colony having temporarily obtained undue consideration as promising great profit, and which collapsed to disappoint every expectation of those who had placed money in the enterprise. De Bienville's official life was a continual struggle with insufficient means to overcome difficult emergencies. The dangerous element of negro slavery could only with difficulty be controlled, and powerful hostile tribes of Indians had to be restrained by a force of insufficient strength. These disadvantages were increased by the competition of the British colonies constantly striving to develop their commerce, and advance their interests among the tribes, which de Bienville was making an earnest effort to conciliate. Although not free from the faults of his day, nothing has come down to us unfavourable to his character for rectitude. He is not accused with overwhelming evidence of being in a plot to rob the state, or of unduly profiting by his position to enrich himself. His desire was faithfully to perform his duty, and while devoted to French interests, he is not remembered by any treacherous or ignoble acts, in his endeavour to advocate them. He was an avowed foe of everything opposed to France, and in his desire to serve his country he was foremost in the example of self-sacrifice and devotion to her cause. His memory in Canada is justly held in respect.

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


BOOK X.

THE GOVERNMENT OF M. DE BEAUHARNOIS TO THE
PEACE OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.

PIERRE GAULTIER DE LA VERENDRYE.

[1726-1747.]



CHAPTER I.





As related at the close of Book VI,* de Vaudreuil died on the 10th of October, 1725; de Longueuil was then governor of Montreal, and as the two preceding governors-general had been promoted from that office to the higher position, de Longueuil likewise looked for similar advancement. The opinion, however, had been formed in France that it was not advisable to appoint a native colonist as governor-general of Canada. During the winter months de Longueuil acted as administrator until August, 1726, when the newly-appointed governor-general, M. Charles le marquis de Beauharnois,† arrived. He was accompanied by M. Dupuy, the new intendant, who replaced M. Begon.

The new governor was a naval officer about fifty years of age. After thirty-four years' service, in 1708 he had obtained the position of *capitaine de vaisseau*. He had married in 1716 the widow of M. de Lanaudière, dame Renée Pays, then a widow for the second time. It was somewhat of a family connection, for his brother Claude had married the daughter of M. de Lanaudière. The governor-general never had any children.

The twenty-one years of the government of M. de Beau-

* Ante Vol. II., p. 517.

† Mr. William Smith, who in 1815 published the second English history of Canada, the first being that of Heriot in 1804, described the marquis de Beauharnois as one of the "*bâtards*" of Louis XIV. Several modern writers have without enquiry accepted Mr. Smith as an authority, and M. de Beauharnois has been so represented. There is no foundation for this statement. The eldest of the family, Charles de Beauharnois, was the brother of François, who had been intendant of Canada [1702-1705]. His younger brother Claude was the ancestor of the first husband of the empress Josephine, and hence of Hortense, the mother of the emperor Napoleon III. Had there been any such taint on the family it would certainly have been remembered in modern times. Saint Simon is entirely silent on the matter.



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harnois, with the exception of the three closing years, were those of nominal peace, but the events which took place in Acadia and Louisiana establish, that during much of this period they were only so in name." In Canada, even from an early date, much jealousy had been felt regarding the sovereignty over the southern shores of lakes Ontario and Erie. In de Beauharnois' day the determination to obtain possession of the Ohio had not become a settled policy. Greater attention was directed to the country north of Massachusetts, than to the connection between Canada and the Mississippi.

One of his earliest acts was to address governor Burnet, of New York,* to the effect that he was sending M. de la Chassaigne to summon the officer at Oswego to retire with his garrison, demolish the fortifications, to evacuate the fort, and to return home. Such a demand was indeed made by the chevalier Begon. Burnet lost no time in sending his answer.† He complained of the little notice given of this intention, "contrasting his own proceedings, that he had in the "modestest manner" written to M. de Longueuil, complaining of the construction of the fort at Niagara, and on receiving a reply not at all satisfactory, he had reported the matter to his court, and that he had learned that the English ambassador at Paris had had orders to bring the matter to the notice of the French government. He had not sent any direct summons to Niagara. By the treaty of Utrecht he had liberty of unfettered trade with the Indians, and accordingly he claimed the right to maintain the fort at Oswego.

No consequences arose from the summons. Cardinal Fleury was the prime minister of France, and his pacific policy prevailed nearly until the close of his life in 1743, in the ninetieth year of his age.

The thirty years succeeding the death of Louis XIV. were those of peace, although by no means free from complications. Stanhope, until his death in 1721, remained first minister of England from the accession of George the first. The nine

* N.Y. Hist. Doc., V., p. 827, 27 July, 1727.

† N.Y. Hist. Doc., V., p. 829, 8 August, 1727.

years of his government had been successful. He was the means of thwarting the policy of Cardinal Alberoni in Spain, which had been hostile to Great Britain. The naval force organized by him, drove the Spaniards from Sicily. He secured the friendship of France through the regent, the duke of Orleans, who in less than three years was to follow him to the grave.*

He re-established the alliance with the Dutch. The emperor again came in accord with the court of St. James, and the influence of Great Britain with foreign courts rendered the efforts of the pretender entirely without result. In 1722 Walpole became prime minister, a position he was to hold for the succeeding twenty years, which he constantly exercised in the interests of peace.

The influence, traceable in the history of the British Empire most seriously to affect its fortunes, has been its relations with France. No two countries have so reacted on each other. The oft-quoted phrase that events must be judged by the standard and circumstances of the century in which they take place, can never be lost sight of in the consideration of these relations. Often, while the results which have followed a

* The regent died 22 November, 1723, his government therefore lasted only eight years. The corruption under the guise of polished manners, which was the characteristic of French society during this period, is often identified with the regency. The influences which unhappily prevailed may be traced to an earlier date, to the last years of Louis XIV. The memoirs of that time shew the profligacy of the higher ranks. Fidelity to the marriage relation was the exception to the general rule of license. The gravest charges are made against men in the first positions. It was no unusual event for a member of an ancient family to be detected cheating at play. The gambling spirit, heightened by the operations of Law, added to the general laxity of principle. The regent was hurried along in this flood of depravity; he cannot be accused of having originated it. To some extent it was the rebound from the hypocrisy of the days of Madame de Maintenon. It is impossible to resist the feeling that the regent was meant for better things. One of the first of modern French writers remarks of him: "Il avait usé dans une perpétuelle orgie sa brillante intelligence, et son corps vigoureux . . . le 2 décembre, 1723, l'apoplexie attendue de tous, et surtout de la victime frappa Philippe dans les bras d'une de ses maîtresses. Ce Prince qui avait si déplorablement gaspillé tant d'heureux dons de la nature, n'avait que quarante-neuf ans." Cardinal Dubois had died the previous 9th of August.

policy remain facts of history, the influence which led to its adoption are no longer remembered. There was with both countries the necessity for peace; both had passed through the ordeal of many years of costly war; in both, society convulsed by schemes of enterprise had entered into the wildest speculation; and in both, the government was unsettled.

In England the accession of George the first, owing to the strong protestant feeling of the country, had been accomplished with the same ease as if his right had been secured by the family traditions of centuries. There was much to interfere with his popularity. Not the least of the unfavourable circumstances which affected him was, that George the first could scarcely speak a word of English. While personally he desired to rule justly and constitutionally, many of the Hanoverian officials in his confidence were better known by their determination to accumulate fortunes, than to accept the conditions of English political life. If we except the huguenot French driven from France by Louis XIV., England had never shewn much sympathy with the foreigner; indeed, the ill-effect of this feeling on occasions in the national history is not a pleasing record to chronicle. The rapacity of baron Bothmar, who had been Hanoverian minister at the Hague, and who remained with the king; of Barnsdorf, a diplomatic agent; of Robethon, the king's private secretary; even of his two Turks, Mahomet and Mustapha, early excited public indignation. The unpopularity of the conduct of these men reflected back on the king. His two mistresses were in no way behind in bringing discredit on the royal name. These two portly dames were Herrengard Melesina von Schulenburg, afterwards duchess of Kendall, and Sophia baroness Kilmanseck, countess of Darlington. Chesterfield described the first as little better than an idiot, and Walpole held she would have sold the king's honour to the best bidder at a shilling advance. The second, although with youth, and some pretensions to good looks, with the same *embonpoint*, was equally destitute of wit. Their intellectual deficiencies were made up in rapacity, which brought discredit on the king. Personally George the first

was honourable, simple in his habits, not lavish of money, with much kindness of nature. He was averse to pomp and display, never a line of conduct to find favour with the body of the people. He fully understood that peace was necessary to England; nevertheless, he did not hesitate to embroil Great Britain in continental complications in order that he could add Bremen and Verdun to his electoral possessions.

The political uneasiness to which this condition gave rise, added to the active intrigues of jacobinism and the open disloyalty of the non-jurors, caused much discontent, and led to an uncertainty of feeling that the Hanoverian succession was not perfectly established. The external danger most to be feared was a hostile movement in France in support of the pretender. With France neutral, the government, if it could not entirely despise the machinations of the jacobites, could at least safely guard against them.

The condition of France alike suggested to her rulers the necessity of the avoidance of hostilities. At the death of Louis XIV., his successor was a sickly child of five years of age; and in case of the death of the latter, the regent was heir to the crown, as the right of birth in this respect had been renounced by Philip V. of Spain. The general belief however, was, that in such a crisis, Philip would claim the succession; and any attempt to have united the crowns of France and Spain, would have been the commencement of another war. Although for some years, Alberoni had been all-powerful in Madrid in his endeavour to restore the ancient glory of Spain, it was not improbable that Philip might abandon the crown of Spain for that of France. Accordingly, it was seen that in the contingency of the death of the young French king, the pretensions of the duke of Orleans as successor would be greatly advanced, if in anticipation, the recognition of his rights could be affirmed. Thus both governments, alike from interest, were led to the cultivation of closer peace relations. The misfortunes, which in subsequent years were experienced by France, have led French historians to make the pacific policy of the regent a matter of reproach; they

accuse him of sacrificing the interests of France in order to affirm his own position. The charge is unjust, and not founded on fact. There were concessions on the side of both countries; the one important act of compliance on the part of the regent was to bring within the spirit of the treaty of Utrecht the works at Mardyke, undertaken to create a second Dunkirk, the fortifications of which had been destroyed. Owing to the protest of the British ministry, the plan was subjected to such restrictions, that the objections against it ceased to exist.

The principal instrument in effecting this result was cardinal Dubois. The son of an apothecary who lived near Limoges, brought up by charity at a college, where he acted as servant to the president, eventually he received the *tonsure* of an ecclesiastic. After acting as teacher in several families, he became the preceptor of the regent, when duc de Chartres. Contemporaries unite in describing the profligacy of his life, and historians directly trace to his influence the perversion of the mind of the regent, whom he early initiated in the debauchery he himself practised. His great talents however, must equally be recorded. One who could raise himself to be first minister of France, to be archbishop of Cambrai, rendered famous as the see of Fénelon, to become cardinal, to hold power until his death: the attainment of these results without birth, family influence, or wealth, could only have been effected by the exercise of wonderful ability, by the possession of an acute intellect and political sagacity of the highest order, blended with untiring energy and perseverance. It is impossible to deny to this godless priest, and this depraved and unscrupulous man, the intellectual gifts with which he was endowed; and in the circumstances in which Europe was placed, it is difficult to prove otherwise, than that his policy was the wisest which could be followed in France.

It is important to understand the relative position of England and France, owing to which peace was maintained in America. It would be difficult otherwise to explain the failure of the repeated attempts of de Vaudreuil to cause

complications on the Atlantic seaboard, and the disregard of the complaint of de Beauharnois regarding the occupation of Oswego and the southern shore of lake Ontario.

One of the features seldom absent from the government of Canada was the disagreement between the leading authorities regarding the extent of their respective powers. It would have been easy to determine the question of precedence and the honours to which each was entitled. As the previous pages of this history establish, the point was never satisfactorily determined, as if purposely to leave the disputants at the mercy of the minister in France. The government of M. de Beauharnois was not free from this want of concord. The new intendant, M. Dupuy, had held a high position in the "*Conseil du roi*," and was well versed in public affairs. He had, however, a distinct idea of the importance of his position, and did not fail to assert it. De Beauharnois reports that he applied for two soldiers under arms to be posted beside his pew in church.* Making allowance for the ceremonial spirit of the day and the habitual exaction of every mark of respect which could be claimed, the incident can only be mentioned to his disadvantage. On one occasion the governor-general requested M. Dupuy to attend at the *château*. He refused to comply on the ground that it would compromise his dignity, and he remained deaf to all appeals on the subject made to him by the chief personages of the colony.† It may be said in his favour that he remained to the death of bishop de Saint Vallier his constant friend, and that Dupuy was appointed by him his executor.

The *Hôpital Général de Quebec* had been founded by Mgr.

* "qui prétend être en droit d'avoir deux archers de la Marine dans les cérémonies et de les avoir dans son banc à l'église, la carabine sur l'épaule contre les règlements." De Beauharnois, 25 Sept., 1727, Parl. MS., 3rd Series, vol. IX., p. 1725.

† Parl. MS., 3rd Series, X., p. 1647, de Beauharnois, 6 March, 1727. De Beauharnois complained in the plainest language of the conduct of Dupuy as an unparalleled insult to his authority. It was necessary, he said, that there should be perfect accord between the authorities. As the intendant would listen neither to rhyme nor reason "*ni rime ni raison*," he thought it better to obtain justice from the minister, than to seek it himself. Ib. X., p. 1648, 8 March.

de Saint Vallier. Its ecclesiastical name to this day is "Monastère de Notre Dame des Anges," the nuns belonging to the order of Saint Augustin. On the 25th of January, 1727, the anniversary of the bishop being received as priest, the jesuit father de la Chasse composed a piece in verse, the subject being Jacob at the point of death asking Joseph to take charge of his other children. M. de Beauharnois, M. and Madame Dupuy were present. It was then apparent that the bishop's constitution was broken. His health continued to fail, and in September, de Saint Vallier, now in his seventy-fourth year, felt his end to be approaching. He arranged his affairs and papers, and as wax was a matter of expense in Canada, he told the nuns to obtain some tapers "*pour ses services.*" They thought he rather required a new *soutane*, his ordinary clerical dress, as his own was so threadbare, that the poorest curate would scarcely wear it. On Saint Andrew's day, the 30th of November, he addressed the community for the last time. Although very weak, he performed mass on three other occasions. He was attended by doctor Sarrazin, a name still held in respect in Canada. On learning on Christmas eve that there was no hope for him, de Saint Vallière sent for M. de Lotbinière, the archdeacon of his diocese, to administer the last rites of the church. M. Dupuy was present. It was at this time the bishop informed Dupuy of his appointment as executor, and of his own desire to be buried in the church of the hospital, his foundation. On Christmas day he was visited by the governor, whom, although dying he received with perfect courtesy. He died at half-past twelve on the morning of the 26th of December, reciting the first verse of the forty-second psalm. "*Quem admodum desiderat cervus ad fontes aquarum, ita desiderat anima mea ad te Deus.*" An altar was erected in the chamber in which the corpse was laid, and mass was performed by M. de Lotbinière and the other priests. This event preceded the most serious difficulty which has affected the Roman Catholic church in Canada. The quarrel has only been imperfectly related, and it has not been difficult to keep the true issue in the background. It

was settled, as such difficulties often are, by the main point being set out of view by those in power, and by the sacrifice of the intendant, who felt bound to interfere, and cannot be accused of having acted from personal motives. Moreover, the arrival of a new bishop-coadjutor removed several causes of dispute, which aided to place the dispute in less prominence.

The quarrel arose from the pretensions put forth by the canons of the chapter. At this early stage in the proceeding, while the superior and the clergy of the seminary paid the customary visit to the corpse lying in state, the canons did not attend. They sent word that the church bells could ring the knell by those sent to toll them; and they asked to be supplied with wax tapers for the service in the cathedral.

M. Dupuy furnished what was required for the decoration of the hospital chapel, together with the car on which the body was carried to the city gates. It had been embalmed, and was exposed for seven days in the "*chapelle ardente*" constructed at the hospital. There it was visited by all the poor of the city, who from the commencement of the illness of the bishop had shewn great sympathy, attending at the churches, some even prostrating themselves before the altars, praying that the bishop's life might be spared.

If any position was assured it was that of M. de Lotbinière, the archdeacon of the diocese. It was upon him the duty officially devolved of conducting the funeral ceremonies, but this claim was not recognised by the chapter. The canons acted as if the diocese were vacant. On the morning of the bishop's death they held a meeting, and appointed three vicars-general to conduct the ecclesiastical affairs: M. Boullard, who had long been *curé* of Quebec, with two priests named Plante and Hazeur. They immediately assumed charge of the diocese, and among other duties gave orders for the burial of the bishop.

These proceedings, the legality of which Dupuy refused to recognise, led to the report that the newly-elected vicars-general had resolved, in spite of the bishop's declared wish, to bury the body in the cathedral. The statement reached

the ears of the intendant. The council was not in session, having adjourned from the days preceding Christmas until the Monday following, "*les rois*," the 6th of January. Consequently, the intendant called upon the canons to appear before the court on the first day after vacation, and in the meantime summoned them to his hotel on the 2nd of January, the day before the burial was to take place.

M. de Lotbinière attended. On the part of the chapter a bailiff appeared with a document, setting forth that they did not recognise any judge in Canada empowered to determine the dispute between themselves and M. de Lotbinière: not even the *conseil supérieur*. They could alone be judged by the king and his council; to that body they appealed, declaring that they would not appear at the place of summons.

On this defiance of his authority Dupuy determined to take summary proceedings to prevent the canons carrying out their purpose, and to assert his power, which they were disputing. On the evening of the 2nd of January, the day previous to that named for the burial, Dupuy, accompanied by M. de Lotbinière, M. de Leigne, lieutenant-general, and M. Hiché, the attorney-general, proceeded to the hospital. He there directed the superioress, Geneviève Duchesnay mère Saint Augustin, a member of an old Canadian family, to lock the doors of the vestibule, and in the king's name he ordered the attendance of the members of the community and the invalid poor of both sexes to hear what he had to say. M. Dupuy then declared that he had attended to perform the ceremony of burial, owing to the canons having determined on the morrow to inter the body in the cathedral. Among those present was Leclair, one of the canons, who desired to speak, but the intendant paid no regard to what he said. M. de Lotbinière, the jesuit father de la Chasse the confessor of the convent, with the other priests, put on their surplices; the canon Leclair was forced to do the same, the funeral service was performed, Dupuy himself chanting the "*Libera*."

While taking this course, Dupuy knew perfectly well that preparations had been made for an imposing burial service on

the following day at the cathedral. Writers in favour of the chapter assert that the intention was to take the body to the cathedral, and after the service, solemnly bring it back to the hospital for interment. It was in consequence of the report that such a step was contemplated, that Dupuy acted as I have described. His intention had, however, become known, and the canons determined to interrupt the ceremony. They caused the tocsin to be sounded, and spread the report that the general hospital was on fire. By these means a great number of the inhabitants of the city were collected at the building. With this crowd following them, the grand vicars entered the hospital chapel. Finding that the ceremony was ended, they placed an interdict on the church, and suspended the superioress from her functions, appointing another *religieuse* in her place: thus passing direct censure on the ecclesiastics who were present, among them the archdeacon of the diocese and the superior of the jesuits.

In the ordinance issued by the intendant, on the 14th of January, Dupuy expressed his surprise at this monstrous proceeding, as if there was any condition in the colony independent of the courts of justice established by the king. Dupuy pointed out that in France an appeal could be made to the king, but it could only be after those interested had acknowledged the court and submitted to its decisions. The course proposed by the chapter would create two years of delay, and in that period the canons would be able to execute with impunity all that their caprice suggested.

Dupuy, in giving a narrative of what took place, asserts that he had heard that it was the intention of the chapter unlawfully to retain with the body of the bishop his cross, mitre, and other pontifical ornaments, and to set at defiance the desire of the late bishop where his body should be placed.

It was not possible for the intendant to regard the course followed by the newly-elected vicars-general in any other light than as a defiance of his authority, and as a usurpation of clerical power at variance with the opinions of the civil officials, and in opposition to law. Subsequent proceedings

determined their character, for they were held to be null and void. By a modern standard of law and order, they can only be called a violation of decency and ordinary propriety. A wrangle over the corpse of a leading ecclesiastic is a scandal in any religion; and it is the more remarkable that it took place in the iron discipline of the Roman church.

The points in dispute were nevertheless sufficiently simple. During the life of M. de Saint Vallier, in 1713, Mgr. Duplessis de Mornay had been appointed coadjutor under the title of the bishop of Eumenia in Phrygia; but he never crossed the Atlantic. In 1715 de Saint Vallier drew the attention of his coadjutor to the condition of the church in Louisiana. M. de Mornay had belonged to the capuchins at Meudon, and he sent out to that colony, some of his own order to carry on the missions, and from France he governed its religious services; at the same time he was administering the diocese of Cambrai, then vacant by the death of the celebrated Fénelon.

After the decease of de Saint Vallier, and previous to the fact being known in France, in March, 1728, de Mornay had resigned his position as coadjutor, and a successor was appointed. But such resignation was of no effect, for at that date de Mornay was *de facto* bishop of Quebec, his first appointment having been made *cum futura successionem*.

Accordingly, when the chapter undertook to elect the vicars-general, they were acting in defiance of the fact that a bishop of Quebec legally held the episcopal office.

On the 31st of May, 1728, the bishop sent the necessary powers to M. de Lotbinière, to administer the diocese in his name; the latter assumed authority in the following September, thus annulling the whole proceedings of the chapter.

Even before the facts were known, the course taken by the chapter was regarded as being in opposition to law. The canons were summoned to appear before the "*conseil supérieur*" at an extraordinary meeting on the 5th of January. They were forbidden to celebrate any service appertaining to their office in the church until their refusal to attend the summons of the council had been judged by the "*conseil*

supérieur." A provisional seizure was placed upon their temporal revenues, and publication of the ordinance was ordered in the churches of Quebec, Montreal, and Three Rivers.* The canons were not prepared quietly to accept these conditions. After-events suggest that they knew that the governor was not actively against them, and towards the end of the dispute he took the opposite side to that of Dupuy. As he gave no countenance to the proceedings of the *cour supérieur*, his sympathies must have been apparent. In whatever way influenced, the chapter issued a *mandement*, bearing the name of the vicars-general, which was read by M. de Tonnancour, one of the canons, protesting against the course taken by the intendant.†

The council met on the afternoon of the 6th of January, in extraordinary session. The first step was to declare the bishopric not vacant; the second, to forbid the sieur Boullard and others to assume the position of vicars-general, and in that position to perform any executive act. The council condemned in unmistakable language the conduct of the ecclesiastics as tending to seduce the simplicity of the people, who could not distinguish the distinction of civil and ecclesiastical rights; that the powers of the ecclesiastics consisted only in performing the services of the church and of administering the sacraments, and affirming that all other rights, ecclesiastical and secular, were under the control of judges charged with the duties of justice.‡

* Ordinance, 4th January, 1728. Edicts and Ordinances, II., p. 326.

† It is worthy of remark that the *mandement* issued by the vicars-general at this important crisis of the church before the conquest, when it assumed to be independent of civil authority, is not included in the volumes of the "Mandements des Evêques de Quebec," lately published. No allusion is made to the dispute either in the sketch of the life of Mgr. de Mornay or that of Mgr. Dosquet.

‡ "laquelle ne tend qu' à séduire le peuple à la faveur de sa simplicité et de la connaissance qui lui manque pour distinguer la puissance ecclésiastique d'avec la puissance séculière : le peuple ne pouvant pas savoir avec assez de précision que la puissance propre aux ecclésiastiques n'est que sur le spirituel et sur les choses qui concernent le salut des âmes, les ordres à conférer aux ministres de l'Eglise, l'administration des sacrements et ce qui s'en suit des effets du sacrement de mariage et des autres sacrements ; que tous les autres droits et prérogatives des ecclésiastiques."

It was resolved that the conduct of M. de Tonnancourt, in announcing the *mandement*, should be examined before the civil lieutenant-general de Leigne. The vicars-general were forbidden to publish the *mandement* in any church of the colony, under the penalty of the seizure of their revenues, and the *curés* were prohibited from reading it in any church.

One effect of the attitude of the council, was to lead to the removal of the edict from the church of the hospital, which took place in February; and at a later date, to restore the superioress of the convent suspended with such indecent haste on the evening of the funeral of de Saint Vallier.

On the day of the purification, the 2nd of February, the sermon at the cathedral was preached by père Valérian, who as a point of religious teaching saw fit to allude to the disputes which were taking place. He took upon himself to say that M. Boullard alone possessed power in the diocese, and that it was he only, whom the people should obey in matters of religion. On the requisition of the attorney-general, the council passed a minute which forbade all ecclesiastics,

tiques et séculiers entr'eux sont matières purement temporelles dévolues à la puissance du roi et partant à la connaissance des juges qui sont chargés de l'exécution de sa justice sur tous ses sujets sans distinction dont les ecclésiastiques (pour l'exemple qu'ils doivent au peuple) doivent se montrer les plus soumis.

L'Eglise étant dans l'Etat, et non l'Etat dans l'Eglise, faisant partie de l'Etat sans lequel elle ne peut subsister : les ecclésiastiques d'ailleurs étant si peu les maîtres de se soustraire un seul moment à la justice du prince que sa majesté enjoint à ses juges, par les ordonnances du royaume, de les y contraindre par la saisie de leurs revenus temporelles n'étant nécessaire pour en convaincre tout le peuple de cette colonie inviolablement attaché au culte dû à Dieu, et à l'obéissance due au roi par l'express commandement de Dieu, que de lui donner connaissance ainsi que nous allons le faire de la déclaration publique que les évêques de France, assemblés à la tête du clergé, ont donnée le dix-neuf mars de l'année mil six cent quatre-vingt-deux ; laquelle déclaration porte en propres termes, que Saint Pierre et ses successeurs, vicaires de Jésus-Christ, et que toute l'Eglise même, n'ont reçu de puissance de Dieu que sur les choses spirituelles et qui concernent le salut, et non point sur les choses temporelles et civiles. . . . nous déclarons que les rois ne sont soumis à aucunes puissances ecclésiastiques par l'ordre de Dieu dans les choses qui concernent le temporel." Ordonnances des Intendants de Canada. Quebec, 6 Jan., 1728. Edits et Ordonnances, II., p. 327-8. Words which cannot be kept too prominently before the attention of those who hereafter may enter public life.

regular and secular, especially the recollets, from preaching anything but the word of God and the teaching of the gospel. The père Valérian on being summoned, appeared before the council and read passages of his sermon, and gave the reasons which induced him to consider M. Boullard the present head of the church in Canada.

There appeared little chance of any settlement of the quarrel when M. de Beauharnois attended at the council and requested that the paper which he had brought with him should be read by his secretary. Although this proceeding was opposed by M. Dupuy, M. de Beauharnois persevered in his demand, and the document was read. It expressed the governor-general's displeasure, that the council without his authority had interfered in matters of religion, and that any decision should have been arbitrarily given in a controversy involving points so delicate; adding, that in his view the course taken by the council would lead to dangerous consequences. He was, therefore, determined to exercise the powers he possessed, and in the name of the king he forbade the council to receive any petition or any reply from the parties summoned, and to give no judgment on the subject under dispute, until it had been submitted to the king, and his majesty's orders had been received regarding it.

The intendant, nevertheless, desired to proceed, but under the circumstances he was powerless. He did not fail, however, to exert his authority. The bailiff of the court, Rogeat, was dismissed for refusing to publish certain notices, and was even imprisoned. The governor released him. A member of the council, M. Crispin, was also forced for a time to discontinue attendance at its meetings.

Following these proceedings, the interdict against the hospital chapel was removed. In September, M. Dupuy ceased to be intendant. The secretary of state notified the council through the governor-general that a writ of *main-levée*, the English replevy, had to be granted. Thus their property was restored to the chapter until further proceedings should attach it, and matters reverted to their original condition.

In October peace was restored to the convent; the mère Saint Augustin was replaced in her position. In the list of "*supérieures*," her name appears as such from 1726 to 1730, in years of unbroken authority. No allusion is made to her suspension, and she died in discharge of her duties.

Dupuy left for France in October, 1728, placing his affairs in charge of his son, a jesuit priest. The position taken by him in the dispute can in no way be assigned to hostility to the church. What he opposed was the pretension of a knot of ecclesiastics to undisputed and irresponsible authority, whose names, but for mention of them in this unwarrantable assumption of power, would have long been forgotten. Opinion in France by no means ranged itself entirely on the side of de Beauharnois and the chapter. Dupuy, as many before him, lost a good cause by want of prudence and judgment. It was said of him that he was right in many respects, but clearly in the wrong on other points. If he had, moreover, avoided the ridiculous claims he had advanced with regard to his position, he would have escaped much of the prejudice in his disfavour, and with more discretion on his part the blame would have fallen on the governor, and it is not improbable that de Beauharnois would have been recalled.*

* "L'année suivante M. de Saint Senoch, agent de notre communauté écrivait de France. 'Vous aurez un nouvel intendant, je ne le connais point; le pauvre M. Dupuy est absolument exclu de cette place. Il a eu raison en bien des choses, mais il a eu bien tort dans d'autres; s'il avait bien pris garde à lui, tous les torts seraient tombés sur M. le Gouverneur, et il n'aurait jamais été rapellé de son intendance.'" Mgr. de Saint Vallier et l'hôpital général de Quebec. Histoire du Monastère, p. 281.

CHAPTER II.

Events in France had not established the principle in favour of which Dupuy had asserted himself. On the advent to power of the regent it was hoped that important religious concessions would be made. The opinions of the regent were known, but he had not the moral courage or the strong convictions of an honourable life to face intolerance. The protestants commenced again to assemble, but the treatment of them was left to the governors of provinces, to act in each case as was thought advisable. In some parts of the south of France, persecution was attempted on the hideous system of Louis XIV. It is an important fact in the history of those days that the jansenists and gallicans were as embittered against the protestants as the jesuits, and were prepared to go to the same length of persecution. The fact is undeniable, and admitted by modern historians.

But enlightened catholics were not wanting whose patriotism was greater than their love of dogma, and who were capable of seeing the unfortunate consequences which must follow the revocation of the edict of Nantes. There was yet time to redeem that fatal error, more condemnable from its want of political foresight, than from the brutality to which it gave rise. The exiled protestants remained Frenchmen; and the love of France was still a part of their being. The fact must be borne in mind that these men were leaving behind everything dear to them, all that in their view had given a charm to life, sustained only by the deep convictions which they drew from their protestant faith. They were prepared to submit to exile, want and privation, in preference to the abandonment of what they believed to be truth. The party who desired their return was headed by the duc de Noailles: it advocated that the protestants should be allowed to

establish themselves in recognised districts of the kingdom. The clerical party would admit of no such concession. While those who professed more moderation condemned some of the excesses of the jesuits in applying the principles of the revocation, that measure as a policy obtained their support. The opportunity passed away for France to recall the protestant exiles, to remember amid the horrors and terrors of the revolution that the revocation was one of the causes which led to the dissolution of society, to which the country during the first years of that convulsion had to submit.

On the death of the regent the duc de Bourbon was appointed first minister. It forms the reverse of a bright page of French history. The remarkable fact of his administration was the marriage of the young king, then only fifteen years of age. One leading object was to obtain an heir to the throne, to debar the son of the regent from its possession. A request was made for a grand-daughter of George the first, daughter of the prince of Wales, afterwards George II. Assent would have cost the dynasty the British crown, for the bride must have become a Roman catholic. Eventually it was determined that he should marry the daughter of Stanislas Lesczynski, the deposed king of Poland, the unfortunate ally of Charles XII., then living in Alsace on a pension granted by France. The young queen was seven years older than the king. No event in modern history has created such astonishment, and it is only explicable by the intrigues which dictated it, into which it is not within the object of this volume to enter. In 1726 M. de Bourbon was dismissed, and cardinal Fleury assumed power.

At this date he was sixty-three years old ; his constitution was still vigorous, for his life had been free from the excesses in which many public men then indulged. The main theory of his government was the maintenance of peace, and the avoidance of the profuse expenditure, which had proved one of the causes of national debt and embarrassment. The one personal effort made by him was to obtain the cardinal's hat, so that he would have no superior among the clergy. He

refused to take the title of first minister, and he caused the young king, then sixteen years of age, in imitation of Louis XIV., to declare that hereafter he would himself govern, and have no first minister. So transparent was this farce, that it appears strange it should have been put in practice. The fact was duly communicated to Canada, and gravely acknowledged by the governor.*

One of Fleury's first efforts was to conciliate the clergy. During the government of the duc de Bourbon the ecclesiastics had been subjected to the tax of the "*cinquantième*," † in common with the remaining population. They had resisted in a body against this tribute, as an attack on their immunity from taxation. Fleury made a declaration that the tax had been extended to their property by a misconception of the principle that the rights of the church were beyond human control. On being thus freed from the legal demand, the church voluntarily made a gift of four million *livres*.

We may attribute Dupuy's recall to some extent to the maxims which he laid down in his ordinance of the 6th of January, of the subordination of the church to the state. He was affirming the reverse of the principle enunciated by cardinal Fleury in Paris.

On the departure of Dupuy no immediate steps were taken to name his successor ; at one period it appeared that it was possible he might return to Canada. D'Aigremont was accordingly called upon to undertake his duties as "*commissonnaire ordonnateur*." He died the following October, when M. Hocquart was appointed ; it was not, however, until 1731 that he was officially named intendant.

During the years succeeding the treaty of Utrecht the population of Canada had steadily increased. In 1713 it is set forth as being 18,119 souls ; at the death of de Vaudreuil in 1725 it had increased to above 28,000. On the arrival of de Beauharnois in 1726 there were 29,396 souls in the colony. The advance in prosperity had not been in population only.

* Parl. MS., 3rd Series, IX., p. 1558.

† The fiftieth part of all rents and revenues for twelve years.

Peace had encouraged and widened all enterprise, one result of which was the formation of a company to trade on the upper Mississippi.* The first venture left Montreal on the 16th of June, 1727. The expedition reached Michilimackinac on the 22nd of July, where it remained until the end of the month. Thence it followed the route by Green bay, Fox river and the Wisconsin to the Mississippi. Ascending the Mississippi, the canoes reached lake Pepin on the 17th of September, where the *voyageurs*† established themselves and constructed a fort on the north side, called by them fort Beauharnois. The intention was to perform mass with some ceremony on the 4th of November, and otherwise to celebrate the birthday of de Beauharnois; but as the fireworks to be displayed on the occasion were not ready, the ceremony was delayed until the 14th. During the festivities on the occasion, some wine made by the Sioux was produced, which by its excellence astonished those who were present, men accustomed to the best wines of France.

It was the first settlement on the Mississippi north of the Illinois. The purpose in forming it, was to establish trade relations with the Sioux. The tribe proved tractable, and many of them established themselves around the fort in a friendly spirit, accepting the presence of the new-comers. It

* The date of the formation of the company is the 6th of June, 1727. It included the names of some of the foremost men of the colony: de Beauharnois, de Longueuil, de La Corne, d'Aigremont, Saint George Dupré and others. [Margry VI., p. 552.] The leader of the expedition was Boucher de la Perrière, and the lake was named after a connection of de Boucherville, Madeleine Loiseau, married to Jean Pepin. It was soon found that the fort had been placed on ground subject to inundations [de Beauharnois, 25 Oct., 1729], and it was abandoned. A new company was formed on the 6th June, 1731. [Margry VI., p. 565.] In spring, 1732, de Linctot re-established the post, selecting higher ground for building. In 1737 it was not considered possible for the company to continue its operations, owing to the threats of the Sioux. It was accordingly resolved to abandon the post and burn down the fort. It was evacuated 30th May. [Margry VI., p. 580.] The post was subsequently restored in 1750 by Marin.

† About this date this word came into use to take the place of the term *coureurs de bois*, to which disrepute began to be attached. The new term, as it were, legitimized the life of adventure.

‡ His appointment was registered 20th August, 1731.

was not the case with the old enemies of the French, the Foxes who shewed that the strong enmity which they had entertained was still felt. The impotent attempt of this tribe on Detroit in 1712 has been recorded,* with the severe punishment inflicted upon them in consequence of this act of hostility. In the fifteen years which had elapsed they had regained strength, and had formed alliances with other nations. They had incorporated into their tribe many prisoners and members of other tribes, willing to join with them in their opposition to the French. The country north of the Illinois from lake Michigan to the Mississippi was inhabited by the Mascoutins, the Kikapoos, the Malhomines, the Folles-avoines, and the Sakis. There grew up among them a common alliance in opposition to the French, and to the Indian nations who were friendly to them. They surprised parties proceeding to the settlement at lake Pepin, and made prisoners of the traders and *voyageurs* when not strong enough to resist them. The Foxes had again become mischievous and dangerous; and the difficulty in their attacks was, that they were a matter of surprise. Watchfulness could never be relaxed. There was nothing aggressive on the part of the French; their one object was to travel on the route to the new settlement. Consequently they were constantly liable to be assailed when least looking for the presence of an enemy.

Peace was made in 1726, by M. de Lignery with the Foxes, Sakis and Puans, which it was believed would be kept. The proposal had been made to attempt the extirpation of the tribe, but it was pointed out that partial success would lead to future and more troublesome hostilities.† The attention of the government had been seriously directed to the danger to which parties ascending the Fox river were exposed, and efforts had been made to assure their safety. It was the route most followed, for it led directly to lake Pepin. The other two routes were looked upon as forming the connection with Louisiana: one by Chicago creek to descend the northern branch of the

* Ante Vol. II., p. 474-478.

† Parl. MS., 3 series, ix. pp. 1461, 1469, 15 June, 1726.

Illinois to the main stream; the second by the river Saint Joseph, to take the *portage* to the headquarters of the southern branch of the Illinois, now called the Kankakee. There was a fort at the discharge of the Saint Joseph into lake Michigan; there was likewise a fort at the head of Green bay. The central point of French settlement was Michilimackinac, and it was at this spot that the expeditions made their final arrangements for starting.

For some years there was no attempt to interfere with the French settlement at lake Pepin. It was during their passage to and from the fort that parties were assailed, as opportunity offered. In October, 1728, seventeen Canadians and French were descending the Mississippi to trade with the Illinois, when they were seized by a party of the Kikapoos and Mascoutins. The point was discussed what treatment the prisoners should receive; whether the captors would burn them, or retain them as slaves, or whether they would give over some of the prisoners to the Foxes to deal with them as that tribe saw fit. They finally determined they would themselves keep them.

Among the prisoners was père Guignas, who in the dreary captivity of himself and his countrymen continued the performance of his religious services, the one consolation they could receive. These unfortunate men were kept five months in imprisonment, for escape was impossible. During this period the attention of their captors was attracted by the priest; by the devotion with which he performed his duties, and by his endeavour to soothe the affliction of his fellow sufferers in the common misfortune. Being a man of ability and able to converse with the tribe, he availed himself of the confidence they placed in him, to dwell upon the advantages they would gain by an alliance with the French. Ultimately he succeeded in entirely obtaining their confidence, to such an extent that they agreed to sever their relations with the Foxes. Consequent on this determination he induced some of the chiefs to descend the Mississippi to fort Chartres, situate ninety miles north of the junction of the Ohio with

the Mississippi, where de Saint-Ange was in command. After some negotiation peace was made, and the prisoners obtained their liberty.

The defection of these allies materially weakened the power of the Foxes. They accordingly resolved to form some connection with the Iroquois, whether with the intention of abandoning their old territory it is not easy to determine. In 1730 de Saint-Ange received information that a party of the Foxes was proceeding in the direction of the Iroquois country; that they had seized some prisoners near the spot known as "Le Rocher," east of lake Peoria, which, in 1682, de La Salle had selected for the site of a fort,* and from its character well known. They had entrenched themselves here in Indian form. Their intention was to ascend the Illinois river, and reach lake Michigan, and possibly thence to find their way to the Ohio. The Illinois Indians, with the former allies of the Foxes, the Kikapoos and Mascoutins, were lying in wait to attack them.

There was now a strong feeling on the part of the French with regard to the Foxes, that there could be no peace with them, and that there was one policy only possible, their extirpation. Accordingly, when de Saint-Ange heard of the position in which they were placed, and thinking the opportunity favourable to attain this result, he resolved upon attacking them. His force consisted of the garrison, and of the Frenchmen he could collect on the river, amounting to one hundred men and four hundred Indians. He arrived at the Illinois on the 17th of August. The Foxes were encamped on the banks of a tributary stream, protected by trees; and as was the peculiar custom of the tribe, they had dug caves in the earth, in which they could take refuge. De Saint-Ange was here joined by two hundred Illinois, Kikapoos and Mascoutins, who had heard of his advance. The Foxes' camp was blockaded, and on their part they made several attempts to surprise the besiegers; in each case unsuccessfully. On the 19th they sent back some slaves, whom they

* Ante Vol. II., p. 110.

had seized from the Illinois, and expressed a desire to enter into negotiations for peace. No arrangement could be arrived at, and de Saint-Ange renewed the attack. On the following day he was joined by de Villiers from fort Saint Joseph, with sixty Frenchmen and five hundred Pottawatamies and Sakis; his force was also increased by the arrival from lake Michigan of de Noyelles with ten Frenchmen and two hundred Miamis.

The Foxes defended themselves with obstinacy. At the same time, having learned from their association with the French what intrigue can accomplish, they resolved to have recourse to negotiation. The Sakis, who were among their enemies, had been their ancient allies. An attempt was made to re-establish the old relations: it was not in vain. The Sakis gave them food, of which they were in want, and entertained the proposal to assist them in their escape from their dangerous position. The relationship could not long remain unknown. It might have eluded the watchfulness of the French; it was scarcely possible it could fail to be penetrated by the other tribes. Jealousy is one of the most powerful motives to influence a savage nature; accordingly, suspicion led to accusation of treachery and to recrimination. At one time it appeared as if the Indian allies on the side of the French would settle their altercation by coming to blows. But the large force of French with de Saint-Ange was able to repress all such demonstrations, and ostensibly to restore quiet.

The siege had now lasted twenty days, and want began to be felt on all sides. Not only the Foxes were without food, but the French and their allies suffered from the same privation. The Illinois were reduced to eat the skins of which their quivers were made, and were the first to yield under the emergency. On the 7th of December, two hundred of them abandoned the siege. De Saint-Ange, nevertheless, persevered in his attack; he now disposed his force so that the Foxes were unable to take water from the stream from which they were obtaining their supply. During the erection of additional

works to protect this new disposition of his men, a violent thunderstorm with torrents of rain prevented the continuation of their labours. At night the storm continued to rage; it was pitch dark and the temperature exceedingly cold. It was under these desperate circumstances that the Foxes endeavoured to escape. Their movements, unfortunately for themselves, were betrayed by the cries of the children. Although the opinion was firm in the French camp, that an escape was being attempted, the darkness of the night and the uncertainty whether friend or foe would be met, caused the French to remain passive until morning.

At break of day the youngest and strongest of the French Indians were sent in pursuit. They soon overtook the Fox column, which could not move with rapidity, as the women, children, and old men had been placed in front. Accordingly it was they who determined the rate of advance, under these circumstances necessarily much delayed. Their warriors were in the rear to protect the retreat. The onslaught of the pursuers met little resistance; the column was rapidly broken, upwards of three hundred of the Fox warriors were killed or taken by their enemies. Of the Foxes present scarcely sixty warriors escaped. The Sakis, however, had previously aided in the retreat of several women and children, who eluded pursuit.

The French now believed that the Foxes were incapable of further mischief, and de Beauharnois wrote to the minister that the Foxes were humbled and would no longer prove troublesome. The expectation was not well founded. The tribe still remained in sufficient force to be aggressive, and once more incurred the enmity of the Illinois. •The latter, with every disposition to destroy them as irreconcilable enemies, failed in their efforts. The quarrel extended to the Hurons in the neighbourhood of Detroit, and they, feeling that they were unable to cope with the tribe, appealed to the christian Indians of the lake of the Two Mountains. On the 17th of October, 1732, fifty of the latter reached Detroit. Joined by seventy-five Hurons they crossed from Detroit to

Chicago creek, where they met a few Mascoutin Indians. The latter, who were well acquainted with the movements of the Foxes, led the party to the Fox village on the Wisconsin river. It was a complete surprise; the Foxes, nevertheless, made a bold attempt to defend themselves, and advanced to the attack. They were outnumbered. Most of the fighting men were killed; the women, children and old men experienced the same fate: but some thirty or forty men and several women managed to escape and found their way to Green bay, where de Villiers was in command, to whom they surrendered. Two of the chiefs were sent to Quebec, as an assurance for the future good conduct of the tribe. Kiala, one of the number, considered to have been the cause of much of the trouble, was transported to Martinique.

The remainder of the Foxes joined the tribe of Sakis, who were established not far from the French post at the head of Green bay. De Villiers determined in no way to permit their presence, and he resolved that this refuge should be denied them. While he thus threatened destruction to the Foxes by insisting on their abandonment by the Sakis, he was outraging a delicate principle of Indian feeling in asking that the hospitality granted by one tribe to another should be violated. He felt himself, however, sufficiently powerful to enforce his request, and he determined to exact it.

In order to carry out his design, he obtained the assistance of de Repentigny, who commanded at Michilimackinac. De Villiers arrived at the Indian village with sixty French and two hundred Indians; Ottawas, Malhomines, and Sauteurs. Leaving his force a short distance in the rear, he went with a few followers to the Sakis, believing that his presence would exact compliance with his request. De Repentigny and his party were instructed to hold themselves in readiness to advance on hearing three gunshots. On his arrival he summoned the Sakis chiefs and demanded the surrender of the Foxes. He promised the Foxes their lives on condition they would proceed to Montreal and place themselves at the disposal of the governor, and he declared if they

were not sent back, he would come himself to seek them. As the hour appointed by him passed without their appearance, de Villiers, accompanied only by nine Frenchmen, proceeded to the Sakis to enforce his demand. While de Repentigny with his party remained some slight distance from the spot, de Villiers, accompanied by his son, proceeded to the enclosure, for the village was protected by fallen trees. Believing that a determined attitude would lead to submission, de Villiers commenced to force his way by pushing aside some of the branches. The chiefs called upon him to abandon the attempt, telling him that their young men could not be restrained, and that if he persevered he would meet his death. De Villiers would listen to no such expostulation, and was continuing his attempt, when a shot was fired from the Sakis. His son, who was by his side, fell to the ground. The elder de Villiers immediately raised his musket and fired. A volley from the Sakis followed. De Villiers fell dead and some of the few men with him were wounded. On hearing the firing, de Repentigny advanced with his force. The action became general, when de Repentigny, du Plessis, and six Frenchmen were killed.

Although the French attack was for the time discontinued, the Sakis felt themselves so insecure in their position that in three days afterwards they abandoned it. The command had now devolved on the younger de Villiers, and gathering what force he could bring together, he immediately pursued them. He came upon the Sakis about twenty miles from the fort and he advanced against them with much determination; their resistance was equally obstinate. On both sides there was loss in killed and wounded, and the action was not decisive. The Sakis continued their march to the Sioux, in the hope of being received by them; but fear of the French doubtless led the Sioux not to accede to the demand. The Sakis finally crossed the Mississippi to establish themselves near the river de Bœuf, the modern Buffalo creek in Iowa.*

* In the narrative of these difficulties with the Foxes and Sakis, I have generally followed the late estimable M. l'Abbé Ferland.

The French determined to exact satisfaction for the losses they sustained, and so reduce the power of the Sakis as to prevent them being mischievous for the future. In the month of August, 1734, an expedition left Montreal under the command of de Noyelles. It consisted of eighty French and one hundred and thirty Indians; at Detroit it was increased by one hundred Hurons and Pottowatamies. It was not until spring of the following year that the force reached the river des Moines, where the Sakis and Renards had established themselves. When de Noyelles arrived at this spot he had with him only two hundred and forty men, the Hurons and the christian Iroquois having left him to attack some Sakis at the river Saint Joseph. De Noyelles found himself before a well-constructed fort, held by an enemy numerically superior, he himself imperfectly provided with food, for his supplies had been consumed during his journey. He was thus driven to the position of making the best of the situation, and accordingly he affected moderation, and was conciliatory in his demands. He agreed to leave the fort unmolested, and to grant terms of peace, conditionally on the Sakis abandoning their alliance with the Foxes; and that they would themselves return to their former settlement at the head of Green bay. The French had no power to enforce these conditions, and the mere acceptance of them by the Sakis was not by any means the sequel looked for. The best report which de Beauharnois could make of the expedition was that it had not been attended by any bad consequences.*

The disputes of the church in 1727 required that steps should be taken for their settlement. The new bishop, who entered into the position by succession, was now sixty-six years old, broken in health, still retaining an invincible dread of crossing the ocean. Accordingly, M. Dosquet, a Sulpician, was appointed coadjutor. In his youth he had resided in Montreal, and had passed two years in that city; but finding the climate unfavourable to his health, he had returned to France. Transferred by the consent of Saint Sulpice to the

* N.Y. Documents, IX., p. 1059.

"*Seminaire des Missions Etrangères*," he became the *procureur-général* of the community, and in 1725 was named bishop of Samos, with the prospect of being appointed to the duties of vicar apostolic in the East Indies. In 1728 he was selected as coadjutor to proceed to Canada.*

The vessel in which the bishop took his passage, "l'Eléphant," commanded by M. de Vaudreuil, one of the sons of the former governor, was wrecked on a rock at Cape Brulé, thirty miles below Quebec, at the end of August, 1729. The passengers escaped, but the vessel sank, and all the personal baggage, with a valuable cargo was wrecked beyond recovery. The bishop suffered serious inconvenience from the accident. Some indemnity was afterwards allowed him, but not to the full extent of his losses.†

In a previous volume ‡ I have alluded to the regulations established by M. de Laval in the appointment of the *curés*. He had objected to make the incumbents permanent, in order that the discipline of the church could be more firmly established: in other words, that his will and power should be indisputable. He was followed in this policy by M. de Saint Vallier. The efforts of the chapter of Quebec to obtain authority, may be attributed to their desire to free themselves from arbitrary episcopal control, and on their part can be regarded as an act of assertion of greater independence. The support given by M. de Beauharnois to the pretensions of the grand-vicars, if it did not suggest, certainly encouraged them to take the decided step of appointing immovable *curés* in several parishes.§

The new bishop on his arrival soon shewed that he entertained the opinions of his predecessors. He contended that the chapter was without authority to make such changes. There was another ground of dissatisfaction felt by the clergy at Quebec: the new bishop was accompanied by M. de La Tour,

* Mandements des Evêques de Quebec, I., p. 530.

† Parl. MS., Series 3, XII., p. 2584, 13 August, 1730.

‡ Ante I., p. 317.

§ According to the "Mandements," I., p. 567. These appointments were made at Lachenaie, L'Assomption, Saint Anne, Château Richer, St. Etienne and la Madeleine.

who was nominated dean of the chapter.* The Canadian clergy had long experienced that all the honours and dignities of the church were reserved for Frenchmen. It was a position of inferiority from which they were never relieved. Until the conquest, the Canadian clergy were retained in the performance of the ordinary duties of the church, and had little to look forward to in the future. This bestowal of ecclesiastical patronage appeared to the Canadian *curés* the more unjust, as many of them proceeded to France in the desire to be more highly educated ; nevertheless, they found themselves continually passed over.

Indeed, there was little advancement in the colony for the native Canadian. His one field of action was that of a partizan leader in the *petite guerre* during the severest weather of winter, and he never failed to distinguish himself in such expeditions. The governor and the intendant as a consequence represented the home government, by which the money was furnished. As the regular troops were from France the officers were necessarily French ; some few commissions were occasionally given to native-born Canadians. The colonial troops were to some extent officered by the *enfants du sol*. But there was no political career open to youth. Those French-Canadians who, in sentimental modern flourishes of rhetoric, allude to the "ancient monarchy" as if with the design of favourably contrasting the harsh government of French Canada with the blessings of British institutions enjoyed by five generations of their countrymen, would have difficulty in setting forth the great benefits which they insinuate, rather than assert it conferred. The date of which I am writing was the most prosperous period of French rule. It would not be an easy task to specify any political privilege the Canadians possessed, beyond that of cultivating their

* The memory of M. de La Tour is preserved in Canada by his life of M. de Laval, and by his editorship of the history of the Hotel Dieu at Quebec. Although the book bears the name of the Sœur Juchereau, it is generally considered to have been rewritten by him, to the extent that it may be looked upon as his work. It was published at Montauban. He was a voluminous ecclesiastical writer : the seven large volumes of his works, however, find few modern students.

farms, following their callings in the cities, subjected to such *corvées* as might be exacted in the king's name, and marrying as they saw expedient. There was, however, always much social charm, and nowhere to this day are the family relationships more affectionately cultivated. There is likewise an inborn gaiety of heart in the French Canadians, which makes all classes among their peers, sociable and genial. These qualities are independent of all political institutions, and it is impossible to deny that there was discontent in Canada at this date in many respects. Particularly in the church; many Canadian priests of ability and education, found that neither their genius nor their culture, nor their devotion to duty, obtained the recognition which was their due.

Independently of having to contend with this dissatisfied feeling, M. Dosquet laboured under the disadvantage that he was not bishop of Quebec, but coadjutor, and his position was made more unpleasant by the opposition he experienced from the seminary. He would not recognise the changes in church discipline introduced by the canons. His effort was to continue matters as they were; consequently he called upon the newly-appointed *cure's* to send in their resignation. The order was obeyed, but unwillingly, and with dissatisfaction.

There was not a cordial feeling between the chapter of Quebec and the jesuits. The former, while endeavouring to obtain the permanency of *cure's* and that the Canadian-born priest should obtain the consideration to which he was entitled, found the jesuits in no way in accord with them. Their influence had always been on the side of arbitrary power. In January, 1660, M. de Laval, the first bishop, in acknowledgment of the services rendered to the colony by the order, "as an eternal monument of gratitude," established that in perpetuity the parish and clergy of Quebec should walk in procession to the church of the jesuits on the saint's days of Saint Francois Xavier, the Circumcision, and of Saint Ignace, chant vespers, hear the sermon, and so return. For reasons "which it is prudent to forget,* to use Mgr. Dosquet's

* "Des raisons qu'il est à propos d'oublier." Mandements I., p. 532.

words, the procession had ceased to take place. The bishop issued an ordinance for its re-establishment *à perpétuité*. The order, however, was revoked within eleven months of its being issued ; but its mention is warranted to shew the spirit in which the new bishop was prepared to act.

The bishop's health not permitting him to make his pastoral visits, he delegated the duty to M. de Lotbinière.* The bishop also directed his attention to the condition of *l'hôpital général*.† The ill-effects of the disturbance at the burial of M. de Saint Vallier had not passed away. The community had lost the peaceful character of its organization, and there was much unpleasant complication. Accordingly, M. Latour, then dean of the chapter, was nominated superior over the convents. The appointment was announced in a *mandement*,‡ and the *religieuses* were directed to address themselves to him in any difficulty ; and the bishop brought the irregularity to the notice of the minister. M. de Maurepas felt it necessary to call the governor's attention to the bishop's expostulations, attributing the cause to the governor's failure to rectify it. The governor explained that there was no very serious ground for complaint, that the great disorder which had been reported was nothing more than the bickerings§ common enough in a community of women. Their conduct, however, had been regular, and they had constantly performed their duties to the sick.

One source of dissatisfaction arose on the death of the superioress Geneviève Duchesnay : the bishop appointed her successor without any communication with the governor ; a minor matter, however, in comparison with the *mandement* issued by the bishop against the use of spirits in trade with the Indians.¶ He forbade all ecclesiastics to admit to the sacraments of the church any person directly or indirectly con-

* 21 February, 1736, Mandements I., p. 533.

† Parl. MS., 3rd Series, XII., p. 2684.

‡ Mandements I., p. 534, 7 March, 1730.

§ Parl. MS., 3rd Series, XII., p. 2869. "Tracasseries." Lettre de Beauharnois et Hocquart au Ministre.

¶ 26 November, 1730, Mandements I., p. 535.

nected with the traffic, the bishop retaining in his own power the right of granting absolution in such cases.* There was much worldly wisdom shewn with regard to the time when this document was issued, for it was put forth too late in the season, for news of its publication to be made known in France before the ensuing spring.

The bishop's views were received in France with a qualified acceptance. Orders were sent to the authorities in Canada to grant permission to the storekeepers to carry on the sale of brandy with care and moderation, and under restrictions. Neither M. de Beauharnois nor Hocquart recognised the wisdom of this repression.† They represented that the Indians were abandoning the forts of Niagara and Frontenac to trade with the English at Chouaguen. They reported that during the last four years the trade was diminished to one-half; falling from 52,000 *livres* to between 25,000 *livres* and 35,000 *livres*. The intendant was unable to establish confidence on the part of the storekeepers: many even declared, with the bishop's threat hanging over their heads, they would prefer to give up their positions. No doubt, if brandy were given to the Indians they would get drunk; and if they could not obtain it, they would abandon the French forts for Oswego. Instructions were given, if possible, to prevent the *voyageurs* from passing south of lake Ontario. Some men were arrested within ten miles of that place on suspicion of proceeding thither to trade. They were tried as being *coureurs de bois*, on which charge they were acquitted. The accusation of violating the ordinance of the 22nd of May, 1716, was referred to M. Hocquart. The charge was examined, and the men were condemned to a fine of five hundred *livres*. Owing to their poverty, after an imprisonment of three months, the fine was remitted. The question of the trade was considered when M. Dosquet was in France in 1732, his threat of excommunication having attracted attention to it. He then undertook on his return to declare, that his intention in reserving for his own

* 26 Nov., 1730, Mandements I., p. 506.

† N.Y. Hist. Doc., IX., p. 1049. 12 October, 1736.

jurisdiction certain cases, did not apply to the ordinary sale of liquor, but to the extreme instances of what is known in the Roman catholic church as mortal sin. No such circular is on record, but probably full explanation was made in this direction, to quiet public feeling in Canada.

Owing to the limited character of his authority, bishop Dosquet's position became more embarrassing; for he was as yet simply the coadjutor. Accordingly in 1732 he proceeded to France, and appealed directly to the interference of the minister. In consequence, on the 4th of August, 1734, bishop de Mornay was called upon to proceed to Canada, and personally take charge of his diocese. That ecclesiastic was then seventy years of age, and preferred to retire from his position to crossing the ocean. On the 12th of September he resigned his sec.*

In 1734 M. Dosquet returned to Canada as bishop of Quebec. His health continuing to fail, the following year he went back to France.† In 1739 he resigned his bishopric, and even assisted at the consecration of his successor, Mgr. de Lauberivière. Consequently, for a few months there were three ecclesiastics bearing the title of the bishop of Quebec.

The new bishop, Mgr. de Lauberivière, was but twenty-eight years of age. His youth may have led to his selection, owing to the confirmed ill-health of his predecessors, attributed to their age. He left La Rochelle on the 10th of June, 1740. A contagious fever broke out on the ship, on which there

* He died at Paris the 28th of September, 1741, aged 78 years.

† There is a curious mandement of bishop Dosquet, issued a few months before his departure from Canada, (Mandements I., p. 545, 24 February, 1735) which throws some light on the manners of the day.

All priests were forbidden to have females living in their houses, unless a near relation and above all suspicion.

No priest was to be allowed to wear a wig (*perruque*) without permission in writing from one of the grand-vicars, and then it was to be so modestly worn, as to be evidently a matter of necessity.

No schoolmaster was to be admitted in a parish without permission in writing from one of the grand-vicars; and such schoolmaster was not to be allowed to teach persons of the opposite sex. The *mandement* states in the preamble that it was issued owing to ecclesiastical discipline having become relaxed.

were four hundred passengers. The young bishop distinguished himself by his attention to the dying. Apparently he suffered in no way from this performance of his duties ; undoubtedly, he made no complaint. He was received on his landing at Quebec on the 8th of August with the usual state and ceremony. Four days after his arrival he was taken ill. Hopes were entertained for several days that he would recover, but on the 20th he died at half-past eight in the morning. His death took place in the seminary, where on his arrival he had been received. There are few cases more sad of so rapid and early a termination to a career of such promise. He may be said to have only looked upon the scene of his future labours when he was carried off by a premature death.

His successor, Mgr. de Pontbriand, reached Canada on the 30th of August, 1741, and retained his episcopal dignity until his death in 1760.

CHAPTER III.

In 1731, de la Fresnière, with a small force, was sent to take possession of Crown Point on lake Champlain, and to construct a fort which should command the passage of the lake. The aggressive power obtained by its possession was evident. A portage of a few miles gave access to the stream now known as Schroon river, a tributary of the Hudson, by which the upper waters of that stream could be gained; and it furnished the starting point of attack from lake Champlain.* The French, therefore, were in a condition to undertake any foray against the northern frontier settlement of New York, or the western advanced posts of New England. It is at Crown Point that lake Champlain narrows in width, so any expedition from the British colonies would become immediately known. De Beauharnois had been informed that it was the intention of the English to make a settlement at this place;† that if not anticipated they would act as at Chouaguen. Accordingly, in 1731, he sent an officer with thirty men to drive off any settlers who might be established. As early as June, 1732, earl Waldegrave, then ambassador at Paris, protested against this proceeding as being in contravention of article 15 of the treaty of Utrecht, and he demanded that the fort should be razed. The answer was the completion of the works; and in 1740 it was reported that the fort was finished, and occupied by a sufficient garrison.‡

This step was the commencement of the policy on the part of France which led to the war of twenty years later. It was

* This locality, 122 miles from Saint John's and nine miles north of Ticonderoga, is always mentioned by the French as "*Pointe de la Chevelure*." The proper translation, therefore, is "Scalp Point." The English colonies preferred the more euphonous term "Crown Point," by which the place is still known.

† N.Y. Hist., Doc. IX., p. 1022.

‡ Ib., IX., p. 1038.

looked upon as a counterpoise to the British settlement of Oswego; an affirmation of the claim of France to the country surrounding lake Champlain. Fort Edward* on the Hudson was the last fort constructed by the English of New York on the route towards Canada, by the way of lake George.

One of the results of the peace had been the establishment in Montreal of several Albany traders, and it became the custom for many of the youth of Canada frequently to visit Albany. Trade between the two places had become profitable. The French authorities saw only difficulty in the presence of the English, and every effort was made to prevent the commerce being carried on. There was a heavy penalty against trade with the foreigner; but no informer was found, who would profit by denouncing it, for it would have been regarded as a scandalous outrage on public sentiment. The spirit of adventure had lately been turned in the direction of trade and travel. Among the arrivals from New York was one John Henry Lydius, who found his way there in 1725. He early professed his conversion to Roman catholicism; but his feelings could not have been strong on this point. Two documents are extant, signed by ecclesiastics, setting forth that not only he performed no one act of his new religion, and never entered a church; but that he objected to his child being baptized, and that he had exhorted a dying countryman to adhere to his faith, and had read the English service over his grave.†

The principal cause of dissatisfaction with Lydius was that he visited the Sault and the Two Mountain Indians, and that he often received them at his house, "himself painting them."

* Fort Anne, nine miles to the north of the Hudson, on the route of the present Champlain canal, was constructed in 1709, during the preparations for the proposed advance against Canada. It was situated on the south side, at the junction of Schroon and Wood creeks. Fort William Henry at the head of lake George, was not built until 1735. Sir William Johnson writes, 3 September, 1755, (Doc. His. N.Y., II., p. 689) "I am building a Fort at this Lake where no house was ever before built, nor a rod of land cleared, w^h the French call Lake St. Sacrament, but I have given it the name of Lake George, not only in honour of His Majesty, but to ascertain his undoubted Dominion here."

† N.Y. Doc., IX., p. 1,021.

He was consequently looked upon as a dangerous man, especially as he was reported to have told the Indians "that the religious mysteries which the missionaries were announcing . . . were pure superstitions." The proceeding shews the jealousy with which all intercourse with the Indians was regarded. There is no reason to believe that Lydius had anything more in view than to carry on a profitable trade with them. He was, however, arrested, condemned for contravening the royal edict, fined 3,000 *livres*, and banished from the colony.

In 1732, Canada was afflicted with a severe attack of small-pox: three hundred persons alone died in the government of Montreal, and as many more in Quebec and the settled part of the country. Such attacks were invariably ascribed to communication with the Indians; and it was the popular belief that the disease was introduced by them from New England. This depressing malady interfered with the culture of the land and consequently a scarcity of corn arose in the colony. To add to the distress, there was little work for those who lived by labour, and consequently much privation was felt by that numerous class, especially at Quebec. Hocquart extended some relief by giving employment on the fortifications of Montreal. The surrounding land was levelled, and the enclosure of the city commenced. At Quebec the construction of a pier was undertaken in the river St. Charles, in the neighbourhood of the intendant's palace, for the protection of shipping.

Owing to the efforts to find work for those seeking it, ship-building received an impulse at Quebec, an industry to continue in activity during the first fifty years of this century. The vessels constructed were of the class to trade between Montreal and Quebec and for the coasting trade to Ile Saint Jean* and Cape Breton. In 1734, a vehicle on wheels first passed from Quebec to Montreal. A general encouragement to enterprise extended throughout the country.

* Prince Edward Island.

Even a small vessel was built at Sault Saint Mary to carry on trade in the upper waters.

One of the most important industries established was the iron forges* at Three Rivers, about nine miles to the north of that town. The mines were known as early as 1667; Talon, always desirous of developing the resources of Canada, drew the attention of Colbert to the subject, and one de la Poterdière was sent to examine into the value of the deposit. He pronounced the ore submitted to him from Three Rivers to possess no special advantage in respect either of quantity or quality. The mines, therefore, remained unworked for seventy years. They were visited by de Frontenac, and by him reported to be of great consequence. De Denonville also thought favourably of any attempt to work the ore. In 1730 de Francheville, the owner of the seigniory of Saint Maurice, obtained a concession of the mines for twenty years, the remission of payment to the crown of the "tenth" being granted likewise to him. He was bound to have the forges in operation within two years. Unfortunately, he died before the works were completed. A company had been formed to carry on the enterprise, and there appears to have been some attempt to continue the operations; if so, it was unsuccessful, and the widow surrendered her right to the crown in October, 1735. In 1737 the fief and seigniory of Saint Maurice were sold to a syndicate composed of Cugnet, Taschereau, de Vezain, Siniouet, and Gamelin. An order in council, dated the 22nd of April, 1737, was passed, granting the right of working the forges to Cugnet and Company, or "*La Compagnie des Forges*," without rent or dues of any kind. At the same

* The forges were supplied with Bog-iron ore, a post tertiary deposit. Its character is described by Dr. Chapman, of Toronto University [Minerals and Geology of Canada, p. 211] as "a hydrated sesquioxide of iron, a variety of brown or iron ore, or Limonite. It arises from the decomposition of iron pyrites and other ferruginous substances in rocks and soils, and the after solution of the oxide of iron thus formed, by water containing free carbonic acid or organic acids. The iron compounds dissolved by this agency and carried into swamps and other low-lying places are there deposited, and are subsequently converted into hydrated sesquioxide."

time, the government advanced them as a loan 100,000 *livres*; and in order to assure a sufficient supply of wood for fuel, the fief of Saint Etienne was in addition ceded to the company. The forges were now skilfully worked, and competent managers brought out from France; but from want of capital and other causes the company did not prosper, and their operations were discontinued. In 1740 the charter was abandoned, and in 1743 the forges reverted to the royal domain. Good and experienced workmen were sent out from France, and the forges were successfully carried on. With some intervals of discontinuance, they were worked for a century and a half until 1883.*

The attention of the government was not alone confined to the iron deposits of Three Rivers. Hocquart obtained authority to investigate the mines throughout the territory. Two German metallurgists, father and son, named Foster, came to Canada and gave favourable accounts of the copper at lake Superior. From the days of Talon, the presence of this metal was known; even Champlain was aware of its existence.† Copper was also reported to have been found at lake Nipissing and on the Ottawa. At the bay of Saint Paul there were deposits of lead and silver. The attempt was made by the *cure* of Terrebonne, M. le Page, to work the iron available at that place: he received instructions to dis-

* Kalm relates that he visited Three Rivers on the 3rd of August, 1749. After describing the forges, he adds, "that there are here many officers and overseers, who have very good houses built on purpose for them. It is agreed on all hands that the revenues of the iron works do not pay the expenses which the king must every year be at, in maintaining them. They lay the fault on the bad state of population, and say that the few inhabitants in the country have enough to do with agriculture, and that it, therefore, costs great trouble and large sums to get a sufficient number of workmen. But, however plausible this may appear, it is yet surprising that the king should be a loser in carrying on this work, for the ore is easily broken, very near the iron works and very fusible. The iron is good and can be very conveniently dispersed over the country. These are, moreover, the only iron works in the country, from which everybody must supply himself with iron tools and what other iron he wants. But the officers and servants belonging to the iron works appear to be in very affluent circumstances." Vol. III., pp. 87, 89.

† Ante Vol. I., p. 34.

continue his efforts. Whether Hocquart considered that Canada could not support two iron works, or the influence of the company directing the Three Rivers forges led to the injunction, it is difficult to say. As it was felt that M. le Page had been treated somewhat harshly, he was ordered to furnish to the government some oak plank for shipping.

Exportations were likewise made of turpentine, tar and oak and spruce plank. The *habitants* were encouraged to grow tobacco. In 1739, Hocquart sent to France examples of the produce of the country. He made a collection of plants to shew the *flora* of Canada, adding examples of the different species of grain, with acorns to determine the quality of the oak, and nuts of the several trees producing them. He included specimens of copper and lead; likewise manufactured glue and isinglass.

An attempt was also made to induce the youth to devote themselves to higher education. Hitherto such pursuits had been confined to ecclesiastical students. The course of study was now extended. That the leading personages of the colony could read and write with correctness, their correspondence proves. There was, however, no taste for letters, and their knowledge was neither wide nor varied. The youth of the higher class looked forward to a life of adventure, to serve as soldiers, or to abandon the quiet existence of the towns for Acadia, or the country beyond the lakes. There was no printing press in Canada.* Printing was only introduced after the conquest in 1764. But during the quarter of a century of peace, the desire had grown up of a more quiet career in other directions. Adventure was taking the form of trade, and although the possibility of war was everywhere conceded, there was not immediate requirement for those qualities of patient endurance and that undaunted spirit

* On this point Kalm speaks plainly: "There is no printing press in Canada, though there formerly was one, but all the books are brought from France, and all the orders made in the country are written, which extends even to the paper currency. They pretend that the press is not yet introduced here lest it should be the means of propagating libels against the government and religion. But the true reason seems to ly [*sic*] in the pooriness of the country, as no printer could

which the French Canadians invariably manifested in their long, exacting expeditions of winter. De Beauharnois both saw and regretted their deficiencies in the point of education, and he suggested to M. Le Verrier, of the seminary, to give public lectures on civil law. Two students only profited by the opportunity. De Beauharnois complained that the young men were disinclined to study and disliked sedentary pursuits. The fact may be explained by the slight rewards attainable in civil positions, which offered little attraction from the limited opportunity of distinction they presented. The majority preferred the excitement of the life of the *voyageur* and the risks and profits of trade, being assured that in time of war their services would be necessary, and that a reputation for gallantry would bring distinction: likewise, for the time they obtained the means of living in ease and plenty. De Beauharnois pointed out the difference between the youth of the West Indies and that of Canada. Between the two there was a diversity both in the manner of life and of circumstance. In the West Indies men of good family generally inherited a patrimony, and their desire was to obtain honours. In Canada, in the same class, there was indigence on all sides, and the effort was to rise above these depressing influences, and to gain the livelihood which was obtainable. This embarrassing condition was increased by the large families which were everywhere to be met in Canada, leading to great division of property, so that the choice of a career was often difficult.

There was not always the possibility of finding competent schoolmasters in the parishes. To supply the defect, in 1737,

put off a sufficient number of books for his subsistence; and another reason may be that France may have the profit arising from the exportation of books hither."

Kalm's travels, 21st August, 1749, Vol. III., p. 183.

The *Quebec Gazette*, the first number of which was published the 21st of June, 1764, is generally considered to be the introduction of printing into Canada.

The first book published in Canada is believed to be *Catéchisme du Diocèse de Sens*, imprimé à Québec, chez Brown et Gilmour 1765.

The first book published in Montreal is supposed to be *Règlement de la confrérie de l'Adoration Perpétuelle du Saint Sacrement et de la Bonne Mort*, chez F. Mesplet et C. Berger, Montreal, 1776.

two christian brothers came to Canada to establish a union with the *frères hospitaliers* and to form one system of schools, but the connection was soon set aside.

In 1741, M. de Pontbriant arrived, the last bishop appointed under French rule. He came at a period when the country was unsettled, looking forward to war shortly breaking out. The establishment of the English at Oswego, and the presence of the French at Crown Point, threatened serious complications, and it therefore became important to determine on which side the Indians would range themselves. Generally, the tribes to the north-west and west of the lakes were in the French interest. Some doubt began to be felt regarding the loyalty of the Sault Indians; considered as a whole, the tribes hitherto attached to the French could still be relied upon by them.

During the period that Lydius was in Montreal he had accused the jesuits of being connected with the Albany trade, and the charge attracted attention. A store had been opened by two *demoiselles* Desaunier, at Caughnawaga, ostensibly to sell necessaries to the Indians. This arrangement was looked upon by the agents of the company as an infringement of its rights. They went so far as to say that the peltry given by the Indians to this establishment found its way to Albany; a commerce which the jesuits were accused of favouring in order to profit by it. The store was eventually closed, but the supposed relations of the Sault Indians with Albany caused uneasiness. Those of the Two Mountains had also shewn some restlessness, and on one occasion a chief in a fit of passion threw his king's medal on the ground. Every exertion was consequently made, to retain these two Indian settlements firm in their sentiment of French feeling.

Although the wars preceding the treaty of Utrecht had been followed by thirty years of peace, the horizon had at intervals portended impending storms, and more than once Europe had appeared on the verge of a convulsion. The quarrel between France and Spain, and the attempt of Spain upon Naples, were of this threatening character, but the influence

of Walpole in England, in unison with that of Dubois, and subsequently of Fleury in France, was the means of the danger being averted. The death of Charles VI. in 1741 precipitated the crisis. The last years of his life had been passed in endeavouring to obtain from the reigning monarchs a guarantee, known as the pragmatic sanction, for the succession of his daughter Maria Theresa. A claimant, however, rose up in the person of the elector of Bavaria, as inheriting from the emperor Ferdinand the first: a pretension which in a great degree may be attributed to the supposed weakness of the young queen of Hungary.

Sir Robert Walpole still remained in power, but his influence was passing away. A few months only were to elapse before his resignation,* after an almost uninterrupted lease of power for thirty years. His majority had been a matter of purchase; the immense expenditure of secret service money can be explained in no other way. Members at the close of the session regularly received the allowance for the votes they gave, and for the time he was supreme in parliament, in spite of the violent opposition of an active minority.

At the death of the regent in France, peace had been seriously threatened. The young king had been betrothed to the infanta of Spain, then four years old. The duc de Bourbon coming to power, broke off the marriage, and the infanta was sent back to Spain. The consequence was enmity to France, and Europe witnessed the strange spectacle of the two old enemies, the emperor and the king of Spain, becoming allies. In 1725 an alliance was formed between them. Spain accepted the pragmatic sanction as the law of ascent to the imperial throne, and recognised the Ostend East India company, which the emperor was desirous of establishing in rivalry to the companies of England and Holland. Among the other conditions entered into, Austria was to render assistance to Spain, to expel the English from Gibraltar and Minorca, and on religious grounds there was to be a crusade, to drive the Hanoverian family, as protestants, from the British throne. Russia also joined the alliance.

* 31 January, 1742.

The consequence of this coalition was the treaty of Hanover in 1725 between Great Britain, France, and Prussia. The latter soon seceded to take the opposite side: but Holland, Sweden, and Denmark became parties to the treaty. A force of Swedes, Danes, and Hessians, to the extent of 44,000 men, was subsidized, for which payment was made by France and England. England, on her own part, paid the expense of 12,000 additional men. Walpole was opposed to the treaty, which had been negotiated by Townsend and the king independently of parliament. It was unpopular in England, from the circumstance that it took the side of France against the emperor, hitherto held in regard as the ancient ally of England, and as one of the main impediments against the encroachments of French ambition. On the other hand, the alliance of the emperor with Spain was one fraught with danger. In such trying emergencies Walpole never rose to the height of encountering the storm, and he shewed the narrowness of his mind outside political intrigue. Spain having in vain demanded the restitution of Gibraltar, commenced an attack on the fortress. Philip offered the command to de Villadarias, a distinguished soldier. Seeing that it was indispensable for the attacking force to be masters of the sea, and that Philip would send no ships, Villadarias declined the command. The expedition was entrusted to the conde de Las Torres, who commenced operations in February, 1727. The so-called siege only led to the destruction of the besiegers: in four months the Spanish army had dwindled to half its numbers from death, desertion, and sickness, and the attack was abandoned.

Walpole did not declare war against Spain: his temporizing character was constitutionally unequal to any decided action. His known hesitation in such cases encouraged aggression on the part of foreign powers. Although peace nominally prevailed, he sent a fleet to blockade the Spanish galleons in Porto Bello. The admiral, however, had strict orders not to attack the Spaniards unless they sailed out of the port. The English sailors died by hundreds. The death

of the English admiral, Hozier, has been attributed as much to disappointment and a broken heart as to sickness.*

It was in the midst of these hostilities during October, 1740, that Charles VI. died. Fleury, in his eighty-seventh year, was still at the head of affairs in France, and France had been one to guarantee the pragmatic sanction. It was marshal de Belleisle who saw the opportunity of inflicting a blow on an ancient foe; and thus France was ranged among the enemies of Maria Theresa. The young queen was sustained only by Great Britain and Holland. Frederick of Prussia, considering the opportunity for aggrandizement too favourable to be allowed to pass, immediately commenced hostilities and seized Silesia.

When the British parliament met, a subsidy of three hundred thousand pounds was granted to Maria Theresa. George II. left for Hanover. Finding that the French army had passed the Meuse and was threatening the capital of his electorate, one of his first acts, without consulting his ministers, was to enter into a treaty of neutrality for a year.

The new election for parliament took place towards the end of 1741: the result was inimical to Walpole, and not long afterwards he resigned to become earl of Orford. Towards the close of 1742 the forces of Maria Theresa so far prevailed that peace was concluded between her and the king of Prussia. The continental hostilities had in the meantime drawn Great Britain and France into the struggle, so that in 1743 the

* Glover's ballad of "Admiral Hozier's Ghost" is the imperishable record of this disastrous expedition. It was written in 1740, after the attack of Admiral Vernon on Porto Bello. Few appeals to national sentiment have ever awakened more powerful feelings of indignation.

The concluding stanza is—

"O'er these waves for ever mourning,
Shall we roam deprived of rest,
If to Britain's shores returning
You neglect my just request?
After this proud foe subduing,
When your patriot friends you see,
Think on vengeance for my ruin,
And for England shamed in me."

armies came face to face at the battle of Dettingen. The English were victorious in the sense of escaping a serious danger, and by the consequent retreat of the French. This action without influence on events, had the important consequences of commencing the condition of positive hostility between the two countries, without any declaration of war, and of causing on the American continent the expectation of immediate active operations.

I have felt it my duty to narrate at some length the events which preceded this war, for in other respects there was no positive cause of quarrel between the two countries. The disputes regarding boundaries had not taken the dimensions they subsequently attained ; and however serious the complications in Acadia, and with regard to the eastern coast of the continent, the irritation had been purely local. De Vaudreuil, and to some extent de Beauharnois, had endeavoured to embroil the two governments. But the court of France however willing to profit by intrigue in the encouragement of Indian attack, absolutely refused to listen to their recommendations, that the Abenakis should be sustained by force of arms. The prevalent desire of both governments had been to maintain peace, and their subsequent antagonism may be traced to their continental alliances and treaties.

The war which broke out after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had its origin to a great extent in the dispute of boundary. Had statesmanship in this respect been shewn by the ministers of George the first, the demarkation of the limit of New England and Nova Scotia could have been established with no great effort of diplomacy. The boundaries to the west involved the connection between Canada and Louisiana, and were not so simple a matter. The French put forth the claim to the valley of the Ohio as tributary to the discovery of the Mississippi; while the English provinces of Pennsylvania and Virginia advanced their pretensions to the territory as a field for the trapper and pioneer. There was never any well-directed attempt to accommodate these antagonistic pretensions, although the consequences of failing to adjust

them must have been foreseen. The temporizing policy of the English ministry and the want of energy and determination on the part of the colonies, had their influence in encouraging de la Galissonnière to endeavour to take possession of the valley of the Ohio.

I have endeavoured to shew in the narrative of the events in Nova Scotia the extent to which that colony was neglected, when a moderate expenditure and some firmness towards the Acadians would have prevented much calamity. The garrison continued unprovided and uncared for, and American affairs were left to adjust themselves. The blessings of peace must always be rightly estimated by all who have sense and feeling. There is, however, a policy which, while it is conceived in the interests of peace, tends directly to the contrary result. Any departure from the true sense of national dignity, as it were, courts aggression. The indifference of Stanhope to the provisions of the treaty of Utrecht in America encouraged the violation of them. No attempt in the first instance being made for their enforcement, the settlement of any subsequent controversy regarding these conditions became more difficult. Walpole's vacillating policy with regard to Spain only made that power more exacting and insolent in her pretensions as to the right of search. In consequence a feeling of indignation was awakened in England, which ended in the declaration of war in 1739 by the British parliament against Spain.

It might be imagined that the battle of Dettingen * would in itself have been looked upon as a condition of war. Whether it was hoped that peace might still be maintained, or whatever the cause, war was not declared by France until nine months later.† The motives assigned were the violation of the treaty of Hanover, the piracies of the English vessels of war, the threatening attitude of the fleet, and the blockade of Toulon. Great Britain did not make the declaration until twenty-seven days later.‡

* 27 June, 1743.

† 15 March, 1744.

‡ 11 April, 1744, N.S.

But France had in no way been idle. The cause of the pretender once more came into prominence, and the prospect of an invasion alarmed the public mind in England. The laws against the English Roman catholics and non-jurors were enforced. The coast to some extent was fortified. Although Walpole was no longer in power, his policy of avoiding and not meeting a difficulty, still animated the government. Lord Wilmington, recollected only in history by his utter incompetency, was first lord of the treasury. He had been suggested for the position by Pulteney, in the spirit of compromise. Some languid effort to meet the emergency was shewn in the equipment of some cruisers for the protection of commerce against France and Spain. The opposition gave no support to the government in the crisis, and in no way relaxed its attacks on the ministry: one of the principal attempts being to obtain the impeachment of Walpole.

In 1743, Wilmington died and Henry Pelham became prime minister, to hold the office for the next eleven years, among the most dreary and the least satisfactory periods of modern British history.

The alarm of an invasion to sustain the jacobite cause was not groundless. During January, 1744, 15,000 troops were brought together at Dunkirk, under marshal de Saxe. Transports for carrying them were obtained, and eighteen sail of the lines were collected at Rochefort and Brest. The English fleet of twenty-one ships under sir John Norris, in order to intercept the expedition, sailed to the Downs, where he was joined by more vessels. In the meanwhile de Roquefeuille, the French admiral, having united the two fleets, sailed towards the English coast. Seeing no ships at Spithead, he thought the landing of the troops feasible, and sent word to Dunkirk for the embarkation to take place, when 7,000 troops were placed on shipboard. De Roquefeuille proceeded easterly in his voyage, and reached Dungeness, the entrance to the straits of Dover. Here he met the English fleet, under sir John Norris, which was superior to that of the French, and

an attack must have resulted in its destruction. Sir John Norris is remembered as a good officer, but he partook of the irresolution which had arisen through the chilling influence of Walpole. His duty was at once to have assailed the French. It was subsequently stated that owing to the condition of the tide and the approach of night he considered immediate attack unadvisable, and the action was deferred until morning. But the French, seeing the superiority against them, sailed away in the night to find refuge in the harbours on their coast. A tempest on the following day made pursuit impossible. Although de Roquefeuille's vessels escaped, many were greatly damaged. In accordance with the direction of the French admiral, the transports left Dunkirk only to experience the storm. The wind blew directly from the north on these vessels, and some of the largest of them with all on board were lost; others were wrecked on the coast. Those that remained regained the harbour much shattered. The young pretender endeavoured to re-establish the expedition, but marshal de Saxe was appointed to the command in Flanders, and the troops were removed.

It was not the only occasion when the navy failed to maintain its ancient renown. The French and Spanish fleets were blockaded at Toulon, by an English fleet of more vessels and heavier metal. The French having received an order to risk an engagement, the ships left their moorings to force their way out of port. There was a deadly quarrel in the English fleet between Mathews, the admiral, and Lestock, second in command. On the first day Mathews bore down on the Spanish line; great damage was done to the Spanish ships, and the combined fleets retired in disorder; but Mathews complained that he was unsustained by Lestock. The ships were pursued by Lestock, and he was about to engage when the order was given to cease pursuit, Lestock was placed under arrest, and sent a prisoner to England. But Mathews was called upon to defend himself. After a tedious investigation, Lestock was acquitted, and Mathews declared incapable of serving his majesty.

These facts are worthy of record to show how the military spirit had degenerated under Walpole's government. To some extent it may be traced to the indifference of the nation personally towards the sovereign. The allegiance to the first monarchs of the house of Hanover must be attributed to the strong protestant feeling generally prevalent, and dread of the return of the days of the Stuarts. The partial successes of the pretender in 1745 is a proof of the inferiority of the men in command, and of the absence in the hour of trial of those great qualities which command success. This apathy and incompetence have the more to be brought into prominence as we have in the following chapters to narrate the wonderful success of the British arms. The change in the national spirit is traceable to the genius of one man: Chatham. No student of his political life can say that it was free from blemishes. In his later years, after the peace of Paris, and during the United States wars of independence, many of his utterances cannot be read with satisfaction, and it is clear that he misunderstood much on which he declaimed. This, however, is not the time to speak of his shortcomings in these respects. That which does entitle his name to undying national gratitude is, that by the force of his genius he raised the spirit of the English people to the highest point of heroism. He was among the first to open the paths of distinction to merit and to worth. He, as it were, created the standard of what in the hour of emergency can be called forth in a nation, a sentiment which has lasted to this hour, still to be appealed to, and with every honourable chivalrous nature to endure for ever. In vain, during his period of power, do we look for the miserable vacillation which preceded it. It is for the reason that Chatham's influence may be truly judged, that I have felt it necessary to include much in the above narrative, which, it has been by no means a pleasurable duty to record.

De Beauharnois foresaw that hostilities could not be avoided, and he took what precaution was in his power to assure the safety of the outer garrisons. Crown Point was revictualled and reinforced. Niagara placed in as good condition as

possible. Cataragui was put in an efficient state of defence. There were at this time in Canada 600 regular troops, with 15,000 Canadian militia available. Of the Indians who could take the field, there were the christian Iroquois of the Sault and lake of the Two Mountains; about 400 in number. There were 700 Abenakis to distress the enemy on the frontiers of New England and to join in the operations in Canada. In the spring of 1744 news of the declaration of war was received.

The intelligence reached Boston in the first days of June; it was, however, earlier known at Cape Breton. Duquesnel, who was in command, lost no time in acting upon his information. He sent an expedition under Duvivier against Canso. The place was held by a garrison of eighty men, under captain Patrick Heron of Philipps' regiment. It was surrendered on the 24th of May, 1744, on condition that the garrison at the end of a year should be sent to New England.* A small British vessel, the "May," was also taken. A blockhouse had been constructed at this place for the protection of the fishermen, and some inhabitants had established themselves there to minister to their wants. They were all sent to Louisbourg as prisoners of war and the place burned.†

Duvivier after his operations at Canso, proceeded to carry out the project entrusted to him, the conquest of Acadia. In the commencement of August, he advanced towards Annapolis. Several Acadians gave assistance in furnishing provisions and in other respects, so that Duvivier entertained the hope that he would be joined by the whole population. In the absence of Philipps, Mascarene was the senior member of the council and was administering the government.

* Quebec Doc. IV., p. 201.

† Mascarene described Canso on the 1st of December, 1743, as follows. Canso "has no other defence than a Blockhouse built of Timber, by the Contribution of the Fishermen who resort there and a few inhabitants settled in that place, for the repairs of which the officers have often been obliged to contribute, as well as to those of the Huts in which the soldiers are quartered. It cannot therefore be expected that that place can make any considerable resistance against the force the people of Cape Breton may bring against it." Nova Scotia Archives, p. 129.

He had reported the condition of the fort at Annapolis,* "as built of earth of a sandy nature, apt to tumble down in heavy rains or thaws after frosty weather." The fort had been "patched up" by a revetment of timber. There had been a proposal to construct the fort with brick and stone, but nothing had been attempted beyond providing some material.

At this date, we first hear of Joseph Louis Le Loutre, a Roman catholic priest, the most bitter and unscrupulous opponent of the efforts to bring the Acadians under British rule.† His name will frequently appear in the following narrative. He possessed fair abilities, and the strength of nerve to shrink from no trick, no crime, no artifice, no falsehood; but he had the fault often accompanying such natures; physically, he was a coward. He could bewilder and threaten with the terrors of his church the ignorant Acadians, whom he misled. In the hour of trial, he was the first to run from the danger, into which he led those who had blindly trusted him. Writers who sympathize with the cause he embraced, abandon his defence. After the reverses in Acadia, he was received only with reproaches and condemnation by the dignitaries of the church which he brought into discredit, and he passed the last years of his life in dishonoured obscurity.

Le Loutre was a Frenchman by birth, and was sent out to Acadia as a missionary to the Micmacs. On his arrival, he called on Mascarene and succeeded in creating a favourable impression; for the commandant, although a Huguenot, in some respects remained a Frenchman. Le Loutre's manners were agreeable and he promised to confine himself to his religious ministrations, and to exercise his influence wisely and beneficently. In the first days of January, 1741, Mascarene wrote to Le Loutre, wishing him a happy new year, which he did willingly, from the esteem which owing to the conversation

* Nov. Sco. Archives, p. 129.

† "Personne ne fut plus propre à porter la division et la désolation dans un pays; ce fut sur ce pied-là du moins qu'il se fit connaître." *Memoirs du S. de C. contenant l'histoire de la guerre*, published by the historical society of Quebec. p. 2.

between them, he had formed for him. Le Loutre had represented himself as the apostle of peace and order, as being "desirous of keeping the people in that submission they owe to the government to which they have sworn allegiance, and under which they enjoy their possessions and the free exercise of their religion."

With this confidence in Le Loutre, Mascarene appealed to his influence to obtain restitution of property taken in the pillage of a sloop. Le Loutre was *cure* of Messaguash,* at Beaubassin; as late as March, 1744, Mascarene wrote to Le Loutre, telling him of his proclamation against selling liquor to the Indians, feeling certain that the priest could aid in establishing peace, law, and justice.

In June news reached Annapolis of the declaration of war, and a proclamation was issued forbidding intercourse with the enemy. In May the garrison had been alarmed by the report that five hundred French and Indians were up the river. The inhabitants of Annapolis took refuge in the fort. Fortunately the report was without foundation. The defenceless condition of the place led many families to abandon it, and on the arrival of a vessel from Massachusetts several left the settlement. There, however, remained about seventy women and children.

On Mascarene proceeding to place the fort in a state of defence, several of the French Acadians not only furnished material, but aided in the labour of putting it in position. The works were being satisfactorily carried on, when, on the 12th of July, they were interrupted by three hundred Micmac and Malecites Indians, who attempted to force their way into the fort. It was said that they were incited to the attack by the exhortations of Le Loutre, and that it was he who directed their operations. There were not above one hundred effective men in the garrison, which number included several artificers, some from England, others sent from Massachusetts. A few of the latter declared that they came to work, and not to fight. On the whole, however, they joined in the defence, and the

* Fort Lawrence was between the rivers Blanche and Messaguash.

assailants were beaten off. In a few days a reinforcement of seventy men arrived from Massachusetts. The Indians, easily discouraged when failing in any enterprise, abandoned all hope of success, and returned to Mines, where they remained waiting for troops from Louisbourg. Subsequently, forty men with some officers joined the garrison. They were armed by Mascarene, and he had scarcely established them in temporary barracks when the news was brought that a body of troops from Louisbourg was within eight miles of the place.

Towards the end of August, this force, which consisted of sixty regular troops and sever hundred militia and Indians, landed at Chignecto, and passing through Mines marched by land to Annapolis. After waiting two days to allow the men to recover from their fatigue, an advance was made against the fort.

The history of Canada shews that until the days of Montcalm the expeditions from Quebec and Montreal were those known as "*la petite guerre*."* A select body of men, under a bold and enterprising leader, attacked a settlement or a locality, committed havoc and damage according to the power he possessed, and rapidly retreated. The one condition of success was surprise; it was a war not only against the defenders of the place, but against women and children, who were carried away as prisoners, and mostly given to the Indians as their share of the booty. Fortitude, courage and endurance were shown by the assailants in these trying circumstances, but what in modern language is called military skill and combination, are in no instance apparent. The expedition against Fort Annapolis was of this character. The troops were without artillery and could not reply to the guns of the fort; their attacks were accordingly made by night and proved exceedingly harassing to the garrison, for it kept them constantly on the alert, and deprived them of sleep.

After some days of this warfare, Duvivier sent his brother with a letter to the effect that the French were expecting the

* The expression is untranslatable. It may perhaps be rendered "petty warfare."

arrival of three ships of war of seventy, sixty, and forty guns with two hundred and fifty soldiers, and calling for a surrender of the place; at the same time he strongly assured the defenders that he had force sufficient to storm it. The reply of Mascarene was that he would send his answer on the following morning. The letter was duly written and despatched, to the effect that the garrison was not reduced to the strait of having to surrender, and that it would be time to consider the question when the fleet was in the basin. Upon its receipt, Duvivier sent his brother to propose a truce, and to ask for the conditional capitulation of the garrison. On the officers being called together, with some exceptions they expressed themselves by no means disinclined to accept Duvivier's offer. Dissatisfied with the condition in which they had been left and the imperfect means of resistance which the fort possessed, they looked upon themselves as abandoned, and were losing heart in the contest. So strongly was the opinion manifested, that Mascarene felt unable to combat it, and three officers were selected to meet Duvivier and hear what terms he would grant. They returned with some articles in writing, sufficiently liberal, the capitulation not to be made good until the arrival of the French fleet, and likewise to be void should aid reach the garrison. Mascarene was earnestly appealed to by his officers to sign it. He, however, refused to do so, telling them that if they saw fit, they could place their signatures to the document as the basis of further preliminaries. Duvivier declined to conduct negotiations in such a form, and demanded that the conditions should be signed by the commander. Producing other articles of capitulation, he asked the officers to submit them to Mascarene for his signature. The officers refused to be the bearers of such proposals. Duvivier accordingly notified them, that the truce must cease at twelve o'clock on the following day, unless the conditions were accepted.

On hearing the turn affairs had taken, Mascarene had no difficulty in making his officers understand that Duvivier's intention had been to create division in the garrison and

impair its discipline. The men, who had heard of the negotiations and had shewn some uneasiness on the subject, answered the notification of the termination of the truce by three stout cheers. The narrative does not present the officers of the garrison in a favourable light; but those who took part in the negotiations were depressed by the neglect which they had experienced, and were abandoning hope for the future. It was fortunate that the commandant Mascarene was not only a man of courage and determination, but likewise that he possessed the tact and energy to restore the cheerfulness and spirit of his garrison, for them to persevere in the defence with renewed courage.

The attack on the fort was accordingly recommenced; the night skirmishing was resumed to weary out the garrison. Finding that he could make no impression on the works, on the 6th of October, (N.S.) Duvivier abandoned the siege and returned to Mines. Shortly after, he left for Louisbourg.*

After his departure the deputies of Annapolis and Mines appeared at the fort and declared that they had refused to take any part in the expedition: and a proclamation of Duvivier† is extant, in which he called upon the Acadians to join him. The main cause of the abandonment of his operations was the non-appearance of the ships in Annapolis basin, which Duquesnel had promised should be present. The British cruisers in front of Louisbourg had prevented them leaving port. Duvivier had accordingly written to Louisbourg, stating that it was impossible to take Port Royal without the co-operation of the vessels, whereupon M. de Gaune was sent to assume the command, with instructions to pass the winter at Mines.

* Duvivier was the son of a French officer, and held the rank of "*enseigne de vaisseau et capitaine*." He married under peculiar circumstances in 1708, Marie de Pomboncoup; her mother was Anne, daughter of Charles de la Tour, who established himself in Acadia in the early days of settlement. [Ante Vol. II., p. 173.] In 1735, Duvivier drew up a *mémoire* in which he undertook, with one hundred men, and with arms to distribute to the inhabitants, he would make a conquest of the country. The *mémoire* is given by Mr. Murdock. Vol. I., p. 509.

† 27 August.

De Gaune on his arrival was waited upon by some of the inhabitants, who stated that the amount of provisions required by him could not be furnished. The hope was also expressed that they and their families would not be plunged in total ruin, and asking that the troops and Indians should be withdrawn from the district. The petition concluded with these remarkable words: "We live under a mild and tranquil government, and we have good reason to be faithful to it. We hope, therefore, that you will not separate us from it, and that you will grant us the favour not to plunge us into utter misery."*

Such was the language used by the Acadians in 1744. They shewed no disposition to aid the French of Cape Breton in their attempt upon the country. The government of Mascarene was popular. If the Acadians unfavourably regarded him in the matter of religion, he was nevertheless one of their race, and the courtesy of his manner, and the liberal treatment of the Acadians by the government, must have satisfied them that they could not look elsewhere for any improvement of their condition. The successful operations against Louisbourg in the following year must have affirmed their belief in the possession of the country by the British, and have quieted all aspirations of the disaffected. It was not until the beginning of the war in 1755 that the Acadians of that date became violent opponents and active enemies of British rule. Their passions had some years previously been excited by the exhortations and appeals of the missionaries on the foundation of Halifax in 1749. It was from this event that their hatred and their unceasing hostility may in a great degree be traced, which, called into being and nurtured by their priests, after circumstances affirmed and intensified.

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 135. Mines, October 10, 1744.

CHAPTER IV.

Early in January, 1745, a force of one hundred and twenty Canadians with four hundred Abenakis and Hurons left Canada to assist in the operations in Acadia. There was, however, no occasion for their services, and events were shaping themselves that this force was to be required for the defence of Louisbourg, not for an attack of Acadia.

The prisoners taken at the surrender of Canso had, in October, 1744, been sent from Louisbourg to Boston, consequently they were able to speak of the condition of the fortress and its weakness in many respects. Louisbourg had been a constant source of dread to New England commerce owing to the privateers which found refuge in the harbour; consequently any information regarding this fortress was a matter of interest in Massachusetts. Privateering was followed as a business by many in Massachusetts and Rhode Island; and whatever its success in the neighbouring seas, in a national point of view it could not be set against the injury done by the French cruisers, which made the calling of the New England fishermen impossible.

The Governor of Massachusetts was William Shirley, by profession a lawyer, who had been appointed to the office in 1740 on the recall of Belcher. He possessed enterprise and energy, and was peculiarly alive to any influence by which the province was in any way affected. The reports, therefore, which reached him obtained his earnest attention. The prisoners during their stay at Louisbourg had not failed to observe the discontent and the bad discipline of the garrison. The men who worked at the fortifications had threatened to mutiny, from dissatisfaction with the extra pay which they received, being less than had been promised. The garrison consisted of 1,300 men: the commandant was Duchambon,

the *commissaire ordonnateur* was Bigot, whose memory has obtained such unhappy notoriety in the history of Canada.

The returned prisoners had formed the opinion that the place, with no great difficulty could be taken. Many Massachusetts mariners had made frequent voyages to Cape Breton, and had obtained a fair knowledge of the harbour and its approaches. The fortress was on the point of land forming the western protection of the harbour, entirely surrounded by fortifications from 30 to 36 feet high, with a ditch of 80 feet wide. The western batteries covered the low marshy ground by which any approaches must be made. There were 164 guns on the walls, including 7 mortars and 20 cohorns, besides a battery on an island commanding the mouth of the harbour, mounted with 32 heavy 42-pounders.

The very idea of attacking this fortress partakes of the character of genius, and to this day the narrative is recorded by the historians of Massachusetts with commendable pride. By the magnitude of the effort we may judge the disastrous influence which Cape Breton exercised over the interests of New England. The French cruisers were not only able to destroy the fisheries and to cause losses to commerce, but the territory of Massachusetts likewise lay open to attack and invasion. There was, consequently, a predisposition to believe in the feasibility of an attack upon Louisbourg: it was moreover evident to those who entertained the project, that in order to succeed, it had to be undertaken without delay, and before the garrison could be strengthened.

Bent on the enterprise, Shirley addressed the government in London, pointing out that an attack on Nova Scotia might be looked for in the ensuing spring, and he asked for a naval force to be sent for its protection. These letters were entrusted to a captain Ryal, who, having been a prisoner at Louisbourg, could personally give explanations regarding the fortress; and the messenger was doubtless well selected.

On the receipt in London of the letters from Boston, early in January, 1745, orders were sent to the naval officer in command of the fleet in the West Indies, commodore Warren,

to sail to the northern Atlantic with a force of sufficient strength to protect the colonies, and to cope with the enemy. He was likewise instructed to co-operate with governor Shirley. The latter was directed to act with Warren, and to furnish transports, men and provisions; the orders to Shirley were enclosed to Warren.

About the same date in January, Shirley, in a message to both houses of Massachusetts, then in session, called upon the members to take an oath of secrecy with regard to an important matter, which he had to submit: an enterprise against Louisbourg. The first vote of the legislature was against undertaking the expedition, but the merchants of Boston, Salem, and Marblehead petitioned for its re-consideration. The matter again came up on the 26th of January (O.S.), when the project of attack was carried by a majority of one. The amount of troops to be raised was estimated at 4,000. Of this number Connecticut agreed to furnish 500, New Hampshire 300, Rhode Island 300. The contingent of Massachusetts was accordingly 2,900.

An application was made to New York for aid. Clinton, then governor, called the assembly together, but there was delay in meeting. After twelve days' deliberation the members could come to no conclusion. They voted no men, but on a representation being made that the expedition was deficient in supplies, the sum of £5,000 was granted for the service. Clinton set on foot a subscription, which reached £2,000: the amount was immediately expended in provisions, which were forwarded to Boston; ten 18-pound guns with their carriages were likewise sent. Clinton at his own expense contributed gunpowder, with clothing and bedding for the troops. Such was the support given by New York to this celebrated expedition.* The Rhode Island contingent was late in arriving; accordingly it took no part in the operations.

Massachusetts acted with wonderful vigour in carrying out the preparations for the undertaking. In seven weeks from the passage of the vote and the proclamation of the governor

* N.Y. Doc., VI., pp. 280-284, 287-306.

the transports were provided, the guns and stores embarked, the troops assembled, formed into regiments, and held in readiness to sail. The naval force consisted of thirteen ships. Two furnished by Connecticut, of sixteen guns ; two by New Hampshire, of fourteen guns ; one by Rhode Island, of twenty guns ; Massachusetts furnished eight vessels, three of twenty guns ; two, sixteen guns ; one, twelve guns ; two, three guns.

The commander-in-chief, Mr. William Pepperell, of Kittery, was born in New England of a family originally from Devonshire. He was in his forty-ninth year, a colonel of militia. The second in command was Mr. Walcott, of Connecticut. Mr. Waldo, a member of the Massachusetts assembly, a colonel in the militia, received the appointment of brigadier, and was third in command.

When the resolution had been formed to persevere in the undertaking, a vessel was despatched to Antigua to commodore Warren, asking him to co-operate with his fleet. His answer might have been looked for, that having no orders to join in such an enterprise, he was unable to take any action, the expedition having been determined upon without receiving his majesty's approbation. The boat returned with this reply the day before the sailing of the fleet from Boston. Shirley communicated it to no one except to Pepperell and Waldo. No change was made in the orders given. The vessels left Boston on the 24th of March, and arrived at Canso, the place named as the rendezvous, on the 4th of April. The force remained at this spot three weeks, and utilized the time by rebuilding the blockhouse in which a garrison of eighty men was placed, and mounting it with eight cannon. During the three weeks the men remained at Canso they were drilled, while the vessels cruised in the neighbouring waters. On the 16th, the capture was made of a brigantine from Martinique, with a valuable West Indian cargo. Two days later an attempt was made to take "la Renommée" of thirty guns, but being a quick sailer she escaped.*

Some modern writers have assigned the cause of the delay

* Hutchinson II., p. 414.

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at Canso to the ice adhering to the shores of Gabarus bay where the landing was to be made, so that it was not practicable. The greater probability is that the absence of the English fleet paralyzed all action on the part of the leaders. Their naval force was unable to cope with that of France, and without command of the sea, difficulties innumerable presented themselves in any attack by land. The probability is, that had the fleet not arrived some expedient would have been found for not proceeding further with the expedition. Canso however would have been re-established, and by aid of the vessels stationed there the fisheries would have been protected.

No sooner, however, had Warren sent his reply to the request of Massachusetts than he received his orders from England by the sloop "Hind," and with his squadron sailed immediately for Boston. The letters which he received acquainted him with the nature of the duty to be performed. As he advanced towards the coast, on the 12th of April (O.S.) he learned that the fleet was at Canso. He started directly for this spot, and on the 23rd of April his four men-of-war arrived there. After a conference with Pepperell, he proceeded to cruise off Louisbourg, to prevent all intelligence reaching the fortress. When in these waters he was joined by six ships of war: three from England, and three from Newfoundland. His force now consisted of four vessels of 60 guns, one of 50 guns, five of 40 guns.

On Sunday, the 29th of April, the expedition sailed from Canso. It consisted of 4,070 men, of which 3,170 belonged to Massachusetts. Two of the small vessels were sent to bay Verte to intercept any craft carrying provisions to Louisbourg. A settlement on Saint Peter's island, near the southern entrance to the Bras d'Or was also taken possession of and the houses burned, the object being to prevent news of the expedition being carried to the fortress.

The wind was against the progress of the expedition. Some hope had been felt that the fortress could be taken by surprise. It is difficult to conceive on what ground, for the fleet

would have been seen in the offing, and some hours notice of the attack could thus have been obtained.

The fleet and transports arrived at eight o'clock in the morning of the 30th of April in Gabarus bay. The alarm was immediately given by the firing of cannon. The ships came to anchor about two miles from Flat Point cove, in itself about three miles east of Louisbourg. A feint was made of landing the troops at this point. During this time the bells were actively rung and guns fired from the fortress, and a party of one hundred and fifty men was detached to oppose the landing. The disembarkation was effected a mile and a half to the west of the spot where the first apparent attempt was made. A skirmish took place, in which some French prisoners were taken, among them the commander, M. de Boularderie. During the day two thousand of the New England forces were landed. At night the flames were visible of the houses considered to interfere with the defences and which were burned by the French: some vessels were likewise sunk for the protection of the harbour.

The following day the remainder of the force was put on shore. As it grew dusk, the New Hampshire regiment, under colonel Vaughan, made a flank march through the woods, and the troops succeeded in establishing themselves to the north of the harbour on the east of the fortress. Without opposition they burned the warehouses and other buildings, which containing pitch and tar caused a great volume of smoke, and led to a panic in the adjoining battery and its desertion by its defenders. It was taken possession of the following day, and found to be mounted with twenty-eight 42-pounders and two 18-pounders. Some shells and shot had not been removed. The powder had been thrown into a well. An attempt was made by a sortie to retake the battery, but it failed. The guns had been spiked, but they were re-drilled and turned upon the town.

The landing of the artillery and stores was difficult and dangerous from the surf rolling on the beach. There was no wharf, and the men had to wade through the sea to bring the

guns and stores to shore. This severe labour was accompanied with much personal privation. A fortnight elapsed before all the artillery was landed, when some mortars were placed about 400 yards from the town, and a battery was thrown up to the north-west of the fortress, to attack the northern defences. Sallies were made from the town to interrupt the work, but they were without effect. Owing to the somewhat imperfect defence by the fortress, it was resolved that the garrison should be summoned to surrender. The answer given was that a surrender would be made when forced by the enemy's cannon. A sortie the following day was repulsed; but a vessel from Bordeaux managed to elude the cruisers and ran the blockade.

From the dampness of the ground and the insufficient protection of their clothing, the troops suffered severely from diarrhoea, and one half the number became non-effective.

The attacking force was increased by the return of the party from Saint Peter's island; the settlement had been destroyed, the inhabitants, however, escaped. Its strength was weakened by the necessity of sending out pickets in force to meet detachments of the enemy, consisting chiefly of Indians with French leaders, who were attempting petty surprises. One of these encounters took place at Lighthouse point, in which Gorham's regiment had established a battery, in which the French were defeated. As many of the men composing these parties came from the neighbouring settlements, most of these places were attacked and burned. At Saint Anne, near the eastern entrance of Bras d'Or and at Niganish, forty houses with several small vessels were set on fire. As many as three hundred prisoners were taken.

The besiegers, nevertheless, increased their batteries, and firing was continued on both sides. On the 18th of May, the French ship of war "le Vigilant" of 64 guns and of 560 men, laden with military stores, met the "Mermaid" of 40 guns, commanded by captain Douglas. The "Mermaid" affected to sail away to escape the larger ship. "Le Vigilant" pursued and she was thus led into the snare of being surrounded.

"Le Vigilant" struck; the event took place in view of the besiegers' camp.

Contemporary writers describe the want of discipline of the troops, and the difficulty of controlling them when not at the front. In spite of their privations and dangers they retained their elasticity of spirits, and sought to relieve the tedium of camp life when not on duty, by racing and athletic games and firing at marks. The work of transporting the cannon was most laborious. The guns had to be carried over a morass with patches of rock cropping out. To endeavour to move a cannon on its wheels, was to see it sink out of sight. Cattle could not be employed to draw the guns, for they were bemired above their knees in the soft ground, and could scarcely extricate themselves. These difficulties were removed, owing to the ability of colonel Messervé, of the New Hampshire troops, who originally had been a ship carpenter. He caused wooden sleds to be constructed, sixteen feet long and five feet wide, of balks a foot thick, by means of which he was enabled to float the cannon across the morass, and with great exertion they were placed in position. The duty was performed by the men, and owing to the exposure to fire from the fortress, the labour had to be done by night, when the foggy, damp weather was trying from its penetrating cold.

The besiegers met a serious reverse on the 20th of May. A party of four hundred men in whale boats made an attack on the island battery, which, from being situate in the centre of the entrance to the harbour, gave the besiegers a great deal of trouble. The surf was high, and the landing place not known. The attacking force was repulsed with a loss of sixty killed and drowned. The bombardment from the other batteries was vigorously continued, seriously to injure the buildings and fortifications; but no practical breach had been made, whereby the place could be stormed. It was thought that the knowledge of the loss of "Le Vigilant" would have a depressing effect on the garrison, and a plan was formed in an irregular way to make known to the commandant the loss of the ship.

Reports had reached the besiegers' lines that several Eng-

lish prisoners carried within the walls had been badly treated, and a plan was based on this circumstance to convey the information to the town. The captain of "Le Vigilant" was le marquis de la Maisonforte; he was invited to visit the English ships in order to take notice of the condition of the French prisoners. On expressing himself satisfied with the treatment they were receiving, he was requested to write to the governor, stating what he had seen, and to ask on the part of the besiegers that the English prisoners confined in Louisbourg should be equally well cared for.

On the 7th of June a captain Macdonald was commissioned to carry the letter. He perfectly understood French, but he did not volunteer the information that he possessed this knowledge. The French officers spoke unreservedly before him; he thus learned that they had not previously known the loss of "le Vigilant," and that much importance was attached to the fact of her capture.

Powder with the besiegers commenced to grow short, and their fire had been somewhat slackened. The result was that the French, as if they understood the situation, frequently shewed themselves out of their casemates. The 11th of June was the birthday of George II., and it was resolved that it should be observed by a discharge of the guns of every battery at noon, the fire to be vigorously continued during the rest of the day. The "Canterbury" and "Sunderland," two ships of war, arrived with a fresh supply of powder, and there was now no occasion to be wary in its use. It was determined to make a general attack by sea and land, and vigorously to push forward the operations.

A large mortar was placed in the lighthouse battery, and its fire on the Island battery was so severe that the battery was abandoned. On the 15th of June the condition of the fortress was such, that a flag of truce was sent to the British camp to learn what terms of capitulation would be granted, and asking for a truce until the following day.

The terms proposed by the French commandant were not accepted. Pepperell and Warren on their side set forth the

conditions on which the surrender was to be made. They were accepted.

The town and fortress had greatly suffered. The guns of the circular battery had been dismantled; the west of the king's bastion was destroyed; with the exception of one house, the town was in ruins. The terms granted were, that what additional vessels were necessary to transport the garrison to France would be furnished; that the officers and inhabitants could remain in their houses and enjoy the free exercise of their religion until re-embarked for France; the non-commissioned officers and soldiers to be placed on the ships of war; that the sick and wounded should be cared for; that any persons who desired to remain unseen could leave masked; the troops to march out with arms and colours, which were then to be "delivered to commodore Warren and Mr. Pepperell," and on the arrival of the troops in France to be returned to them. The loss of the English forces during the siege is computed at 101 killed, and thirty deaths from sickness. The loss of the French is estimated at 300 men. The siege had lasted forty-nine days, and on the 17th of June the French marched out with colours flying and drums beating. Pepperell, at the head of the victorious force, entered by the south-west gate. He presided at a banquet to the officers of the expedition in honour of the victory, and every expression was given to the feeling of gratulation and joy.*

The garrison which surrendered consisted of 600 regular soldiers, there were 1,300 militia, several of whom must have been detached from Canada, and had been selected, doubtless, from having seen previous service in the expeditions to

* Among the regimental chaplains present the Rev. Mr. Moody, of York, a man advanced in years, the uncle of Mrs. Pepperell, had been called to say grace. His sermons were renowned for their length. It was expected that he might "improve the occasion" by a severe and lengthened prayer. No one, however, dared to speak to him on the subject. He had been reserved, for it took all present by surprise: "Good morning, we have so many things to thank Thee for that time will be infinitely too short to do it. We must therefore leave it for the work of eternity. Bless our food and fellowship upon this joyful occasion, for the sake of Christ our Lord. Amen."

Acadia and elsewhere. A large number had been gathered from the parishes of Cape Breton along the coast. The defence of the place had been made by about 2,500 men. The inhabitants, the non-combatants, including women and children, many evidently the families of soldiers, amounted to 2,000 souls. To this number must be added the crew of "le Vigilant," amounting to 560 men. Seventy-six cannon and mortars, with provisions for six months, fell into the captors' hands. There was not a good supply of powder; a fact to be borne in view when considering the capitulation. Accordingly, 4,130 souls were sent back to France.

A vessel was immediately despatched to Boston carrying news of the triumph. It arrived after midnight, at one a.m. on the 3rd of July. Late as the hour was and unseasonable for the transmission of news, at daybreak of this midsummer's day, when the night is the shortest during the year, every bell in Boston rang out its peal of rejoicing. It must have been a great relief to many who heard the news. The failure of Phipps, three quarters of a century previously, was a matter of history, and the story had been told at many a family gathering; even the most hopeful must often have felt how great were the chances of failure; and there could be no illusion as to the magnitude of the undertaking. The effort had arisen entirely within Massachusetts, without suggestions or orders from London; so that in the event of failure the cost would have been to a great extent thrown upon the province, to have taxed the industry of more than one generation. As it succeeded, so the credit and renown has been accepted by the children and descendants of those engaged. Their names are yet preserved, and in modern life the same christian and surnames are to be met. To this hour the ancient pride in the achievement is retained.

The French colours were kept flying on the parapets, in order to decoy French vessels. Two east Indiamen and one ship from the south seas were taken at the mouth of the harbour; the booty on this occasion is valued at £600,000. The fortress was held under the joint authority of Warren and

Pepperell. Governor Shirley, from Boston, arrived at Louisbourg on the 17th of August, and he was able to induce the New England troops to prolong their period of service. Five ships remained in the harbour for its defence, and steps were taken efficiently to garrison the fortress.

Warren was promoted to rear-admiral of the blue. Pepperell was made a baronet with the rank of colonel in the army.* Shirley obtained the same rank. Both were authorized to raise regiments to be on the roll of the regular army. Shirley's regiment was afterwards known as the 50th of the line, now the Queen's Own Royal West Kent. Pepperell's regiment was the 51st, now the South Yorkshire regiment.

Three years later the expenses incurred by Massachusetts were fully reimbursed. No prize money was given to the New England troops; the naval force alone received the benefit of the capture of vessels, and it has been said that the share of a seaman before the mast was eight hundred guineas.

It is not possible to over-estimate the importance of this success. Had it not been achieved, an attack on Nova Scotia would have been made in such force that the province must have again passed under the power of France. By the removal of the French cruisers, the fisheries of New England were re-established, and the commerce of the seaports of Massachusetts was relieved from the risk of continual attack. That province further became assured of the inviolability of her hearths and homes, and the dread of attack and of organized invasion passed away. In a word, the loss of Louisbourg to the French reaffirmed the supremacy on the northern Atlantic of the British provinces.

The feeling at a later period entertained by the English colonist took its rise in a great degree from this event: that spirit of confidence and self-assertion, which, when the wars were ended, and the power of France was driven from the

* Sir William Pepperell left no surviving sons. His grandsons were loyalists, and their estates were confiscated. One could have hoped that, after the peace of Paris, the services of their grandsire of 1745 might have been remembered, and that their name would have saved them from this extreme measure.

continent, attained its full force: a sense of strength which encouraged the colonist to regard any policy, only so far as it affected his own interest, and with many of the leading men, assumed a positive and antagonistic character towards the mother country.

The garrison which took possession of Louisbourg could not be brought under good discipline, and could only be imperfectly controlled. Elated by success, unhappily the troops did not observe the self-mastership necessary in every calling of life, and never more called for than in the hour of good fortune and temptation. In spite of the efforts to remove the wine and spirits for safe keeping within the citadel, and upwards of one thousand hogsheads of rum were so stored, the place had still abundant provision of liquor. There was, consequently, much drunkenness. Admiral Knowles, who succeeded Warren, states that one thousand men were drunk daily.* The consequence was that of the 3,000 men left in the garrison, 1,200 had died before the following May. In most cases these deaths may be attributed to broken constitutions undermined by excess: at the same time, cold, imperfect clothing and the severe privations of winter had their share in the sickness which prevailed.

No medals were given in those days, so the conquerors of Louisbourg received no special distinction. There was, moreover, dissatisfaction that more honours were not shewn to the provincial officers. In May, 1746, the colonial troops returned to their homes, being relieved by two regiments from Gibraltar and by the two American regiments which had been lately raised. A large force of the returning troops landed on the coast of Maine, by its strength to impress the Indians who had again been attacking the out-settlements. Previous to their departure, Warren addressed the men on the parade ground of Louisbourg, on the 19th of May, 1746, wishing them a happy

* In July, 1746, Knowles wrote that he did not believe that the New England people could be induced to come to Louisbourg, "but for their present gains, for everyone I found here, from the generals down to the corporals, were sellers of rum." He describes the soldiers as lazy, dirty, and obstinate.

meeting with their families, highly complimenting those present, and expressing sorrow for the loss of those who had died. After describing the means taken to protect the fortress, he concluded by saying "we need not fear the power of France, but should their vanity lead them to make an attack upon us, I am persuaded the same spirit that induced you to make this conquest will prompt you to protect it."*

* American Magazine, 1746.

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CHAPTER V.

The news was received in London during the last week of July with exultation ; the park and the tower guns fired their salutes of rejoicing ; the bells rang their chimes from every steeple of the city ; in the night bonfires crackled in the principal streets ; and general illuminations testified to the public joy. In France and in Canada the capture of this stronghold, from which so much had been hoped, was heard of with surprise, dissatisfaction and pain. Louisbourg had been considered to be impregnable, and its possession was looked upon as the key to French power in America. At the treaty of Utrecht the retention of Cape Breton had been pertinaciously adhered to, and on no point had greater diplomacy been exercised. Its loss had reversed the whole policy of France, and her possession of the remaining American colonies for the time appeared to be threatened by the capture. No point more sensibly affected French honour than this reverse, and it had considerable influence on the establishment of the peace of 1748. The moderation of her demands, involving the abandonment of the conquests in the low countries, is to a great extent explained by the unconquerable desire to obtain repossession of Louisbourg. It was the one equivalent which the allies could offer, and the continental alliances of Great Britain enforced upon her the sacrifice of the restitution.*

* According to the Abbé Raynal, the cost of the fortifications of Louisbourg was 30,000,000 *livres* :—" La nécessité de transport d'Europe les pierres & beaucoup de matériaux nécessaires pour ces grandes constructions, retarda quelques fois les travaux, mais ne les fit pas abandonner. On y dépensa trente millions. On ne crut pas que ce fût trop pour soutenir les pêcheries, pour assurer la communication de la France avec le Canada, pour ouvrir un asyle en tems de guerre aux vaisseaux qui viendroient des isles Méridionales. La nature & la politique vouloient que les richesses du Midi fussent gardées par les forces du Nord." *Histoire Philosophique et Politique* [1778], VI., p. 116.

While these events were occurring in America, the pretender, Charles Edward, had been busily engaged in organizing his second attempt on Great Britain. Charles Edward landed at Moidart, on the west coast of Scotland, on the 25th of July, two days after the arrival of the news of the fall of Louisbourg. He was not directly sustained by the French government, although a French vessel of war, "L'Elizabeth," sixty-seven guns, was ordered to cruise to the north of Scotland, and without appearing to do so, to convoy "La Dou-telle," a privateer brig of eighteen guns, which carried the pretender from the mouth of the Loire. The arms which had been gathered, some 1,500 guns and 1,800 broadswords, with ammunition and twenty small field pieces, had been placed on "L'Elizabeth," together with all the money possessed by Charles Edward, 4,000 *louis d'or*.

On the day following their departure from the island of Belleisle, the vessels met the English ship of war, "The Lion," 58, captain Brett. The English ship attacked the vessels. "La Dou-telle" took no part in the conflict. After a fight of nearly six hours, both vessels were so disabled that "L'Elizabeth" put back to France and "The Lion" to England. The consequence was that the pretender lost the cannon, arms, stores and money placed on that vessel.

It is no part of this history to enter upon that extraordinary episode: it was not until the following April that the rebellion was crushed at Culloden. As it is now dispassionately considered the expedition had never any chance of success. The stronghold of jacobitism was the highlands of Scotland, and such of the population as could be induced to join the contest, as lightly abandoned, as they had embraced it. The lowlands were generally in favour of the reigning dynasty; the non-jurors, however, were generally disloyal. There was one point in favour of the enterprise. The king was in Hanover, in command of a large English force, to protect the Netherlands. Nevertheless, in England no effort worthy of the name was made in favour of the cause. The limited success which was obtained could not have been possible, except

from the incapacity of the generals engaged, and the absence of all public spirit in the English people. Nothing in our history is read with more wonder than the failure to cut off the retreat of the small undisciplined force which penetrated to Derby. The rebellion had, however, the effect of bringing some subsidized Hessian regiments to England, and withdrawing the English force from the low countries, thus marshal de Saxe could continue his career of conquest and triumph. What a contrast to the days of Marlborough and Eugene!

I have before remarked that the military operations on the continent, from the year 1743 to the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, equally as those incident to the attempt of the pretender, furnish direct proof of the want of capacity of the English commanders. Superiority in strength obtained for the navy some successes. Admiral Anson's expedition around Cape Horn may be excepted from the narrative of want of enterprise and ability which distinguished these years. Warren behaved with great judgment and capacity at Cape Breton, and his conciliatory manners, and his tact in his intercourse with the colonial troops, deserve all praise.

In 1745, on the 11th of May, the battle of Fontenoy was fought. The allies were the attacking party, in order to relieve Tournay besieged by marshal de Saxe. The Dutch on the left were repulsed. One colonel Appius in command of a Hessian contingent, in the pay of the Dutch, rode away in flight with his men to Ath, whence he wrote that the allied army was cut to pieces, and his men alone were those who had been saved. A colonel Ingolsby of the British force was sent by the duke of Cumberland with his division to pass through the wood of Barré, and storm a redoubt. He returned with the report that the wood was occupied in force, asking for further orders; whereas there were only sharp-shooters present. This loss of time was of irreparable injury to the army. Nevertheless, the duke of Cumberland led on the British and Hanoverian force to overcome the obstacles before them, and successfully resisted the charge of the French cavalry. The column steadily continued its advance. Had the Dutch equally done

their duty, the whole force of the French could not have been turned against the right wing. Even as affairs were, the situation appeared critical to marshal de Saxe, and he ordered up the whole reserve of the household troops, which were hurled against the advancing force, front and flank. The British column was overpowered and fell back, but without confusion; with its face to the foe, it withdrew in orderly retreat. The allied cavalry was now able to come up to its aid, and thus sustained, the troops retired to Ath, leaving the French in possession of the ground, and undisturbed in their operations against Touraine.*

The success at Louisbourg so elated the whole population

* Fontenoy was the scene of the traditional story of the French guards, answering the cry of the English guards, "Messieurs les gardes françaises tirez," with the reply, "Messieurs les Anglais nous ne tirons jamais les premiers." The story is admitted by French historians.

The loss of the allies on the right in killed was, British, 4,041, Hanoverians, 1,762; on the left the loss of the Dutch and their subsidized troops was 1,544; making a total loss killed of 7,327, without taking any account of the wounded, missing, and prisoners, which amounted nearly to 4,000 additional. Both at Dettingen and Fontenoy the English soldiers shewed the ancient courage of their race, but the higher officers were without capacity for directing troops. The duke of Cumberland was especially remarkable by his bravery: he was the first in danger, the last to retreat.

The French place all their losses at 7,000. During the action marshal de Saxe was so ill that he could not sit his horse, and was carried about in an osier litter. His mind was still clear and bright, and he unfailingly seized the entire situation of the attack. I can find no authority for the tradition of the wonderful effect of the charge of the Irish brigade. I cannot learn, that they took more than their part in the action when the reserve forces were brought up. A simultaneous attack was made on the British and Hanoverian column, on its front and flanks, while the French guns played upon it *en écharpe*. No one regiment was distinguished by pre-eminent gallantry. The individual prowess of the Irish brigade on the occasion is one of the fables repeated, like the traditional mass of snow, to become of greater weight as it is rolled round.

Henri Martin thus describes the attack: "Le sort de la journée semblait fort compromis; le maréchal de Saxe . . . commença de disposer la retraite pour le cas où un dernier effort ne réussirait pas. . . . Si les Hollandais fussent à temps revenus à la charge, et si l'habileté manœuvrière des Anglais eût égalé la puissance de leur feu, la bataille eût été perdue sans ressource. Heureusement la confusion régnait parmi les Anglais eux-mêmes: leur bataillon carré s'était resserré, entassé en une épaisse colonne d'une douzaine de mille hommes et n'avançant plus: il leur fallait ouvrir cette masse, replier les deux ailes pour en-

of New England that the scheme for the conquest of Canada was revived. In spring, 1746, Shirley, sustained in his views by Pepperell, submitted to the duke of Newcastle the plan of an expedition. This nobleman had continued as secretary of state during the several political changes which had taken place since the retirement of Walpole. He had held the position during the ascendancy of Granville, and he remained in office when his brother, Henry Pelham, was appointed first minister.

The government likewise received the support of Pitt : he held only a subordinate office, being appointed vice-treasurer of Ireland. Subsequently he was appointed paymaster of the forces. In this position he refused to profit by the balances left in his hands, and to accept the percentage allowed by foreign sovereigns on the subsidies paid to them : disinterestedness at that day remarkable, which gained him public confidence, and subsequently obtained for him the field, in which his great powers and his high qualities were so vigorously exercised.

Whether Pitt in any way influenced the decision cannot be said. It is scarcely possible to conceive that it emanated from Newcastle. His ignorance of American affairs has already been stated ; and his mind was not one capable of con-

lever Fontenoi et les redoutes de Barri, et donner passage à la cavalerie, qui étoit assez loin derrière, pour balayer la plaine.

Le temps que mirent les chefs ennemis à essayer de rétablir leurs rangs et à se concerter, fut bien employé par Maurice de Saxe ; il fit converger toutes les forces disponibles vers la redoutable colonne et défendit qu'aucun régiment chargeât isolément. Les premières pièces de campagne qu'on trouva sous la main furent placées de façon à prendre en écharpe la tête des ennemis ; on lança la cavalerie sur leur front, l'infanterie sur leurs deux flancs, pêle-mêle, sans ordre, mais avec l'ensemble d'un triple ouragan. La masse ennemie fut écrasée du choc comme dans un étai. " La colonne Anglaise, dit un historien militaire,* fut foudroyée et disparut." Les débris se précipitèrent en fuyant au delà du ravin ; on ne les poursuivit que jusqu'à Veson, où ils furent recueillis, par la cavalerie anglaise et par une réserve d'infanterie. Les Hollandais, qui avaient enfin tenté sans succès une nouvelle attaque, opérèrent en même temps leur retraite.

* D'Espagnac II, p. 106. " Les gardes françaises lavèrent leur affront en ce moment. On remarqua surtout la fureur des bataillons irlandais au service de France."

ceiving a policy marked by vigour. Although not wanting in readiness in his replies, his speeches were confused and absurd ; and his political power is alone traceable to his rank, fortune, and hereditary influence. Whatever the cause assent was given to the proposition.

Early in spring Newcastle wrote setting forth that the assistance of the Six Nations should be obtained. Clinton, then governor of New York, asked for supplies from the house of assembly for their support. Although profuse in expressions of loyalty, the house refused to vote money.* What the traders of Albany desired was to establish the neutrality of the Six Nations, so that the northern frontier could be secured from attack without cost to themselves. Hence the refusal of the house of assembly to recognize the appeal. Some force, however, was raised by the assembly : sixteen companies of infantry,† which, with the four companies in pay, were organized into two batallions. The command was offered to sir William Gooch, who was governor of Virginia. As he refused the position, it was given to colonel Roberts. Clinton's desire was to garrison fort Edward, but the commissioners named by the legislature would not supply provisions, and the movement did not take place.

The arrival of a fleet had been anxiously looked for, but as none appeared, the legislature considered that it had been put to useless expense in raising forces and victualling them, and repeated the refusal to join in the support of the Six Nations.

During their negotiations Clinton had been much embarrassed by receiving no instructions from London ; neglect perfectly in accord with the character of Newcastle. Owing to the non-receipt of their pay, the troops became discontented, and threatened to mutiny. Clinton went personally to Albany and succeeded in quieting them. When in Albany Clinton received a letter from Shirley urging on him the advisability of calling together a general congress at New

* New York His. Doc. VI., p. 398.

† *Ib.*, p. 314. 9 April, 1746.

York, to engage all the colonies in the enterprise against Canada. The council to whom the matter was referred considered that it was too late in the year for the congress to meet. They recommended, however, that Crown Point and Niagara should be attacked ; but the legislature refused to entertain the proposition, unless the plan to be followed should be communicated to its members.

Shirley shortly afterwards received despatches from Newcastle informing him that the expedition to Canada could not take place. The colonies were called upon to advance the pay of the soldiers until an appropriation could be made by parliament. Clinton, in reporting the position of affairs in September, 1747, states that the companies paid by the crown were at Albany. He described the place as blockaded by the enemies' skulking parties, and that none dare go out for any distance without a guard.

In France a strong feeling had arisen as to the duty of retrieving the national honour by retaking Louisbourg. It was determined that an expedition should be sent to retake the fortress. A fleet, under the command of the duc d'Anville, was to leave France with transports carrying a force of 3,000 men, to be landed at Chebucto,* at which place a corps of Canadians was to join them. These troops were to proceed in the first instance to Mines, and there establish themselves until the arrival of the French ships. Louisbourg was to be reconquered, Annapolis taken, Boston attacked, and the coast settlements of New England devastated. In accordance with this programme, an expedition started from Canada, under de Ramesay, and safely arrived at Mines.

The prospect of an invasion from the English colonies could not long remain a secret at Quebec. Indeed, to the last days of French power, the fear of an attack upon Quebec by sea was always present to the mind of the Canadian rulers. In view of such an attempt, arrangements were made, on the appearance of the ships, for signal fires to be continuously lighted from Rimouski to Quebec. Instructions were also given for

* Halifax.

cabins to be constructed in the woods, to which the families could retire with their cattle on the approach of the fleet. The men were instructed in all haste to make their way to Quebec, to aid in the defence of the city.

It was for protection in an emergency of this character that the fortifications of Quebec had been greatly extended, and the city enclosed with ramparts. Generally precautions were taken for the defence of the place, when the approach of a hostile fleet was known.

On lake Champlain de Beauharnois had not contented himself simply in preparing measures of defence. He had during the preceding November directed an attack against the advanced posts of New York. The situation of Crown Point furnished facilities for sending out expeditions ; and de Beauharnois was invited to this aggression by the passive and indifferent spirit shewn in Albany. No preparation was made against such an emergency, and there was an insensibility to the danger of any attack from Canada. The past history of New York should have reminded those responsible, that an attack was feasible and probable. Albany reposed upon the hope that the Six Nations would remain neutral, and accordingly that the French would not invade their territory. There still was a contraband trade between Albany and Montreal, the profits of which led many to embark in it, and with such as these, there was a strong desire that it should not be interfered with. These expectations, however, were rudely dispelled.

The force assembled at Crown Point in November consisted of three hundred French and Canadians, with about the same number of christian Indians. The former arrived on the 14th, the Indians three days later. They were under the command of Marin, a partizan leader of much enterprise and courage, but without one spark of pity. The intention was originally to attack the settlements in Connecticut, but owing to the season of the year the Indians objected to any attempt in that quarter. It was determined accordingly to assail fort Saratoga.

Saratoga consisted of a blockhouse surrounded by a small settlement, on the east side of the Hudson, opposite to Fishkill.* Its distance from Albany is about thirty-six miles. There is no record of the route taken by the French. It is probable that the eastern shore of lake Champlain was followed until the ordinary trail was found. On the night of the 28th-29th November, the settlement was reached. There could have been little defence against such a force. The few houses were burned, and the population seized as prisoners, men, women and children,† and as was usual, the Indians were rewarded by receiving their share of the prisoners as slaves. One family alone escaped to carry the news to Albany, and to report that the place was in flames.‡ According to the French report, several of the prisoners in the hands of the Indians at Saint François and Bécancourt, were ransomed at the king's cost and carried to Quebec. Some of them were subsequently sent to Louisbourg when in possession of the British.§ Clinton reported to the lords of trade|| that twenty houses had been burned with the fort, which the legislature had refused to repair, and that thirty persons had been killed and scalped and sixty carried away prisoners.¶

* A creek on the west side of the Hudson on which is situated the town known in modern times as Schuylerville.

† N.Y. Doc. X., p. 39.

‡ Journal N.Y. Assembly II., p. 86.

§ N.Y. Doc. X., p. 125.

|| 30 November, 1745, N.Y. Doc. VI., p. 288.

¶ This fort was in existence when Winthrop marched towards Wood's creek in August, 1690, when the design was simultaneously to invade Canada from the south in connection with Phipps' attack. [N.Y. Doc. IV., p. 194.] In 1698 Saratoga was reported upon by colonel Romar as an important frontier. [IV., p. 329.] At that day there were seven farms adjoining. In 1701 Lord Cornbury described it as the most northerly settlement; the fort was then out of repair. [IV., p. 1128.] In November, 1739, authority was given to rebuild it. [VI., p. 151.] When attacked it was in a bad condition. [VI., p. 288.] After its destruction it was imperfectly restored in 1745 [VI., p. 648] and was occupied by a garrison in June, in 1746, although unfinished, being without an oven or well. It was unsuccessfully attacked by a party under the chevalier de Rigaud in July, 1747. The garrison shortly after was withdrawn, and the place not being tenable was burned. The condition of the fort was one of the causes of quarrel between the assembly and Clinton. Kalm visited the fort in June, 1749. He

No contrast can be greater than the conduct of the French in Canada, in their activity, enterprise and almost ceaseless energy, and the absence of these qualities in New York and Albany with the English population, and more especially with the descendants of the Dutch. It has been shown that the legislature refused to co-operate in the attack of Louisbourg, and that the desire of those having influence at Albany was to retain the Iroquois in neutral inactivity, in order that the frontier would be left unassailed. It was the desire of governor Clinton to engage the Six Nations in hostility on the British side. The French adhered to their old policy of destroying unprotected and out-lying homesteads, in order to create a sense of insecurity on the frontier; and from the certain danger attending it, to make more northern settlement impossible. They never rose above this petty warfare, and whatever suffering it caused it was without permanent result; the effect passed away. On the other hand Canada was exposed to these attacks only to a limited extent. What was there dreaded, was an invasion by a large force on an organized plan. On two occasions well equipped fleets ascended the Saint Lawrence, and it was the failure of these naval expeditions which led to the abandonment of the attack by lake Champlain, when great preparations had been made to assure success.

Parties of Indians roamed about in accordance with this policy; all that they were able to effect was the seizure of

described it as being "built of wood by the English to stop the attacks of the French Indians upon the English inhabitants in these parts, and to serve as a rampart to Albany. It is situated on a hill on the east side of the river Hudson, and is built of thick posts driven in the ground, close to each other, in the manner of palisades, forming a square, the length of whose sides was within the reach of a musket shot. At each corner are the houses of the officers, and within the palisades are the barracks, all of timber. . . . The English themselves set fire to it in 1747, not being able to defend themselves in it against the attacks of the French and their Indians." Vol. II., p. 289.

I have taken some pains in describing this locality, for it is the site of this fort which gave the name to the scene of Burgoyne's surrender in October, 1777. The event which more than any other determined the ultimate success of the United States in the revolutionary war, for it led to the avowed alliance of France.

prisoners. In June, near Bridgman's fort, on the site of the village of Vernon in Vermont, a short distance north of Deerfield, they seized some men who had strayed from their working party. Their object in making such captures was to obtain intelligence from the prisoners brought to Montreal. Nothing could be more contradictory than the reports which were received. These prisoners, taken at remote distances from the political centres of New England and New York, could only repeat the imperfect information which reached them. Nevertheless, parties were constantly sent out, to long distances from Crown Point, to prowl about settlements in which the inhabitants believed themselves in no way to be exposed to danger.

A more serious attack took place in August, 1746. A party under de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, major of Three Rivers, consisting of seven hundred Canadians and Indians, reached Crown Point with the original purpose of strengthening the garrison. On his arrival de Rigaud found that the report of an attack upon the place was not credited, and that there was full confidence in its strength to meet any ordinary emergency. He determined accordingly to become the assailant, and on a council being held, it was resolved to attack the settlement of fort Massachusetts, on the river Hoosac, on the site of the present town of South Adams. No record of the route followed is given; the probability is that de Rigaud went the way he returned, as hereafter related.

We have a record of these operations from the narrative of the Rev. John Norton,* who was accidentally present.

* Fort Massachusetts is shewn on Sauthier's map of New York, 1779, on the northern bank of the Hoosac, a tributary of the Hudson, which discharges a short distance north of the site of fort Saratoga, opposite the present village of Mechanicsville. It was situate on the line of road from Albany to fort Dummer on the Connecticut. A road ran from the fort to the southern end of lake Champlain, the modern Whitehall. The Rev. John Norton remained in captivity in Canada a year, and on his return in 1747 published the history of his captivity. This book is very rare. I believe only four copies are known. The text, however, is accessible in a limited reprint, which is also scarce.

This work of fifty pages is a valuable addition to the history of this time. Norton records the personal kindness which he received in all directions. One

Evidently he was making a tour of the posts as chaplain, for his intention was to remain there a month. The fort had been left under the command of the sergeant, John Hawks, with twenty soldiers, half of whom with himself were suffering from dysentery. There were also three women and five children in the place. Uneasiness had been felt, as on the preceding day some miles from the fort, signs of an approaching enemy had been discovered. The attacking party arrived on Tuesday, the 30th of August (N. S.), between eight and nine in the morning and with loud cries surrounded the fort, unceasingly firing. The little garrison made a gallant defence, holding the place for twenty-eight hours. The French admitted the loss of one killed and twelve wounded, among the latter the commander. The French never gave any account of the losses of the Indians, several of whom were seen to fall. Among them a chief, foremost in the attack, who must have been one of the Saint Francis Abenakis. Norton records that four of the Indians died from their wounds on the second and third days of the return march. Two of the garrison were wounded; on the second day the man on duty in the watch box on the wall, one Knowlton, was shot dead. Fears were entertained that during the night an attempt would be made to burn the fort, but the French remained quietly round their watch fires, by the light of which the besieged discharged their muskets.

At noon of the following day, after a continuance of the attack for some hours, de Rigaud asked for a parley, and proposed a surrender. As there were but four pounds of powder left, and there were evident preparations to attempt to

fact that struck him was the anxiety for news regarding the talk of invasion. At Quebec he met both de Beauharnois and Hocquart, who behaved with great courtesy to him. He remained in that city from the 15th of September, 1746, until the 25th of July, 1747, at which date he was sent by the ship "la Vierge de Grace" under a flag of truce to Boston, where he arrived on the 16th of August. During the ten months of his imprisonment seventy-three prisoners died, among them the three women taken at fort Massachusetts. He himself suffered from a serious attack of sickness; when he arrived there were 105 prisoners, subsequently increased to 226 in number. Accordingly one-third of those confined died. They possibly received as good treatment as could be given under the circumstances, and there was no interference with their religious exercises.

burn the building, the fort capitulated. The conditions were that those surrendering should be prisoners to the French, not to the savages; that the children should remain with their parents; and that they all should be exchanged as opportunity offered. At three o'clock the gate was opened and the French entered. Twenty-two men, with the women and children, surrendered.

The Indians, displeased with the conditions granted by de Rigaud forced their way into the fort, and shewed much restlessness. They seized Knowlton's corpse, scalped it, and cut off the head and arms. After the prisoners had been removed from the fort it was plundered. The Indians now desired to have their share of the prisoners. The situation was evidently embarrassing. The interpreter, described under the name of "Doty,"* asked Norton to request some of the soldiers to consent to stay with the Indians. They refused; nevertheless, a few of the men were given over to them. It was perhaps not possible to act otherwise. The officers took charge of the children. Norton was assigned to de Muys, Hawks to Saint Luc de La Corne.

The buildings of the settlement were burned and plundered. No prisoners were captured from them. The French account describes the settlement to lie within a circle of thirty miles on which the harvests were destroyed.† Had such been the case, the inference is, that it would have been mentioned by Norton. We may conclude that the settlement only consisted of a few houses.

To the honour of de Rigaud, he insisted that the prisoners should be properly treated, and in no case was outrage committed. There is not an instance on record when the prisoners were more cared for and considered.

On the first day of the march to Canada, Mrs. Smeed, the wife of one of the prisoners, was confined of a daughter. The Indians carried her carefully in a litter which they made, and she felt little pain or suffering in the journey. Other

* Perhaps D'Auteuil.

† N.Y. Doc., X., p. 77.

prisoners were similarly well treated. In one instance the Indians carried on their backs a prisoner unable to proceed. So far as Norton's account of the journey can be understood, they went on foot across the forest for three days, and on the fourth crossed what he called the Saratoga river. To judge by the map, this stream is evidently Battenkill. They continued their route crossing Wood's creek, until they reached lake Champlain. Leaving fort Massachusetts on the Thursday, they arrived at their canoes on the Tuesday. On the following day they reached Crown Point.

Mention is also made of nineteen men surprised near Deerfield by sixty Indians of this force, with the loss of six killed and four prisoners. The fact is sustained by the narrative of Norton, who relates the return of the Indians who had left them after the capture of the fort. They brought back a prisoner, a lad of nineteen, given over to the Abenakis Indians of Saint Francis. Through him Norton learned the names of those who had been killed, six in number, whose scalps were brought to Crown Point.

These attacks with the trifling results they achieved were not wisely conceived. They had the effect of awakening enmity at Albany, and suggested to its inhabitants the urgency of steps being taken for their own preservation. They gave force to the sentiment that it was necessary to destroy Crown Point, whence these expeditions came forth. The destruction of Saratoga within thirty-six miles of Albany, attributable to the want of prudence and neglect of preparation of the New York legislature, led to much anger, and also gave strength to the conviction that to resist such surprises, active measures were required. Fort Saratoga was restored and a garrison placed there. It was in this condition when reconnoitred by Canadian parties in the autumn.*

The operations of the French had likewise their influence on the Iroquois. In July, 1745, an Indian deputation had waited upon de Beauharnois, and asked him to leave their ter-

* N.Y. Doc., X., p. 76.

ritory at peace, and not march through it with a warlike force. Hitherto, owing to the failure of New York to recognise their wants, the Mohawks had hesitated as to the course they would take. It would have been a wise policy for the rulers at Quebec to have avoided all cause of dissatisfaction on the part of the Six Nations, and in no way to have awakened their fears. Clinton never ceased in his attempts to induce them to embrace the English cause. On receiving news of the declaration of war in October, 1744,* he reported that in June he had renewed the alliance. He was desirous of organizing an attack against Crown Point, but could obtain no support. In May, 1747, colonel Johnson was able to report the good disposition of the Iroquois.† Shirley, untiring in his enterprise and determination, was strongly of opinion that the reduction of this fort should be undertaken by the colonies, without assistance from home.‡

Several Iroquois parties took the field against the French on lake Champlain, and in the neighbourhood of the Saint Lawrence; accordingly de Beauharnois declared war against them. While the Abenakis extended their ravages to the Connecticut and to the Hudson, the Iroquois passed northwards on their mission of destruction.

In April, 1747, a force of twenty-two French and Canadians leaving Crown Point were surprised by an Iroquois party and five of them killed. Attacks were made on Chateaugay, on Ile Perrot and Saint Anne, where three women were taken. One hundred men were rapidly gathered together, under the chevalier de La Corne, and the women were rescued. An attempt to intercept a band of Iroquois, so far failed, that only one canoe of the four was taken, and the other three escaped. These desultory attacks were persevered in by both sides, while it was the warfare which the Canadians preferred, the Iroquois alone took the field on the part of the English. In New York it gave strength to the war party, who

* N.Y. Doc., VI., p. 259, 9 October.

† Ib., VI., p. 386.

‡ Ib., VI., p. 385.

were not inclined patiently to submit to outrage for the sake of the profits of the contraband trade between Albany and Canada.

The French fleet which had been put in commission to operate in America, to retake Louisbourg and to conquer Nova Scotia, left la Rochelle the 22nd of June, 1746. It consisted of twenty-one ships of war, nine of them of 60 guns; two of 50 guns; four of from 24 to 30 guns; the remainder with 8 and 10 guns. There were twenty additional armed vessels and privateers, with transports carrying a land force of 3,150 men, under M. Pommeril. The whole expedition was commanded by M. de la Rochefoucauld, duc d'Anville.

During the voyage the fleet was delayed by frequent storms; on the 2nd of September, in the neighbourhood of Sable Island, a severe tempest was experienced. The consequence was, that the squadron was dispersed and four ships of the line and a transport were driven before the wind. Two of them were eventually captured off the French coast. D'Anville himself arrived at Chebucto in the "Northumberland," on the 10th of September. Another ship of the line and three or four transports were all that were present. Six days afterwards, on the 16th of September, three transports arrived. On that day d'Anville died from a stroke of apoplexy.* The same afternoon d'Estourville, the vice-admiral joined the fleet with three ships of the line.

The new governor-general, M. de la Jonquière, sent to replace M. de Beauharnois, was on board the admiral's ship the "Northumberland." Previous to leaving France he had received the title of *Chef d'Escadre*, so was third in command of the expedition.

Jaques Pierre de Taffanel, marquis de la Jonquière, was himself a naval officer; he was of a Languedoc family, and was now sixty years old. He had also been actively engaged with the land force in the proceedings against the protestants of the Cevennes in 1703. He had served with Duguay-Trouin,

* He was buried on an island in Halifax harbour, said to be the one known as Saint George's island.

and had seen much naval service. He was a man of undoubted courage, somewhat meanly educated; he has obtained the reputation in Canadian history of being fond of money, which he was not scrupulous in obtaining, and of being parsimonious in his habits. De la Jonquière is represented as being tall and distinguished in his manners and appearance.* From his known courage, it may be assumed that at the council of war which was held, his opposition to the recommendation of d'Estourville to abandon the expedition, was one of the principal causes that the proposal was not accepted.

During the voyage Conflans, with three ships of the line and a frigate, had been sent away to convoy some merchantmen to the West Indies; he had not returned. Thus there were only seven ships of the line in the harbour. A portion of the land forces were in the missing ships. The troops present were suffering from weakness and debility. During the voyage a ship fever of extraordinary malignity had been prevalent, and it is said that upwards of twelve hundred men died at sea, and eleven hundred perished at Chebucto. Dysentery was also working its ravages. Some Indians also who arrived when the ships were known to be in the harbour, were attacked by the malady.

It was under these painful and depressing circumstances that d'Estourville proposed that the expedition should be abandoned and the vessels return to France. De la Jonquière with most of the officers of both services resisted this pro-

* "M. de la Jonquière étoit grand, bien fait, et avoit un air imposant; il étoit brave à l'excès, mais il n'avoit point eut d'éducation; il termit ses grandes actions par son avarice qui donna souvent lieu de dire que la crainte de perdre son argent ou ses marchandises donnoit lieu à son intrépidité. Il gagna des sommes immenses dans ses voyages, et il pouvoit en Canada mépriser le commerce; c'est ce qu'il ne fit pas; et c'est aussi ce qui empoisonna ses dernières années. Quoique il eût plusieurs millions en caisse, il se refusa, pour ainsi dire, jusqu'à la mort, son nécessaire. Il fit son testament et ne légua rien ou très peu de chose; enfin il mourut, point regretté, pas même de ses proches, accablé de chagrin et d'infirmités."

Mémoires du S^{ieur} de C^{arleton} contenant l'Histoire du Canada, durant la guerre et sous le Gouvernement Anglais, p. 26. Quebec Historical Society. Edition 1873.

position. They set out of view the original object to be attained, but if no attempt was practicable against Louisbourg, they felt it their duty to attack Annapolis and seize Nova Scotia. The weak condition of Annapolis, its insecure fortifications, its small, ill-provided garrison, were known. If Annapolis could be captured, Acadia was regained for France, the population having been excited to be hostile to British rule. The two priests Germain and Le Loutre had been actively engaged in awakening the old animosity and in preparing the Acadians to take active part with the French when operations should commence.

A supply of fresh provisions had been brought to the French at Chebucto by the route of the Shubenacadie, and the sick were recovering ; most of the land troops were on shore. The proposition of d'Estourville was rejected. He was so affected by this vote, considering it a reflection on his personal character and honour, that he lost his reason. Next morning he was found stabbed ; evidently he had thrown himself upon his sword.

M. de la Jonquière was now in command. He sent " la Renommée " frigate to convey four vessels laden with stores to Quebec. On the 12th of October he sailed with the other ships out of the harbour. He took the precaution to embark fifty Acadians from the neighbourhood of Mines to act as pilots when he should reach Annapolis, and to serve as guides when the troops were landed.

Although there were seven ships of the line, five of them could scarcely be considered effective owing to the number of sick which they contained, amounting to one thousand men. At cape Sable they again experienced terrible storms. A council of war was held when it was resolved to return to France. The Acadians who had joined the fleet were therefore landed, and the ships sailed homewards. Two vessels are said to have approached the Annapolis waters, but on hearing that some British men-of-war were present they withdrew.

Such was the close of this disastrous expedition. It has

been estimated that the French lost upwards of 2,500 men, 1,100 of whom were buried at Halifax.

In my humble judgment, no pages of history are more worthy of consideration and comment, than these records of failure and misfortune. As a rule they are passed over briefly and superficially, for they are not of a character to appeal to national exultation and vanity. They seem to me rather to call for the fullest examination, than to be dealt with in semi-silence. They appeal to that sense of safety which bases its operations on prudence and forethought. Wise as it may appear to awaken the enterprise and courage of a people, to cheer them onwards in the confident hope of victory and success, it is equally indispensable to inculcate that prescience and care in organization, which are the best preventives of defeat and disaster.

The expedition sent from France, commanded with judgment and organized with prudence, possessed full power to attain the ends proposed. The wonder, indeed, is that it could fail. One of the first, as well as the simplest of conditions, was that the ships should not be overcrowded; that they should be well ventilated and without a taint to affect health. The fleet should also have been kept together, and no vessels detached on special service. The storms were serious impediments to success, but when the ships had once reached what is now the harbour of Halifax much of the danger was passed. Even if Louisbourg had been left unassailed, there was no power to stay the conquest of Annapolis and the repossession of Acadia. But this great armament crumbled to pieces from the elements of dissolution within itself. The ships were pestilent with disease; the men became weak in body and broken in spirit, to die by hundreds; ships were sent away; there was want of accord among the leading officers. Undoubtedly the death of the commander-in-chief and the storms which drove the vessels apart were great misfortunes. The latter trial, however, is incident to all naval operations, to be overcome on the part of a commander by seamanship and discipline. It was not entirely owing to

adverse circumstances that the ships, damaged by gales, and the men shattered in health and broken in spirit, returned to whence they started without the slightest achievement. The absence of prudence, good organization and forethought for the force composing the expedition, greatly contributed to the unfortunate result.

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CHAPTER VI.

After the siege of Annapolis of 1744 and the capture of Louisbourg, Mascarene was able to breathe more freely ; but although for the time he knew that his safety was assured, he must have remained continually in dread of attack. He had awakened from his illusions with regard to Le Loutre, holding him responsible to a great extent for the conduct of the Indians at the siege, and attributing to him the present hostile attitude of the Acadians. Anticipating further attack, he asked for a ship of war to be stationed in the harbour, with a tender to obtain supplies and to visit the settlements in the bay ; for there could be no misunderstanding with regard to the undoubted hostility of the inhabitants. During the previous years, contrary to the injunctions of the authorities, the people of Mines and Chignecto had been accustomed to supply Louisbourg with provisions. The corn and cattle were taken by land to bay Verte, and there shipped. It was by this traffic that the French silver coin, current in the province, was obtained. There had been little interference with the trade ; because the supplies which Annapolis endeavoured to obtain were sought for in the farms in the neighbourhood ; and there was difficulty in the way of the population at Mines seeking a market in New England, which they did not possess the enterprise to overcome. Moreover, French manufactures and wines were by these means introduced into Nova Scotia, a matter of some advantage.

The inhabitants of these districts could not be prevailed upon to send their produce to the English garrison at Louisbourg. The terrorism must have been extraordinary to cause the Acadians to reject the profits of this trade ; their conduct can only be attributed to one cause, the menaces of the missionaries. De Beauharnois reported at length his views

on Acadia.* He represented the population as being about 2,500 men, capable of bearing arms, with the exception of a small portion, desirous of returning to French rule, and ready to take the field. They had been much disconcerted by the conquest of Louisbourg. De Beauharnois describes the Acadians of that time. They "have not extended their plantations since they have come under English dominion; their houses are wretched wooden boxes, without conveniences and without ornaments, and scarcely containing the most necessary furniture; but they are exceedingly covetous of specie. Since the settlement of Ile Royale they have drawn from Louisbourg, by means of their trade in cattle and all the other provisions, almost all the specie the king annually sent out; it never makes its appearance again; they are particularly careful to conceal it." Many of the Acadians applied to de Beauharnois to know if they could find lands in Canada. He "avoided all answer." In the meantime they refused to carry on trade with Louisbourg, where there were several British regiments, and several men-of-war, in which their profits would have been large and assured.

In view of aiding the French expedition, the results of which I have related, de Ramesay, in command of 680 Canadians, left Quebec in June, 1746. The force had been raised in May; one hundred at Three Rivers, the remainder equally between Montreal and Quebec. His orders were to repair to bay Verte, keeping to the east of the island of Saint John.† On the 15th of June he reported his arrival at Gaspé, to which place stores were sent to him. On the 17th of July he notified the Government that father Germain had sent him pilots to guide him between the island and the main shore. In August he was at Mines.‡ He had been placed in some embarrassment by being asked by the commander of "l'Aurore" to take charge of 168 prisoners, and for fear of

* 12 September, 1745. N.Y. Doc., X., p. 5.

† Prince Edward Island.

‡ N.Y. Doc., X., pp. 49-51.

being short of provisions he had sent them to Chebucto under an escort of 150 men commanded by de Repentigny.*

De Ramesay experienced difficulty in obtaining provisions from the Acadians. They refused to take the card money of Canada. In accordance with his instructions, he himself proceeded to Beaubassin to await orders; but it was considered advisable that 300 of his force should winter at Mines to satisfy the Acadians and protect them against any hostile attack from the English. On the 2nd of October de Ramesay, being short of provisions, proceeded to cape Tourmentine, where he heard from Girard, the priest of Cobequid, of d'Anville's fleet having sailed away from Chebucto. The disasters of the fleet were not known, so the proceeding was inexplicable to him. In December de Ramesay was again at Beaubassin.

The arrival of d'Anville's fleet was not reported in Quebec until the 14th of October,† when Bigot requested Le Loutre to furnish some fifty oxen, for which he would pay in silver; at the same time he undertook to meet the notes already given for the supplies received. It must have been agreeable news to the Acadians, whose love of money had led them to refuse giving food to the Canadians who were to winter there if they were to be paid in card money. Under the religious terror caused by the missionaries, they were excited to make great sacrifices; but as recorded in French documents, these sacrifices did not include the risk of losing money.

I have now to relate one of those episodes of loss and defeat, only to be explained by the incompetence of the English commander. To anyone acquainted with the conditions of winter in the central latitudes of North America, it seems an impossibility that troops should have been sent on outpost duty unprovided with snow-shoes.‡

* N.Y. Doc., X., p. 62.

† Ib. X., p. 72.

‡ The snow-shoe, or *raquette*, is a frame of about three feet long, and from fifteen to eighteen inches broad. The outline is the form of a double bow, the cords placed side by side. The frames are of ash, the surface of strong plaited gut, held in position by two transverse bars. The snow-shoe is strapped tightly to









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The arrival of the French troops at Mines, and their subsequent establishment at Beaubassin, suggested to Mascarene the danger in which the fort was placed. Accordingly he applied to Shirley for additional troops to be sent to Nova Scotia, so that this Canadian force could be driven away, and British authority affirmed. At Shirley's recommendation it was resolved to send reinforcements, five hundred of which fell to the quota to be furnished by Massachusetts.

On the 24th of December (N.S.), 1746, the first division arrived under the command of captain Morris. The design was to quarter them at Grand Pré, the modern Horton. The navigation was closed. The intention had been to disembark at Mines, but the journey by water was not possible, so the expedition landed on the shore of the bay of Fundy, and marched by land to Horton. It was a distance of seventy-five miles, and was accomplished in eight days, each man carrying, independently of kit, arms, and ammunition, fourteen days' provisions. Two civil officers were sent to Mines to represent the government there.

The officer in command was colonel Arthur Noble, who arrived with the other companies. The rank and file now amounted to 470 men. They had all been enlisted in New England. Noble had seen service at Louisbourg, having been present in Waldo's regiment. Among the troops was a company of Gorham's rangers, who had also been at Louisbourg. The troops were quartered among the people of Grand Pré, scattered in twenty-four houses, payment being made for their subsistence. They considered themselves perfectly secure during the severe months of winter. Warning, however, had been given them by the inhabitants that they would certainly be attacked. Unfortunately for themselves, the warning was neglected and little precaution was taken.

De Ramesay was established at Chignecto, and on the 8th of January the report reached him of the arrival of two

the foot ; the toes are passed through a loop ; the heel is kept free, that it can rise from the *raquette*. It is by this contrivance alone that it is possible to pass over deep snow without sinking above the knee, in which case progress would be impossible.

hundred and fifty New England troops at Grand Pré, at which place, in spring when the weather permitted, they designed to fortify themselves. He held a council of his officers, and it was agreed that it was advisable to attack them before this purpose could be carried out. De Ramesay himself was unable to move, owing to an injury to his knee, and he placed the force under the command of Coulon de Villiers. We have to follow the French account of the expedition.*

This narrative represents the attacking force to have consisted of 240 Canadians, with sixty additional Indians. The English accounts represent that six hundred men were present. As fifteen days were taken to complete the preparation, it does not seem probable that only sixty Micmacs and Malecites had been gathered together. The force left the present village of Cumberland on the 23rd of January, 1747.

It was in expeditions of this character that the power of endurance and the patient submission to cold, privation and fatigue were most apparent in the French Canadians. On no occasion were they ever more severely tested. The march was continued for seventeen days in this most severe season of the year. They passed round the coast and reached Windsor, then known as Pisiquid, about twelve miles from the English quarters, where the troops remained in perfect fancied security. Coulon de Villiers here heard that their number was 550, quartered in the houses of the settlers who had abandoned them. The latter had left their dwellings, not from ill-treatment on the part of the troops, but from a conviction of the danger they incurred by remaining. It was from the certitude that an attack would be made that they abandoned the place. Notwithstanding that the force was greater than was looked for, it was determined to persevere in the attempt, and a picket was placed on the road to prevent intelligence of their presence being carried to Grand Pré.

At Windsor they were joined by twenty-five Acadians, who undertook to pilot the force to the houses, which it was important should be the first surprised. They left Windsor

* N.Y. Doc. X., p. 91.

during the day, and reached the river Gaspereau at nine at night. They were then about a mile and a half from their destination, when the attack was planned, for Coulon de Villiers was in possession of full information of the disposition of the troops. At two of the morning of the 11th of February they left their bivouac, and advanced to the spot, the guides leading them directly to the houses first to be assaulted. The force was divided into ten divisions; excepting that of de Villiers, each consisted of twenty-eight Canadians; his own company had the strength of seventy-five men. In each case the force was accompanied by Indians. They suffered much from cold, snow had been falling for thirty hours, so that in spots it was four feet deep, and a storm of unusual severity was raging. Sentries had been thrown out, and certain precautions taken against surprise by the Massachusetts troops; the result shewed to what little effect.

Indeed, the night was so stormy that men sustained by the conviction that attack was impossible, would not be actively on the watch. It was three o'clock when the Canadians reached the spot. Owing to the thick falling snow they were unseen until close upon the sentries, for their guides unerringly led them to the houses where the troops were quartered.

An alarm was given by the shots which were fired. But there was no delay in making the assault, the doors of the houses attacked were easily forced, and the troops surprised in their beds. Colonel Noble was killed early in the action, fighting in his shirt. The men offered what resistance was possible; it could not have been effective, for in the contest only six of the Canadians were killed and fourteen wounded. Indeed there could have been no great opposition, so complete was the surprise. Among those who were wounded was Coulon de Villiers, whose left arm was struck by a musket ball, and faint from loss of blood he was forced to retire. The command accordingly devolved on the chevalier de La Corne. At five in the morning the attack ceased.* The result at

* The account [N.Y. Doc. X., p. 92] gives the figure "3." Evidently a misprint for 5, as it is distinctly stated that the attack commenced at three.

that hour was, that of the English force, 6 officers with 70 rank and file were killed, 60 wounded, and 54 taken prisoners.*

The action ceased owing to the remainder of the New England troops having been assembled in a stone house. At early daylight de La Corne sent a flag of truce to ask for an English surgeon to attend on captain Howe, who was seriously wounded, the French surgeon being absent with de Coulon. This demand led to hostages being sent, and hostilities were suspended until the surgeon's return, and a truce was proposed until nine o'clock.

The English had previously made a *sortie*, but, unprovided with snow-shoes, had been driven back. Indeed, it was not possible for them to advance. The French were greatly fatigued, and attempted no offensive movement. Had the New England troops been accustomed to fight under such circumstances, and placed in the position to do so, the probability is that the Canadians would have been exterminated. The New England troops were powerless, they could not move a yard from the beaten path. The truce was accordingly accepted.

The want of precaution of the commander of the detachment is apparent, when it is stated that when the question was considered what course should be followed, it was found that there were only eight rounds of ammunition left, with scarcely food for the day, and not a stick of wood with which the defenders could make a fire. A proposal was accordingly sent by captain Goldthwaite, then in command, for a capitulation. The French themselves saw how dangerous their own position was, and they knew that their safety depended upon an immediate retreat. But it was not in the power of de La Corne to grant any conditions, so the proposal was sent to de Coulon, who lay wounded at the river Gaspereau. De La Corne received full authority to act as he saw fit, and

* These numbers are according to the English account in the Boston Gazette, 16th March, 1747. The French in the first instance gave a different statement. Subsequently, the English statement is repeated without contradiction [N.Y. Doc. X., p. 104] and it may be inferred was admitted to be correct.

the terms were agreed upon: viz., that the troops capitulating should leave within forty-eight hours with the honours of war for Annapolis; that the prisoners captured in the night attack should remain prisoners to the French; that a boat seized by the Indians should not be restored; that the sick and wounded could remain at the river au Canard; that the troops included in the capitulation should not bear arms during six months in Acadia. The English buried their dead on the 13th. On the 14th, in double file, with their arms and colours, they marched past a detachment of the Canadian troops of six officers and sixty men. In this wise 348 New England troops of all ranks left the scene of the disaster. They were escorted to the last house of the settlement, and provisions given them for their journey. Twenty Acadians went with them to the nearest houses of Annapolis.

The Canadian troops left Grand Pré on the 23rd of February, taking with them their prisoners. They arrived at Beaubassin on the 28th of March. Brilliant in a military point of view as the expedition had been, the temporary displacement of the New England troops accomplished no political consequence. It was without influence, except that it should have taught a lesson not easily to be forgotten. But such lessons had been given since the days of de Frontenac. The capitulation did not even lead to the country being held by the Canadian troops, for the force was immediately recalled. The event can be regarded only as one of the many exploits in *la petite guerre*, in which the French-Canadians shewed great qualities, the war of surprise soon to be forgotten. It would be difficult to shew that this mode of warfare permanently gained for Canada one acre of land. It was, however, persevered in to the last. It never found favour with the French officers during the seven years' war. It remains strongly reprehended in their writings which have come down to us. It had, however, become a principle of Canadian tactics, and all other operations were looked upon with disfavour.

De Ramesay remained at Beaubassin until the 1st of June, when he was ordered with his detachment to return to

Canada. He left behind him a fort under Legardeur de Repentigny. Thirty Canadians, with some Indians, constituted the force. These were also soon withdrawn. It was evident there were no French troops available to attack Acadia: any small force was exposed to danger. There was likewise to some extent difficulty in obtaining provisions. The main cause of their removal may be traced to the losses of the French in Europe.

The reverse which had happened to the French fleet on the 3rd of May was known in Canada. The fleet of M. de Saint George of seven men of war convoying six large Indiamen, joined to five ships of war under the command of de la Jonquière convoying transports and ships with stores for Canada, were met off cape Finisterre by the English fleet, consisting of sixteen ships of war commanded by Anson and Warren. The French fought with determination. They were however defeated, their killed and wounded amounting to 700 men. Six French men of war were taken, with six Indiamen and several transports. De la Jonquière himself was made prisoner and carried to England. It was his second attempt to reach Canada as governor general. The booty in stores, arms, accoutrements and money was large. Seven thousand uniforms and one thousand stands of arms were taken. They were generally designed for the use of Canada; it had also been the intention to land a force at the bay Verte, and to clothe and arm the men who would join it.

It was not the only naval disaster of the year. Commodore Fox with six ships of war took about forty French ships coming from Saint Domingo, which were separated from their convoy.

In October, Hawke with fourteen ships of the line, met M. de l'Etendeur with nine ships of the line and some frigates in convoy of a merchant fleet. The French commodore directed one of his larger ships and the frigates to accompany the merchantman, and with his eight vessels resolutely met the superior force against him. The fight lasted until night. All the ships were taken except "l'Intrepide" and "le Tonant,"

which escaped to Brest in a shattered condition. The French lost 800 men. Disastrous intelligence of this character made it plain to Canada that assistance could not immediately be looked for from France, either for the attack of Cape Breton or the reconquest of Acadia.

The diplomacy of de Beauharnois had been exerted to keep the Iroquois neutral. He had failed to do so, and on their attack on the French settlements, in reprisal of the expeditions from Crown Point, he formally declared war against the Mohawks.* The hostility of the tribes devoted to Canada was appealed to and called into activity, and the frontier warfare of former years was actively carried on. This policy was readily accepted by the Abenakis, and by the representatives of several western tribes then in Montreal.

The Indian relations in the west likewise presented a threatening aspect. Some Hurons had left Detroit under a chief named Nicolas, and had established themselves at Sandusky. Under circumstances which are not recorded,† he had attacked five Frenchmen who were returning from the river Blanche, and had seized the furs they were carrying with them. With the exception of the Illinois, much ill-feeling was entertained against the French, among the tribes bordering on lakes Huron and Michigan, several of whom had become engaged in an alliance to drive the French from Detroit: the intention was to carry out the plot on the day of the pentecost. A Huron woman discovered the design, and gave notice of it to de Longueuil. The Canadians accordingly sought refuge in the fort, and precautions were taken against any attack. As it was evident to those hostilely disposed that no surprise was possible, and it being plain that their plot had been betrayed, the attempt was not made.‡

* War was declared 7th March, 1747, in a council held at Montreal with the Saint Louis and Two Mountain Indians, and la Chauvignerie was sent with the announcement to the four other Iroquois cantons, to explain the cause which had led to the declaration. N.Y. Doc., X., p. 91.

† N.Y. Doc., X., p. 114.

‡ N.Y. Doc., X., p. 115.

The Hurons of Detroit had been conciliated by permission having been granted, in accordance with their request, to père de la Richardie to return amongst them. This priest had been removed from his position owing to the belief being entertained at Quebec that he had interfered with the policy of the government in its attempt to effect a settlement of members of the tribe in eastern Canada. Other tribes also shewed disaffection, and the report of M. Boishert, the superintendent of Indian affairs, gave a gloomy account of their condition.*

In these complications several Frenchmen were killed, and animals destroyed. A design had been formed to surprise Michilimackinac, but the precautions taken, made any attempt impossible. The letter announcing the fact was brought to Montreal by de La Verendrye.† The Indians had made unmistakable threats of their purpose, and they had killed the horses and cattle in the neighbourhood. The bells in the fort were rung. The tattoo beat and demonstrations of defence made. No Indian was permitted to enter the fort without restrictions. Some Frenchmen shortly after increased the garrison which had only consisted of twenty-eight men.

One of the causes of discontent was the high price of goods exacted by the French; and consequently the desire of the Indians to obtain from the English the necessaries they required, at a cheaper rate. Occasionally, English traders penetrated to their villages; but rarely. The cost of keeping the western Indians devoted to France was excessive, and even in this necessarily large expenditure, private interest played its part to make it greater. The maintenance of the western posts greatly increased the annual outlay of the province,

* N.Y. Doc., X., p. 88. "Things are in a bad condition in that country; their consequences may be unfortunate if we do not obtain a reinforcement of troops. The expenses necessary to maintain trade, and which are very heavy, are not to be thought of, and those people are always craving without its being possible to satisfy them." Report on Indian Affairs, November, 1747.

† N.Y. Doc. X., p. 119. He arrived August 13th, 1747. He never returned to the west: his death took place on the 6th December, 1749.

and it forms the constant topic of explanation on the part of the intendant.

The continuation of the fortifications of Quebec, so that the city should be surrounded by ramparts, was looked upon by de Beauharnois as indispensable.

The opinion in France was not in favour of the work. Independently of the great cost, it was reasoned that the conversion of Quebec into a fortified city was to hold out an inducement for an attempt in force to be made against it. The enemy once master of the place, in a short time could so strengthen himself, that he could not be driven out, even in winter when the naval force accompanying the expedition had sailed away. Such could not be the case if the land defences remained to some extent imperfect.

The work had been commenced in an irregular way in 1702. In 1712 some unimportant additions had been made by de Beaumont to the rear of the hospital of the Hotel Dieu, between St. Johns and Palace gates. In 1716 de Vaudreuil sent a *mémoire* to the regent recommending the completion of the *enceinte*. He pointed out that the loss of the city would be the loss of the whole of Canada. His *mémoire* was accompanied by the report of Chaussegros de Léry, describing the condition of the redoubts and bastions, and enumerating the works he recommended to be performed. In 1720, with the design greatly extended, the fortifications were recommenced, but they could not have been carried on to any great extent; no doubt the death of de Vaudreuil in 1725 interfered with their progress. In 1728 the king replied to the representations of de Beauharnois and Dupuy on the subject.* The project of constructing a citadel was rejected on the ground that this species of fortification was not in accordance with the genius of the Canadians and of the great expense it would entail. The completion of the enclosure was, however, considered as necessary to the security of the colony, and the sum of 87,250 *livres* was annually appropriated to attain it. The work could not have been continued,

* N.Y. Doc., IX., p. 1005.

for in 1734 de Beauharnois addressed the minister on the subject, asking that authority should be given for the completion of the wall round the town, in accordance with the plans sent by him the previous year.

The additions made, appear to have been limited to the batteries and ramparts along the shore,* and their condition was reported by de Beauharnois in 1744. Fully impressed with the necessity of carrying out the plans submitted by him, in July, 1746, he called a meeting of the inhabitants, and the opinion was obtained, that the completion of the fortifications should be persevered in, and that the country ought not to bear the whole expense. After the capture of Louisbourg, the work had been recommenced, under a contractor, M. Trottiers Désauniers; for some reason it was discontinued, and the contractor entered his protest against this breach of his contract. De Beauharnois was thus further impelled to resume the completion of the defences, and in reporting his operations stated that he would rather subject himself to a reprimand than neglect what he looked upon as an essential duty. M. de Léry was accordingly instructed to carry on the work, and in May, 1749, the *enceinte* was completed.

I have related the course taken in New England and New York in support of the proposition of Shirley for the invasion of Canada. It was estimated that 6,000 colonial troops could be brought into the field, and with the regiments from England the force would have been formidable. Much indecision was shewn in London; it could scarcely be otherwise in any project controlled by the duke of Newcastle. The preparations had been actively urged forward in New England. The leading men of those provinces were firmly convinced, that there was no safety for the country so long as it was exposed to an attack from Canada. The promised assistance by the British government had been anxiously looked for. It was determined, however, by the home authorities not to engage in any American expedition.

The resolution was taken to divert against the western

* Ib. IX., p. 1103, 8th of October.

parts of France the military strength which had been organized. An attack was made upon L'Orient in Brittany with the design of destroying the shipping and stores of the French East Indian company assembled there. The troops were under the command of St. Clair, the fleet under admiral Lestock. Nothing more was effected than that some villages were burned and plundered, so that the fleet and troops returned, much as they had left the shores of England.*

Although this fruitless expedition took place in 1746, no communication of any change of policy was sent to the colonies, and the feeling prevailed that the design against Quebec would eventually be carried out. In 1747, however, orders were sent to disband the enlisted men: a change of policy induced by negotiations for peace having been commenced after the battle of Lauffeld on the 2nd July. As both Shirley and Warren were of opinion that the attempt could only be made with a large force, instructions had been given to complete the strength of Philipps', Shirley's and Pepperell's regiments. Warren also recommended that the harbour of Chebucto should be fortified; the first intimation of the proceedings taken three years later for the foundation of Halifax.

In 1747, an attack made on fort Saratoga, which had been re-established, shewed, in its consequence, the absence of all caution and discipline on the part of the New York troops. The commander, de La Corne Saint Luc, represents his force to have consisted of twenty-five French and two hundred Indians. Some chiefs were sent to loiter about the fort, and on two of the garrison appearing outside the gate, the Indians fired upon them and retreated. About 120 men were marched out on a reconnoitring expedition and were led by the Indians

* Lord Mahon, with expressions of approval, quotes the remarks of a contemporary historian when relating this expedition. III., p. 323. "The truth is that Lestock was by this time grown too old and infirm for enterprise, and as is alleged, was under the shameful direction of a woman he carried along with him; and neither the soldiers nor the sailors during the whole of the expedition seem to have been under any kind of discipline."

Tindal's Hist., IX., p. 271.

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directly into an ambush where the French force was concealed. Twenty-eight men were killed and forty-five prisoners seized; the remainder hastily retreated. A second force was sent out in support, but no active operations were taken to rescue the prisoners.*

De la Galissonnière, who in June had been chosen to supply the place of de la Jonquière, then a prisoner in England, arrived in Quebec on the 19th of September, 1747, in the frigate "Northumberland." On the 14th of October, de Beauharnois took his departure. He had held his position for twenty years, which for the most part had been a period of peace. The record of a country governed as Canada, under the arbitrary authority of a central power, must in such times be to a great extent the history of the development of its trade and resources. From 30,000 souls in 1727, the population had increased in 1739 to 42,000. No figures are given of the population when de Beauharnois left the country. It could not have been short of 52,000 souls. If there be no remarkable event remembered in connection with de Beauharnois' administration, there is no accusation against him of remissness of duty, or of dishonest disregard of the public weal. The political event of his rule was taking possession of Crown Point, establishing and garrisoning a fort there, and the encouragement given by him to de La Verendrye. He rendered all the aid he possibly could to the government of Louisiana; and he had not unsuccessfully met the animosity of the western tribes. The country made rapid advances in the early years of his government, in all that may be described as material progress. It, however, suffered from the commercial convulsion with which France was afflicted, and in 1729, on the recommendation of de Beauharnois, card-money again became the currency of the colony.

The ordinance laid down the necessity of such an issue, owing to the specie sent out from France immediately returning

* The story is attested by Kalm, II., p. 288. He was at the spot in 1749, the fort was then burned, and he there heard the narrative. He adds that the colonists of Dutch origin hated the English settlers.

thither, by which commerce greatly suffered. The issue was to consist of 400,000 *livres*, consisting of notes of "24," "12," "6" and "3" *livres*, to be signed by the governor-general and intendant: likewise of notes of "1 *livre* 10 *sols*, 15 *sols* and 7 *sols* 6 *deniers*," which required only to be initialed.* The issue limited to this amount was receivable at its face value by the government for stores furnished, and for letters of change on France. This amount of currency being found insufficient, a second issue of 200,000 *livres* was authorized.†

This moderate quantity of such paper was unattended with risk, and undoubtedly extended relief, owing to the absence of specie in the colony, and the necessarily restricted currency. Had not the wars of four years later broken out, no inconvenience would have been felt, and there could be no such record as that which exists with regard to this currency. Its depreciation arose from the reckless administration of Bigot, who scattered broadcast his promises to pay in the shape of "*ordonnances*."

The wants of the colony were carefully considered by de Beauharnois. Not only were the fortifications of Quebec brought near completion, but those of Montreal also were placed in good condition, and the *enceinte* completed in 1741. The work had been commenced in 1716. Its total cost was 445,141 *livres*, 10 *sols*, 3 *deniers*. Of this amount the royal treasury advanced 329,117 *livres*, which was to be repaid by the citizens, and by the seminary: half of this amount was subsequently remitted, the remainder being made payable by the annual sum of 6,000 *livres*.‡

Roads were also opened. I have narrated that in 1734 a vehicle could pass from Quebec to Montreal. The communication between the two cities until this time had been by boat. There were lines of road to some extent in the neighbourhood of the three cities, but there were stretches of unopened land, particularly in the neighbourhood of lake Saint

* 2nd March, 1729. *Edits et Ordonnances*, I., p. 522.

† 12th May, 1733. *Ib.*, I., p. 544.

‡ *Arrêts du Conseil*, I., p. 567.

Peter. This portion of the route was undertaken in 1733, at the instance of the government, and apparently the work of opening the line where necessary, was performed, by *corvées*. Trade was generally encouraged. One nuisance de Beauharnois was the means of removing. It had become the practice of religious houses to receive the deserters and fugitives from justice who sought a refuge in these institutions. This abuse was abolished.* The officers of police were required to apply to the grand-vicars when desirous of making a domiciliary visit. In urgent cases they could waive this proceeding, and, accompanied by a judge and a priest, the law could be enforced. Notaries were called to account for the negligent manner in which they kept their papers, and they were instructed to arrange them orderly year by year; and to follow prescribed formalities.†

In 1744 several obligatory saints' days were suppressed by Mgr. de Pontbriand,‡ that is to say, recognition of them was transferred to the following Sunday. The strict observance of nineteen such days as holidays was no longer enforced, thus extending the period for agricultural labour. The reason for the change was their interference with the industry of the people. On several occasions permission had been given to work on these days, while many of the inhabitants had worked without permission. Moreover, the saints' days (*fêtes d'obligation*) were more numerous in Canada than in France. It was considered that this change in no way did away with the veneration due to the saints' days in question, but only transferred the special service to another occasion. Whatever the explanation given, it was a wise measure.

A remarkable ordinance was published on the 25th of November, 1743, by which all religious communities were restrained in the acquisition of property, and the law of mortmain with respect to them defined. It recapitulated that in 1703

* Ordinance, 19th February, 1732, I., p. 528.

† Ib. 6th May, 1733, p. 538.

‡ 24th November, 1744. Mandements, II., p. 40. "Mandement pour transférer la solennité de quelques fêtes au dimanche."

Louis XIV. had established that no religious house could hold more land than a hundred negroes could cultivate ; and further, that in August, 1721, it was enacted that no community could obtain additional land or property without the royal permission in writing. It was now declared that for the future, no religious or charitable community could be established without the royal authority, and that no foundation created by will could be permitted. Those who desired to establish a foundation were bound to obtain express permission to do so, setting forth the nature and value of the endowment. The permission, if obtained, could not be registered without being communicated to the other communities whom it might affect, and to all parties interested. If held to be expedient the enregistration could be opposed, and all endowments as to which these formalities were not observed were declared illegal.

All established communities were forbidden to accept property of any kind without express authority, including rents redeemable or irredeemable, and even if permission were granted, they were bound to enter into possession within a period of six months. Notaries were forbidden to pass any deed of gift to any communities. All persons were forbidden to lend their name to an indirect transfer under a fine of ten thousand *livres* ; in those days an extreme penalty. Gifts by will, including negroes, were forbidden. Payment of monies for the acquisition of property without permission of the crown was of no effect. In such a case, power was given to the heirs, or their children, or the heirs presumptive, to enter upon the property, notwithstanding prescription, or any consent tacitly or expressly given. In failure of the heirs to make the claim, the property could be united to the royal domain, to be employed in fortifications, or other public works. In other respects the communities were confirmed in the privileges which they possessed.*

* "Déclaration du Roi concernant les ordres Religieux et gens de main-morte établis aux Colonies françaises." Enregistered 5th Oct., 1744. Edits et Ordonnances, I., p. 576. It may be observed that in the acts hitherto passed by the

To prevent the minute division of property, a law was introduced, that no one should build on land less than an arpent and a half of front,* by forty arpents of depth. By law the properties were equally divided among the children; the consequence had been the creation of farms of a few feet of frontage and a long strip of land in depth, occupied by a poor class of holders, who lived in continual poverty.† The intention was to lead to the settlement of new concessions of uncleared land. This ordinance was only enregistered in Canada in 1746, six years before the final war broke out, so that it could only have been imperfectly acted upon. After the conquest it ceased to be observed, and has not been enforced during the period of British rule.

The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was so suddenly concluded that it is expedient briefly to relate the events which preceded it. My strong conviction is, that the desire of France to regain Louisbourg and Cape Breton was the main motive which led to the negotiations, for it was by France that the proposal was first made.

The campaign of 1747 had been unfortunate for the allies. In Italy nothing had been effected. Genoa declared its independence of Austrian authority, and the advance of a French army had led the Austrians to retire from fear that their communications would be cut off. In the Netherlands, where the duke of Cumberland was in command, the operations had commenced with the invasion of Holland by the French, which had the contrary effect to what was looked for. It had been anticipated that the presence of a hostile force would drive the inhabitants into a separate negotiation. It awoke the ancient pride and stubborn courage of the Dutch. With a cry of treachery against their rulers, they deposed the magistracy and nominated prince William of Nassau, stadtholder, captain-general, lord high admiral.

In Canada the question of mortmain has been regulated by limiting the extent of property to be held by a community or corporation; and giving them power to sell and acquire other property to the extent of that sold.

* 248 English feet.

† Edits et Ordonnances, I., p. 586, 28th April, 1745.

With two leaders in the field such as the young stadtholder and the duke of Cumberland, there arose jealousy and discord in no way favourable to military operations. At the battle of Lauffeld on the 2nd of July, the allies were defeated. The loss on both sides was severe. The duke made good his retreat beyond the Meuse. During the battle, sir John Ligonier, who had been a protestant French subject, was taken prisoner, and his arrest led to important consequences.

Both nations were suffering from the prosecution of the war. Pelham, the English minister, was disheartened at its cost, the difficulty of obtaining subsidized troops, and the unfortunate result of every thing undertaken. France, however, influenced by special motives, was equally strained by the loss of men and the drain on her resources, and was impressed with the desirability that hostilities should be brought to an end. By the desire of the French king, de Saxe had some confidential communication with sir John Ligonier. De Saxe remarked that the king did not like war : with regard to himself, he knew that he was disliked by the French, and that the least reverse would prove his ruin. Moreover, his health was broken, and he had honour enough. Finally he suggested that Ligonier should return to the duke of Cumberland, and make the proposition that negotiations for peace should be commenced. France asked nothing ; she was willing to restore what she had conquered and held in possession. If the demolition of Dunkirk were insisted upon, she desired to retain Furness. If the harbour of Dunkirk could remain intact, all that she would exact was the restitution of Louisbourg and Cape Breton. France would even restore Madras, which she then occupied.

This intelligence caused some perplexity in England, from the fear that George II. would insist that the negotiations should be entrusted to the duke of Cumberland. There was never any doubt of the duke's honour or courage, but he was impulsive, and was without diplomatic training ; a want not supplied by his natural character. The difficulty was met by sending the earl of Sandwich to assist the duke, who was to

hold the first place. Sandwich lost no time in proceeding to Holland, and on his way, at Liege, he held a secret interview with the marquis de Puisieulx.

The difficulties incident to a complicated alliance were not wanting. Both the duke of Cumberland and the prince of Orange, ambitious of military fame, were not averse to the continuance of the war. The empress Maria Theresa, whose vindictive nature was fully aroused, still hoped to obtain satisfaction for the successes of the French in the Austrian Netherlands; they then held Brussels, Mechlin, Louvain, Antwerp, Mons, Charleroi, and Namur. In Holland, Berg-op-Loom had fallen, on all sides regarded as a great disaster, and Maestricht was threatened. Austria had thrown the defence of the Netherlands on the maritime powers, and had carried on the war in Italy by English subsidies. Maria Theresa looked coldly on the negotiations, being indifferent to the suffering her policy might cause in the territory, where the battle was to be fought. George II. was not unwilling to conciliate the head of the empire, and in the interest of his electorate he would not have opposed a prolongation of the war if the terms of peace he desired could not be obtained. In this view he was sustained by the duke of Newcastle, who, as a matter of personal interest, supported the king. Thus the meeting of the congress was delayed, and the allies carried on their preparations for the next campaign, 30,000 Russians being subsidized to take the field.

The intrigues in the English cabinet are not matters of Canadian history. Pelham, in his desire for peace, was sustained by Chesterfield, who resigned office, on finding that his representations did not obtain the consideration he felt they were entitled to. Previous to taking this step he drew up a memorial setting forth the dangers of the war, and then retired to privacy, refusing the title of duke.*

Chesterfield was succeeded by the duke of Bedford, and

* The last public act of this gifted man, whose published writings give so imperfect a reflection of his intellectual endowments, was the prominent part taken by him in bringing the calendar of Great Britain in harmony with the rest of Europe. Eleven days were cancelled, it being enacted that the day following the

Sandwich was again despatched to Aix-la-Chapelle. The desires of the war party had failed to be realized ; even any hope of success in the campaign had passed away. In April Pelham gave instructions to conclude a preliminary treaty independently of the other allies. In this course Great Britain was joined by Holland, and on the 30th of April, 1747, the preliminaries were signed. The other powers refused to join in the settlement.

In spite of the exhausted condition of English finance, and the want of success on the continent, the peace was unpopular in England. The restoration of Louisbourg led to a great outcry, for its cession was looked upon as a sacrifice of national honour.

There is scarcely a writer on Canadian history who does not unfavourably narrate the restitution of Louisbourg. A little reflection will show that no other course was open to Great Britain if peace was to be obtained. It was the one condition exacted by France. The war, so far as it had been carried on by Great Britain, had been mainly one of subsidies, and excepting the issues raised on account of the disputed territorial possessions in North America, England had been drawn into a contest, in which she had but slight interests at stake. The navy was all powerful to protect her commerce from any insolence on the part of Spain ; and we in vain ask to be told what principle or interest was involved in the continental contest. The abandonment of the cause of the pretender was a great concession on the part of France ; it was the final settlement of his pretensions. We hear no more of him in history except of his personal character and his weaknesses : and the restitution of the conquests in the Austrian Netherlands, and in Holland, removed all dread of further European encroachment on the part of France.

The abandonment of Louisbourg to France by the mother country, a trophy of colonial prowess and enterprise, can never be a pleasant record to dwell upon by one, who professes

2nd of September, 1752, should be known as the 14th of September. From that date the "new style" came into vogue. As might be expected, this reform was opposed by the duke of Newcastle.

to write either the history of Canada or the present United States. But the event must not be considered from the standing point of sympathy or fancy. The question is plain, could anything else have been effected? No reader of history can answer that question in any other form than in the negative. In plain words, the establishment of peace was not attainable without this sacrifice.

At the time no one could doubt that the cession was fraught with mischief. The steps taken the following year to found Halifax was an attempt to counterpoise the preponderance which France had gained by receiving back her possession. It is an act of injustice to tax England with an abandonment of American interests by the surrender of Louisbourg. The sacrifice was forced upon her by circumstances too powerful for her to withstand; and by influences which she was unable to resist. It was a sequence to the continued want of success on the continent experienced by herself and her allies. One fact only is apparent in these contests, that the courage of the race had not passed away. But neither on the field of battle nor in the political home-life of the country are we gladdened by the faintest gleam of genius or the slightest evidence of patriotism. There was never a war so barren of results, and we have to add that the ignominious condition was attached to the restitution of the fortress, that Great Britain should furnish hostages for the observance of her engagement. The main point, however, to be considered in this history is: was the cession made in disregard of what was due to the American colonies or not? It is but an act of justice to the mother country to free her from every suspicion that such was the case.

Louisbourg was evacuated by the English and given over to the French on the 12th of July, 1749, colonel Hobson, governor of the fortress, acting for Great Britain, M. Desherbiers receiving the transfer on the part of France. On that day the flag of France was hoisted on the principal places of the island, the keys of the fortress given to the French commander, and the British troops were withdrawn.*

* Quebec Documents, III., p. 436.

CHAPTER VII.

The territory west of lake Superior is first mentioned as attracting attention a few years after the treaty of Utrecht; as early as 1716 de Vaudreuil brought the subject to the notice of the regent.* The route to the lac des Assiniboines, lake Winnipeg, must have been well known for it is described. Mention is made of a *voyageur* de Noyon, who wintered at the lake of the Woods, lac des Christinaux, in 1686. On his authority we hear of a nation from three and a half to four feet high, thick set; such as likewise had been seen by Jérémey at Hudson's Bay. De Noyon also, on the authority of the Indians, reported that there were fortified towns, where the men travelled on horses, the women sitting *en croupe*, and that it was possible to visit the western sea and return in five months. The memoir pointed out that the only means of obtaining the commerce of this country was by bringing it across the country to lake Superior.

In consequence of these representations it was resolved that three ports should be established: at the Kaministiquia; the lac des Christinaux, lake of the Woods; and at the lac des Assiniboines, lake Winnipeg.† In 1716 la Noue had been sent to the Kaministiquia, and in June, 1717, he was relieved by Deschalons.‡ The regent was however deterred from prosecuting the design owing to the expense; but an officer and fifty men were detailed to proceed with the discovery of the country. It was considered that there was nothing

* Mémoire joint à la lettre de MM. de Vaudreuil et Bégon de 12 Novembre, 1716, pour être porté à Mgr. le duc d'Orléans délibéré par le conseil, le 3 février, 1717. [Margry VI., p. 495.]

† 3 February, 1717.

‡ La Noue to the regent, 15 October, 1721.

certain, by which it could be judged whether these expeditions would be useful or not.*

It was to examine into the question and to determine the policy the most advisable to follow that the celebrated jesuit father, Charlevoix, visited Canada. He left Paris in July, 1720, and we have his well-known letters to the duchesse de les Diguieres, narrating his journey, and it is to his pen we owe the first history of Canada. On his return in 1723 he addressed the comte de Toulouse relative to the special mission which had been intrusted to him.† He recommended that the search of the western sea should be made by the valley of the Missouri, or through the establishment of a mission among the Sioux. The regent considered that the better course was to establish the mission. Charlevoix held to the view that the valley of the Missouri should be ascended and explored. Although Charlevoix made enquiries in all directions, he had to report that he could get little information of value. On occasions he was misled. The Canadians, he told the minister, made their journeys without giving themselves much trouble with regard to the countries they passed through. It was even necessary to be on one's guard in the acceptance of their statements; for sometimes being ashamed of not being able to render any account of what they had seen, "they make no difficulty in substituting some romance which they had pretty well digested in place of the truth which they do not know."‡

* Charlevoix to the Comte de Morville, Secrétaire d'État. Paris, 1 April, 1723. Margry, V., p. 531.

† Charlevoix à Mgr. le Comte de Toulouse, Paris, 20 Janvier, 1723: "Pour obéir à l'ordre dont j'avais été honoré [*sic*] il y a bientôt trois ans d'aller dans les principaux postes de l'Amerique Septentrionale faire des enquêtes touchant la mer de l'Ouest je m'embarquai au commencement de juillet, 1720, &c." Margry, VI., p. 521.

‡ "ils ne font point difficulté de substituer des romans qu'ils digèrent assez bien à la place de la vérité qu'ils ne connoissent pas," p. 522. Charlevoix was much puzzled by the contradictory reports he had heard at Cascasquias, forty leagues below the river Illinois. He met several Canadians, who on many occasions had visited the country of the Missouri river. On this subject he remarks: "j'ai trouvé tant de contradictions dans leur rapports que je n'ai pas jugé y devoir faire beaucoup de fond." Margry, VI., p. 523.

Charlevoix reached the Mississippi by the southern branch of the Illinois and descended to New Orleans, whence he went to Biloxi. His intention was to reascend the Mississippi; but he was attacked by a serious illness which lasted during six weeks.* It was, moreover, dangerous to ascend the river without a proper convoy,† and Charlevoix could obtain no such protection. Accordingly, he started for San Domingo, with the design of sailing thence to Quebec. But he was ship-wrecked off the coast of Florida, and this delay threw him into the winter season when return to Quebec by the sea was not possible; consequently, Charlevoix started for France.

It must ever be regarded as a great loss to our records that Charlevoix did not ascend the Mississippi. He would have explored the Missouri; and proceeding to the western limit of lake Superior, he would have anticipated the discoveries of de La Verendrye. We should possess in these papers a picture of the country, written with that clearness and careful attention to detail to be found in every page of that eminent writer. Charlevoix narrates, that had he reached lake Superior he would have obtained all possible information from the Indians, and, if practicable, would have gone as far as the western sea. In these projects there is no consideration given to the formidable range of the Rocky Mountains. It is plain that their existence was unknown; indeed it would be difficult to shew that these mountains were supposed to have any being:‡ it was surmised that there was an ordinary height


* Margry VI., p. 524.

† Ibid. p. 533.

‡ There is a MS. in the archive branch at Ottawa hitherto unpublished, being a journal by de La Verendrye in the form of a letter, from the 20th of July, 1738, to May, 1739. It gives but little information. He had heard that some white men, whom he considered to be Frenchmen, were living at a great distance to the west, and he undertook the journey in the hope of discovering them. He was unable to ascertain if the report was correct. Mention is made in a general way of some mountains to the west, but with no definitiveness. De La Verendrye was detained during the winter at the cabins of one of the tribes, having been robbed of the presents he was carrying for distribution, and by the desertion of his interpreter. In the spring he returned to the Assiniboines. This journey in another form is given with some detail by Margry, VI., pp. 583-595. It is undated.

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of land to be overcome, such as was met in other parts of the continent.*

During his stay in Canada Charlevoix found that attention was much directed to the discovery of the western sea. It was evidently regarded as the scene of future adventure. Many withheld information; others made enquiries, in the hope of profiting by Charlevoix's examination. It appeared to him that several were desirous of proceeding on the expedition,† with the desire of obtaining some ulterior advantage.

On his return to Paris, Charlevoix advocated the establishment of a mission among the Sioux on the Missouri. This tribe was then at war with the Assiniboinés, and Charlevoix conceived that prisoners might be taken, from whom ample information could be obtained. He offered personally to proceed to the Missouri to establish the mission; he desired, however, again to return to France, owing to the state of his health, which would not admit of his permanently undertaking its duties. The consequence was the establishment of the mission at lake Pepin, on the Mississippi, which I have related.‡

It was during the government of de Beauharnois that the explorations were commenced, by which the territory ultimately to some extent became known. The chief actor in these labours was Pierre Gautier de La Verendrye, son of René Gautier, seigneur of Varennes, for some years governor of Three Rivers. In 1744 he described himself as having had thirty-nine years' service in France and the colony, and to have

* Some idea may be formed of the condition of geographical knowledge when it is stated, that in 1723 a little more than a century and a half back, Charlevoix gave the narrative of a vessel caught in a south-westerly wind above California, in latitude 48°, being driven by the currents into straits, whence in a few days she came out north of Newfoundland, to pass to Scotland and to Lisbon, taking but three months for the voyage.

† Charlevoix au Comte de Toulouse. Missilimakinak le 27 juillet 1721. "j'ai cru m'apercevoir qu'en quelques endroits je ne faisais que battre les buissons, que quelques personnes que vouloient paraître fort instruites me disoient peu de choses, et que d'autres faisoient des recherches dont ils ne m'ont fait aucun part."

Margry, VI., p. 529.

‡ Ante page 270.

received nine wounds ; * nevertheless, he still held subaltern rank. Although a gleam of sunshine was cast upon his last years, like many distinguished men whose names are prominent in history, he enjoyed few of the prizes of life. His career was one of toil and privation, embittered by the jealousy of many of his contemporaries ; nor was calumny absent. In this case he was fortunately able to overcome it. In 1728 he was in command at Nepigon on lake Superior ; a fort at the foot of the river, running from the lake of that name, situate to the east of the river Kaministiquia. At that time he was a man between forty-five and fifty. He necessarily met many Indians at his post, and from them he gathered the geographical features of the country lying to the west. Two years after the arrival of de Beauharnois, de LaVerendrye addressed a memoir on the subject to him. On the authority of a chief of the Christinaux Indians, Pako, he reported the discovery in that territory of a great lake with three outlets: evidently lake Winnipeg. His narrative included the account of men three feet high, previously given by de Vaudreuil, living in caves from the want of timber to build houses. In 1729 de La Verendrye again addressed the governor-general, relating that four great rivers flowed from the western height of land. Geographically the fact is sustained by the Mackenzie, the Athabasca, the Saskatchewan, and the Missouri rivers. We may safely assume that very little was then known of the lake of the Woods, and its outlet by the river Winnipeg to the lake of that name ; a fact which in itself destroys the fable of a journey made upwards of a century earlier, in 1667, by Radisson and des Groselliers passing through these waters to Hudson's Bay.

De La Verendrye asked that aid should be given him to make some establishment at the lake of the Woods, and on lake Winnipeg, which he described under the name of Nepigon. He prays for the governor's countenance, on the ground that French occupation of the territory was necessary

* The memoir of his son [Margry, VI., p. 627] states that his father was wounded at Malplaquet.

to prevent the English entering into possession, the English being engaged in trade with the Christinaux Indians. There is no evidence that English traders had ever reached thus far. They had commenced to some extent to find their way to the Wabash, a tributary of the Ohio: the limit of their exploration. No person at Hudson's Bay had ever passed more than a moderate distance from its shores.

It is scarcely possible to look upon the assertion in any other light than that it was used as an argument by de La Verendrye to direct attention to his project: it was an appeal to national jealousy. It, however, establishes that although the territory may have been visited by individual traders during the preceding quarter of a century, and some facts of its geography were known, only little correct knowledge concerning it was current.

I have mentioned * that in 1727 a company was formed for traffic with the Sioux on the Mississippi, and that in 1731 it was reorganized. There is ground for the surmise that it was in connection with this company, or with some of the prominent parties in relationship with it, that the explorations of de La Verendrye took their origin. We possess the narrative of his proceedings during the succeeding thirteen years, so we are able to follow him year by year in the work which he accomplished. Subsequently de La Verendrye identified M. de Beauharnois with his efforts; but no assistance was given by the Government, and it must have been in his private relationship with the company that de Beauharnois acted. He ever remained the firm friend of de La Verendrye, and sustained him cordially to the last.

It is a coincidence worthy of attention that de LaVerendrye left Montreal two days after the new articles of association were signed. He himself mentions that several persons were

* Ante page 270.

† "Mémoire du Sieur de LaVerendrye au sujet des Établissements pour parvenir à la découverte de la mer de l'Ouest, dont il a été chargé par M. le Marquis de Beauharnois, Gouverneur Général de la Nouvelle France en 1731." The memoir was contained in a letter addressed to the Ministre de la Marine, Quebec, le 31 octobre, 1744. Margry, VI., p. 585.

connected with him in the enterprise. He started on the 8th of June,* 1731.

At Michilimackinac he was joined by the jesuit father Messaiger, and proceeded to lake Superior. He landed about thirty-eight miles south of what is now known as Pigeon river, the spot at which the *portage* commenced to navigable water. Its length led to a mutiny among his party. He was, however, able to equip four canoes of moderate size, and he sent his nephew la Jemeraye and his sons to Rainy lake. He himself wintered at the *portage*. The dispute proved a serious loss to him, owing to a quantity of his provisions being uselessly consumed.

On the 29th of May, 1732, the party from Rainy lake returned with the few furs collected,† which were sent to Michilimackinac in charge of his son with instructions to bring back the provisions and stores sent from Montreal. On the 8th of June, de La Verendrye started on his voyage of discovery. He was accompanied by the missionary, his nephew, two of his sons and several Indians. On the 14th of July, he arrived at the discharge of Rainy lake into Rainy river, where on the north side the preceding autumn fort Saint Pierre had been constructed. He descended the lake accompanied by fifty canoes of Indians, and on reaching what is now known as the north-west angle, where the islands first are met, he constructed fort Saint Charles. He was here joined by his son from Michilimackinac.‡ The last twenty-five miles of the journey had to be made on foot, as the ice had commenced to form. The party wintered here. It had been the intention of de La Verendrye in spring to prosecute his discoveries among the Assiniboines. The letters he received objected to this course until his canoes had returned. Accordingly he sent back the canoes to Montreal in 1733. Father Messaiger went with them, and his nephew carried a report to the governor of what had been done. In place of the four canoes

* The articles were signed on the 6th June, 1731.

† "Peu de peltrie."

‡ 12th November.

which he expected, a small boat only arrived, bringing the information, that those charged with the trade there, had consumed the provisions. In September, however, some canoes with an ill-assorted cargo reached him. At this time de La Verendrye was greatly embarrassed, and from his debts unable to continue his operations. *

In March, 1734, at the request of the Christinaux and the Assiniboine tribes, de La Verendrye sent his eldest son to construct fort Maurepas at the discharge of the river Winnipeg into the lake of that name. He himself returned to Montreal, where he arrived in August, and where he remained until June, 1735, when he left for the west. He arrived at fort Saint Charles on the 1st of September, to find it without provisions, and owing to the high level of the water, with little hope of obtaining any wild oats. On his arrival he sent la Jemeraye to fort Maurepas with the goods he had brought.

When in Montreal his arrangements had been made with a new set of men; and he returned with another missionary, père Auneau. In the spring of 1736 he was again destitute of all he needed,† and to his great surprise two of his sons and two of his men rejoined him owing to the want from which they were suffering. They reported the death of la Jemeraye. They had left the cargoes brought down in their canoes at a *portage* some twenty leagues distant. Accordingly, de La Verendrye sent away their canoes to obtain supplies and to bring back merchandise. Père Auneau resolved to accompany the party, being desirous of proceeding to Michilimackinac, and the missionary asked that the eldest son should be sent with them. The facts of the cause of the disaster were never known, but the whole party were attacked and massacred by the Sioux within seven leagues of the fort. ‡

Some limited supplies were forwarded in autumn. The following year, June, 1737, leaving matters in good order, he descended to Montreal. In 1738, he was at fort Saint Charles

* Margry, VI., p. 587.

† "denué de tout."

‡ According to Margry, VI., p. 576, this event took place on the 23rd of August.

in June. Leaving one of his sons behind in charge, he started with six well equipped canoes, and arrived at fort Maurepas on the 23rd. Continuing his explorations on the lake, he entered the mouth of the Red river, which he speaks of as the Assiniboine, and following the Assiniboine as the main river, he ascended it to the most northern bend, still known as Portage point ; there he constructed fort de la Reine. A *portage* of some miles carried him to lake Manitoba, opening up another system of waters. He was joined by one La Marque, his brother, and ten men in two canoes, with some Indians. Thus strengthened, he started to reach the tribe of the Matanes. His force consisted of twenty Frenchmen, independently of the leaders. Four Indians and their wives accompanied them. On the prairies he came upon two hundred huts of the Assiniboines, some of whom attended him on his journey to the lodges of the Matanes.

The difficulty of finding an interpreter, together with the loss of a box which had been stolen on the day of his arrival at the Matanes, caused him to discontinue his explorations. He determined to return, leaving behind him two Frenchmen, who remained to study the language. De La Verendrye was suffering from severe illness : he trusted that the exercise of the journey would revive him. It proved quite the contrary. The weather was severely cold ; the party arrived at the fort de la Reine on the 11th of February, de La Verendrye in the bad condition of his health having found the journey exceedingly painful. It was impossible, he said, to suffer more, and it is death only can release us when we have to undergo such hardships.*

In April he sent his son to explore lake Manitoba, when fort Dauphin was constructed by him at the narrows where lake Winnipegosis discharges itself into lake Manitoba. Ascending lake Winnipegosis, the younger de La Verendrye crossed the *portage* to reach the waters into which the Saskatchewan discharges. This river he names as the Poskoioac,

* "on ne peut souffrir davantage ; il n'y a que la mort qui puisse nous délivrer de pareilles peines." Margry, VI., p. 591.

and ascending its waters, a fort was constructed not far from where Cumberland House now stands.

In May the other canoes bearing the furs which had been collected, started for lake Superior to transfer the load across the *grand portage* and to receive the supplies which had been sent. The men of the party had to wait at lake Superior eighteen days, suffering during this period from want of food.

When the lake Superior canoes reached Michilimackinac, an order from the intendant was served upon them to pay goods to the value of 4,000 livres. An appeal was made to the commandant, who in some way arranged the difficulty. On the 20th of October the ascending canoes reached de La Verendrye with the provisions. Finding himself greatly embarrassed from want of merchandise, in 1740, he again started for Montreal. In July he sent supplies from Michilimackinac, instructing his sons to make an expedition among the Matanes. On the 25th of August he arrived at Montreal, and on his appearance was met by a declaration of a law suit. He explains that he arranged the claim to his great loss. At Quebec he was received with distinction as a guest by de Beauharnois in the *château*, and in the spring he accompanied the governor to Montreal. Otherwise he appears to have experienced jealousy and neglect. He related that he was accused of having imposed upon the court and having amassed a large fortune. With some bitterness he speaks of his 40,000 *livres* of debt as the result of his enterprise, and that he had sacrificed himself and his children to the public advantage. It was to the future he hopefully looked for the recognition of his services, not the least of which had been, that he had anticipated the English in the occupation of the country, and the furs which would have been carried to enrich their trade, had been a source of profit to Canada.

In 1741 he again started, accompanied by père Coquart, who did not, however, go beyond Michilimackinac. On the 16th of September, he reached fort Saint Charles. He found the Indians bent upon war. He obtained a promise that they would abandon their intention, but it was not kept. He pro-

ceeded to fort de la Reine, on the river Assiniboine, where he arrived on the 14th of October. He was surprised by his son giving him a white cotton covering such as is used by Europeans, which he sent on to de Beauharnois. One of his own sons he despatched to fort Bourbon, situated at the discharge of the Saskatchewan into lake Winnipeg, again to occupy it. On the 27th of April, 1742, he sent his son known as the chevalier de La Verendrye with another son and two Frenchmen to continue his explorations among the Matanes and to reach the "Gens de chevaux." They were absent fifteen months. At this point the memoir of de la Verendrye ceases.

The chevalier de La Verendrye has himself left a record of his own journey.* It is not, however, possible to trace the course followed by him on this occasion, or to form any correct opinion of the distance within which he approached the great range of the Rocky Mountains. With one of his brothers, and two Frenchmen, he started on the 29th of April. The object of his expedition was to discover the western sea. He reached the tribe of the Matanes in May, and remained with them two months, until the last week of July. He had delayed his journey in the hope that some of the tribe described as the "Gens de chevaux" would appear. None, however, came, so he engaged two men to guide him to their country. They journeyed west south-west for twenty days, and on the 11th of August they reached the mountain inhabited by the tribe. The guides would go no further. So the Canadians built a house, and lit a fire to attract attention. After remaining for a month at this spot, on the 14th of September they observed some smoke at the south south-west. It proved to come from some of the tribe of the "Beaux hommes." The latter hospitably received the party of de La Verendrye, and they remained with the tribe twenty-one days. On the 9th of November they started to discover the "Gens de chevaux."

* "Je prends la liberté de vous faire le récit du voyage que j'ai fait avec un de mes frères et deux François envoyés par mon père, etc." *Journal du Voyage fait par le Chevalier de la Verendrye, etc.* Margry, VI., pp. 598-611. It is undated, but must have been written before 1747; in October of that year de Beauharnois left Canada.

On the 19th they arrived to find the tribe in great tribulation, one of their villages having been destroyed by the "Serpents," a people fiercely hostile to them. Continuing their journey, they reached the "Gens de la belle-rivière." The village was large, and the Indians, like all the tribes of that country, possessed many horses, asses, and mules.* Proceeding on their journey, they arrived in view of the mountains on the 1st of January, 1743,† and on the 8th of January they came to their base. The description given of them in no way suggests that they reached even in view of the celebrated snow covered range. De La Verendrye describes them in a sentence as for the most part being well wooded, and that they appear very high.‡ Is it impossible to conjecture the mountains he looked upon. On his return, he evidently followed the route between the Saskatchewan and the Missouri, for on the 15th of March he names the tribe of "La petite cerise," who were two days from their fort on the Missouri. No attention was directed to the fact, to suggest that these high lands were in any way considered remarkable. No contemporary writer mentions the range of hills barring the way to the sea-coast. Had the striking lofty peaks covered with snow, glittering in the sun, been seen by the Canadian travellers, it is scarcely possible but the spectacle would have been reported, and the facts made known. It is only in modern times that the name of de La Verendrye has been heard as the discoverer of the Rocky mountains.

It is not a pleasant duty to call in question a popular tradition: but if history has to be written, it must be written honestly. The elder de La Verendrye accomplished great results, and his character needs no meretricious embellishment. Few names in Canadian history command more respect. He penetrated far beyond lake Superior, and it was by his expe-

* The date assigned in the memoir is the 18th November. As the travellers previously mention the 19th of this month as the date they arrived at the village of the "Gens de chevaux," the correct reading must be December.

† The fact is thus recorded: "Le 1er janvier 1743 nous nous trouvâmes à la vue des montagnes." p. 603.

‡ "enfin le douzième jour nous arrivâmes aux Montagnes. Elles sont la plupart bien boisées de toutes espèces de bois et paroissent fort hautes." p. 605.

ditions that lakes Winnipeg and Manitoba and the rivers Assiniboine and Saskatchewan became known, although the memoir of de Vaudreuil * establishes that the country had been visited before his explorations. The distance from lake Superior to lake Winnipeg is 500 miles. From fort Maurepas south of the lake, to fort Bourbon at the junction of the Saskatchewan, following the shore line must be 300 miles, to fort Poskoioac is 150 miles further. From fort Maurepas to fort de la Reine is 150 miles. Without considering the expedition of the chevalier de La Verendrye, the above furnishes a long list of good service. When we come to speak of the Rocky mountains, there must be hesitation in associating them with the name of this remarkable man. It is worthy of attention that in the map of the discoveries of M. de La Verendrye given to the *dépôt de marine* in 1750 by de la Galissonnière, no allusion is made to any discoveries beyond those I have mentioned.

The attacks against de La Verendrye to some extent attained their purpose. It is stated that M. de Noyelles was appointed to continue his discoveries. We read that they arrived together at Montreal from Michilimackinac on the 13th of November, 1747.† There is a letter extant from de La Verendrye, dated Quebec, November, 1746, which shews his return to favour, for he thanks the minister for his promotion to a captaincy. It is not improbable that he started immediately for the west, to return the following year with de Noyelles. His memorial to the minister of marine is dated Quebec, the 31st of October, 1744. I am unable to discover how he was engaged the succeeding two years.

De La Verendrye was much indebted to de Beauharnois for his re-establishment in favour; de la Galissonnière also proved his friend. Immediately after his arrival he addressed the minister on de La Verendrye's behalf. The new governor-general defended him from the charge of unduly enriching himself, pointing out that as the king paid nothing towards

* Ante page 366.

† N.Y. doc., X., p. 118.

the explorations, the only means of carrying them on was by trade. In September, 1749, de La Verendrye acknowledged the decoration of the cross of Saint Louis.*

The month of May, 1750, had been named by him for his departure on an expedition which was to take three years. The design was to winter at fort Bourbon, and there complete the organization, to make a start in the spring of 1751. It is one of the many unrealized projects which fill the records of every country. It failed owing to the death of de La Verendrye. His health had been much affected by the fatigues of his long career and by the hardships he had lately undergone. There had been little repose during his busy, anxious life. He died at Three Rivers on the 6th of December, 1749. He must then have been about sixty years of age.

Kalm the Swedish traveller records meeting the elder de La Verendrye in 1749, at Quebec, who gave him an account of the western explorations.† The Rocky mountains formed no

* 23 October, 1747. Margry, VI., p. 613.

† It was in August, 1749, that Kalm held a conversation with M. de La Verendrye, which he records. His narrative is worthy of attention when the character of the expedition I have attempted to describe is considered. "They set out on horseback from *Montreal* and went as much due west as they could on account of the lakes, rivers and mountains which fell in their way. As they came far into the country beyond many nations they sometimes met with large tracts of land free from wood, but covered with a kind of very tall grass, for the space of some days' journey. Many of these fields were everywhere covered with furrows, as if they had been ploughed and sown formerly. It is to be observed that the nations which now inhabit *North America* could not cultivate the land in this manner, because they never made use of horses, oxen, ploughs, or any instruments of husbandry, nor had they ever seen a plough before the *Europeans* came to them. . . . When they came far to the west, where to the best of their knowledge, no *Frenchman* or *European* had ever been, they found in one place in the woods, and again on a large plain, great pillars of stone leaning upon each other. The pillars consisted of one single stone each, and the *Frenchmen* could not but suppose that they had been erected by human hands. Sometimes they have found such stones laid upon one another, and as it were, formed into a wall. In some of those places where they found such stones they could not find any other sorts of stones. They have not been able to discover any characters or writing upon any of these stones, though they have made a very careful search after them. At last, they met with a large stone like a pillar, and in it a smaller stone was fixed, which was covered on both sides with unknown characters. This stone, which was about a foot of *French* measure in length, and between four or

part of his communication. What was put forth as an extraordinary discovery, would, if found in Europe, be described as druidical remains. I am not aware of such being known in modern times on the north American continent. What geographical allusions were made were entirely with regard to the western sea, which was described as being only a few days distant from the spot which had been reached: an assertion, whatever the error of distance, which took no account of the mighty intervening range of mountains.

It is questionable indeed if the Rocky mountains as we now possess the knowledge of them were correctly known until the passage across them by Lewis and Clarke in 1805.*

five inches broad, they broke loose and carried to *Canada* with them, from whence it was sent to *France* to the secretary of state, the count of *Maurepas*. What became of it afterwards is unknown to them, but they think it is yet preserved in his collection. Several of the jesuits who have seen and handled this stone in *Canada* unanimously affirm that the letters on it are the same with those which in the books containing accounts of *Tataria*, are called *Tatarian* characters, and that on comparing both together, they found them perfectly alike. Notwithstanding the questions which the *French* on the south-sea expedition asked the people there concerning the time when and by whom those pillars were erected? what their traditions and sentiments concerning them were? who had wrote the characters? what was meant by them? what kind of letters they were? in what language they were written? and other circumstances; yet they could never get the least explanation, the *Indians* being as ignorant of all those things as the *French* themselves. All they could say was that these stones had been in those places since times immemorial. The places where the pillars stood were near nine hundred *French* miles westward of *Montreal*. The chief intention of this journey, viz., to come to the south-sea and to examine its distance from *Canada*, was never attained on this occasion. For the people sent out for that purpose were induced to take part in a war between some of the most distant *Indian* nations, in which some of the *French* were taken prisoners and the rest obliged to return. Among the last and most westerly *Indians* they were with, they heard that the South sea was but a few days' journey off; that they (the *Indians*) often traded with the *Spaniards* on that coast, and sometimes likewise they went to *Hudson's Bay* to trade with the *English*. Some of these *Indians* had houses which were made of earth. Many nations had never seen any *Frenchmen*. They were commonly clad in skins, but many were quite naked." Kalm, III., pp. 123-128.

* A qualified exception must be made in favour of the celebrated Sir Alexander Mackenzie, who in 1793 reached the Pacific ocean by ascending the Unjigah or Peace river to one of its sources, and descending the river Columbia; thence taking a trail to the coast. In the years succeeding the conquest the men engaged in the fur trade only by degrees penetrated into the country west of lake

There is only one reference to them in the writings of this period of the eighteenth century. It is the report of Legardeur de Saint Pierre, to which allusion will be made in another place. Attention is in no way directed to any such range of mountains; and it is doubtful if, in the broad sense of the phrase, their existence was even conjectured.

Superior. Finlay, the two Frobishers, Peter Pond, Wadin and their assistants had only in view the profits they could obtain. In 1783-4, the Canadian North-West company was formed; in 1787, Pond reached the Elk or Athabasca river, the furthest point to which trade operations had then been directed, and in 1788, they were extended to the Peace river.

The journey of Samuel Hearne from the "Prince of Wales" fort in Hudson's bay to the Arctic ocean in 1769-70-71-72, undertaken by the order of the company for the discovery of copper mines, has no bearing upon this investigation, however important the discovery of the discharge of the Copper mine river into the Arctic ocean. It was Hearne's expedition which established the existence of the straits to the north of the American continent, and suggested the possibility of a north-west passage from east to west by the ocean, a problem only determined within the last thirty years. In his western explorations he reached the Great slave lake, called by him lake Athapuscon. The land passage across the main continent to the Pacific was first effected by Sir Alexander Mackenzie. Three years previously to his engaging in this undertaking, in 1789, he left fort Chepewyan, on the south side of the lake of the Hills, or as it is now called, lake Athabasca, and descended the Mackenzie river to the Arctic ocean. He returned to his starting point on the 12th of September of that year. During the whole of this period there is no mention of the Rocky mountains, as they are to-day known. Doubtless the fact that a range of some character formed a barrier across the continent had been imperfectly learned from the reports of the Indians, but there was no defined idea of the nature of this range.

In his passage to the Pacific, Mackenzie left fort Chepewyan on the 10th of October, 1792, and passing down the Elk into the Peace river, wintered above the forks, where he landed on the 1st of November. On the 9th of May he resumed his journey. It was August the 24th before he reached the same spot in the Peace river on his return. In his passage to the Pacific, Mackenzie has recorded his first view of the range. "At two in the afternoon the rocky mountains appeared in sight, with their summits covered with snow, bearing South-West by South: they formed a very agreeable object to every person in the canoe, as we attained the view of them much sooner than we expected." (p. 164).

This occurred on the 17th of May, 1793, and on the 25th of the same month he relates there were mountains on all sides of him.

In his description of the geography of the country he gives an account of what the mountains were then believed to be (p. 401). "The last, but by no means the least, is the immense ridge, or succession of ridges, of stony mountains, whose Northern extremity dips in the North Sea, in latitude 70 North, and longitude 135 West, running nearly South-East, and begins to be parallel with the coast of

the Pacific Ocean, from Cook's entry, and so onwards to the Columbia. From thence it appears to quit the coast, but still continuing, with less elevation, to divide the waters of the Atlantic from those which run into the Pacific. In those snow-clad mountains rises the Mississippi, if we admit the Missouri [*sic*] to be its source, which flows into the Gulf of Mexico; the River Nelson, which is lost in Hudson's Bay; Mackenzie's River, that discharges itself into the North Sea; and the Columbia emptying itself into the Pacific Ocean. The great River St. Lawrence and Churchill River, with many lesser ones, derive their sources far short of these mountains. It is, indeed, the extension of these mountains so far South on the sea-coast that prevents the Columbia from finding a more direct course to the sea, as it runs obliquely with the coast upwards of eight degrees of latitude before it mingles with the ocean."

This description sufficiently proves the uncertain knowledge obtained of these mountains. The volume containing Mackenzie's journey was published in 1801; an United States edition being brought out in Philadelphia the following year. The expedition from the mouth of the Missouri to its source, and thence across to the Pacific Ocean, under Lewis and Clarke, organized by the United States Government, carried out in 1804-5-6, was narrated by Patrick Gass, and published in London in 1808. It was by this expedition alone, that generally the true character of the Rocky Mountains became known, and a correct description of them given to the world.

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BOOK XI.

FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF M. DE LA GALISSONNIÈRE TO
THE TAKING OF OSWEGO BY MONTCALM IN 1756.

THE FOUNDATION OF HALIFAX, 1749.

THE FORCIBLE REMOVAL OF THE ACADIANS, 1756.

CHAPTER I.

M. de la Galissonnière remained in Canada only two years, nevertheless, few governors have exercised more influence upon the condition of the colony.* Rolland Michel, marquis de la Galissonnière, was born at Rochefort in 1693. At seventeen he entered the navy and saw much service, having on all occasions distinguished himself by his conduct and courage. On his arrival he was within a month of reaching his fifty-fourth birthday. We have the traveller Kalm's authority for his scientific attainments.† He describes the new governor

* M. de la Galissonnière arrived the 19th September, 1747. He left Quebec the 24th of September, 1749.

† Kalm relates that on his arrival in fort Frederick, Crown Point, "The governor of the fort was pleased to shew me a long paper which the then governor-general . . . had sent him. . . . In this writing a number of trees and plants are mentioned, which grow in *North America*, and deserve to be collected and cultivated on account of their useful qualities. . . . It is further requested that all kinds of seeds and roots be gathered here; and to assist such an undertaking, a method of preserving the gathered seeds and roots is prescribed, so that they may grow and be sent to *Paris*. Specimens of all kinds of minerals are required, and all the places in the *French* settlements are mentioned where any useful or remarkable stone, earth, or ore has been found. There is likewise a manner of making observations, and collections of curiosities in the animal kingdom. To these requests it is added to enquire and get information in every possible manner, to what purpose and in what manner the *Indians* employ certain plants, and other productions of nature as medicines, or in any other case. This useful paper was drawn up by order of the marquis de la Galissonnière by M. Gaultier,* the royal physician of *Quebec*, and afterwards corrected and improved by the marquis's own hand. He had several copies made of it, which he sent to all the officers in the forts, and likewise to other learned men, who travelled in the country. At the end of the writing is an injunction to the officers to let the governor-general know which of the common soldiers had used the greatest diligence in the discovery and

* Gaultier died in 1756 at the early age of forty-seven, from an attack of ship fever, caught during his attendance at the hospital: a contagious disease communicated by "Le Leopard," one of the vessels of the squadron bringing *Montcalm's* reinforcements [M. l'Abbé Verréault].

personally as being small in stature and somewhat deformed, but of pleasing appearance. He speaks of de la Galissonnière's knowledge as remarkable, especially in natural history, so that the listener could fancy he was being addressed by Linnæus. Kalm was equally impressed by his political sagacity. During the short time de la Galissonnière was in Canada, he made a collection of the natural productions of the country, and carried back to France many young plants and saplings in pots of earth for propagation. To this hour, few governors have been more remarkable for assiduity and broad statesmanlike views. He was recalled to take part in the commission to determine the boundaries to be established under the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in which duty he was associated with M. de Silhouette. The English commissioners were Shirley and Mildmay.

De la Galissonnière arrived in Canada during the war previous to the commencement of the negotiations for peace; his letters shew that he was not without apprehension that Quebec would be attacked by sea.* On receiving instructions discouraging any operations on his part, he replied† that he was contemplating attacks upon Hudson's Bay and Oswego. He complained of being doomed to inactivity, and recommended that a strong force should be sent to Acadia; it would lead to expense, but it would bring good results. He advocated the employment of Indians in warfare, as they cost as much when idle as when on service.

A memoir written by de la Galissonnière the year after he left the country is worthy of attention, as it explains the policy which he himself followed.‡ He foretold much that came to pass; he foresaw that when war commenced in

collection of plants, and other natural curiosities, that he might be able to promote them, when an opportunity occurred, to places adapted to their respective capacities, or to reward them in any other manner." 2nd July, 1749, Vol. III., page 5.

* Que. Doc., III., p. 396. 22 Oct., 1747.

† Ib., III., p. 399. 6 Nov., 1747.

‡ N.Y. Doc., X., p. 220. It was held of such importance, that nine years later [N.Y. Doc., X., p. 941] it was sent by M. de Silhouette to the minister of marine as possessing great weight.

Europe it would be transferred to America, and an attempt would be made to invade Canada : accordingly, the province ought to secure the avenues by which any attack might be made. Passing over the general principle of the utility of colonies and the necessity of attending to their preservation, there being but few persons who did not admit that they were in some degree necessary to a great state, he drew attention to the fact that they were established in America. There were in those days a class which advised the abandonment of colonies, when not productive of revenue, or which were a source of expense. De la Galissonnière enumerated the arguments which can be adduced to sustain this view. From their extent, it was not always practicable for their government to be controlled by the same mind, and the component parts could not always give reciprocal aid. When French manufactures were only deliverable by sea, in event of a blockade there would be a scarcity of these goods ; on the other hand, a surplus of Canada produce would arise. Goods for exportation could never be furnished as cheaply by Canada as by New England, and for a long time the expense of government must exceed the revenue. Briefly dwelling on the motives of honour and religion which bound a nation not to desert a people who had emigrated to a foreign country under government auspices, he directed his argument to the national benefits to be obtained from the retention of the province.

One advantage Canada possessed : the power of making war on the Anglo-American territory, which was held in great account by its possessors, and daily increasing in power. He instanced the number of French Canadians who lived in the woods with the Indians, qualified to lead them in fight, or themselves to attack the Indians. He foretold that the loss of Canada to France would drag after it the superiority which France could claim over England. His desire was to wrest Hudson's Bay from the English on the first declaration of hostilities. It was plain to him that, on the opening of the war, if the French did not seize Acadia, the English would again take Louisbourg. He highly estimated the pos-

session of the fortress, from the importance of the fisheries, and the number of seamen engaged in them, accustomed to the life. To secure cape Breton, to use the modern word, to the French, it was necessary to maintain its connection with Canada. As for some months of the year the ascent of the river Saint Lawrence was not possible owing to ice, during winter communication was only practicable by land. It was this consideration which gave weight to the English occupation of Acadia. He laid down the principle that no fort should be built from Canso to the isthmus on the east coast; and that the territory, for a width of three or four leagues, seven to ten miles, should be neutral, along which the French should have the right of passage. He claimed the Kennebec as the boundary for France. He recommended settlement along lake Champlain to Crown Point; that Ogdensburg, to use the modern name, should be fortified, and settlement commenced in its neighbourhood. He looked upon the establishment of Oswego as a British port as most dangerous to French prosperity, and advocated its destruction so soon as hostilities permitted.

The Ohio attracted his attention as the best communication with the Mississippi and Louisiana: likewise the connection by the Illinois. He regarded the settlement of this territory as imperatively called for; Detroit as of primary importance, for when it once contained a farming population of one thousand, it would feed and defend the remaining portion of the territory. He summarized his remarks by dwelling on the necessity of permanently settling the country at Crown Point, Niagara, Detroit and the Illinois, recommending that several persons should be sent from France, principally soldiers; some smugglers might be added; even women of bad reputation if necessary; but few of the latter, as there were more women than men in Canada, and this step might not be required.

De la Galissonnière was joined by Francis Bigot, who replaced Hocquart as intendant. He landed at Saint Joachim about twenty miles below Quebec in August, 1748, and drove

to the city, which he reached on the 25th. He only assumed the duties of his office on the 2nd of September, but he had been appointed some months earlier to the position. He was a member of a family of Guienne, of high position in the law. Those who describe his good side speak of him as having wit and penetration, with ability of a high order ; when once he gave his protection he did not lightly withdraw it. He lived in magnificent hospitality, and many paid him their court ; he was charitable, kindly, and fond of his pleasures. At the same time he was devoted to his duties, worked hard, and was jealous of his authority. One cause of his subsequent misconduct was his entanglement with Madame Péan. Her husband was a native Canadian, with moderate ability, who was dependent on Bigot for his position. The woman is described as young, sprightly, and witty. Her conversation, sparkling and agreeable, attracted the intendant, who, succumbing to this infatuation, to the last hour remained attached to her. He passed every evening in her society. It was the secret of Bigot's speculations. There is no record to shew that, independently of his frauds on the government, and they were in every way infamous, he was better or worse than the other officials who illegally carried on trade ; many as a necessity, for they were poorly paid. A contemporary writer,* not unfriendly to Bigot, describes Madame Péan as the centre of a small court of persons of her character, or approaching it, who by their deference deserved her protection, and who made great fortunes. It resulted that those who desired employment or promotion could only obtain it through her. Servants, lackeys, people without birth, education, or character, were by her influence placed in charge of the stores at the posts. Their ignorance and dishonesty were no obstacle to their advancement. Her recommendation prevailed to exclude worth and merit. The finances in a short time suffered from the avidity of these men, and the whole people groaned under their arbitrary power. Bigot held office to the last hour

* Mémoires de S — de C — contenant l'histoire du Canada durant la guerre, p. 63.

of the struggle. His energy and ability made his services valuable ; unhappily for the country and himself, his honesty was not on a par with his admitted capacity.

The troubles with the western Indians continued. One scheme to coerce them was to deprive them of supplies for the support of their families,* and in the spring of 1748, it was proposed that no canoes should be sent to the west. In 1747, several of the Miami tribe under the chief "la Demoiselle," seized some property belonging to traders established near the fort at the head of lake Michigan. As the tribe contained a strong party in favour of the French, de Longueuil, then in command at Detroit, sent Dubuisson, an officer of some energy, with a small force to the fort, which had been partially burned, to hold possession of it, but not to engage in any expedition. The party started ill-provided; and when at the post suffered privation owing to the ill-feeling of the Indians, who refused supplies. During the period of his stay, a Frenchman who strayed from the fort was killed. The assailant was not given up, but much of the property which had been stolen was returned. In the spring, Dubuisson went back to Detroit, and the expedition was without effect.†

Difficulty had also been experienced with regard to the christian Hurons established at Sandusky. Some of the tribe had killed five French traders passing through the country, and they had called upon the Ottawas and Pottawatamies to join a general rising. The latter declined to interfere, but several of the Ottawas had agreed to take part in it. The slaughter of the five Frenchmen precipitated matters. The Indians, well disposed to the French, came forward to aid them, and the consequence was that those who were responsible for the outrage appeared at Detroit with propositions for peace. De Longueuil had with him only a small force, and was ill-supplied for any operation in the field. He had, moreover, received instructions from M. de Beauharnois how to act in

* New York Doc., X., p. 137.

† N.Y. Doc., X., p. 181.

such a case, and as he had been directed, he offered terms of peace, in no way onerous to the Indians. During the period that the negotiations were being carried on, and a favourable conclusion to them seemed certain, an attack was made by some Indians on a canoe not far from Detroit,* in which three men were wounded. De Longueuil immediately sent a party, under an officer named de Belestre, in pursuit, who followed on the trail of the aggressors so actively that he seized the five Indians who had committed the assault. One of them was immediately executed at Detroit; a second committed suicide; the remaining three, at the solicitation of the friendly Indians, were given back to the tribe, in the hope that, gratified by this course, they would return to their old alliance with the French. As in Montreal there was doubt of the success of this policy, it was resolved to make a demonstration in force, especially as de Longueuil had asked for more men and provisions.

A party, consisting of one hundred soldiers, several *voyageurs*, with a few reliable Nipissing Indians, started from Montreal for Detroit under the command of de Céloron. The direct effect of the appearance of this force was that several Huron chiefs descended to Montreal to propose terms of peace. They arrived at the same period as several Indians from Michilimackinac. There had been many outrages on the upper lakes. Some men had been killed at Saginaw, an Ottawa village on lake Huron; others at La Cloche, in the neighbourhood of the Manitoulin islands; others at Grosse ile, near Michilimackinac. The *voyageurs* at Sault Saint Mary and lake Superior had not escaped attack. De La Corne was then the commandant at Michilimackinac; but he was absent, having been ordered to Montreal and sent on the expedition to Acadia.† His place had been supplied by de Saint Pierre, who arrived there in October, 1747. He found the Indians ill-disposed to the French. He, however, was

* N.Y. Doc., X., p. 182.

† Ante page 349.

able to seize two of the murderers, who by his instructions were taken to Montreal by members of the tribe.

De la Galissonnière was then in Montreal, whither he had gone in January. Kalm tells us that the governor preferred Montreal to Quebec. On this occasion he remained in the city until the end of July. He met the Michilimackinac deputation, and at their request set at liberty some hostages held by the French, as he did not desire to punish the innocent for the guilty. He resolved, however, to send the prisoners to Quebec, to be kept there under restraint. During the interview one of the Indians present was recognised as an active participant in the outrages. He was arrested and sent with the others to be kept in confinement.

The sequel is difficult of explanation. The three prisoners were placed under the charge of an experienced sergeant and seven picked men. The prisoners were manacled at their feet. Shortly afterwards the canoe was discovered with the bodies of some of the soldiers. The prisoners had escaped. The event has never been explained. The news was first carried to Three Rivers, and owing to some laxity of investigation the facts were only imperfectly known. It is scarcely possible that the escort could have been defeated without stratagem or some assistance from without.

It was de la Galissonnière who gave instructions for the establishment of a fort at Toronto. The whole territory extending to lake Huron was then known by that name. Lake Simcoe is shewn on Charlevoix's map of 1745, as lake Toronto; while in the early French maps the site of the present city is referred to as Teiaigon; Matchedash bay is also known as Toronto bay. The name was even given to some of the waters of the bay of Quinte.

It was the route followed to lake Huron. Lake Ontario was left at what is now called the river Humber; the *portage* passed, Holland river was descended to lake Simcoe. At the end of the lake, the river Severn led to Matchedash bay and to lake Huron.

The object in the establishment of the fort was to prevent

the trade of the Indians with Oswego. The design originally conceived by de la Galissonnière and Bigot, was only executed under de la Jonquière. In the autumn of 1749, some workmen with de Portneuf and fifteen soldiers were sent up to carry out the project. On completion, the new structure was named "Fort Rouillé," after the colonial minister. It remained, occupied by a small garrison, until 1758, when Niagara was taken in the attack of Prideaux and Johnson. To prevent the fort falling into the hands of the English it was abandoned and burned.*

The ordinance of the French king† consequent on the signature of the preliminary articles of peace forbade all hostility to be committed against the king of Great Britain. In July, 1749, Louisbourg was evacuated, for the French flag once more to wave over cape Breton. The fact of the peace with the condition of the evacuation of Louisbourg was thus well known at Quebec. Nevertheless these changed relations between the two nations in no way caused de la Galissonnière to relax in his determination to secure territory for France, and he resolved to take possession of the valley of the Ohio, in an authoritative if in a peaceful manner; regarding it as the connecting link between Canada and Louisiana. He was no little encouraged so to act, by the irresolution of the New York legislature. The vacillation of this body shewn in its neglect in protecting the outer posts of the province, especially at Saratoga, was well known in Canada. During the last months of the war, more energy had been shewn, and the prowling parties from Crown Point had obtained no success; indeed the French had suffered from the attacks of the Mohawks.

No ground for the claim to French sovereignty over the valley of the Ohio, can be found otherwise than on the explo-

* We owe to the exertions of the Rev. Dr. Scadding, of Toronto, that the site of the fort has been preserved. An obelisk erected on the ground on which it stood was unveiled by Lord Lansdowne, 6th September, 1887. Situated in the agricultural exhibition grounds, it is about 130ft. east of Dufferin-street, within half a mile of the river Humber.

† Que. Doc., III., p. 420, 26 May, 1748.

rations made by de La Salle. In a previous chapter,* I have examined de La Salle's pretensions to the discovery of the Mississippi by the Ohio: they appear to me untenable. France had established her authority over the country to the north-west of the lakes, and to the south of the Illinois. The district south of lake Erie had never been the scene of French Canadian exploration, and the territory around the Ohio had been tacitly regarded as an appendage to the eastern British provinces of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia. From these states for some years traders had crossed the mountains, and the inhabitants of the three provinces had established relationship with the Indians domiciled there. Except for the necessity of uninterrupted connection between Canada and Louisiana, it is not probable that the French claim to the territory would have been preferred. With de la Galissonnière the conviction was strong that the possession of this connecting extent of country was indispensable to French power: and although there was not a known Canadian settler throughout its extent, and no dispute had as yet arisen with regard to its occupation, he took steps to proclaim French sovereignty over the whole valley of the Ohio and its tributaries.

He organized an expedition under the command of de Céloron, a captain in the French service, a chevalier of Saint Louis. His immediate subalterns were de Contrecoeur, Coulon de Villiers, six junior officers and six cadets, with twenty French soldiers, one hundred and eight Canadian *voyageurs*, and thirty Iroquois and Abenakis. They left Lachine on the 16th of June, 1749, and landed at the spot now known as Portland, whence the *portage* was to be taken to lake Chatauqua. The water in the neighbourhood is so shallow that barques cannot approach within a league of the shore, and the navigation, owing to a rocky bottom with many projecting points of the formation, is dangerous to canoes. No protection can be obtained against the winds, and there was then no Indian village in the neighbourhood. The landing place made an unfavourable impression on de Céloron. We

* Ante Vol. I., p. 408.

have in these facts the explanation of the subsequent change in the base of operations to Presqu'île, some miles to the west on lake Erie, at the town now known as Erie in Pennsylvania. It formed the landing place for future operations; no further attempt was made to follow the route taken by de Céloron.*

The distance from lake Erie to lake Chataqua is eight miles, the latter being in its mean height 726 feet above lake Erie; to reach the height of land between the two water systems 1,000 feet has probably to be ascended. Some advantage was taken of the small creek discharging into lake Erie, but nearly the entire distance had to be overcome by "portaging." On the 22nd of July, de Céloron was able to place his canoes on lake Chataqua. He was now on a tributary of the Ohio which discharges into the Mississippi. De Céloron repaired his canoes and gave his men a day's rest after their labours. They had been severe, for he had had to cut his way before he could pass with the canoes and stores. He arrived within two miles or so of the discharge of the lake, when his scouts informed him that parties had been seen in the woods and had fled on their approach. The small tributary stream into which he entered was shallow, so the canoes were lightened and a *portage* of three quarters of a league saved. De Céloron tells us that le Sieur de la Saussaye pointed out this spot, conveying the idea that he was previously acquainted with the country.

On the 25th a council was held. The previous evening they had reached a village, the cabins of which had been precipitately abandoned, the canoes, utensils and even food having been left behind. De Céloron saw the risk of alarm being given to the other villages, and an ambuscade of a large united force being laid for his party. He accordingly determined to send forward Joncaire, a lieutenant, with some Indians

* "Journal de la campagne que moy Céloron, chevalier de l'ordre royal militaire de Saint Louis, capitaine, commandant un détachement envoyé dans la Belle Rivière, ai faite par les ordres de M. le Marquis de la Galissonnière, commandant général de toute la nouvelle France et pays de la Louisiana." [Margry, Vol. VI.] "Je n'y ai rien trouvé d'avantageux, etc," p. 669.

to the village of Paille-coupée to invite those living there to remain, and to explain to them the friendly spirit of the expedition. The route was followed cautiously for the three ensuing days. Owing to the low level of the water at many spots, the canoes were frequently only moved forward with difficulty. On the 29th he reached the stream now known as the Alleghany; the creek he had been following was the Conewango.

De Céloron had been furnished with leaden plates with engraved inscriptions.* On arriving at the Alleghany, one

* These plates were eleven inches long and seven and a half inches wide. One of the inscriptions was as follows:—"L'an, 1749, du regne de Louis XV., Roy de France, Nous Céloron Commandant d'un détachement envoyé par Monsieur Le M^{re} de la Galissonnière [sic], Commandant General de la Nouvelle France pour rétablir la tranquillité dans quelques villages sauvages de ces cantons, avons enterré cette plaque au confluent de Lohio et de Tchadakhoin ce 29 juillet, près de la Rivière Oyo autrement Belle Rivière, pour monument du renouvellement de possession que nous avons pris de la dite Rivière Oyo, et de toutes celles qui tombent, et de toutes les terres des deux côtes jusque aux sources des dites Rivières ainsi qu'en ont jouy ou du jouir les précédents Rois de France, et qu'ils s'y sont maintenus par les armes et par les traites spécialement par ceux de Riswick d'Vtrecht et d'Aix la Chapelle."

A fac-simile is given in the New York Doc., VI., p. 611.

One of the plates was stolen, probably dug up after having been sunk in the ground. It was delivered to Sir William Johnson on the 4th of December, 1750, at his residence on the Mohawk, by a Cayuga chief [New York Doc., VI., p. 604], who stated that it had been obtained by artifice from Joncaire. He desired to know the meaning of the proceeding. Johnson explained the matter as may be supposed.

"Brethren," he said, "this is an Affair of the greatest importance to you, as nothing less than all your Lands and best Hunting Places are aimed at with a view of secluding you entirely from us & the rest of your Brethren, viz^t, the Philadelphians, Virginians, &c., who can always supply you with the necessaries of Life at a much lower rate than the French ever did or could, & under whose Protection you are, & ever will be, safer and better served in every respect than under the French. These and a hundred other substantial reasons I could give you to convince you that the French are your implacable enemies. But as I told you before, the very Instrument you now brought me of their own writing is sufficient of itself to convince the world of their Villanous designs. . . ."

The chief, "with great attention & surprise, heard you repeat the substance of that Devilish Writing which I brought you, & also with pleasure noticed your just remarks thereon, which really agree with my own sentiments on it."

New York Doc., VI., pp. 609-610.

Clinton sent a report of the matter to England, and forwarded the plate on his receiving it on the 17th January, 1750.

of these plates was buried, and the arms of the king of France on a shield of tin were attached to a tree. The place is now known as Warren. Proceeding down the Alleghany, de Céloron met the deputation which had been sent from the village to confer with him. He gave them some milk of their father Onontio, as they called brandy, and some tobacco. They reached a village, which consisted of twelve or thirteen cabins, and de Céloron was saluted on his arrival by musketry. He encamped on the opposite bank. He invited the Indians to accompany him to the village of "Paille-coupée," and there to hear what he had to say. He arrived on the 30th: both these villages were composed of Seneca Indians. Joncaire had great difficulty in persuading them to remain, and it is probable, that without his presence among them, they would have abandoned the place. A council was held. De Céloron relates that the Indians agreed not to receive the English; and in spring that they would themselves return to Canada. It rained the following day, so de Céloron remained where he was. The rain raised the level of the creeks, the journey could therefore be continued with less impediment. On the 1st of August, he passed a village of the Loups and Foxes. One man only was present; all the rest had taken flight. At a second village he addressed the inhabitants setting forth his friendly intentions. The answer, which he received, shewed the good feeling towards the English, the Indians praying to be allowed until next spring to retain those who were present among them.

On his arrival at the junction of French creek with the Alleghany, described by him as the river aux Bœufs, he found only five or six Iroquois. The English traders and the Indians had sought refuge in the woods. He here buried a second plate.

Joncaire was again sent forward to the village of Attigué. On reaching this place, supposed to have been some twenty-five miles above Pittsburgh, de Céloron only found Joncaire with his men; the Indians belonging to the place had taken flight. He proceeded onward to Chaouanon, a Shawnee

village, which, by the order of de Beauharnois, had been abandoned since 1745, when Chartrand and the party with him were removed to the river Vermillon, a tributary of the Wabash. He there met six English traders with fifty horses and about one hundred and fifty packets of furs. De Céloron relates that he summoned them to retire from the territory as belonging to the king of France, with the threat that if they came back their property would be taken from them. They were allowed to proceed homeward with their wares, de Céloron describing them as profuse in promises not to return, and whether by fear or otherwise,* admitting that they had no business there.

From this place de Céloron addressed a summons to the governor of Pennsylvania. It was dated the 6th of August: he was careful to avoid any declaration that he was present to take possession of the country. He represented that he had come to settle some quarrels which had broken out between the savage tribes. He was exceedingly surprised, he said, to find English traders who had intruded on the territory to which they had no right. He called upon the governor to put a stop to this trade as contrary to treaty.

The journey was continued. A village of Loups, in which only three men had been left, was passed. De Céloron invited them to attend him to the next village, known as "Rocher Ecrit,"† under the sovereignty of an old woman devoted to the English. By the description given of this place the belief has been formed that it was in the neighbourhood of Pittsburg,‡ below the junction of the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers, which unite to form the broad Ohio. The banks in this season were rich with luxuriant foliage. Although the Indians had left, the English traders had remained. They were taken before de Céloron. None of the Canadian party could speak English; the English affected not to understand French, finally they came to some inter-

* "Soit par peur ou autrement," p. 686.

† On examining the rock the writing was found to consist of some English names in charcoal; p. 688.

‡ "Cet endroit est une des plus beaux que j'ay vus jusqu'à présent dans la Belle Rivière," p. 688.

change of ideas by means of Indian *chaouanon*. The traders were ordered away from the spot. They are represented as saying that they claimed no particular right of commerce, but were simply endeavouring to earn their bread, and hereafter that they would not return.

The camp was placed three leagues lower down. De Céloron was now approaching Chiningué, indeed, he was only some five miles above it. Accordingly, he directed his men to take some pains in their dress before starting, in order to impress the Indians by their decent appearance, this village being one of the most considerable on the Ohio.

As he was preparing to start a canoe was seen approaching. It contained two men sent out to obtain information. De Céloron gave them "*un coup de lait de leur père Onontio*," brandy: the men asked that some time be allowed the village, duly to receive the French. De Céloron, uncertain of his reception, served out ammunition and took precaution against hostilities. On his approach he saw one English and some French flags flying. As soon as he appeared he was received with a salute of musketry: as the salute took the form of a discharge of ball cartridge de Céloron desired that it might cease, and he requested that the English flag should be hauled down.

Carefully establishing his camp and placing sentinels, the officers were instructed unceasingly to visit the posts during the night. Joncaire subsequently stated, on the authority of a native woman whose acquaintance he had made, that the project of an attack had been entertained but owing to these precautions it was abandoned.

The village was large, consisting of about eighty cabins.*

* This place, under the name of Logstown, Pennsylvania, is often mentioned in the later Indian wars. A few days after the departure of de Céloron, it was visited by Colonel Crogan, who had been sent by governor Hamilton, of Pennsylvania, with a message to the Indians. He thus describes what took place. [N.Y. Doc., VII., p. 267.] "After I had delivered my message to the Indians I enquired what the French commander said to them. They told me he said he was only come to visit them and see how they were clothed, for their Father, the Governor of Canada, was determined to take great care of all his children settled

The meeting between de Céloron and the chiefs took place on the 8th of August. Speeches were made and the proceedings were friendly. The Indians expressed their willingness to hear the words of Onontio; de Céloron therefore undertook to address them in the morning, and stated his objection to the appearance of any English flag.

The Indians not feeling assured of the perfectly good intentions of their visitors remained awake the whole night, and as is usual in such cases, passed the time in dancing. Joncaire in the morning reported that eighty warriors were on the point of arriving, and that the resolution had been formed to attack the French. It is not probable that such was the case. The Indians invariably attempted a surprise, and it would have been contrary to their mode of warfare to have attacked such a force as that of the French. However, de Céloron might be impressed with such belief, his instructions from de la Galissonnière was to avoid any exhibition of strength. Therefore, in the afternoon, through Joncaire he called upon the Indians, to act upon the determination they had formed with regard to his party. Fifty of the Indians passed before de Céloron and saluted him, and two hours later the chiefs came to his tent with the calumet of peace. The pipe was smoked, and a meeting arranged for the next day at ten.

The village was composed of Iroquois of the several tribes, Shawnees, and Loups. There were also some christian Iroquois from the Two Mountains, and Caughnawaga, with some Nipissings, Abenakis, and Ottawas. De Céloron dwelt on the design of the English to seize the country, and called

on the Ohio, and desired they would turn away all the English traders from amongst them, for their Father would not suffer them to trade there any more, but would send traders of his own, who would trade with them on reasonabler terms than the English."

"I then asked them if they really thought that was the intention of the French coming at that time: They answered, yes, they believed the French not only wanted to drive the English traders off that they might have the trade to themselves; but that they had also a further intention by their burying iron plates with inscriptions on them in the mouth of every remarkable Creek, which we know is to steal our country from us. But we will go to the Onondaga Council and consult them how we may prevent them from defrauding us of our land."

upon them in any war to remain neutral. One of the conditions of the late peace between England and France was that the English should not enter this territory, and he should order the English traders who were present to retire. They were summoned accordingly and so notified; de Céloron also wrote to the governor of Carolina, complaining of their presence.

On the 11th the Indians appeared with their reply. De Céloron affected to be satisfied with it; nevertheless, he thought that their promises were little to be relied upon. He saw that their interest engaged them on the side of the English, and he formed the extraordinary opinion that the loss sustained by goods being cheaply sold was borne by the king of England, or by the country. It was plain that the French could not count on the Indians being on their side until they could furnish them with cheap goods. Presents, however, were given, and de Céloron continued his journey.

On the 12th he met two wooden canoes, laden with goods, conducted by four Indians. There was difficulty in the tribes understanding each other, but eventually it was discovered that the canoes were returning from the Scioto, twenty-five days journey from where they were. De Céloron did not molest them. He had now many of his men ill, and the Indians were set to hunt in the hope of obtaining some buffalo. The rations were reduced to oatmeal porridge; fortunately some deer were killed.* On the 13th he reached the Kanououara: here he sank a third plate. Modern writers consider that this place is Wheeling creek, in Virginia. On the 15th a fourth plate was buried at the river Yenanguakonon: a fifth plate on the 18th of August at Chinondaista.†

* "Pour rafraîchir mon monde, qui ne vivoit plus qu'à la colle mais je fus trompé. Mes sauvages n'avoient tué que quelques chevreuils; c'est une faible ressource pour soulager du monde affamé et malade." (p. 700.)

† These two plates were discovered in modern times. In 1798 some boys found the plate at the mouth of the Muskingum river. Some portion was cut off in order to make bullets, but enough of the plate remained to shew its character. It is in the possession of the Antiquarian Society of Massachusetts, to whom it was given by Mr. de Witt Clinton. The fifth plate was discovered only in 1846, at the foot of the Kenewha river. No other plates have been found.

In all these cases the arms of France were attached to a tree. On the 19th it rained, so no start was made. The journey was continued the following day. On the 21st Joncaire was sent to the Scioto village in consequence of the representation of the Indians that as the presence of the expedition was known, an ambuscade might be laid for it. The advance was made with caution. The canoes had gone about four leagues when a canoe bearing a white flag was seen approaching. It was Joncaire with seven Shawnees and Iroquois. De Céloron learned that the people of the village were much excited and inimical to the French. They had threatened Joncaire, and retaining his subaltern de Niverville, and his Indians, they had sent Joncaire back under an escort. De Céloron directed the Shawnees to return to their village, promising that he would shortly be there himself. He learnt from Joncaire that the Indians had constructed a fort with the intention of defending themselves. "I knew," writes de Céloron, "the weakness of my detachment, two-thirds of which were young men who had never served, and at the appearance of ten painted Indians would have taken to flight." * He was without provisions, his canoes were damaged, and he had no bark or gum to mend them. He had, however, fifty good men and good officers.

The threatened danger passed away: either a more prudent or a better feeling was entertained by the Indians, and de Céloron on his arrival was received with salutes. He states that one thousand shots must have been fired. He landed opposite the village and returned the salute. Some of the chiefs crossed the stream, bringing with them de Niverville and the Indians of the party. They came bearing the calumet, and cut the grass so the party could sit down. As they were seating themselves, about eighty Indian warriors passed over from the other side, upon which de Céloron placed his own men under arms. The Indians assured him that they had no hostile intention, and they would retire as their presence

* "A l'aspect de dix sauvages matachés auroient pris la fuite." p. 706.

created suspicion. They invited de Céloron to come over to their village; he declined the invitation and pointed out it was their chiefs who should visit him. All night de Céloron remained on the watch.

The village was composed of Shawnees and Iroquois of the Six Nations. There were likewise some christian Indians from Caughnawaga and the Two Mountains, with Loups, Miamis and other nations. Joncaire found them devoted to the English. On the 23rd, some chiefs came across with a friendly message. De Céloron told them that they would be ruined by holding relations with the English. His language, however, was amicable, and he expressed the hope that hereafter they would listen to the words of their father Onontio, and he addressed them on the part of the governor-general. While the council was being held, a Shawnee entered stating that the village was about to be attacked by some Ottawas from Detroit. Joncaire was sent to examine into the truth of the report. It was found that three Ottawas had been sent with letters by de Sabrevois to de Céloron. The answer of the chiefs of the village as reported by de Céloron were submissive. The village promised loyalty to the French. The English traders were accordingly ordered to leave the country, and the governor of Carolina was again addressed as to their presence.

The letters of de Sabrevois, who commanded at Detroit, related to the Indians at that place. It is difficult to understand de Céloron's allusion to them. He, however, wrote back for twenty canoes to be prepared for him below Detroit, with provisions, by the commencement of October.

After passing the river Blanche on the 28th, he sent de Villiers with his son to the Miami village, three leagues distant. On their return with the chiefs, he called upon the latter to accompany him to the village under the control of the chief known as "la Demoiselle." On reaching the stream described by him as "La Roche," now known as the Miami, the last plate was buried.

De Céloron now commenced the ascent of the Miami to

the village of La Demoiselle. He had only passed down the upper waters of the Ohio ; the inference must have been, that by the French holding the upper territory, the sovereignty of Louisiana assured them possession to the Mississippi. The water was low, and it took twelve days to arrive at the village, which was established at the junction of Loramie creek with the Miami. "La Demoiselle" was an ally of the English ; * nevertheless, he sent four chiefs to meet de Céloron. From the general shallowness of depth, and in order to admit the passage up stream of the canoes, de Céloron had landed some of the troops. It was at this spot de Céloron, with de Courtemanche, met these chiefs. The calumet was smoked, and they remained there for the night. On the 13th of September he arrived at the village. Two Englishmen were present ; they were sent away. De Céloron had asked de Raimond, in command of the fort on the river Maumee, to send him a man named Roy an interpreter, whom he expected to meet at this place. He waited for the man for three days : as he failed to appear de Céloron had to make use of an Iroquois who spoke Miamis, and on the 17th he addressed "la Demoiselle" and his people, and called upon them to return to Kiskakon.† He forbade them proceeding to the Ohio to have intercourse with the English, all of whom he said he had ordered to retire from the country. Presents were given to the chiefs, and to the women and children of the tribe. On the 18th the two chiefs, "la Demoiselle," of the river Miami, and "La Baril," of the river Blanche, came to him with a promise to return to Kiskakon in the spring. De Céloron was desirous that they should proceed thither without delay, but the chiefs pleaded that the season was too advanced. On the 19th the interpreter Roy arrived. De Céloron endeavoured with his help to induce the chiefs to accompany him, but the attempt failed.

On the 20th, finding that owing to the low state of the

* He is mentioned in the reports from the west, of two years earlier, 1747, as the organizer of the league against the French. N.Y. doc., X., p. 139-143.

† Kiskakon was the site of the later fort Wayne on the river Maumee.

water, the canoes could not be taken further up stream, they were burned, and the party proceeded overland to Kiskakoni, on the Maumee. Every man carried his provisions and knapsack. The officers' baggage was put upon the backs of some horses which had been obtained, and was taken by Indians specially engaged. The distance to the river was 125 miles, and it was passed over in less than six days, for they arrived at the Maumee on the 25th. The force was divided into four brigades, de Céloron commanding on the right, and de Contrecoeur on the left. It was in expeditions of this character that the discipline and endurance of the French were always apparent.*

De Céloron remained two days at the fort in order to obtain provisions and canoes to coast lake Erie to Detroit. But he could not find a number sufficient for the whole force, so some of the party started by land. Previous to his departure, in a conversation with the Pied Froid, a Miami chief, he heard that no reliance could be placed on "la Demoiselle's" promises. De Céloron left the Maumee on the 27th of September, and arrived at Detroit on the 6th of October. He would have started at once for Montreal, but the Indians had indulged in a *gaudeamus* before leaving the Miamis, and did not arrive until two days later. He could not therefore leave before the 9th, and he arrived at Montreal on the 9th of the following month. He lost only one man in the expedition, who was drowned.

The jesuit father Bonsecamp, a mathematician of some reputation, accompanied the expedition, and during the journey established the latitude and longitude of the places visited. His observations have been found to be generally correct. He estimated that the expedition had passed over 1,200 leagues: 3,000 miles. De Céloron believed the distance to be greater. In his official report he records the opinion that the Indian tribes were ill-disposed to the French, and devoted to the English. He was dubious as to the policy to be fol-

* "Nous n'avons mis que cinq jours et demi à faire cette route que l'on estime à cinquante lieues;" p. 723.

lowed. If violence were used towards them they would take flight; and the French could not give them goods as cheaply as the English. Moreover, he did not consider that it was a wise policy to make the position of tribes on the Ohio too agreeable, as it would tend to divert the population from the old post of Detroit, and the Miamis with the other Indians would be exposed to English influence. De Céloron expressed the opinion that many of the French traders carried on a profitable commerce with the English.

Such was the remarkable expedition of de Céloron to the Ohio; the prelude to the subsequent war, owing to the policy which it suggested, and the influence which it exercised. It was the first act in the drama, when the French attempted to take possession of the territory. When de Céloron reached Quebec, de la Galissonnière had returned to France. The governor-general was de la Jonquière. It was not in his day that any attempts were made to carry out the policy foreshadowed. When de Céloron arrived at Quebec it was in November, and little could be done, more than to report the result of the expedition and ask for instructions. In this respect de la Jonquière had given decided opinions. Two months before the return of de Céloron he had written to the minister of marine, that it was necessary to establish several commercial posts on the Ohio, especially towards its source, for without this precaution the English would infallibly take possession of the country.*

* Margry, VI., p. 727. M. de la Jonquière au Ministre de la Marine. "Il faudroit que nous établissions un ou plusieurs postes de commerce sur la Belle Rivière, ou dans les environs et surtout vers sa source. . . . sans cela les Anglois s'y établiroient infailliblement."

CHAPTER II.

In September, 1748, the abbé Picquet commenced the foundation of "La Presentation" at the head of the rapids of the Saint Lawrence, the modern Ogdensburg on the river Oswegatchie. When de Céloron, on ascending the river, visited Picquet, on the 25th of June, 1749, he found about forty arpents of cleared land. On his return in October de Céloron again stopped at the new settlement to learn what progress had been made. A fort had been built, but it had been burned in the absence of Picquet by some Cayuga Indians, it was said, sent by the English from Oswego. A negro also had been induced to leave him. A portion of the buildings had been saved, in which three men remained as a guard, one of whom had had his arm blown off by the barrel of a gun bursting.

Picquet was a Frenchman born at Bourg in Bresse, on the 6th of December, 1708.* He studied in Paris, and became a sulpician. In 1733 he arrived as a missionary in Canada. He was finally sent to the mission of the Two Mountains, and, like many priests of that period, was impressed by the opening offered through the political requirements of the country, and consequently became an active agent in any operations in which they were involved. He was present with Marin in his attack on Saratoga. He advocated the construction of a fort at the head of the Saint Lawrence rapids. There was nothing novel in the opinion, for the advantages of making a settlement at La Galette on the Canadian side, had frequently been pointed out. Picquet's proposition was to construct a fort on the opposite shore, in the Iroquois territory, to create opposition to the settlement

* Doc. Hist. N.Y., I., p. 428. "Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses, XIV."

of Oswego.* His representations received unusual encouragement. In October, 1749, Bigot reported that 3,485 *livres* had been expended at "La Presentation," the name given to the new settlement, independently of provisions for the workmen. The intention of de la Jonquière was to send the Sieur de la Morandière in charge to control the trade, but a fire which happened on the 28th of October made that step unnecessary. The design to induce several Onondagas and Oncidas to leave their cantons and establish themselves at the new post was not entirely without success. Picquet had endeavoured to form direct relationship with the Onondagas, but had failed, and in 1748 is mentioned in connection with the mission of the Two Mountains.† On the 30th of September of that year, he left Quebec to determine the precise location for his attempt. In May, 1749, he started with twenty-five Frenchmen to commence his operations on the Oswagatchie.‡ A fire nearly destroyed the result of his labours; he succeeded, however, in establishing himself, and gathered around him several Indians. The new settlement had no influence on subsequent events. When first proposed it obtained the countenance of de la Galissonnière, who considered that the post should be fortified, "but discreetly," and settlement established around it.§ No political result was attained, more than that it afforded a field for the operations of Picquet. One of his proceedings was in 1751 to travel round lake Ontario. What object he had in view, except to make his presence known, cannot easily be seen. The narrative of his journey is recorded with much self-complacency.

A contemporary writer represents him to have been as ambitious as Le Loutre, but with more decency. As he was well acquainted with the Iroquois language, he could more readily attain the position he sought; and his representations

* Ogdensburg is about seventy miles from the discharge of the Oswego into the river Saint Lawrence. The distance the Oswego travels to the coast, is about seventy miles.

† N.Y. Doc., VI., p. 743; X., p. 154.

‡ Ib., X., p. 203.

§ N.Y. Doc., X., p. 228.

that it was possible to gain the alliance of the Six Nations led to his views being entertained. The fort at the time by no means found general countenance, and by many was called "Picquet's folly." * The success recorded was but moderate. Picquet's courage was undoubted. He was ready on all occasions to join in any hostile expedition; and from his strength of character he obtained influence over the Indians. On one occasion he organized a party to proceed from Cataraqui to seize prisoners in the neighbourhood of Oswego. On hearing of Montcalm's success at Oswego, he made his way thither and erected a cross with the motto "in hoc signo vincunt." A pole was placed beside it with the king's arms and the inscription "manibus date lilia plenis." † He was also at the head of the Amalecite Indians with Montcalm at William Henry: no officer is mentioned as being associated with him. ‡ He had been attached to de Levis' force assembled to operate on the Mohawk, § but afterwards countermanded to the defence of Ticonderoga.

De la Jonquière's name has become identified with the questionable treatment which the sons of de La Verendrye received. They were removed from all connection with the north-western explorations, and Legardeur de Saint Pierre was appointed in command. The motive has been assigned to the fact, that de la Jonquière, with Bigot, was engaged in trading operations in the territory, which they desired to keep uninfluenced by the previous transactions, in which de La Verendrye was involved, and that in consequence Legardeur de Saint Pierre was selected to conduct them. The charge also has been brought against de la Jonquière that he was

* Mémoires contenant l'histoire du Canada durant la guerre, p. 18.

† N.Y. Doc., X., p. 463.

‡ Ib., X., p. 607.

§ Ib., X., p. 719.

|| After de Levis' failure to retake Quebec in 1766, Picquet, who always paraded his intense hatred to the English, made his way to Michilimackinac, and thence to Louisiana. After remaining twenty-two months in the country, he returned to France, where he died, at Verjon, on the 15th July, 1781, at the age of seventy-three. Doc. Hist. N.Y., I., p. 439.

parsimonious, fond of money, and unscrupulous in its accumulation. No general accusation can be so easily made.* Bigot's name is scarcely ever mentioned without doubt being thrown upon his motives. His turpitude on all occasions is presupposed. The corruption of his administration is undeniable, but there is no evidence for the assumption of crime in all he did.

An agent to conduct matters in the west could have been found in the younger de LaVerendrye, dis severing him from the former operations. His father had not carried on his explorations by his own resources; he had represented a company, the members of which resided in Montreal and Quebec. At his death the consideration arose who should be placed in charge. De la Jonquière must have known de La Verendrye, for he arrived in Canada on the 14th of August,† four months before his death. The contemporary writer to whom I have alluded describes his discoveries as being only advantageous to himself and his associates, and speaks of his reports as being unreliable. De la Galissonnière had recommended his continuance in his position. The same writer tells us that de la Jonquière became a partner in the new company, and was represented by M. Bréard, controller of marine, and that he was a partner of Marin, who was sent on an expedition to the Sioux in October, 1750.

In February, 1750, de la Jonquière reported that de Saint Pierre was the only officer capable of replacing M. de La Verendrye. In September the son wrote to the minister of marine, expressing the willingness on the part of himself and his brother to serve under M. de Saint Pierre, and stating that the offer had been refused. He had, however, obtained permission to visit the ports previously occupied, in order to

* A story is current that on his deathbed, seeing wax tapers were being burned in his room, he ordered them to be replaced by tallow candles, as they were less expensive, and would answer the purpose equally well. I can find no authority for the story. We do know by the death of de Saint Valier that wax was often difficult to be got in Canada, and it is not impossible that some such scene took place in view of the scarcity of wax tapers.

† We know the fact from Kalin.

extricate himself from his embarrassments. There was some dissatisfaction expressed as to the amount of cargo taken by him. He met de Saint Pierre at Michilimackinac. The interview was conducted with courtesy, but the complaint was preferred by de La Verendrye the younger, that he had been unjustly excluded from the country west of lake Superior.

Legardeur de Saint Pierre was accordingly placed in charge of the expedition of discovery. He left Montreal in June, 1750, and remained absent until 1753. At that time Duquesne was the governor-general.

De Saint Pierre's report establishes that he had not previously been in the country, for he describes it as being much worse than he fancied it could be.* He arrived in September, 1750, at fort Saint Pierre, to find the Indians at war with the Sioux. He endeavoured to make peace, and obtained a promise that the hostilities should cease. When at the fort de la Reine in 1751 he heard that war was still going on. From the scarcity of provisions, he sent de Niverville on snow-shoes to fort Poscoioac, on the Saskatchewan. There was suffering from want of food, and in June, owing to ill-health, the jesuit father Lamorenerie returned to Michilimackinac. In accordance with his instructions, on the opening of the navigation, the Poscoioac, now known as the Saskatchewan, was ascended by de Niverville's party. Ten men left on the 29th of May in two canoes, and ascended the river "aux Montagnes des Roches." This is the first mention of the Rocky Mountains. A fort, named "la Jonquière," was built.† De Niverville did not accompany the

* "Je dois remarquer que cette Route est des plus difficiles, et qu'il faut une pratique bien formée pour en connaître les Chemins; quelques mauvais que j'eusse lieu de me les figurer je ne peux qu'en Etre surpris." Can. Arch., 1886, p. clviii.

His report was first published in the Canadian Archives of 1886. It is also given by Margry, VI., p. 637, published in 1888. Both refer to the same authority, the "Haldimand papers." The Archive report follows the precise spelling with certain blanks as to date. Mr. Margry has modernized the spelling and supplied the dates. There are several minor differences in the text; the sentences in some cases increased by additions, in others shortened by the omission of certain words. The main narrative is unchanged. This discrepancy requires some explanation.

† Sir Alexander Mackenzie in his account of the fur trade alludes to the

expedition, and accordingly these ten unknown Canadians may be considered as the first white men who looked upon these mountains thus described.*

De Saint Pierre himself never proceeded beyond fort de la Reine, on the Assiniboine. Owing to the illness of de Niverville in 1752, he went himself to lake Superior to attend to the safe transit of goods and munitions. He returned to the Assiniboine, where he remained until the 7th of October. After a short rest, he started to reach the new fort "la Jonquière." On his route he met a party sent to him to inform him that de Niverville was still ill and that there had been trouble in the west. The Assiniboines had visited the French fort "la Jonquière," where they found some of the Yhatchelini. The Assiniboines at first pretended friendship, but finding themselves the more numerous, after a few days carouse they attacked and destroyed the other tribe, carrying off the women and children as prisoners. No mention is made of any French being present.

De Saint Pierre endeavoured to enlist some Indians to proceed westward and obtain information; but he could find none who would undertake the mission. He relates that in February, 1752, when there were only five persons in the fort with himself, two hundred Assiniboines forced their way in, and were commencing to take possession of the arms, when he forced open the door of the magazine, and knocked off the head of a barrel of powder, and with a lighted brand threatened to blow up the building. The Indians rushed from the

presence of the French at these two advanced posts. [Voyages from Montreal . . . through the continent . . . to the Frozen and Pacific Oceans . . . 1789, 1790, 1801, p. lxxiii.] "The French had two settlements upon the Saskatchewan long before, and at the conquest of Canada, the first at the Pasquia [Poscoioac], near Carrot River, and the other at Nipawi [Nippeween], where they had agricultural instruments [*sic*] and wheel carriages, marks of both being found about those establishments, where the soil is excellent."

* It is difficult to believe that if the great range of the Rocky mountains, with their snow-covered summits, had been seen and become known, they would not have been passed by with so slight a perfunctory allusion. So far as I can learn, it is the only reference to them during the discoveries of de La Verendrye and his successors.

fort to escape the danger, and ran into the plain. He followed them and fastened the lock of the front gate. He was in dread with regard to the safety of fourteen men, who had been sent in search of provisions. But they returned in safety before evening.

De Saint Pierre again went to the portage at lake Superior for his provisions and goods. Four days after his departure fort de la Reine was burned. On his return he wintered at the Red river, where provisions were more abundant. In August, 1752, he was gratified by the receipt of a letter from the new governor-general Duquesne. He is careful to place on record that no charge of any kind had been at the cost of the king. Giving his forts over to M. de La Corne, he proceeded to the lake Superior *portage*, where he was met by M. de Niverville, who had reached this spot by passing through lake Winnipeg. The expedition then started for Montreal.

We may infer from the narrative of de Saint Pierre that trade with the Indians was his one consideration. No account is given of the journey of M. de Niverville more than it extended over three hundred leagues by the river Saskatchewan to fort "la Jonquière." It is disposed of in two lines. No description is furnished of the country more than that the Rocky Mountains are mentioned; and little information was given to determine what future policy was advisable.

The expedition of de Céloron was not followed by any active operations on the part of de la Jonquière. He gathered some troops together for an expedition, but he was deterred from proceeding for fear of causing an Indian war.* The non-execution of the project caused dissatisfaction in France. In March, 1750, he wrote to Clinton the governor of New York, calling upon him to forbid any British subject trading on the Ohio.† This letter remained unanswered. De la Jonquière gave orders accordingly to de Céloron, who had been appointed commandant at Detroit, to arrest any British he should find in the territory. Four traders were consequently taken : three

* N. Y. Doc., X., p. 239.

† Ibid., VI., p. 733.

at Sandusky bay, one near the French fort of the Miamis. They were sent to Quebec, whence three of them were carried to France, the fourth from sickness being unable to embark.

Clinton protested against this assumption, and called in question the encroachments of the French on English territory as established by the treaty of Utrecht.* He complained to de la Jonquière of this arrest: the latter justified what had been done. Clinton submitted the case to England, and the ambassador at Paris was instructed to demand the release of the men.

De la Jonquière likewise instructed de Céloron to destroy the fort of "la Demoiselle," and to punish the tribes who had shown unfriendliness to the French: and at the same time to expel the English from the Ohio. De Céloron had been appointed in 1750 to the command at Detroit,† with instructions to act with vigour. But with the force at his disposal he did not consider that he had strength sufficient for the expedition; and he could place no reliance on the Indians. Throughout the west they shewed themselves unfavourable to the French. The year 1751 accordingly passed without any demonstration. Whatever might have been de la Jonquière's intentions, the following year they were made impossible by his death.

He died the 17th of May, 1752, aged seventy-seven. The dishonest encouragement given by him to the prevarication and duplicity of Le Loutre, in the time of absolute peace, causing war and bloodshed and his inciting the Micmac Indians to assassinate the English settlers, casts the greatest stain on his memory. Without these revelations he would have retained a respectable place in history.

It was in his day that the price of Gensing reached the highest value, from which it rapidly degenerated.‡

De la Jonquière was buried at the recollets' church at Quebec, the third of the French governors interred there, the two former being de Frontenac and de Vaudreuil.

* N.Y. Doc., VI., p. 711.

† Ib., X., p. 245.

‡ Ante Vol. II., p. 503.

On his death the government fell to Le Moyne, the second baron de Longueuil, then governor of Montreal. His administration lasted until July, when M. Duquesne, the new governor-general, arrived at Quebec.

CHAPTER III.

One of the consequences of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was that the attention of the mother country was awakened towards Nova Scotia. The peninsula had hitherto obtained little consideration; but the cession of Cape Breton to France had made it clear, that it was necessary to raise up a counterpoise to Louisbourg, so that its creation would be a matter of less danger. Propositions had already been submitted to the government for the establishment of settlers in the province. Captain Gorham of the rangers, offered to found a township on the eastern coast. Shirley suggested that protestants should be interspersed among the Acadians, and had recommended that certain points should be fortified. It had been proposed to establish one hundred families in the Annapolis basin; forty families within five miles of the fort, with additional settlements up the river. Shirley wrote elaborate memoirs to sustain his views, and greatly contributed to the situation of the province being better understood.

A mode of settlement was finally adopted by the British Government, and within six months of the signing of peace, in March, 1749, a notification was published, offering to all officers and private men discharged from the army and navy, and to artificers of a certain character, a free passage to America, provisions for the voyage, subsistence for a year after landing, arms, ammunition, utensils, and a free grant of land under a civil government, with the privileges enjoyed by English colonists. Forty thousand pounds was voted by parliament for the undertaking. In a short time 1,176 settlers, with their families, volunteered to accompany the expedition. On the 9th of May colonel the hon. Edward Cornwallis was gazetted as governor of Nova Scotia: he left England in the war sloop "Sphinx" on the 14th, and

immediately afterwards the emigrants embarked in thirteen transports.

Colonel Cornwallis was thirty-six years old, and unmarried. He was known in public life, having represented Eye in parliament. He arrived at Halifax on the 2nd of July,* the transports on the 8th, and in the subsequent three days the emigrants were landed. They numbered 2,576 souls.

Cornwallis' impressions of the country were favourable, and he so wrote to England. He anticipated no difficulty with the Indians, and the future caused him no anxiety. The transports were sent to Louisbourg to receive the regiments leaving that place on its evacuation by the British, and the vessels shortly returned to Halifax, with the troops which had formed the garrison. On the 25th the new council was called together on board the transport "Beauport," amid a salute from the ships.†

Those of the new-comers who had tents went on shore; the others remained in the transports until they could be housed. The ground was rapidly surveyed, and laid out in streets and lots assigned, so that building could commence. The whole energy of the new settlers was directed to protect their families from the weather, and to find themselves a home.

Towards the end of July Cornwallis issued a proclamation in French and English, addressed to the Acadians, calling on them to assist the settlers. He reminded them that they had enjoyed possession of their lands and the free exercise of their religion; nevertheless, they had covertly and openly aided the king's enemies. This would all be forgotten, and they were

* These dates are new style.

† Among the members of the first council was John Salusbury, father of Hester, Mrs. Piozzi, who as Mrs. Thrale is so often mentioned in the literary history of the last century. Her father, a Welshman, a friend of Lord Halifax, accompanied Cornwallis to Nova Scotia, where he obtained the appointment of registrar. His letters must have been the reverse of cheerful. Mrs. Piozzi writes: "My mother and uncle, taking advantage of his last gloomy letter, begged him to return to share the gaieties of Offley Place," the seat of Sir Thomas Salusbury in Hertfordshire. Salusbury left Halifax previous to 1760. He accompanied Lord Halifax to Ireland on his appointment as lord-lieutenant. Salusbury died in 1762.

now called upon to take the oath of allegiance, and to act as British subjects.

When the council first met the character of the oath was discussed, and it was resolved that it should be unconditionally administered, without reservation. On this occasion the deputies from Grand Pré attended, and they were then notified that the oath must be taken. The deputies replied, that they were only present to pay their respects to his excellency, to learn what was to be their treatment, and whether their priests would be allowed to remain. They were informed, that the priests who officiated must first obtain permission from the governor. The deputies were requested to report to the other settlements what had taken place.

These settlements were at Annapolis, Grand Pré, Mines, now Horton; Rivière des Canards, Pisiquid, known as fort Edward, Windsor; Cobequid, Truro. They extended from Annapolis along the coast of the bay of Fundy to the basin of Mines. To the north there were settlements at Beaubassin, at the head of Chignecto bay and at Chipody on the New Brunswick coast. The Micmacs generally were scattered through the territory traversed by the Shubenacadie, a stream which, with some *portages*, extended from the vicinity of Halifax to the bay of Fundy. At the foundation of Halifax, the Acadian population was between 12,000 and 13,000 souls. Before the end of 1754 the number had been reduced to 9,300. Through the influence of the French emissaries and the priests, numbers were induced to abandon their lands. Many went north of the Missaguash, several passed to Isle Saint Jean, Prince Edward's island, and many to Cape Breton; during these years through this emigration, the number became greatly reduced.

Towards the end of July the new city received the name of Halifax, after George, earl of Halifax,* then first lord of trade. The number of the council was increased to twelve.

Early in August, 1749, ten of the Acadian deputies arrived

* Grandson of the earl of Halifax, who had played so prominent a part in the reign of William III. He died childless in 1772, and the title expired with him.

in Halifax. They delivered a letter representing the opinions of the districts in which they lived. On its consideration it was resolved that the oath should be taken without exemption, and that no priest should presume to officiate without a licence. This declaration was read to the deputies,* upon which they asked if they could sell their lands and effects. They were informed, that by the treaty of Utrecht a year had been allowed from the surrender of the province when the French inhabitants could have sold their effects; "but that at present, those should chuse to retire rather than be true Subjects to the King, could not be allowed to sell or carry off anything." The deputies asked permission to return to their departments and consult with the inhabitants. They were notified that whoever would not take the oath of allegiance before the 26th of October would forfeit his possessions and his rights in the province. "They then asked leave to go to the French Governors & see what Conditions might be offered them," and they were told whoever should leave the province without taking the oath of allegiance would forfeit his rights. On the 12th of August a proclamation was issued calling on "the French inhabitants of the province" to take the oath of allegiance by the 26th of October.

On the 17th of September the deputies again appeared, with a letter signed and bearing the marks of a thousand persons. The letter thanked Cornwallis for his kindness, and referred to the oath taken to general Philipps. It asserted that any more binding oath would subject them to the barbarous cruelty of the savages. It distinctly stated that the inhabitants had resolved not to take the oath, except with an exemption from bearing arms, and they were resolved if the conditions they asked were not granted to leave the country. What caused them pain was that the English desired to live among them.†

* 12 August, N.S. Nov. Sco. Archives, p. 170.

† "Ce qui fait peine à tout le monde, c'est apprendre que les Anglais veulent s'habituer parmi nous." Sentiment, de tous les Habitants soussignés. Nov. Sco. Archives, p. 173.

Cornwallis emphatically pointed out that it was the third time they had appeared with the same story. They had declared that they would only be conditionally subjects of the British crown. It was contrary to common sense to suppose that anyone could remain in a province and hold lands without being subject to its sovereign. They deceived themselves if they thought they could choose to be so or not. Since 1714 they had become subject to the laws of Great Britain as other catholic subjects, and these obligations had never been lessened. Cornwallis concluded by saying: "Gentlemen, you allow yourselves to be led away by people who find it to their interest to lead you astray. They have made you imagine it is only your oath which binds you to the English. They deceive you. It is not the oath which a king administers to his subjects that makes them subjects. The oath supposes that they are so already. The oath is nothing but a very sacred bond of the fidelity of those who take it. It is only out of pity to your situation, and to your inexperience in the affairs of government, that we condescend to reason with you; otherwise, gentlemen, the question would not be reasoning, but commanding and being obeyed. His majesty himself, in his printed declaration, has guaranteed to you your possessions and your religion. Just think of what you are doing on your part. You talk a great deal of the services you have rendered to the government since my arrival in the province. What proofs have you given of your attachment and your zeal for your king.

"I should be delighted to be able to say to his majesty, that you are acting as good subjects, and that you have done all in your power to assist this colony. If, instead of your frequent consultations—your messages to the French governors—your letters signed by a thousand persons, you had sent me a hundred of your inhabitants to work in the service of his majesty, you would have done much better, and would have found it very much to your advantage. Gentlemen, you have been for more than thirty-four years past, the subjects of the king of Great Britain, and you have had the full enjoyment

of your possessions and your religion. Show now that you are grateful for these favors, and ready to serve your king when your services are required. On your return you will find a detachment of his Britannic Majesty's troops at Mines. I have sent them for your protection. When I hear from them, I hope to hear that you have aided and assisted them as much as you could. I have ordered them to pay for everything in ready money, or in certificates, which I shall cash immediately at sight.

"Manage to let me have here in ten days fifty of your inhabitants, whom I shall employ in assisting the poor to build their houses, to shelter them from the bad weather. They shall be paid in ready money, and fed on the king's provisions."*

Before relating the almost unceasing series of outrages which were commenced against the garrisons and the settlers, it is necessary to examine the influences which created them. The French government, and especially the Canadian authorities, looked with suspicion and disfavour on the establishment of Halifax. Virtually it was the occupation in force of the whole province, and reduced greatly in importance the geographical advantages of Cape Breton. What was more sensibly felt was, that the British possession of Nova Scotia made access by land from Canada to Cape Breton impossible. The memoir of de la Galissonnière had advocated the retention of a strip of territory along the eastern coast. De la Galissonnière was one of the commissioners to determine the boundaries, and it was the knowledge of the isolated condition of Cape Breton which dictated the extreme pretensions with regard to the limits of Acadia, and which made any settlement of the question impossible.

The theory of the main advantage derivable from the sovereignty over Cape Breton was the hold that it gave to regain Acadia; the power it conferred, to use the words of de la Galissonnière, to make war on the British possessions in America. It equally furnished ground for the confident

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 175.

assertion that the country would again shortly be ceded to France. A second influence on which reliance was placed was, the tone and temper of the Acadians themselves, which exposed them to the machinations of the leaders in whom they placed confidence. It is not possible for a people to have received better treatment. On the foundation of Halifax in 1749, every Acadian under thirty-six years of age had been born a British subject. He had held his lands without paying any contribution to the government. He had been permitted the free, unembarrassed observance of his religion; he had enjoyed the protection of the law; he had lived without fear of being robbed or abused by any official whatsoever; he had been paid the full value for all he sold. The difficulty under which the people laboured was their ignorance. Few could write; there were no schools; except some rarely seen devotional work, there was not a book in the country; and this condition made them the tools and dupes of the cunning, unscrupulous priests selected as French political agents. It is these men who worked on the religious terrors which for the occasion they created. They awoke prejudices which they never allowed to slumber, and which they stimulated by falsehood and misrepresentation.

It must be remembered, that but a few months had elapsed since the signature of the peace, and Cape Breton given over to the French; it was only on the 8th of July that the transports arrived at Halifax with the British garrison which had been in possession. Among the early arrivals at Louisbourg was Le Loutre. Bigot was also present. Le Loutre was well acquainted with de la Jonquière, having met him at Cape Breton, and as the latter was known to be in Canada as the successor to de la Galissonnière, Le Loutre sent three Micmacs to Canada to de la Jonquière with a letter, which bears date the 29th of July. He wrote, he said, because M. de Maurepas had instructed him to report what was taking place. He related the arrival of Cornwallis at Halifax, and with the falsehood habitual to him, stated that when ordering the deputies at Mines to attend, Cornwallis had

forbidden them to send cattle to Louisbourg, under the penalty of corporal punishment and the confiscation of their property. There was a design to cut a road from Chebucto to Mines. Cruisers were stationed to prevent intercourse from Boston and Acadia with Cape Breton. A vessel was to be stationed near the bay Verte. The British garrison of Louisbourg was to be sent to Chebucto. The English were doing all that was possible to conciliate the Indians, giving them presents, shewing they desired to be friends. A force would be established during the winter at Mines, and once established at Mines and at Chebucto, they would take possession of Beaubassin and bay Verte.

For the rest of his communication M. Le Loutre must speak for himself. "Such, monseigneur, is the design of the English and the situation of Acadia; the French *habitants* are seized with general terror. They look upon themselves on the point of becoming English by their life and religion, or to leave and abandon their country." After some remarks as to the missionaries in the country, Le Loutre continues: "I have seen Monsieur Desherbiers, MM. Bigot and Prevost, who have promised me all possible assistance to preserve the savages in their religion, and in the fidelity which they owe his majesty. In consequence, I am starting for Acadia. I will do my best to reassemble my Indians, and as it is not possible openly to oppose the enterprises of the English, I think that we cannot do better than excite the savages to continue to carry on war against the English. My intention is to cause the Indians to tell the English that they will not permit new establishments in Acadia, which they contend should remain in the same state that it was in before the war, and that if the English persist in their design the Indians will never be at peace with them, and will declare against them an eternal war. My Indians consequently will send deputies among the other nations to invite them to join in opposing the enterprises of the English, and to prevent them forming their establishments."

"Such, monseigneur, is the course I will take for the good

of the state and for religion, and I will do my best to make it appear to the English that this design has its origin with the savages, and that I have nothing to do with it and as I shall be in Acadia, I will spare nothing to learn the intentions of the English.*

We might have hoped that de la Jonquière, who in his life had shewn himself to be the possessor of great qualities, would have treated this infamous communication as it deserved. It set aside all national obligations, all decency, every sentiment of personal honour and truth, all the teachings of Christianity and the dictates of charity. To his shame, he accepted and acted upon it. In the course of the autumn he forwarded the letter to France with such information as he could obtain. He stated the conditions of the oath asked by Cornwallis and the period when it should be given, with the regulation that no priest would be permitted to act without the authority of the government. De la Jonquière had also written to de Boishébert to urge upon the Acadians to seek a home upon French soil.

It is proper likewise that M. de la Jonquière should speak for himself. "The three Indians who brought me these despatches spoke to me relative to what M. l'abbé Le Loutre stated in his letter. I was careful to give them no counsel on the subject, and I confined myself to the promise that I would not abandon them. Also, I have made provision for everything, arms, ammunition, provisions and for other necessities. It is to be desired that these Indians thus gathered together may succeed in hampering the English in their enterprises, even in that of Halifax; they are in this resolution, and if they can execute what they propose, assuredly they will prove very troublesome to the English, and the troubles which they will create will prove great obstacles. These Indians must act alone. There will be with them neither soldier nor *habitant*, all will appear their own movement without the appear-

* Que. Doc., III., p. 437. "Voilà, Monseigneur, le parti que je vais prendre pour le bien de l'Etat et de la Religion, et feray mon possible de faire paraître aux Anglais, que ce dessein vient des Sauvages, et que je n'y suis pour rien."

ance that I had the least knowledge of what was happening I am impressed, monseigneur, with all the delicacy of this negotiation. Be assured that I will conduct it with so much precaution that the English will be unable to say that it was in any way attributable to my orders."

De la Jonquière had no fear that the intrigue would miscarry. He had full confidence in the machinations of the two priests, the père Germain and the abbé Le Loutre. When Desherbiers was leaving cape Breton, Cornwallis expressed regret that the change was being made, as "he had behaved with great honour and sincerity." He was then ignorant that this French governor was intriguing in the same direction. Desherbiers reported that he had prevailed on the Acadians not to take the oath. When this letter was read at the royal council in France, letters also came from Le Loutre and Germain relating their endeavours to harass the new settlement as best they could, and Bigot reported that he was sending the Indians powder and bullets, with merchandise, in order to encourage them in their good intentions. The fullest royal approval was received from France of what was being done. Desherbiers was to treat the English with the greatest politeness; but he was to do all he could, to lead the soldiers to desert.

The successor to Desherbiers, count Raymond, was instructed to continue the same policy. The missionaries, without compromising themselves, were to persevere in inciting the Indians to robbery and murder. De la Jonquière, in order to support the movement, sent de La Corne to the north of the peninsula with ammunition, arms, and guns for the Indians; the expedition was to assume the character of trade. De la Jonquière a few months later thought it advisable that some Acadians should join the Indians and assist them in their enterprises, and if caught and hanged, it could be said that they followed their own impulse.

Cornwallis soon penetrated the influences under which the

* De la Jonquière au Ministre, 9th October, 1749, quoted by Mr. Parkman. Appendix, Vol. II., p. 419.

Indians were acting. His information fully satisfied him, that the troubles arose entirely from Le Loutre and those associated with him. He took every possible step to secure the settlement from attack. An enclosure was completed so as fully to protect it, and a space to the extent of thirty feet was cleared outside the barricade and a fort constructed on the hill.

The outrages had now commenced. Twenty Englishmen, five of whom were settlers, were seized at Canso by a force of Indians while taking in hay. An English vessel was also captured. The prisoners were taken into Cape Breton. Cornwallis on hearing of the attack despatched two armed cruisers in pursuit. In the meantime, Desherbiers sent sixteen prisoners back to Halifax, and four were returned with the vessel. Cornwallis had previously sent a force to Mines under captain Handfield. A report was received from this officer that two vessels had been attacked at Chignecto. Eight Indians, under pretence of traffic, went on board and endeavoured to surprise these craft. Three Englishmen were killed and seven Indians severely wounded. Le Loutre was at the place at the time, consequently Cornwallis called upon Desherbiers to remove Le Loutre. Desherbiers, in reply, disavowed all connection with the priest who, he stated, was not commissioned by the Cape Breton government. He had been sent as a missionary from France among the Indians, and Desherbiers had no power over him; at the same time Desherbiers expressed his horror and detestation at the attacks of the Indians.

A saw-mill had been constructed near Halifax, six men sent out unarmed to cut wood were attacked; four were killed, one was made prisoner, one escaped.

When the council met they determined not to declare war against the Indians, as to do so would have the effect of recognising them as an independent people. It was resolved to deal with them as "a banditti of ruffians." Ten guineas were offered for an Indian living or dead, or for his scalp. A company of volunteers was raised; and on this occasion the snow-shoes were not forgotten. The woods were scoured

around Halifax, and the works in progress continued. Some thirty Acadians came forward and cut a road from the head of the bay to the town.

On the 25th of October, sixteen days later than his letter to the minister, de la Jonquière wrote to Cornwallis. He trusted that the general peace would draw the two peoples into a natural friendship. There had been some difficulty relative to the French occupation of the country on the Saint John. In accordance with the suggestion of Shirley, Cornwallis sent captain Rous, in the "Albany," to prevent any French settlement establishing itself there. De Boishébert, who commanded the party from Can. '3, wrote to Cornwallis, disavowing any intention of fortifying himself, adding that his orders were to prevent any one so acting, until the boundaries had been determined. De la Jonquière, in answer to the letter of Cornwallis, justified these proceedings, which had taken place by the orders of his predecessor. He declined, likewise, to interfere with any matter under the control of the bishop. Cornwallis replied, objecting to the presence of de La Corne, and contended that the Saint John formed a part of Acadia.

Mgr. de Pontbriand also wrote to Cornwallis, claiming the right to send priests to Acadia, and intimated that he was himself desirous of visiting the country. Cornwallis assured the bishop that he would be personally glad to see him, but his orders would not allow the bishop to exercise his ecclesiastical functions. He had not refused permission for priests to be sent to the Acadians; lately he had issued a passport to the Abbé Maillard so to act. He could not believe that the bishop had sent Le Loutre as a missionary to the Micmacs; but he was certain if the bishop had appointed this priest, he had not counselled that the Indians should be excited to the commission of the cruelties they perpetrated, or that Le Loutre should stand between them and union, with a friendly and civilized people. The priest was leading the Indians to their ruin.

At the commencement of December three hundred Micmacs

and Saint John Indians had surprised a party detached from the fort at Mines, consisting of eighteen men, under lieutenant Hamilton. They proceeded to attack the block-house, and for seven days attempted to take it. On their failure to make any impression they retired. Information was received that eleven Acadians had taken part in the operations. Gorham, with his company, started to arrest them, but the men were not to be found.

The Indian attacks had become of such a character that the inhabitants of Halifax were formed into a militia, and a guard placed every evening. Cornwallis became more satisfied of the continual intrigues of Le Loutre, and formed a plan for his apprehension, but it was made of no avail through the indiscretion of the council at Boston. The design became known, and it was no longer possible for it to be carried out. In March three Englishmen were carried away prisoners from Windsor. A force under Gorham was sent to make arrests of those implicated. On his route he came up with some Indians, and a skirmish followed. Gorham and two of his men were wounded. By Cornwallis' orders, he joined Handfield at Mines.

Cornwallis sent a party under captain Bartelo to surprise some Indians hanging about Cobequid, Truro; but the latter on receiving information of his advance, quickly disappeared. He brought back to Halifax the priest and the deputies. In the examination of these parties, Cornwallis learned that the French troops had been placed on the Saint John, to be in readiness in case of emergency to proceed to Beaubassin, and that the Micmacs were clothed and found in necessities by the French king. The priest also told Cornwallis in confidence that de La Corne had made the inhabitants at Chignecto take the oath of allegiance to France. Le Loutre had lately been at Truro to pay for some damages which the Indians had committed, and at the church door, in the presence of the two priests, he had threatened with death any *habitant* who should pass the Shubenacadie.

Cornwallis saw the difficulty of permitting the presence in

the province of French priests, who made their religious character the means of acting as political agents. His proposition was to obtain catholic priests from Italy or Germany, for the French missionaries paid by France did "everything in their power to alienate the minds of the people."

Writers who strive to establish foregone conclusions have endeavoured to shew, that the Acadians were deliberately sacrificed from the desire of obtaining possession of their land for New England settlers and that their expatriation was a wholesale confiscation to carry out this purpose. Shirley had indeed proposed that settlers from New England should be intermingled among the French *habitants*; but expropriation of their property formed no part of his scheme. Nothing was so little desired, than that the Acadians should leave the province. Politically, it was the transfer of many hundreds of able-bodied men to the French ranks, and the weakening effect of this loss was more than proportionate to any possible gain on the side of the English colonies by their absence. On the other hand, there was no reliance on any co-operation in the field on their part in a contest with France. In that respect they would furnish no strength to British power.

What was desired was to place them above the influences which, in the hour of difficulty, would divert their strength against the sovereignty of the country in which they lived; and it was hoped that by binding them firmly through an oath of allegiance without exemption of any duty, to remove the chance of their being made the focus of intrigue and disaffection.

It is customary to speak of these people as "the neutrals." The term grew into use, but it is entirely unwarranted. Inferior novelists, with more serious writers, have made the word a vehicle on which they can base such arguments as they can offer; while poetry has given a fictitious character to the political rights, habits, manners and characteristics of a few thousand people whose occupation was fishing and the cultivation of

the soil, without schools, knowledge or refinement ; whose credulous natures became imbued with the terrors rather than with the consolations of religion, to become the instruments and to subserve the ambition of an unscrupulous, remorseless priest, who made an infamous use of the creed he professed.

No one can turn to the temperate, statesmanlike addresses of Cornwallis without recognising that the strong desire of the British authorities was to retain the Acadians in the country, to extend them every consideration, but at the same time to enforce the performance of political obligations. In April, 1750, the inhabitants of the river Canard, Grand Pré, Horton, and of Windsor, sent by their deputies a request for leave to evacuate the province and to carry with them their effects. The demand was well understood to originate with Le Loutre : it was one of those tentative demands to which it was foreseen a refusal must be made. By these means further discontent would be created, and another grievance brought into prominence on which the agitator could descant.

Cornwallis' answer is long and reasoned. He told them that he knew every influence had been enlisted to alienate their hearts from the government. They had been told that their religion was in danger ; great advantages had been promised them ; they had been threatened that the Indians would cut the throats of those faithful to the government ; but they were being led to their ruin by the missionaries and French officers who had appeared at Chignecto. It was they who induced the Indians of the Saint John to join the Micmacs, and were the cause of the outrages committed by them. They were men without honour or character, who sought to embroil the Acadians with the government. He could not believe that such persons were authorized by the French government. It was not for subalterns and missionaries to explain treaties. If the French ministers were thus acting, why did they not appear in their own character? "You have allowed yourselves," said Cornwallis, "to be led away by their counsels." . . . "We have good reason to complain of your having recourse to the counsels of the French governors,

their officers and missionaries. If you had grievances, it was to us and to the council that you should have applied for the remedy, and after us to his majesty himself.

"For, once more, my friends, you are the subjects of the king of Great Britain, and not of France. It is true that you refused to take the oath of allegiance to our king last autumn, after the declaration which I published by the king's command; I informed you then that neither your situation nor your duties as subjects were at all changed by that act. It was at that time that you were indebted to us for not having made you leave the country, even during winter.

"But after having passed the winter in the province, and commenced to prepare the lands in the spring, it is ridiculous to come and tell me that you will not sow, having resolved to withdraw. My friends, you must go and sow your lands, in order that they may be left in that condition in which they ought to be at this season. Without that you will have no right to expect the least favor from the Government. When you have done your duty in this respect, I will give you a more precise reply to your request.

"In the meantime, as it is my determination to act always in good faith with you, and not to flatter you with vain hopes, I will now let you know my sentiments on two important articles. I declare to you frankly, that according to our laws nobody can possess lands or houses in the province who shall refuse to take the oath of allegiance to his king when required to do so. As to those who shall leave the province, the order of no Government permits them to take with them their effects. All their goods are confiscated to the king. I have just issued my orders to the effect that all shall be arrested and brought back who are found carrying off such effects."*

How any one desiring to write the truth, with this statement before him, can assert that there was ever the desire to send the Acadians from the country, is a marvel.

In May a similar petition was presented from Annapolis by two men who were not deputies. They would give no

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 187.

reply by whom and when the paper was written. It stated that they had never considered themselves subjects to the "king of new England." There was also a petition from Mines for permission to leave the country; and one asking that M. Girard should be sent as priest. The latter, on taking the oath of allegiance and giving his honour not to leave the province without permission, received leave to proceed to the place named.

Cornwallis had given a promise that he would reply to the petition when the seed was sown, and he took steps to keep his promise. He told them that he desired "to hinder nobody from following what he imagined was his interest. We know that a forced service is worth nothing, and that a subject to be so against his will is not far from being an enemy." He had done everything to secure them the occupation of their lands, and their religion had been assured to them. The settlement of the province was most advantageous to them. They possessed the only cultivated land, and they would have all the profit of the cattle and grain they produced. There were many well disposed among the inhabitants; but they had allowed themselves to be seduced owing to their inexperience and ignorance of the affairs of government and their habit of following the counsel of others. They asked for a general permission to leave the country. Cornwallis continued: "As it is impossible that you could all meet at a certain rendezvous in order to set out all together with all your families, one must understand by the expression '*congé général*' a general permission to set out whenever you shall think proper, by land or by sea, or by whatever conveyances you please. In order to effect this, we should have to notify all the commanders of his majesty's ships and troops to allow every one to pass and repass, which would cause the greatest confusion. The province would be open to all sorts of people, to strangers, and even to the savages. They have only to dress themselves like you in order to render it difficult to distinguish them from you.

"The only manner in which you can withdraw from this

province is to follow the regulations already established. The order is, that all persons wishing to leave the province shall provide themselves with our passport, to be shewn to the vessels or troops they may meet. And we declare that nothing shall prevent us from giving such passports to all those who ask for them, the moment that peace and tranquility are re-established in the province.

"In the present state of the province, we are astonished that you thought of asking for such leave.

"You know that the savages are assembled at Chignecto, furnished with everything, and protected by a French detachment. You know that you will have to pass these French detachments and savages, and that they compel all the inhabitants who go there to take up arms. I am to presume, my friends, that you pay no attention to this.

"It is a demand which I can by no means grant."*

He had given orders that there should be no communication with the bay of Fundy.

They were deceived if they imagined they were passing out of the king's territories, for the places where the French had established themselves were claimed by his Britannic majesty. He pointed out that lately their deputies had acted with impropriety. He advised them to elect no more, or to choose proper persons. He forbade all assemblies as they had only led to sedition. After bidding them remain quiet in their districts, he pledged them his word that in quieter times passports would be given to all who asked them.†

In accordance with the determination to construct a fort at Chignecto, colonel Lawrence was directed to proceed thither with four hundred men. He marched to Mines, where he took ship to Chignecto. De La Corne had constructed a fort about two miles distant, at a place known as Beauséjour. On his arrival Lawrence was surprised to see the French colours flying, and troops posted as if to dispute his landing.‡

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 190.

† Nova Scotia Archives, p. 189.

‡ *Memoire sur le Guerre*, p. 8.

Beaubassin was an Acadian settlement on the south of the Missaguash, the stream claimed by the French as forming the boundary between Nova Scotia and French territory; the English contended that the line was considerably to the north. News of the intentions of the English had become known, and Le Loutre, by threats and persuasions, had induced many of the residents of Beaubassin to leave the village with their property and to pass to the north.

On their arrival among the French they were forced to take the oath of allegiance to France. Lawrence's instructions were to avoid hostilities, and he asked to see the French officer in command. The latter informed Lawrence that the stream formed the boundary, and in reply to the question where the English troops could land, pointed to the village of Beaubassin, then in flames. Le Loutre having seen hesitation on the part of the Acadians to leave their homes, had himself set fire to the church, and ordered his Indians and those who obeyed him to burn down the houses, thus forcing the *habitants* in their homeless condition to seek an asylum with de La Corne.*

Lawrence looked on this proceeding with horror, and returned to Mines. Thence he proceeded to Windsor, where he built the fort known as fort Edward. Doubtless he obtained further instructions, for on the 16th of August he returned to Chignecto to commence the construction of a fort. On his arrival he found entrenchments thrown up, defended by a numerous force to oppose his entrance. Use had been made of the dykes, which were capable of resisting canons, and *banquettes* had been constructed to fire from; there was little doubt but French officers had assisted in their formation.

Lawrence attacked the force holding this ground, numerically greatly superior to his own, and the defenders were gallantly driven out. Lawrence's loss, however, was six killed and

* "Ayant vu que les Acadiens ne paroissent pas fort pressés d'abandonner leurs biens, avoit lui-même mis le feu à l'Eglise, l'avait fait mettre aux maisons des habitants par quelques uns de ceux qu'il avait gagnés." *Memoire sur la guerre, etc.*, p. 8.

twelve wounded. As he was establishing himself he received a letter from de La Corne, asking to speak to him in the middle of the stream in a boat. Lawrence replied that he considered de La Corne had no business where he was, and if he had anything to say he could come to Beaubassin.

It was by no means an easy task to carry on the work of constructing the fort. Navigation to reach the shore was difficult owing to the high tides, and all materials had to be brought by sea, especially provisions; for the cattle had been driven off. Fuel could only be obtained under the escort of an armed party in force. Howe, a member of the council, who understood French and was known to the Acadians, indeed was popular with them, was sent on duty to the garrison. The result was only what could have been expected from the ability and energy of Lawrence. The forts and barracks were completed and secured for the winter. Lawrence formed a favourable opinion of the settlement. The winter was mild, and there was constant intercourse with Halifax. Lawrence was desirous of making peace with the Indians, and he made great efforts to attain this end. There had been conferences with de La Corne and Le Loutre to obtain the release of some English prisoners, and these negotiations paved the way to an act of treachery and bloodshed without a parallel in war between civilized nations.

Howe was a man obnoxious in many respects to Le Loutre. He was of courteous manners, perfectly knew French, and was kindly and genial. Le Loutre feared Howe from the influence he was obtaining, and had formed the opinion that in some form Howe must be removed. On the 15th of October a flag of truce was shewn in front of the fort. It was carried by one in the dress of an officer, who, as he came forward, waved a white handkerchief, the usual ceremony observed when such communications were to be made. Howe was deputed to meet the messenger, and advanced to do so. Some Indians had placed themselves in ambuscade, and on Howe coming within their range he was shot dead. All contemporary testimony points to the fact that









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this wanton murder was committed by the orders of Le Loutre.*

It was in this year that Captain Rous, in the "Albany," took the brigantine the "Saint Francis," commanded by de Vergor, carrying stores and ammunition to the Saint John. The French vessel was accompanied by a schooner, which escaped. De Vergor defended his ship with spirit, and lost five seamen in the fight, while three of the English crew were killed.

The French now busied themselves in completing the fort at Beauséjour. The Acadians who had been induced, or forced to leave their homes, found that one penalty of the step was, that they were pressed without pay to work at the fortifications, only receiving their rations. They suffered much privation during the winter. Some few found imperfect shelter and scanty food at the settlement of Chipody, on the north coast of the bay of Fundy. Those who shewed dissatisfaction, and made apparent any disposition to submit to the English were sent to the island of Saint Jean, Prince Edward island. All, who refused to go, were threatened by Le Loutre that his Indians would carry away their wives and children; and in April, 1749, de la Jonquière issued an ordinance directing that these Acadians should take an oath of fidelity to France.

According to the writer of the "short account,"† the English

* *Mémoire sur le Canada, &c.*, p. 14. We are here told that the commissary at Louisbourg had been instructed to obtain some provisions for the French port at Saint John, and that Howe had agreed to furnish them. Le Loutre looked on this proceeding as interfering with his operations. According to this narrative, Le Loutre was present at the murder; as a matter of course, he disavowed it. Nevertheless, he was held in general execration "aussi de Laloutre fut-il en exécration aux uns et aux autres." The writer of a "Short account, &c.," *Que. Doc.*, III., p. 466, says positively Le Loutre, "cloathed in an officer's Regimentals an Indian named Cope, whom I saw some years after at Miramichy." He tells us, "All the french had the greatest horreur and indignation at Le Loutre's barbarous actions." Cornwallis described the act as an instance of treachery and barbarity not to be paralleled in history. 27 Nov., 1750, *Nova Scotia Archives*, p. 195.

† "A short account of what happened at Cape Breton, from the beginning of the last war untill the taking of Louisbourg by the English in 1758." *Que. Doc.*, III., pp. 465-486.

and French garrisons lived in good accord. No striking event occurred during the year except the continuance of the Indian outrages around Halifax. Dartmouth, opposite to the town, was surprised, although a force was stationed there for its defence. Four of the inhabitants were killed and six of the soldiers off duty carried away prisoners. The detachment was greatly blamed for its want of discipline and care, and a court of inquiry was held. Owing to the Indian outrages, it became a matter of difficulty to obtain wood; and stone could not be quarried. To encourage these attacks Le Loutre paid a premium for every Englishman's scalp.

De La Corne was at this period removed from Beauséjour, and was replaced by de Vassan. The latter was instructed to confer with Le Loutre, especially with regard to the policy to be observed towards the Acadians. De Vassan had frequent quarrels with Le Loutre, whose treatment of the Acadians was harsh and arrogant, making them believe that the provisions given to him by the government for distribution were furnished by himself,* and de Vassan had difficulty in allaying the discontent. But the spiritual weapons at the command of Le Loutre were his unfailing resource in the management of the unhappy people over whom he had obtained influence.†

Cornwallis had become wearied with his government, and in September, 1751, he asked for leave to return home,† assigning his indifferent health as the cause of his request. On his arrival in England in 1753, he married a daughter of lord Townsend, an engagement which may have influenced his determination. He had noticed the ability of Lawrence, and had recommended he should be made lieutenant-governor. He may have felt that in failing to induce the Acadians to accept English rule his government had not been a success. Cornwallis' name, however, must ever remain pre-eminent in the history of the country. He was a man of a chivalrous and honourable nature, untiring in devotion to the interests entrusted to him. There is no taint of duplicity on his name.

* Memoire, p. 13.

† Nova Scotia Archives, p. 645.

or of seeking his own interest; and he acted with wisdom and judgment in the establishment of the new province. In the midst of serious and unceasing difficulty, he founded Halifax on a firm basis. His foresight in establishing forts at Mines, Windsor and Chignecto, gave a firm hold of the country and made the policy possible which his successors felt called upon to carry out. It is not pleasant to remember, that no monument or statue has been raised to his memory in the province he may be said to have founded; but that memory is so honourably inscribed in history, that it will not easily pass away.

The population of Halifax in 1752 had reached 4,000 souls. One of the prominent facts connected with its settlement is the almost total absence of all religious instruction for the people. Excepting the regimental chaplains, we read of no clergymen being sent from England to Nova Scotia. One strange fact is that the commanding officer at Annapolis, captain Handfield, obtained authority to perform the marriage ceremony of his daughter, "provided neither the chaplain of the garrison nor any other lawful minister be present." The members of the council also assumed the adjudication of divorce cases. The contrast of the settlement of New Orleans to that of Halifax in this respect, can be seen in the ample number of priests and nuns sent to Louisiana. It is essentially the genius of Roman catholicism, in no way, to leave uncared for the religious wants of those belonging to her communion. Some explanation may be found of the impatience of protestants of any attempt at clerical control in matters beyond spiritual teaching; and even in the respect of doctrinal assumption, when undue pretensions of an absolutely extreme character are preferred, they are resisted as incompatible with the doctrines of scripture. It is worthy of remark that we hear of no attempt on the part of the methodists to enforce their doctrines on the population of Halifax. They had, nevertheless, obtained influence. Wesley had left Georgia in 1738; Whitefield had succeeded him, and had passed through the English colonies from Georgia to New England, and

methodism became flourishing. In 1750 it had many adherents in England. We possess no record to show that it took any part in the early settlement of Halifax. *

The only trace of any religious sentiment being entertained, is apparent in the fact, that no Roman catholic settler should be permitted, and the transfer of property could only be made to a protestant. There is no complaint that the regimental chaplains were deficient in zeal or wanting in conduct; but it was not the system of those days to consider the religious wants of a community. It must ever be a delicate question as to the extent to which the state should intervene beyond giving reasonable countenance to individual effort. It is the theory of protestantism that it is the duty of a community itself to make this provision. In a prosperous, established condition of life the fact needs to be sustained by no argument. Few, moreover, will deny that on the foundation of a new colony the members of the faith elsewhere, in organised civilized communities, are called upon to shew their sympathy, by rendering aid in the proper form of sending out and providing for competent and able missionaries among the people, who have sought a new and distant home.

On Cornwallis' retirement colonel Hopson assumed the government. He remained in this position from the 3rd of August, 1752, to November, 1753. He suggested to the government that no application should be made for the oath to be taken.† He particularly enforced the most careful treatment of the Acadians, and that they should be paid in full for everything that was purchased from them, and in no way to be insulted.

Some new phase of their position was constantly being

* It is probable that methodism was not introduced into Halifax before 1782. In that year the Revd. Wm. Black says in his journal, "Tuesday, June the 11th, and on the two following days, preached at Halifax to a stupid set of people . . . What a town for wickedness is this!" On Friday, the 14th, he says, "Preached in the evening at Mr. Wells. Many mocked most of the time, and kept up such a continual noise, that few could hear what I said." [Rickey's life of Revd. Wm. Black, pp. 69-70]

† Nova Scotia Archives, p. 197.

raised. One petition was presented asking that the missionaries should be exempted from taking any oath. It was presented by forty-five inhabitants of Grand Pré, river Canard, and Pissiquid, and sets forth that they had taken the oath on condition that they should be allowed the free exercise of their religion, and that Daudin, a priest, declined to remain if forced to take the oath. The council resolved that the inhabitants should be allowed a sufficient number of priests provided they complied with the regulations. M. Daudin's conduct will be subsequently related.

Another petition, unsigned, was also delivered by two Acadians, who had left their property and desired to return to it. It asked the same conditions as those previously enumerated, to take the oath without being bound to bear arms against anyone, even the Indians; the right for them and their descendants to withdraw *la tête levée* when they saw fit; the priests to come without taking the oath; and that any land occupied by the English should be restored. The answer was given that on swearing full loyalty to the monarch they could return to their lands, and enjoy the privileges granted by the treaty of Utrecht.

On the two bearers of the petition being questioned, they produced a paper signed by four-score of the inhabitants, authorizing them to act. The petition was sent in towards the end of 1753, and it is a proof that although these parties strongly desired to return to their lands, which they had left at the instigation of Le Loutre, they could in no way understand the obligations incident to the possession of property. Their petition was written so objectionably that its self-assertion is on the verge of insolence, and it made apparent that there was no change in the feeling which had led them to abandon the province; and that on their return, their loyalty would on the first strain at once disappear.

One of the duties of Hopson during his administration was to enter into a treaty of peace with the Micmac Indians. They were represented by J. Baptiste Cope, the same chief who had been used by Le Loutre at the murder of Howe.

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of Howe.

The treaty was signed on the 22nd of November, and was one of those illusory attempts to obtain quiet, in which no one could have had faith. It is, however, one of the many proofs that the British government left no effort untried to establish peace in the province, so that its development could be peaceably attained: a development, as Cornwallis remarked, which would have brought more profit and advantage to the Acadians than to any other class, owing to their being the only possessors of land under cultivation. Hopson regarded the condition of the province as a treacherous calm, soon to be succeeded by hostilities. It was evident that nothing could be effected with the Acadians. They resisted every attempt at conciliation. As early as 1753,* the means of removing them was under consideration. There were 973 families on the south of the bay of Fundy, and 63 families from Cobequid to cape Sable, and the continued Indian war made it impossible to extend English settlement in the neighbourhood of the French. Accordingly there was no law or civil government, and the Acadians were left entirely to the missionaries and French emissaries. It was these, added Hopson, who daily persuaded the *habitants* that the country was soon to pass to France by negotiation or force of arms.

Hopson continues, "Tho' these doctrines would not fail of their desired effect with so ignorant and so bigotted a people, yet no event happening in all this time towards the accomplishment of their predictions, the Inhabitants began to suspect they were deceived, and even some few of those who had deserted their lands returned again into the province, and I have been privately informed the Inhabitants went so far as to hold consultations whether they should not throw themselves under the protection of the English government and become subjects to all intents and purposes: but there arose a very considerable objection to their taking this step, which was that as they live on farms very remote from one another, and of course are not capable of resisting any kind of enemy,

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 198. Governor Hopson to Lords of Trade, 23 July, 1753.

the French might send the Indians among them and distress them to such a degree that they would not be able to remain on their farms, which apprehension they were soon confirmed in by the arrival of the Abbé Le Loutre at Bay Verte, where he has just now assembled the Indians, whose numbers I have omitted no pains to learn, but could never succeed in obtaining any certain account; it is generally estim'd there are about 300 families of the Mickmacks, but I could never yet find that any person who has been among them has ever seen two hundred men under arms together."

Hopson explained that small as this force was, he had not the troops to attack them. Independently of the difficulty of marching through the wilderness to reach them he mentioned the several forts he had to maintain, which proved a serious drain on his strength. In a sentence he pictured the situation of Nova Scotia at this date, "In fact, what we call an Indian War here is no other than a pretence for the French to commit Hostilities upon his Majesty's subjects."

"Your Lordships may imagine how disagreeable it is to me to see his Majesty's rights encroached on, and these encroachments openly abetted, avowed and supported by the Governors of Canada and Louisbourg, when it is not in my power to prevent it, as I have barely a sufficient force to protect the settlers from the Insults of an Indian war, under a pretence of which the French take an opportunity to commit Hostilities upon his majesty's subjects. I have been informed that French have often been mixed among them in their expeditions, and am convinced past doubt that they are clothed, fed, protected from our pursuit and encouraged to disturb us as openly and in as great a degree as in time of war."*

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 199, 200.

CHAPTER IV.

The new governor-general of Canada, the marquis Duquesne de Meneval, arrived at Quebec in July, 1752. He belonged to the distinguished naval family of that name. According to a contemporary, his haughty manners were deliberately assumed by him in view of those with whom he had to deal. He inaugurated his government by a general review of the troops and militia; the latter amounted to 13,000 men capable of bearing arms.* He compelled all who were bound to serve to enrol themselves, and he enforced strict discipline. He also established corps in the cities, which were constantly drilled. All these preparations led to the general opinion that the new governor was there to command, and that the time could not be far distant when their service would be called for in the field.

The instructions of Duquesne were to arrest the pretensions of the English to the Ohio, manifested by the expeditions they fitted out, and to drive them from the territory. No English were to be permitted to trade there. The Indians, however, were not to be interfered with when proceeding to the English settlements.

During the administration of de Longueuil, Bigot had advocated active operations on the Ohio. De Longueuil had been unwilling to act, from a belief that the occupation of the territory was dependent upon trade, and if the French could sell goods cheaper than the English, the latter would be forced to retire. Moreover, as the country was to a great extent then held by the Iroquois, he considered that it would be impolitic to embroil the province in a quarrel with these tribes for its possession.

Duquesne, in his reports of the condition of Canada, dwells

* Mémoire, p. 29.

on the want of discipline of the provincial troops, and the disinclination of the officers to active service. He describes them as struck with terror when called out.* He was dissatisfied with them in other respects, describing them to be badly constituted as a body, many desertions taking place, the men neglecting to salute their officers; several of them in debt and deficient in cleanliness. The service had been much neglected, and theft was punished by a short imprisonment.† It took twenty months to remedy this disorganization and to reintroduce order and discipline.

Nevertheless, Duquesne determined to act, and in the autumn he sent Marin, with three hundred Canadian militia, to commence the construction of the first fort on lake Erie, designing to take possession of the valley of the Ohio. Péan went with him as major. During the winter Bigot was actively engaged in completing the boats and canoes necessary for the expedition in the spring. The objectionable features of the landing to connect with lake Chatauqua were now known, and the base of operations was changed to Presqu' Ile, now known as Erie in Pennsylvania, which possessed the advantages, of which the spot first selected was deficient, being easy of approach, and furnishing an excellent harbour. Marin here established himself for the winter; in the spring a large reinforcement was sent, and the work of developing the route commenced. A road was cut to the first navigable waters, known as French creek, a tributary of the Alleghany, and the stores, boats, and ammunition were carried to the higher level, where a second fort was constructed, known as fort le Bœuf. The distance was about twenty-one miles. The labour and privation were very great, and were much felt. Some of the younger officers acted with so little zeal as to call forth the rebuke of Duquesne. The detachment likewise suffered from ill-health; among those who succumbed was the

* 30th October, 1753. "Paroissent consternés," quoted by Dussieux, p. 114.

† 26th October. "Leur indiscipline est outrée; cela provient de l'impunité dans les cas les plus griefs;" he had seen a soldier. "Passer sous le nez de son capitaine sans lui ôter son chapeau." Quoted by Dussieux, p. 115.

commander, Marin, who died in his sixty-third year, on the 29th of October, 1753. He was a man of vigour and determination, and remained to the last at his post, when he should have sought quiet and repose. His place was taken by Legardeur de Saint Pierre, who had returned from the west a few months previously. The struggle between France and England for the possession of the Ohio had now commenced in earnest.

This territory for some time had attracted the attention of Pennsylvania and of Virginia. Organizations had been formed for its development. Exploring parties from the former passed up the valley of the Juniata, and from the latter by the tributaries of the Potomac, to cross the Alleghanies. In 1750, the Ohio company was formed; it included many of the leading men of Virginia. The grant of 500,000 acres was obtained from the king on condition of the settlement of one hundred families being made within seven years, and a garrison being established for their protection. Gist, who represented the Ohio company, went as far as the Wabash; Croghan, sent by Pennsylvania, reached the Miami. Howsoever these rival interests for a time were smoothly conducted side by side, they concealed great jealousies and animosities. Both were desirous of banishing opposition from the field, so each poisoned the mind of the Indian against his rival. By these means the designs of the French were aided, and it was easy to impress the Indian with the conviction that the object of the English in crossing the Alleghanies was not to trade but to obtain possession of the territory; and thus the tribes, which hitherto had been faithful to England, began to look with suspicion on the policy of Pennsylvania and Virginia.

The Ohio is formed at Pittsburg by the junction of the two streams, the Alleghany from the north and the Monongahela from the south-east. It was by the waters of the north that access to the country was obtained from Canada. Indeed, the Canadians considered the Alleghany a branch of the main stream and gave it the name of the "Belle Rivière," by which the Ohio was known to them. The Monongahela,

imperfectly navigable, furnished the route to some extent to the English colonist. The junction of these streams suggested the site for the establishment of a fort by the power claiming the sovereignty of the country. Croghan, the Indian trader, seems to have been the first to point out its advantages. He had been sent by Hamilton, governor of Pennsylvania, to explore the country, and had arrived at Logstown shortly after the departure of de Céloron.*

The governors of the northern English provinces were fully impressed with the necessity of affirming and strengthening the Indian alliances. The difficulties between Clinton and the New York assembly had made the successful pursuit of the policy impossible. Hamilton in Pennsylvania experienced opposition of the same character. The legislature seldom rose above the view of endeavouring to save the people's money and of opposing the royal prerogative. Hamilton, in the first instance, sent Croghan to the Miamis, where he met several of the Wabash Indians.† Croghan entered into a treaty of amity with them, and they were to receive a present. On his return his report was rejected. Croghan was reprovved for misconduct in drawing an additional expense on the government, and the Indians remained neglected, the promises made to them being broken. Croghan was again sent to the Ohio with a present of goods. He returned with a request from the Indians that a strong house should be built at the forks of the Monongahela for the protection of the Indian and English traders. The assembly rejected the proposal, and, adds Croghan,‡ “condemned me for making such report, alleging it was not the intention of the Indians.”

The Virginian Ohio company had built a trading house at Will's creek, a branch of the Potomac, now known as fort Cumberland, about 120 miles distant from Pittsburg; but in June, 1752, when some of the Virginian commissioners met the Indians at Logstown, the latter asked for the construction of the fort at the Ohio. The request was of no effect.

* New York Doc., VII., p. 267.

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There have been legislatures which, previous to obtaining political knowledge, have committed wrong and injustice, and have caused woeful injury to the interests entrusted to them. That of Pennsylvania, in the early stage of the final struggle on this continent between France and England, stands pre-eminent in its perverseness. Franklin must be blamed to a great extent for this conduct, for he led the assembly, in the full meaning of the word. There was also a dispute as to boundary between the two provinces. Both claimed the Ohio, and owing to these differences no law could be administered in the territory. Virginia would do nothing. The legislature was bent upon gaining concessions from the governor, which, in the present emergency, they thought they could exact. New York was applied to in the common interest. All that the New York legislature could recognise was, the duty of attending to its own Indians, and keeping up the communication between the Mohawk and the Onondaga, which has its outlet at Oswego; and in 1751 Oswego consisted only of the houses of some traders, with a block-house, surrounded by a stone wall, having cannon at the angles.

In spite of the protests and efforts of the governors of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia, the assemblies would take no steps to protect the territory each claimed, neglecting their opportunity for minor and unimportant interests, which would in no way have been affected by delay.

This continued inaction of the English provinces was an incentive to effort on the part of the French. Three years had passed since de Céloron had descended the Ohio, and although the object of the expedition was well known, no measures had been taken to counterpoise his pretensions. The one influence on the Ohio on the side of the English colonist was that of the trader; there was neither any force nor a single fort to encourage the Indian to adhere to the side of the English. The trader sold his goods cheaper than the French, and they were better. The Indian might prefer French brandy to English rum, but the latter could be had for less value in exchange. The English traders endeavoured by every effort to keep the

French on their side, and there was little scruple as to the means followed. The French assert that a plot was formed by them to destroy every Canadian found south of lake Erie, but it is unsustained by proof.

It has been related that the instructions to de Céloron when in command at Detroit were to drive the English from the Ohio and to punish such Indians as were unfriendly to the French. De Céloron considered that he had not strength to make the attempt. While the authorities at Detroit were hesitating as to the possibility of attack, Charles Langlade, who lived at the head of Green bay, arrived at Detroit with 250 Ottawas and Ojibwas. Descending to lake Erie, they reached the Maumee, which they ascended to the French fort Kiskakon, crossed the portage to Lorimie creek, and descended to the village of "La Demoiselle," Pickawillany. Most of the men were absent on a hunting expedition. With scarcely any resistance the place was taken and destroyed. Fourteen Miamis were killed, among them "la Demoiselle," who was afterwards eaten. There were eight English traders: one of them was killed, five were sent to Quebec, two escaped.

The inactivity of the English colonists had the effect which might have been anticipated. Vigour and courage are arguments which peculiarly appeal to the Indian. Consequently the tribes saw in the steps taken by the French, the exercise of power not possessed by the English, and unsolicited they visited the French at Presqu'île and fort le Bœuf and made offers of assistance, their presence fully establishing the success of the policy of Duquesne. The intention had been to complete a third fort at Venango, the junction of French creek with the Alleghany. These three forts being sufficiently garrisoned, Péan with a strong force was to pass through the country and to shew to the Indians the power and strength of France. Disease and fever prevented the accomplishment of the plan, and as winter approached the sick were sent back to Montreal; three hundred men were left in the forts. The emaciated and suffering condition of the invalided soldiers on their arrival obtained for them much consideration.

Dinwiddie, the governor of Virginia, saw that the effect of the French possession of the Ohio would be to enclose the English colonies between the Atlantic and the Alleghany mountains, and forever definitely to curtail British power in America. Receiving no support from the house of assembly, he was powerless to take steps to prevent its accomplishment. A British trading house had been constructed at Venango, in which a trader named Fraser lived. In August Marin had sent six soldiers who seized the post and made prisoners of the two men they found there. The French had somewhat strengthened the place and occupied it, and had raised the French flag. Joncaire was placed in command with two subalterns. Dinwiddie, not being able to despatch an armed force to the Ohio, determined to send a protest against French occupation; he selected for the duty Washington, then a young man of twenty-one, a major in the colonial service and one of the adjutants-general of Virginia.

Washington left Will's creek in November, 1753, with Gist as guide, a Dutchman as a French interpreter, a trader and four men. He reached Venango and was courteously received, and over supper when the wine had been liberally drunk, the French said plainly they had the territory and by God would keep it. The English could raise men, but their operations were so slow and dilatory, that they could not interfere with any French undertaking.

From Venango Washington proceeded to fort le Bœuf, where Legardeur de Saint Pierre was in command. He there delivered Dinwiddie's letter.*

* It set forth that the lands upon the river Ohio were so notoriously known to be the property of the crown of Great Britain that it was a matter of equal concern and surprise for him to hear that a body of French forces were erecting fortresses and making settlements upon that river, within his majesty's dominions. He had, therefore, sent George Washington, Esq., one of the adjutants-general of the forces of this Dominion, to complain of the encroachments, and of the injuries done to the subjects of Great Britain, in violation of the law of nations. It was his duty, Dinwiddie wrote, to "require your peaceable departure," and "that you would forbear prosecuting a purpose so interruptive of the harmony and good understanding which his Majesty is desirous to continue and cultivate with the most Christian King." New York Doc., X., p. 258.

De Saint Pierre received it with courtesy, and was extremely complaisant personally to Washington. The same hospitality was shewn to, and at the same time, every effort made to win an Indian named the "Half King," who had joined Washington at Logstown. At the end of three days de Saint Pierre gave a reply to the effect that he would send the letter to the marquis Duquesne, whose answer would be his law. If ordered to communicate it to Dinwiddie he would do so; he could not obey the notice to retire, as he was there by the orders of his general.*

Washington pursued his journey homeward. It was not without danger and privation, for it was the middle of January before he reached Williamsburg to relate what had taken place.

Dinwiddie, on reporting these proceedings to England, received authority to construct the forts required and to repel force by force; but no money was sent, and the work was to be executed at the cost of the province. The house of burgesses, however, would grant no supplies, unless the governor would allow the fee of a *pistole* paid on each patent of land to be declared unlawful. On this petty contingency the province was risking its possession of the territory claimed by it. Pennsylvania shewed equal apathy, but from a different cause. The German settlers in the province shewed perfect indifference regarding the future ownership of the western land; while the prosperous quakers of Philadelphia, living in their comfortable homes, had no thought of the wants of others and were non-combatant from principle.

Dinwiddie appealed to the other colonies, and called together the legislature of Virginia. On this occasion a vote of £10,000 Virginia currency was obtained to defend the frontier. Dinwiddie earnestly asked the governors of New York and Massachusetts by making a feint against Canada, to divert attention from the Ohio. Two companies, enlisted in New York and South Carolina, paid by the mother country, were placed under the orders of the governor of Virginia.

* N.Y. Doc., X., p. 259.

The whole force of that province consisted of a regiment of three hundred recruits, half of whom were at Alexandria being drilled by the colonel, Fry. The major was Washington, who was present with the other half at Wills' creek.

In February, 1754, forty men under one ensign Ward were sent across the mountains to commence the fort at the junction of the streams forming the Ohio. They were engaged in its construction when de Contrecoeur appeared with five hundred men and called upon them, as being in French territory, to surrender. Duquesne knew the necessity of despatch, and without hesitation had taken possession of the country with the determination of holding it. Dinwiddie was much mortified at this intelligence; he had, however, still hopes to be able to drive out the French. He ordered his troops, small as was their number, to assemble at a place known as Great Meadows, between Wills' creek and the new fort which the French had completed and had called fort Duquesne. The distance by the trail followed between the two places was about seventy miles.* Washington was placed in command; he commenced cutting a road over the two ranges of mountains to move his supplies and guns. He had crossed the main ridge when news was brought him that a detachment had been sent from the new fort to attack any English colonists they might meet. What Washington dreaded was that he would himself be surprised. Leaving his camp well guarded, with forty men he started at night in the rain and at dawn reached the wigwams of the "Half King." He and his warriors joined the expedition; and in no long time the scouts came upon the trail of the French. The French detachment had been traced to a dark glen, where it was plain they were lying concealed. Washington on hearing of their presence determined to confront them. He had to pass over irregular broken ground, and his advance was marked by difficulty, while the scouts followed the track to where the French were concealed. It was not possible to advance in

* Great Meadows by trail is about fifty miles from Wills' Creek, and seventy miles from Fort Duquesne.

silence, and the French, on the alarm being given, seized their guns. A skirmish followed, the English party receiving the order to fire. In the fight, which was short, the commanding officer, an ensign Coulon de Jumonville was killed, twenty-nine were taken prisoners, one Canadian only escaped.* The Virginians had one man killed and three wounded.

De Jumonville had in his possession a letter which ordered that all persons he might find on French territory were to depart, and if necessary that he was to exact compliance. He had heard that Washington's force was greatly in excess of his own, and he had sent information of the fact to de Contrecoeur. During this period he had kept his party in concealment in the neighbourhood of Washington's camp. There can be no other conclusion, than that he was waiting for reinforcements in order to attack the Virginian force. The previous action of the French cannot be disregarded. They had seized the English trading house at Venango, they had compelled the surrender of the small party working at the fort on the Ohio forks, and had taken possession of, completed and garrisoned it. Their policy was that of immediate action, and there cannot be a doubt that on the arrival of sufficient force, Washington would have been attacked. His own despatch and determination alone prevented this proceeding. The statement that de Jumonville was shot as the bearer of a letter which he was prevented from reading is untenable. Washington distinctly denied that the affair was anything but a skirmish. The prisoners were sent by him to Virginia.

On his arrival at Great Meadows, Washington expecting an immediate attack asked for reinforcements, and commenced entrenching himself, giving to the fort the name of "fort Necessity." Fry, the colonel, was, at Wills' creek dangerously ill, and in a few days Gist arrived to say he was dead. Washington was now in command, and the three

* The names of those constituting the detachment are given Que. Doc., III., p. 521. Some of the prisoners were sent to London. Others are named as returning from Martinique in October, 1755. Among the officers, the only name now familiar to us is that of the cadet de Boucherville.

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companies were sent to Great Meadows, raising the force to three hundred men. Shortly after the number was increased by the company from South Carolina. It was commanded by a king's officer Mackay, and the old difficulty of rank arose; Mackay declined to receive orders from Washington as a colonial officer. Washington accordingly advanced twelve miles further to Gist's settlement, cutting a road as he went. When at this place he learned that he was about to be attacked by large numbers. Mackay and his men were sent for, and a council of war held. Gist's place was not considered defensible, being commanded by heights, and it was determined to return to Great Meadows and await the attack. There were few horses, so the baggage and stores had to be carried on the backs of the men, and in this work the regular company, although composed of colonists, would not aid. There were nine swivel guns to drag over the rough road, and two days were taken to travel the distance, about twelve miles. The men were worn out with fatigue or the retreat would have been continued. The Great Meadows were reached on the 1st of July.

By this time a strong force had been assembled at fort Duquesne. When the news of the death of de Jumonville reached Montreal, his brother Coulon de Villiers was sent forward with a large body of Indians. He travelled with such despatch that he reached fort Duquesne on the 26th of June. As he arrived, five hundred French and Canadian troops with a force of Ohio Indians were marching from the fort. The expedition was delayed for a few hours, and the command of it was transferred to de Villiers. Previous to starting, the principal officers drew up a paper justifying the hostile movement by the death of de Jumonville. The force, about nine hundred strong, ascended by canoes the Monongahela to Redstone creek, and landing at this spot commenced their journey through the forest to Gist's landing. Here they bivouacked, marching at daybreak of the 3rd of July. De Villiers halted at the spot where his brother had been killed, or as he says, "had been assassinated"; some dead bodies were

still lying on the ground. He had learned by his scouts the position of Washington, and he formed his men for immediate action.

Washington's force did not exceed three hundred and fifty men. From the superiority of the enemy he imagined that the attack would immediately be made, and he formed his men in column before the fort to receive it. Villiers, however, was determined to risk nothing, and evidently designed to besiege the place. Washington, consequently, retired to his entrenchments. They had in the last few hours been made more secure by logs; but they were of a simple character, the ditch being within the fortification, forming a rifle-pit from which the men could fire. The English had scarcely any provisions for a few hours; they had no bread, but they had fresh beef.

A heavy torrent of rain was falling; the fight, nevertheless, with periodical lulls lasted for nine hours. It was carried on with vigour, for the English had seventy killed and wounded; the loss of the French was seventy-two. The French, worn out by their march and long exposure to the rain, and it may be surmised having but an insufficient stock of provisions, proposed a capitulation. They also fancied in the distance they had heard drums beating and the firing of guns. The English refused the parley. On the second occasion the French requested that Washington would send an officer to their camp to discuss the conditions. As there was then no fear of a spy being admitted into the camp, the proposal was accepted.

Among Washington's officers only two knew anything of French, one of whom was wounded, and the only person at his disposal was captain Vanbraam, a Hollander. The English were almost without food, the powder nearly finished and their guns foul from firing. Vanbraam was accordingly sent to discuss the terms of capitulation. The English were to carry away a gun with their private property, and to march out of the entrenchments with the honours of war.

At midnight the articles were signed. They were in French

and the expression, "*l'assassinat de de Jumonville*," appears. The Hollander was the only person capable of translating the original, blotted by the rain. It was one of those trying situations when a decision has to be made, and an occasion when the translator of a language, not his own, would not be precise in philological accuracies. The French claimed that the signatures to the capitulation was an acknowledgment that the death of de Jumonville was a murder. It excited great attention at the time, and the assertion was immediately disputed. All the officers present, without exception, declared that the word "*assassinat*" was translated by the word "death." The conditions were written on wet and blotted paper, read by the light of a candle kept burning with difficulty. Washington and Mackay alike denied the fact. It is not possible to believe that in the crisis in which the French themselves were placed, they would have persevered in hostilities on account of the rejection of a word without political import. The contention of those who surrendered was, that the word through poltroonery or carelessness was falsely translated. The verdict of posterity can only be given on the honest consideration of the facts.*

Washington's retreat was one of unusual hardship, even in those days. The Indians had killed all the horses so the wounded had to be carried; consequently, much of the baggage was left behind. He had before him a dreary march of fifty miles. After he had proceeded for some distance he encamped and waited for the arrival of waggons. Owing to the want of cattle and oxen, the English garrison was permitted to place their baggage in security,† leaving parties behind to watch it. In order to insure the safe return of the French

* The opening sentence of the capitulation is as follows :

"Ce 3 juillet, 1754, à huit-heures du soir, Sçavoir : "Comme notre intention n'a jamais été de troubler la paix et la bonne harmonie (*sic*) qui régnoit entre les deux princes amis, mais seulement de venger l'assassin (*sic*) qui a été fait sur un de nos officiers porteur d'une sommation et sur son escorte, comme aussy d'empêcher aucun établissement sur les terres du Roy mon maitre." The term "assassinat" is also used in the VII. article. Dussieux p. 126 : quoted from a document in the Archives de la Marine et la Guerre. Vol. 3393 pièd 102 bis.

† "En cache."

prisoners, two hostages were given who accompanied the victors, captains Jacob Vanbraam and Robert Stobo.

De Villiers marched back to fort Duquesne with all the prestige of success and much of its self assertion. On his way he destroyed Gist's settlement and the store house of Redstone creek. His victory removed all opposition to the French possession of the Ohio. There was no force in the whole territory but that of the French, and no English trader could shew himself. The whole of the Indians declared in their favour, and it seemed that their power was firmly established, not again to be disputed.

In view of the re-establishment of British interests, the emergency was serious, nevertheless, the colonies most directly interested could not recognise the necessity of meeting it. To Massachusetts French power had always been a reality. Her commerce on the ocean had been assailed by privateers; her fisheries had been continually attacked; her outlying settlements had severely suffered from the Abenakis led on by French officers, and encouraged to deeds of slaughter by priests. With New York the struggle had been one for commercial supremacy; the clique of Albany traders charged with the management of the Indians had carried on their duties in the most selfish and narrow spirit. Within the last two years Virginia and Pennsylvania had seen the possibility of their limit being fenced in by the Alleghanies. Maryland and North Carolina were affected in no great degree by the struggle, and no aid commensurate with the danger could be looked for from these provinces. With the exception of New England, taught by a century of trial, there was no hope that the other provinces would aid in carrying out the true policy of active, energetic resistance to French pretensions; and thus the English claim to the territory was in danger of being hopelessly sacrificed.

The appeal was, therefore, made to the home government for aid. Writers have repeated the tradition that the mother country opposed all union of the provinces, on the ground that it would confer strength on communities which, under

separate governments, could be easily controlled. The principles of colonial government were very imperfectly understood, and much jealousy of feeling prevailed on both sides. With the exception of Great Britain and her colonies, every European government was a despotism: if not of a monarch, of an oligarchy. For this opinion to be sustained, proof must be shewn that the colonies were desirous of forming a political union, and that they had been thwarted by home influence. Undoubtedly, the project of the provinces meeting together, to lay down principles on which treaties with the Indians should be made, arose with the British government. In September, 1753, a circular letter was sent from the lords of trade and plantations to the governors, calling upon them to cause the assemblies to adopt a common policy and procedure in dealing with the Indians. A meeting took place in Albany: the provinces represented were, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland. Franklin attended as commissioner from Pennsylvania. It was here that he proposed his scheme of general government, to consist of a president appointed by the crown, and a general elective council, representing the provinces, the number of which was to be determined according to the taxes paid by each province. The president to represent the executive power, the council to have the right of legislation, but every act required the assent of the president. The united power of president and council extended to a declaration of war, or conclusion of peace, making Indian treaties, the establishment of the regulation of trade, the purchase of land, the settlement of colonies, the erection of forts, making laws, and imposing taxes. Every law was to receive the royal approbation, and unless disapproved in three years, to remain in force. The military and the naval officers were to be appointed by the president; civil officials by the council; in each case approved by the other branch. The scheme generally was accepted by the commissioners. It was rejected in Great Britain, as giving too much power to the people; it was unpopular in America, as yielding too much to the crown.

Possibly one difficulty was felt : the want of any guarantee that the provisions of such a constitution could be worked. The time was also one marked by disquiet and danger ; and it was scarcely wise to attempt constitutional innovations when the country was month by month becoming more involved in hostile complications. If, however, Great Britain hesitated to accept the project of such a union, it was evident that for the colonies to be continued in vitality, the mother country had to throw its strength into the contest, and assert her power to sustain and to aid them.

Parliament met in November, 1754. The king declared the intention of the nation to protect the trade of its possessions, as one of the sources of national wealth. Money was voted ; and two regiments were ordered to proceed to America. On leaving England they were to consist of five hundred men each, and on their arrival were to be increased to seven hundred. The two regiments were the present 44th and 48th of the line, and they were embarked at Cork in the middle of January, 1755.

The proceeding was accepted as a challenge by France. Eighteen ships of war, carrying three thousand men, were ordered to Canada : they left on the third of May, with the purpose of maintaining by arms the territory of which possession had been taken. Nevertheless, pacific messages were interchanged between the courts, as if war was the last contingent looked for ; but the secret instructions of both courts to their commanders shew that each knew that war was imminent. Admiral Boscawen, with eleven ships of the line, and a frigate, was ordered to capture any vessel bound for North America. Three weeks later he was followed by admiral Holbourne, with seven ships of war.

Most of the French ships escaped the English fleet to reach Louisbourg and Quebec. Three vessels, "l'Alcide," "Le Lys," and "le Dauphin," owing to the fog, became separated from the squadron, and on the 7th of June, 1755, were seen by the English fleet. The story has often been told. Hocquart, the French admiral, declared that the "Dunkirk" coming within

speaking distance, he called out through a speaking trumpet, "Are we at peace or war?" and that the captain, Howe, replied in French, "*La Paix! La Paix!*" Hocquart then asked the name of the admiral, and on hearing it, replied, "I know him, he is a friend of mine." He was then asked his own name. He had scarcely replied, when the English vessel fired a broadside into him.* The French vessel returned the fire, and after a contest, was taken. "Le Lys" also struck her colours, she had on board eight companies of the regiments "La Reine" and "Languedoc." On the news being known in France, the French ambassador, M. de Mirepoix, was recalled. War, however, was not declared.

One proceeding of Shirley's had caused great dissatisfaction at Quebec: he had taken steps to fortify the carrying place between the Kennebec and the Chaudière, having, in 1754, sent Winslow to construct a block-house, called by him fort Halifax.† It was the assertion of sovereignty over the country which Duquesne had encouraged the Indians to devastate. The latter relates that the Abenakis, of Bécancour, destroyed twelve leagues of country, and brought back five scalps; while those of Saint Francis made raids towards Boston, and took thirty prisoners and scalps.‡ At the same time he admitted that the fort could not have been constructed if the Indians had not been gained over. Shirley even sent troops to the north, as far as La Beauce, to chastise any French or Indian parties he might meet.

Duquesne, in consequence, instructed de Boishébert at Saint John, and father Germain, to incite the Malecites to join the Canadian Abenakis in any attacks they would make. He also called upon de Vergor and Le Loutre to induce their

* The fact is not recognised by English historians. Lord Mahon thus represents the event: "The foreign Commandant inquired if it was war or peace. Howe replied that he must wait for his Admiral's signal, but he advised the Frenchman to prepare for war. Ere long appeared Boscawen's signal for engaging, Howe attacked." Vol. IV., p. 46, chap. xxxii.

† N. Y. Hist., Doc. X., p. 277. It was situate in the town of Winslow, in Kennebec County, Maine.

‡ Que. Doc. III., p. 515. Dusquesne au Ministre, 10 Oct., 1754.

Indians to take part in the struggle. While he was thus urging on the French officers and missionaries, and furnishing powder and ball to the Indians, he boasts that he is observing outward circumspection towards the English.*

The policy of these attacks was to weary the New England troops, and so induce them to abandon the new fort.

* "Je me suis servy des commandants et des missionnaires pour les y engager en leur fournissant de la poudre, et des balles, moyennant quoy je conserve les ménagements extérieurs vis-à-vis l'Anglois que je fais harceler." *Que. Doc.*, III., p. 517.

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CHAPTER V.

The commander of the British expedition designed for active operations was general Edward Braddock, then upwards of sixty years of age; having joined the Coldstream Guards in 1710, he had forty-five years' service. There is no record of the extent to which he had been engaged in the last war. His father, general Braddock, had also served in the Guards, and had retired in 1715. The latter died in September, 1725, leaving to his three children, two of whom were daughters, £6,000 each. We know likewise by the memoirs of George Anne Bellamy that Braddock left her £7,000;* facts which go far to repel some of the scandals put forth regarding his character. His integrity is universally admitted, especially by contemporary American writers. There is no ground to suppose that he was ever in want of money. Braddock was without court influence, and to all appearance he was selected for the duty by the duke of Cumberland from belief in his ability and capacity. The same may be said of his staff, major Burton and captain Orme, the latter of whom is especially spoken of as "an experienced officer."

No character in the history of the American continent has received greater defamation than that of Braddock;† and

* Vol. V., p. 192.

† The main ground for the expression of this unfavourable view is the autobiography of Franklin, whose depreciatory estimate of Braddock has been universally accepted. Franklin wrote his account of Braddock after 1788 [Chapter X.], when eighty-one years old, and thirty-three years after the event. The first five chapters of the autobiography were commenced at Passy, near Paris, in 1771; chapter VI. was written in 1784; chapters VII.—XII. were commenced in 1788. Franklin himself says [chap. VI.], "I am grown old, and my memory bad." Later he writes: "I cannot have the help I expected from my papers, many of them being lost in the war." In my humble judgment Franklin cannot be accepted as an authority in the narrative of these events. When he wrote he was desirous of depreciating everything connected with the mother country, which

English historians, without investigation, have accepted these unjust accusations. He is represented as brutal, incompetent, self-indulgent, neglectful and deficient in all prudence of character. Franklin describes him as having the belief that Indians were not necessary to him in the campaign; and that

at this period he regarded almost with hate. His letter to Strahan may be accepted as typical of his feelings in this respect. Early in the struggle he was an earnest advocate of the separation of the colonies: no one more strongly desired their independence, although from policy he concealed his opinions. There were, moreover, strong political reasons for him to write, so as to destroy respect for the thought and statesmanship of the mother country, and for the men she could produce. "The whole transaction," he says, "gave us Americans the first suspicion that our exalted ideas of the prowess of British regular troops had not been well founded." This account is so incorrect, that his biographer, Dr. Sparks, appends the note, "There are some errors in this part of Braddock's defeat;" (p. 192).

A second authority seriously reflecting on Braddock is Horace Walpole. He relates the story of an unhappy sister of Braddock, who, through losses at play at Bath, committed suicide, and of a consequent brutal speech by her brother. We all know how such stories become current, to end in an epigram. With some detail Walpole describes Braddock's relations with a Mrs. Upton, who, as Walpole puts it, "kept him," and the extent to which, in an infamous manner, he obtained money from her. Walpole refers to that unfortunate production of Fielding, "The Covent Garden tragedy," which every admirer of Fielding's genius can only read with sorrow. Some United States writers have taken upon themselves to say that Braddock was the original of Captain Bilkum. The piece was produced in 1732, a year previous to Braddock obtaining his captaincy; a few years after he had received £6,000 by the death of his father. Walpole states that "the ridiculous story" is "recorded in heroics" in this play. The assertion is unwarrantable, that any passage in the burlesque, for so in modern language it may be described, has any such application. Braddock was then in the Guards, in good society, and in no want of money. If Walpole had ever read the play he must have forgotten it. I hazard the following extract in proof of my assertion. The heroine, Stormandra, addresses Bilkum:—

"Dost thou forget the time

When, shivering on a winter's icy morn,

I found thy coatless carcase at the roundhouse?

Did I not send for half-a-pint of gin

To warm th' ungrateful guts? Pull'd I not off

A quilted petticoat to cloath thy back?

That unskin'd back which roils had dress'd in red.

The only title to the name of captain?"

Braddock possibly may have committed many follies of fashionable life; but it may safely be said they were not of the deplorable character named by Walpole. George Anne Bellamy, in her memoirs, gives a pleasing impression of Braddock. The night before his departure he called upon her with his two aide-de-camps,

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
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
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Map of the Country between Wills Creek and Monongahela River.

SHEWING THE ROUTE AND ENCAMPMENTS OF THE ENGLISH ARMY IN 1755.





REFERENCES.

- 1 Spaulding Camp
- 2 Martins Ferry
- 3 Savage River
- 4 Little Meadow
- 5 West side of the little crossing
- 6 Bear Camp
- 7 Squaw's Fort
- 8 East side of the Great Meadow
- 9 West side
- 10 Red Fort.
- 11 Oak's
- 12 East side of the Savage
- 13 West side
- 14 Great Swamp
- 15 Jacob's Ladder
- 16 Sail Lock
- 17 Thickety Run.
- 18 Monocanica
- 19 Monongahela Camp



he had a poor opinion of the provincial troops. Orme* relates that the latter were placed under an officer named Allan, and that the general had frequent opportunities of seeing and hearing of their character, spirit, and discipline. They were men newly enlisted and had only been some weeks under arms. Orme says of them that "their languid, spiritless and unsoldier-like appearance, considered with the lowness and ignorance of most of their officers, gave little hopes for their future good behaviour;" it is not impossible that Franklin heard some such opinion when present with Braddock.

Braddock was a captain in 1736, a lieutenant-colonel in 1745. Subsequently, he was appointed colonel of the 14th foot and was stationed at Gibraltar, where he became exceedingly popular, and was greatly liked by his officers. In the journal of a naval officer who accompanied the expedition,† Braddock's death is mentioned "as much lamented by the whole army." He was a strict disciplinarian. The records of the court martials shew that one thousand lashes were

major Burton and captain Orme. He produced a map, and spoke of the expedition in a depressed spirit, "as going with a handful of men to conquer whole nations, and to do this must cut their way through unknown woods." He told Mrs. Bellamy that he would never again see her, and on saying good-bye to her left with her a paper, which proved to be his will. [Vol. II., 194.] As has been said in the text, it was in favour of Calcraft, with whom Mrs. Bellamy was living, and believed to be her husband, to the amount of £7,000.

* The authority followed by me in the history of the expedition is the journal of captain Robert Orme, Braddock's aide-de-camp. It was first published in the United States in 1855, by the historical society of Pennsylvania, with an introductory memoir by Mr. Winthrop Sargent. It was procured in London during Mr. Ingersoll's official residence there. Orme was a lieutenant in the Coldstreams; he was severely wounded on the 9th of July and returned to England. In 1756 he left the service and married Audry, daughter of lord Townshend. Little more is known of him than that he died in 1781. His diary is accompanied by an official letter, probably addressed to Colonel Napier, A.D.C. to the Duke of Cumberland, requesting it be delivered to H. R. H. Orme's report is a dispassionate narrative of the campaign, and the impression made by it is, that it is in every respect reliable. There are many fables related with regard to the expedition to which no value can be attached.

† One copy of this document is in MS. in the Woolwich archives; a second copy which has also been published by Mr. Sargent was in the hands of the Revd. Francis Orbin Maurice of Newburnholme rectory, to whose father it was given by captain Hewitt. The variations in the text of the two MSS. are unimportant.

awarded; although a fearful punishment, the blame must be attached to the system which prevailed to the first quarter of this century; a commanding officer must obey the regulations prescribed for the punishment of crime, but he cannot be held responsible for them.

It will be seen in the course of the narrative, that the absence of the Indians was not only in no way attributable to Braddock, but the cause of complaint by him. From the early formation of the expedition in London it was considered that a surprise would be attempted. Previous to Braddock's departure he received a letter from colonel Napier, the duke's aide-de-camp, in which the chances of the expedition were discussed.* Braddock was enjoined to observe strict discipline, and to be careful that the troops "be not thrown into a panic by the Indians, with whom they are yet unacquainted, whom the French will certainly employ." "It is unnecessary," say also the instructions, "to put you in mind how careful you must be to prevent being surprised." Braddock was also specially directed "to endeavour to engage the Indians to take part with our forces in such operations as you will think most expedient."

The fleet arrived at Hampton in Virginia on the 20th of February, when Braddock proceeded to Williamsburg to confer with commodore Keppel. He there met Dinwiddie, the governor of Virginia. Braddock told the governor that it was expected the assembly would raise money towards the expenses of the expedition. The two regiments were each to be raised to 700 men. Sir John St. Clair, who had previously arrived, was acting as quartermaster-general, and it was arranged that the troops would be disembarked and be equipped at Alexandria.

One of the first questions asked by Braddock of Dinwiddie was the number of Indians that could be obtained. Dinwiddie undertook that one hundred and twenty fighting men of the Cherokees and Catawbias would join him. The next question was that of provisions to be delivered at Wills' creek, afterwards

* London, 25 Dec., 1750.

known as fort Cumberland. It was anticipated that difficulty would be experienced in procuring horses and waggons: it is conceded that at one time it appeared, from inability to obtain them, that the expedition could not be carried out. Neither Indians, nor horses and waggons, reached the camp. Franklin relates that the assembly of Pennsylvania, apprehending that Braddock had conceived strong prejudices against that body as being adverse to the expedition, desired him as postmaster-general to address the general under the guise of opening postal communication. Franklin found Braddock impatiently waiting the return of parties he had sent out to obtain waggons. Franklin dined with him daily. He learned all that could be collected was 25 waggons, when 1,500 pack horses and 150 waggons were needed. Franklin offered to make an attempt to collect them; he accordingly published an advertisement with an address to the inhabitants of Pennsylvania, dated the 26th of April.* At this date the troops had been in the country three months, and nothing had been done to assist the expedition.

The suspicion existed both in Virginia and Pennsylvania among the people, that the story of French encroachments

* Franklin's address was characteristic of the man. It set forth that the general and officers were exasperated that horses and carriages had not been furnished; and as through the dissensions of the governor and assembly no money had been provided, it was proposed to send an armed force to seize the best carriages and horses: that the presence of a body of soldiers with the temper they were in, would cause inconvenience to the inhabitants. He then described the service as light and easy; he himself had no interest in the affair, and had intervened in hopes of succeeding in leading them to accept the service for pay. He proceeds to say, "The King's Business must be done, so many brave Troops, come so far for your Defence, must not stand idle thro' your Backwardness to do what may reasonably be expected from you, Wagons and Horses must be had; violent Measures will probably be used, and you will be to seek for a Recompence where you can find it, and your case perhaps be little pitied or regarded. . . . I am oblig'd to send Word to the General in fourteen days, And I suppose *Sir John St. Clair*, the Hussar, with a Body of Soldiers, will immediately enter the Province, of which I shall be sorry to hear."

Braddock reported to the home authorities 5th June, 1755, the assistance he had received from Franklin. He described Franklin as having performed the duty "with so much goodness and readiness, that it is almost the first instance of integrity, address and ability, that I have seen in all these provinces."

was made up in the interest of the Ohio company and of land speculators, so that the country could be occupied by British troops. We have a letter from Washington stating that such was the case.* Braddock complained bitterly of the neglect from which the expedition was suffering. "Pennsylvania," he wrote to Mr. Fox, "will do nothing."† He complained to Lord Halifax, "the inhabitants of these colonies have shewn much negligence for his Majesty's service. Pennsylvania and Maryland refuse to contribute anything."‡ Moreover, he represented "the necessity of laying a tax upon all his Majesty's dominions in America, for reimbursing the great sums that must be advanced for the service and interest of the colonies, in this important crisis." I believe the earliest official recommendation of this policy on record.§

On the 14th of April a general council was held at Alexandria, at which the northern and eastern governors were present. Dinwiddie, of Virginia; Sharpe, of Maryland; Morris, of Pennsylvania; Delancy, of New York; and Shirley, of Massachusetts, attended. The plan of the campaign was discussed, and the operations to be followed were determined. The fort of Beauséjour, in Nova Scotia, was to be attacked by Monckton; Shirley was to command an expedition against Niagara, organized from Oswego; Johnson was to conduct the operations against Crown Point; these expeditions to be undertaken simultaneously with Braddock's advance against fort Duquesne, so that France could not concentrate her strength in any one direction.

Braddock proposed to reinforce Oswego with two companies of Pepperell's regiment and two New York independent companies; likewise, that two vessels of eighty tons should be built on lake Ontario. No one, more than Braddock, dwelt

* "Nay, after I was sent out in December, 1753, and brought undoubted testimony even from themselves of their avowed design, it was even thought a fiction and a scheme to promote the interest of a private company, even by some who had a concern in the government." Sparks, II., p. 218.

† 24th February, 1755.

‡ Without date.

§ Braddock to Sir Thomas Robinson, Alexandria, 19th April, 1755.

on the necessity of obtaining the aid of the Indians. Johnson was appointed plenipotentiary to the Six Nations of New York. In the first instance he declined the office, on the ground that the promises made to them in 1746 had not been fulfilled. He was finally persuaded to undertake the duty, and he was commissioned as sole manager and director of Indian affairs.

On the 31st of April the general proceeded to Winchester to meet the Indians who were to join the expedition. None were present, so he went on to fort Cumberland. He arrived on the 10th of May with the 48th. He found sir Peter Halket with six companies of the 44th encamped. Twenty Indians only were present. Braddock treated them with every consideration. They had been brought by George Croghan, who received a commission as captain for the campaign. Several of them desired to return with their wives and children to the Susquehanna. Eight remained; those who left never came back. Subsequently, sixteen reached Dunbar's camp at Rock fort, fifty-one miles from fort Cumberland.

One reasonable expectation had been formed by the English general, that the troops would have been furnished with fresh meat. They had now been three months in the country; during the whole of this period they had lived on salt provisions. The roads by which they had to march had been to a great extent made by themselves and were rough, and it was with difficulty that the artillery and stores were moved over them. The distance extended over two hundred miles, and the men had suffered great privation and fatigue.

Orme tells us that the "general offered large rewards and lent several people his own money to enable them to provide the camp, and gave all manner of encouragement to such as would give provisions." It is plain that Braddock was provident in the extreme. Strict regulations were enforced, and every protection given to those bringing supplies, to assure them the receipt of a fair price.

At the same time messengers were sent to the Delaware and Shawnee Indians to hasten their attendance.

The artillery did not arrive until the 20th of May, having been delayed from want of horses, which had been only obtained by parties sent out to press them. At the end of May the Pennsylvania waggons and horses came up, but with little flour, owing to the infamous neglect of the Cresops, father and son. The father had been employed to prepare some salted beef. When it came, it was so bad being without pickle, that it had to be buried. The consequence was that the general, to obtain further supplies, had to send thirty waggons under a captain's guard to Winchester, sixty miles of mountainous, rocky country, and three hundred carrying horses with a troop of light horse to Congeogee, ninety miles distant.* There was no means of tethering the horses so as to keep them in safety. Many were stolen by their owners. "There was no security," says Orme, "against the wildness of the country and the knavery of the people."

Except the Indians I have named, none joined the force. Some Delawares came, conferred with Braddock, received kind treatment and presents, and promised to return: they never rejoined. The Catawbias and Cherokees, who were to form part of the force, did not appear. Gist, who had been sent to bring them up, stated that they had marched three or four days towards the camp, when an Indian trader in the interests of the French gave them liquor, and when under the influence of drink, as cunningly suggested by this man, they asked for Gist's sealed instructions. He had been furnished with none, so they were led to regard him as an impostor, and left him.

Braddock was doomed to disappointment in every direction. One Hile, a Virginian, who had contracted for five hundred beeves, informed the general that the committee of the Virginian house of assembly had declined to confirm the contract; therefore, he could not go on with it. Braddock

* In spite of these facts some writers have reproduced contemporary letters describing Braddock as wasting his time in roystering and revelling with loose women at fort Cumberland. It is documents of this character I unhesitatingly classify as false.

applied to the governor of Pennsylvania to construct a road from that province to join the road he was forming, either at the great Meadows or the Youghiogeny. The assembly paid no regard to this request. Braddock, seeing that he could not only rely on his communications with Virginia, resolved himself to construct the road out of the military chest.

We must bear in mind the nature of the march to be undertaken. The troops were carrying with them artillery, baggage stores, and provisions, not simply for the march, but for victualling for some days the place they looked forward to take. The distance to fort Duquesne by the route travelled was 122 miles. They had to pass through a rocky wilderness, selecting the road they had to follow, and to cut their way as they advanced, under constant dread of attack from Indian parties. That this march was made in security, without overpowering fatigue to the men, and with scarcely any casualties, could only have been effected by discipline, prudence, and care. It was not an expedition of *la petite guerre* of the French, who when lightly clad, with provisions only, without artillery, stores or baggage, made their remarkable marches, until they found a place open to assault. It was an operation of war in the widest sense, rendered necessary by the geographical situation. The force had to cross lofty mountains, through an imperfectly known, broken, rocky country, daily presenting serious obstacles, carrying with it all the paraphernalia and appliances of war; and under the circumstances of the case no other course was possible. However disastrous the subsequent defeat, the march must be considered as having been skilfully and gallantly performed, and exacts respect from the good generalship which conceived it, and the endurance and discipline of the troops who cheerfully bore their privations.

The provisions being gathered to the extent possible to obtain them, a council of war was called, and Braddock submitted his plan of operations. No one knew better the extent to which he would be encumbered with a long line of horses and vehicles, and the constant danger of surprise. The road

to be made was twelve feet wide, and it was necessary to throw out scouting parties to guard the flanks. So far as forethought could anticipate the difficulties which lay before the troops, they were foreseen. The precautions during the march proved successful. The French and Indians hung about the force; but the discipline was such that no attack could be made. Only on two occasions was there any loss. On the 25th of June three men who strayed before the cordon of sentries were killed and scalped, and three or four men met the same fate on the 6th of July by lingering behind. The French contented themselves with writing their names, with some gasconading and not too decent sentences, on the trees, which they stripped of their bark. The force was divided into two brigades, the first placed under the command of sir Peter Halket, the second under Colonel Dunbar.*

In a few days the men got accustomed to the work before them, and learned how to meet the difficulties incident to the rough roads. They handled the artillery and waggons skilfully and successfully, and shewed cheerfulness and readiness in carrying out their duties.

On the 7th of June Halkett left with the 44th; on the 8th

* These brigades were thus constituted :—

The first brigade, commanded by Sir Peter Halket.

	Complement.	Effective.
44th Regiment of Foot	700	700
Capt. Rutherford's { Independent Company }	100	95
" Gates { of New York. }		
" Polson's Carpenters	50	48
" Peronnee's Virginia Rangers	50	47
" Wagner's "	50	45
" Dagworthy's Maryland Rangers.....	50	49
Second brigade, commanded by Colonel Dunbar.		
48th Regiment of Foot	700	650
Capt. Demerie's South Carolina Detachment..	100	97
" Dobb's North Carolina Rangers	100	80
" Mercer's Company of Carpenters.....	50	35
" Stevens' Virginia Rangers	50	48
" Hogg's " "	50	40
" Cox's " "	50	43

TOTAL..... 1,977

Burton followed with the provincial troops ; Dunbar, on the 10th, marched with the 48th, accompanied by Braddock and the headquarter staff. Washington was on Braddock's staff. Owing to the order of the 12th of November, 1754, giving precedence to king's over colonial officers, Washington had declined joining the expedition. Early on his arrival on the 2nd of March, Orme wrote to him by Braddock's command, stating that the general "would be glad of your company in his family," in other words would place him on his staff. This offer secured him the recognition of his rank. Washington acknowledged the letter in fitting language, and expressed his gratification at the offer, which he accepted. He was unable from private causes to join before the 10th of May, at Fredericktown, in Maryland, when his appointment was placed in orders. In the advance he was taken seriously ill with fever. Being unable to proceed with the main body, he was left behind at the sixth station, Bear's Creek. He here joined Dunbar's brigade on its arrival, and did not go further than Rock fort, where Dunbar's camp was formed. On the evening of the 8th, Washington joined the main body, still weak and ill, having travelled in a covered waggon to reach headquarters.*

It was known from the Indians who had been sent to reconnoitre fort Duquesne, that one hundred soldiers were in the garrison, and that reinforcements were expected. It was not, therefore, the force to be encountered which influenced the operations of Braddock: indeed, we may infer that he underrated its strength to be aggressive; an opinion unfortunately confirmed, as his march was continued, with little attempt at interruption. The anxiety felt by Braddock was with regard to the limited amount of provisions he had obtained, and the means of moving them. There were only forty waggons above the one hundred and forty obtained from Pennsylvania, with six hundred horses, insufficient to carry seventy days' flour and fifty days' meat: the quantity necessary to avoid risk. In order to gain time, it was determined to send forward

* Sparks, II., p. 85.

600 men to construct the road. The party left on the 30th of May. The first attempt was the formidable undertaking of commencing a way up the mountain side, beginning the ascent two miles from the camp. Fortunately Mr. Spendelow,* the navy lieutenant in charge of thirty seamen, accompanying the force, discovered a pass through the mountain, and in two days a good road was made.

On the first day's march to Spendelow's camp, five miles of distance, the serious difficulties attendant on the expedition made themselves fully felt. A council of war was held, and the determination was formed that all baggage not absolutely necessary should be sent back. The horses thus set at liberty were given over to the public service, and by these means the service horses were increased nearly one hundred. The general and his staff supplied twenty of this number. Most of the officers made sacrifices with regard to their personal comfort; during the campaign they used the soldier's tents. The artillery was reduced by two 6-pounders and four cohorns: and powder and stores, to the extent of leaving twenty waggons at liberty, were sent back. The king's waggons were found to be too heavy, and in their stead the country waggons were used for the powder. The force was reconstituted, and it was considered the line of march when properly closed up would not extend over half a mile.

On the 13th the start was made for Martin's plantation. The road was rocky and mountainous, and although the distance to be travelled was only five miles, the first brigade did not reach the ground until nightfall, and the second brigade did not arrive until eleven next day, causing a halt of a day.

On June the 16th, after four days' march, they reached

* He was killed on the 9th of July.

* Detail of march from Fort Cumberland to scene of action of the 9th of July, west of the Monongahela :—

Fort Cumberland, 7th June—Halkett left with 44th Regiment.

“ “ 8th “ —Barton “ “ Provincial troops.

“ “ 10th “ —Dunbar “ “ 48th Regiment, and

general and headquarter staff.

Little Meadows.* It was found impossible to proceed even with the smaller number of guns and the reduced quantity of baggage. In spite of every effort to keep the line in close order, it extended over from four to five miles in length. The horses were growing fainter, many dying, while the fatigue to which the men were subjected, by remaining so long under

Station.	Distance from Fort Cumberland.	
	Days' halt.	Miles.
1 Spendelow Camp—arrived 10th June, Council of War held 11th June	2	5
2 Martin's Plantation—arrived 13th June, left 15th June,	1	5
3 Savage River — " 15th " " 16th "		
4 Little Meadows — " 16th " second brigade only arrived 17th June. Council of War: it being found impossible to proceed with number of carriages, many horses having died, it was determined to march forward with best men, the second brigade to follow. Left 19th June.....	2	10
5 West side Little Meadows—arrived 19th June, left 20th June.		4
6 Bear Camp—arrived 20th June, left 23rd June	2	9
7 Squaw's Fort — " 23rd "		6
8 East side Great Meadows—arrived 24th June		6
9 West " " " — " 25th " (three men scalped).....		2
10 Rock Fort—arrived 26th June (Dunbar's Camp).....		4
11 Gist's " — " 27th "		6
12 East side Youghiogeny—arrived 28th June	1	5
13 West " " — " 30th "		2
14 Great Swamp — " 1st July		5
15 Jacob's Cabin — " 2nd "		6
16 Salt Lick — " 3rd "		6
17 Thicketty River — " 4th " left 6th June	1	6
18 Monacatuca Camp — " 6th " (three or four men scalped).....		6
19 Monongahela Camp—arrived 7th July.....		8
20 Two miles from Monongahela—arrived 8th July.....		6
21 Advance to Fort Duquesne — " 9th " (day of action)		7
	9	114

The spot where the action was fought is about eight miles distance from the site of Fort Duquesne, at the junction of the Ohio and Monongahela, now Pittsburgh.

arms in guarding the baggage, was wearing them out. Braddock, accordingly, resolved to move forward "with a detachment of the best men and as little encumbrance as possible." *

The force continued its march, occasionally made slow and difficult by the rough unbroken character of the route. The distance from fort Cumberland to the field of battle is about 114 miles by the route followed. It was accomplished in twenty-one days. In addition nine days' halt was made during the advance, rendered necessary by the obstructions to be removed.

At the seventh station, Squaw's fort, on the 23rd of June, three Mohawk Indians visited the camp; they assumed a friendly attitude, and were kindly received. They described themselves as having lately left fort Duquesne. They reported that reinforcements had arrived, and more were expected; that there was little provision in store, as from the low water in the streams the canoes could not descend. They were probably spies, for although treated with kindness, they left that night, taking with them one of Braddock's Indians, who had previously raised suspicions of his fidelity. On the march of the following day they came upon an Indian camp, whence probably these men had been sent. It was estimated that about one hundred and seventy of them had been present. Some trees in the neighbourhood had been stripped, on which the French had written scurrilous threats and bravadoes. On the following

* Washington in a letter to his brother (Sparks, II., 81) describes the change in the order of march to convey the idea that it was caused by his recommendation: he says, "The general before they met in council asked my private opinion. . . . I urged him in the warmest terms I was able to push forward, if he even did with a small and chosen band with such artillery and light stores as were necessary. . . . This advice prevailed." Washington's opinion was, no doubt, asked, as queries of this character are made. But the change was dictated by the very urgency of the situation. The impediments to the advance had been so painfully felt as to exact attention, and in themselves to suggest the remedy. It is not possible to ascribe the alteration in the plan of the campaign, as has been pretended, to Washington's wisdom. Orme is very clear on the point, he says "By these four marches it was found impossible to proceed with such a number of carriages. . . . The general determined to move forward with a detachment of the best men."

day three men, who passed beyond the line of the sentries, were killed and scalped; this was the only instance of such a loss during the advance, except on one other occasion.

On the 20th of June they came upon another Indian encampment, again to meet the stripped trees scrawled over with names, with expressions of insult pretty freely expressed, with boasts of having taken the three scalps. An officer's commission left behind established the fact that the leader was de Normanville. The trail shewed that the party had divided: some returning direct to fort Duquesne, others descending to the junction of Redstone creek with the Monongahela. A captain, four subalterns and ninety volunteers led by guides marched to this spot to attack them. So there was no want of enterprise during the march. All that was found was a small quantity of provisions and a large *bateau*; the latter was destroyed. The party rejoined the advancing column at Gists's plantation.

Dunbar's column had dropped back some marches in rear with most of the stores. Part of the flour having been damaged during the rains which had fallen, an order was sent to him to despatch one hundred horses carrying flour and some beeves. There was a halt to admit of their arrival. The men's arms were drawn and cleaned and four days' provisions were served out.

On July the 3rd at Salt Lick, about forty miles from fort Duquesne, a council of war was held. Dunbar's force was at Squaw's fort, nine marches behind; the question was discussed if the main body should wait for his arrival. It was considered that eleven days were necessary for Dunbar to join the main column, and that this time would give the French an opportunity to receive reinforcements and provisions and to strengthen the fort. Moreover, it was conjectured that there were not many Indians at the fort, as the French had permitted the column to pass spots which, with a few resolute men, could have been advantageously defended. It was resolved not to wait for Dunbar, but to march on without him.

On July the 4th, when at Thicketty river, two Indians were

prevailed upon to go towards the fort to obtain intelligence, and Gist, who acted as guide to the general, likewise was sent out on the same duty. The Indians returned bringing in the scalp of a French officer, whom they surprised when hunting within half a mile of the fort. They had found none of the passes between the troops and the fort occupied, and they formed the opinion that few French scouts were out on observation: no additional works to the fort had been constructed. Gist corroborated their statement; he had narrowly escaped being taken.

On the 6th of July they reached Monacatuca camp; it had its name from an unfortunate mistake. Three or four of the men lingering behind had been surprised and killed. On the firing being heard a party was detached against the attacking Indians, and the latter fled. They were again discovered in front by Braddock's Indians, who, on the alarm being heard, although giving the prescribed signal, not being recognised by the advance guard, were fired upon by the rangers. The son of the chief Monacatuca was killed by the discharge. The general sent for the father and the chiefs, and endeavoured in every way to console them, by expressions of sympathy and by presents. This conduct reconciled the Indians to the loss, and led them to recognise the event as an unfortunate blunder.

The first intention was to cross the head waters of Turtle creek, about twelve miles from its junction with the Monongahela, and to proceed directly to the fort without crossing that stream. But the working parties found themselves before a precipice, impracticable for descent, and another route was sought. It was resolved to follow the trail which led across the two fords of the Monongahela, by which means they would avoid the "Narrows," where it was thought that a stand might be made. The stream had consequently to be twice crossed. That night the force advanced to within two miles of the river. The following morning Gage started at day-break with three hundred men and two six-pounders, to take possession of the second ford, about five miles distant from

the first, Sir John St. Clair having preceded him to make the road passable.

The main body crossed the first ford of the river about eight in the morning of that fatal 9th of July. A mile beyond the ford, Braddock received a note from Gage that he was in possession of the second crossing. It was nearly one o'clock when the main body reached the stream. It was formed in column, and marched across with "colours flying, drums beating, and the fyes playing the Grenadier's March."* There was little thought of further resistance when they were allowed to pass the stream unopposed, and they were within eight miles of their destination.

The force was reformed on reaching the river bank. About two o'clock the order to move forward was given. The instructions were to march until three, when a halt was to be made. The column had proceeded about five-eighths of a mile, when it reached an ascending ground, skirted to the right by some heights. The country was densely wooded, with a thick undergrowth of bush. Some short distance to the west a ravine commenced, which gradually deepened to the height of a man; and to the east, not far removed, a similar ravine was available for defence. By the time the advance-guard had reached this spot, the main body with the baggage was in motion, and shortly afterwards heavy firing was heard in front. It was now half-past two.

The column had gone forward, with its working parties, and advance-guard, protected as it had hitherto been, by pickets and flank files, when the French were discovered in front. De Beaujeu was in advance in an Indian-hunting dress. He halted and waved his hat. The French fired one round and disappeared, to take post in the ravines, which formed natural rifle pits: the heads of those stationed there, alone appearing above the level of the ground. From this position they poured a continuous galling fire into the English, giving the loud yells characteristic of Indian attack. The force had

* Journal of the Proceedings of the Detachment of Seamen, &c., in Woolwich Arsenal.

halted on the appearance of the French, and fired to their front. By this time the artillery was brought into action, and in the discharge of grape and musketry which followed, de Beaujeu, with some French and Indians was killed.

According to French statements, the opposing force consisted of 72 French troops of the line, 146 Canadians, and 637 Indians. The number has been otherwise stated as 900 men. Their loss in killed was 3 officers, 25 soldiers, Canadians and Indians, and as many wounded. They fell by the first discharge. For after this hour, at no time of the action could any foe be seen, until the rush in flight to the river, when the Indians came forth to scalp and plunder. The French force fired in almost perfect safety from the ravines where they were concealed.

On hearing the firing, the general, conceiving the advance guard to be attacked, ordered the column to halt and sent forward Burton with the vanguard of 800 men, leaving 400 men to protect the artillery and baggage. The number of men going into action was 1,460 of all ranks.

Braddock ordered an aide-de-camp to the front to learn the character of the attack, but the firing continuing he left Sir Peter Halkett in command and went forward to judge the situation himself.

Burton was forming his men to feel the rising ground on his right, conceiving that the attacking force was posted there, when the advance detachments gave way and retreated upon his column, throwing the whole into confusion. The thickly wooded country, it must be borne in mind, was simply traversed by a road twelve feet wide. An attempt was made to retrieve the disorder. The colours of the regiments were placed apart and efforts were made to separate the men. The general gave orders for the troops to form, in small divisions, and for them to be led forward in this formation. It was in vain. The men could see no foe, and the fire was rapidly continued with terrible aim. The officers exposed themselves to encourage the men to keep their ranks, but as Orme relates, "neither entreaties nor threats would prevail."

The flank parties detached to secure the column ran in. The baggage was now attacked, for the enemy extended themselves along the line. Some horses and drivers were killed; those unhurt fled. For a short time the cannon kept off the Indians, but the ammunition was mostly expended and the discharge was without effect. The troops, crowded confusedly together, were firing wildly. Burton got together one hundred men of the 48th and was leading them to the rising ground to the right, when he was disabled from wounds, and his men faced about and would not proceed.

Braddock, seeing the officers falling, the men dispirited and obeying no command, and the loss being serious, gave the order for retreat. The men had fired away all their ammunition, the general was wounded, many officers were killed, and on the word to retreat being given, a panic seized them. As if with one consent, the whole force with few exceptions, regulars and provincials, abandoned the field, and ran for the ford as fast as they could. All efforts, on the part of the officers to lead them to rally and to form, failed. They threw away their arms, many their clothes, in order to escape. The Indians were busy in scalping and pillaging. Some fifty of the French and Indians followed the fugitives to the river, and killed several as they were in the ford, but made no attempt to cross the stream.

Braddock, after having five horses shot under him,* was struck by a ball which passed through his right arm into his lungs. He fell to the ground; he was indifferent about being removed, and desired to be left to die where he was. Orme disregarded his injunction; with the aid of captain Stewart, a Virginian, commanding the light horse, the wounded general was first placed upon a tumbril, then upon a fresh horse, and so led from the field. A couple of hours had scarcely passed since the commencement of the attack.

About a quarter of a mile on the opposite side of the ford, one hundred men were gathered together under colonel

* This statement is not made in the official report, but in Orme's letter to Governor Hunter Morris, July 18, 1755. [Nova Scot. Arch., p. 415.]

Burton. The first intention was to hold this ground until reinforcements could be obtained ; but in less than an hour the men abandoned the post. The general and officers were left almost alone, and they had no recourse but to join in the retreat. On gaining the second crossing of the Monongahela they were joined by Gage, who had collected about one hundred men. At the first halt, Washington, who was unhurt, although two horses were shot under him and bullets had passed through his clothing, was despatched to Dunbar to send waggons for the wounded, to meet them at Gist's, or nearer if possible.

The disbanded army, for such it was, marched all that night, and the next day ; at ten at night, the fugitives reached Gist's plantation, sixty-seven miles from the battle field. Some waggons and provisions arrived the following day. The wounded general sent a party to the Youghiogeny, with provisions for the men who had been lost in the woods. Those who remained made the best of their way to Rock fort, six miles distant, where Dunbar was encamped. Many of his men, most of whom were provincials, had deserted on hearing of the defeat.* The rest were without discipline. Many of those who had fled from the battle field had not stopped until they reached this place. In the disorganization it was resolved to retreat to fort Cumberland. As the waggons were required for the wounded, and there were no horses to remove the stores and guns, such as could not be carried away were destroyed or buried. The narrative of Orme relates this proceeding as unavoidable. On the 13th they reached Great Meadows, and it was at this spot Braddock died. He was buried "decently, though privately." By the 21st of July the wounded officers had reached fort Cumberland. Of the 1,460 men of all ranks who were engaged, 26 officers and 557 rank

* Dunbar had nearly six hundred men with him. The whole force amounted to about 2,000, 1,450 of which were regular troops ; about 1,250 of these were present in the action, so that only 200 men of the British regiments could have been at Rock fort.

and file escaped; 26 officers and 430 rank and file were killed; 37 officers and 380 rank and file were wounded.*

The English loss, in a sentence, was all that they were carry-

* Many statements are made concerning this action, which I am unable to recognise as worthy of respect. A rambling story is told that Braddock was killed by one of his own men. It has been affirmed that he reproved his men for fighting behind trees, and that the Virginians were the only troops who shewed courage. It was so reported at the time in colonial life, and the letters published in England were to the same effect. One account sets forth "that the Virginians, who formed the rear guard, still stood unbroken, and continued the engagement on very unequal terms near three hours, but were then compelled to retire." The action scarcely lasted two hours; there was no rear guard, and only three companies of the Virginians were present. There could not have been two hundred provincial troops in the column, including the light horse, the working parties, and the pickets. The official account describes the general flight to the river, and in the panic which seized the troops, the Virginians were neither better nor worse than the other regiments. Five provincial captains and seven subalterns only were present. Of this number seven were killed and wounded. Of the eighty-nine officers present in the action, only twenty-six came out uninjured. On all sides they exposed themselves, to arouse the men to the performance of their duty.

Franklin relates, on the authority of Orme, that after the defeat Braddock kept unbroken silence, except the two sentences: "Who would have thought it?" "We shall know better how to deal with them another time." This assertion is clearly disproved, for Braddock desired to make a stand a quarter of a mile east of the Monongahela. He sent Washington to Dunbar to order up the waggons from the camp. Moreover, he dispatched parties with provisions to provide for stragglers.

He undoubtedly keenly felt his defeat; but he bore his suffering with stoical fortitude during the four days he lived after the action. It may safely be said, from the confidence with which he crossed the last ford, no one could have been more surprised than he at the result.

It has been affirmed that Braddock refused the advice of Washington, which, if listened to, would have changed the fortunes of the day. Washington made no such statement himself, and there is no authority for it. Washington only joined the night before the action, having been ill with fever, from which he was to some extent still suffering. His letters are full of passionate invective against the cowardice and misconduct of the troops, and here his blame ends. As might be looked for, he excepted the Virginians from censure. I cannot, however, see on what ground he did so. [Washington's letter to his mother. Fort Cumberland, 18 July. Sparks, II., p. 87.] Washington was reported to be killed. [Letter to John A. Washington, 18th July.] He wrote to Robert Jackson on the 2nd of August: "I join very heartily with you in believing that when this story comes to be related in future annals it will meet with unbelief and indignation, for had I not been witness of the fact on that fatal day, I should scarcely give credit to it even now." [Sparks, II., p. 91.]

ing with them except the clothes they wore all else remained upon the field. The artillery, the waggons, provisions, including 100 oxen, baggage and stores fell into the hands of the victors, with the military chest containing £25,000 in specie; likewise the general's cabinet including his instructions and private papers; among the latter a plan of fort Duquesne. It had been made by Stobo, a hostage since the surrender of Washington at fort Necessity. He had availed himself of the opportunity to make a drawing of the fort and to send it to his countrymen by a friendly Indian.*

When the British force was advancing against fort Duquesne, the fort was under the command of de Contreccœur, and was garrisoned by regular troops and a body of Canadian militia. Three captains were present who took part in the attack, de Beaujeu, Dumas and de Ligneris; many of the western Indians had been collected in the neighbourhood. It was afterwards a matter of dispute with whom the resolution originated of disputing the advance of the British column. Dumas claimed that the suggestion came from himself to de Beaujeu. Wheresoever the determination arose, justice must be done to the gallantry which sustained it. It could only have arisen from the desperate position in which the French were placed. Had the force of Braddock arrived before the fort, the slender garrison could have made no defence. Their conduct, therefore, exacts the greater respect; and the admirable mode in which the attack was organized shews the care with which it was considered, and the promise it gave of success.

Surprise has been expressed that the attack was not made when Braddock's column was passing the ford. I cannot think any such design was entertained.

The situation of the ravines furnished the most favourable spot to lay in wait for the column. Subsequent events sug-

* By the discovery of this plan Stobo was threatened with great danger. He was sent a prisoner to Quebec, where he remained for nearly four years, but finally escaped and joined the army under Wolfe, to give him what local information he had obtained.

gest that it had been so determined, for the ground was immediately occupied on the signal made by de Beaujeu. The campaign is worthy the attention of every military student. It is impossible not to believe that the advancing force felt all danger to be past, and that caution was relaxed. But for the protection of these ravines the march could not have been successfully opposed, and had the scouting parties been more widely extended, they must have been discovered. Had an attempt been made to occupy them from their entrance, the probability is that there would have been little resistance.

It is to this want of caution that Braddock's defeat is to be attributed. His indifference and neglect of the Indians, his delay at fort Cumberland revelling and roystering, his failure properly to estimate the provincial soldiery, his brutality to his own soldiery; all such statements may be dismissed as fables, as the previous narrative establishes.*

There is a melancholy close to the episode, which tells to the dishonour of the French. A young Pennsylvanian prisoner relates that twelve soldiers taken in the fight were burned on the bank of the Alleghany river, opposite the fort. It is to

* Wolfe's opinion of this campaign is given in a letter to his father. [Wright, p. 324.]

"Southampton, 4th September, 1755.

"The accounts of Mr. Braddock's defeat are not yet clear enough to form a right judgment of the cause of it; but I do myself believe that the cowardice and ill-behaviour of the men far exceeded the ignorance of the chief, who, though not a master of the difficult art of war, was yet a man of sense and courage. I have but a very mean opinion of the Infantry in general. I know their discipline to be bad, and their valour precarious. They are easily put into disorder, and hard to recover out of it. They frequently kill their officers through fear, and murder one another in their confusion. . . .

"Was there ever such a slaughter of officers as upon this expedition? and did ever the Geneva * and p—— of this country operate more shamefully and violently upon the dirty inhabitants of it under the denomination of soldiers? I am sorry to say that our method of training and instructing the troops is extremely defective, and tends to no good end. We are lazy in time of peace, and of course want vigilance and activity in war. Our military education is by far the worst in Europe, and all our concerns are treated with contempt or totally neglected. It will cost us very dear some time hence. I hope the day is at a distance, but I am afraid it will come."

* Gin.

the indelible disgrace of the French that they permitted their Indians to torture their prisoners. English rule on this continent may have been far from perfect, but there is no such accusation against them. The French prevention of Indian cruelty was rare. They allowed it free scope. One of the chief rewards of the Indians, after permission had been given to satisfy revenge, was the possession of Christian prisoners, to be used by them as slaves. A victory to the Indian extended the right to profit by it, in any form he saw fit.

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CHAPTER VI.

On the 1st of November, 1753, Hopson sailed from Halifax, and the government devolved on the Hon. Charles Lawrence. He had been a major in Warburton's regiment in the garrison of Louisbourg; on Cape Breton being given back to the French he was transferred to Halifax and shortly afterwards appointed to the council. I have related the operations in which he was engaged in the establishment of fort Lawrence at Chignecto. After temporarily administering the government, he was appointed lieutenant-governor on the 21st of October, 1754, and governor on the 23rd of July, 1756. No one in the history of North America was ever more devoted to British rule; he was a man of great ability and determination of character. During his administration, he honestly and unceasingly strove to advance the interests of the province. It was during his administration, in 1758, that the first assembly was convened.*

The early days of his government were disturbed by difficulties at Lunenburg among the German population, which, however, were quieted. These settlers had no great sympathy with the government, and it is believed that they were not unwilling to enter into an independent arrangement with the Acadians and Indians for their own surety.

The French fortress of Beauséjour was now under the command of de Vergor, son of M. Duchambon, the governor of Louisbourg, at the time of its surrender in 1745. No name is

* Lawrence died 19th October, 1760, after an illness of eight days from inflammation of the lungs, having its origin in a cold caught at a ball in government house. He was buried at the public expense, and the legislature voted a monument to his memory "From a grateful sense of the many important services which the province had received from him during a continued course of zealous and indefatigable endeavours for the public good, and a wise, upright and disinterested administration." No monument of Lawrence is, however, known.

remembered by the French Canadian with greater detestation than that of de Vergor. His subsequent surrender of the fort of Beauséjour is held of little account, in comparison with the fact that he was in command of the outlying picket, of the Anse du Toulon, at the summit of the path by which Wolfe ascended to the plains of Abraham. The spirit which, with some minds, exacts a victim, in explanation of a painful passage of history, has led de Vergor to be looked upon as the primary cause of Montcalm's defeat. He owed his position to Bigot, who had been intendant at Louisbourg during his father's government. Whatever Bigot's faults, he never forgot an act of kindness or a friend. Duchambon had died, leaving his family with little provision, and the son had asked Bigot's protection. De Vergor was not only commandant, but as *commissaire* he controlled the expenditure. He is represented as being a man of limited capacity, imperfectly educated, unfit for his duty, fond of money, with a bad countenance. On assuming his position, he endeavoured to control Le Loutre, but the priest was too able and cunning for De Vergor's inexperience, and so retained his influence.

De Vergor is likewise recollected by an extraordinary letter addressed to him by Bigot, in which the latter told him to profit by his place, to prune and clip he had full power, "so that you will soon be able to come and join me in France, and buy a property within hail of me."* Le Loutre continued as active as ever, keeping his religious duties in subordination to his ambition. He lost no opportunity in placing himself in prominence. In September, 1749, Hamilton, a lieutenant, with eighteen men, had been surprised by three hundred Indians, and had been subsequently ransomed from Quebec.

* The original is given in "Mémoire durant la guerre, &c.," p. 41. "20th August, 1754. "Profitez mon cher Vergor de votre place : taillez—rogniez—vous avez tout pouvoir—afin que vous puissiez bientôt venir me joindre en France, et acheter un bien à portée de moi." The advice is accepted as genuine. I cannot resist the impression that the letter was a jocular mode of conveying the news of a good appointment to a needy friend, written in the worst taste. Able men engaged in fraud do not openly proclaim their villainy, and Bigot's ability is undeniable. This view, however, may not obtain assent.

When a prisoner, Le Loutre had thought it politic to shew him some attention. Hamilton felt grateful for this assistance, and accepting the outward show as genuine, retained a kindly feeling of what he looked upon as a service. Le Loutre used this relationship to open negotiations, and wrote to Hamilton, professing himself desirous of contributing to a peace with the Micmacs. The letter was sent to Lawrence, who replied that the same proposal had been made to him at Chignecto, only three days before the treacherous murder of Howe. Hamilton was instructed to reply that the English were not the aggressors, but desired to make peace. He was recommended to act with caution. Le Loutre was informed, through the commandant at Chignecto, that he or the Indian chiefs could receive a pass to come to Halifax, and that they could do so in safety. Le Loutre invited Hamilton to dinner and from what passed, Le Loutre, with two Indian chiefs from Bay Verte, had an interview with the commandant Hussey. Le Loutre complained that Hussey offended the chiefs by not getting out of his waggon. The conversation, however, was short. Hussey told them that he was unable to treat, for the matter had been reserved by the council at Halifax.* Le Loutre accordingly addressed the governor, and a more offensive political paper was never written.

Le Loutre had the audacity to say that he was astonished at the proclamation of captain Hussey, declaring that the oath of allegiance was in force, and that any Acadians taken in arms should be treated and punished as criminals. He took upon himself to say that the document "having come to the knowledge of our savages, this Baptiste Cope, another Micmac who speaks French, and Toubick chief of the Medocteh savages of the river Saint John, undertook on Sunday last, after high mass, to inform all these refugees that if any of them should be bold enough to return to the habitations which are now under English rule, they, the savages, speaking in the name of the whole nation, would look upon them as enemies, and would treat them as such."

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 215.

He went on to demand the cession of half of Nova Scotia, the territory of bay Verte, including fort Lawrence to the entrance to Mines bay, thence to Cobequid, to within eight leagues of Halifax, this eastern portion to be given over to the Micmacs, in which no English or French fort was to be built. An answer was asked between Saint Michael's and All Saints.

On being "read and considered, it appeared too insolent and absurd to be answered through the author."

No one knew better than Le Loutre, that a proposition of this character would be treated with contempt, and that it could be made with no hope of success. It was simply an attempt to cajole those who listened to him. Indications of dissatisfaction on their part had become apparent. Both the Acadians and Indians were wearied out by the consequences of their hostile attitude. The promised success appeared further than ever from realization. The Acadians who had abandoned their homes, had to toil and drudge for the French with insufficiency of food. The Micmacs had gained nothing by their enmity. The families of the men, who had left their parishes, were suffering from want and poverty. Many had been sent to Prince Edward island. There was, moreover, the all-powerful influence that at fort Lawrence the traders sold their goods cheap, and French paper money was received. Credit was even given, and there was always a *coup** for those ready to trade.

Consequently, a memorial was sent by some of the body to Hopson requesting permission to return to their lands: it was granted conditionally on their taking the oath of allegiance. Le Loutre, indifferent to the misery he was causing, interfered to prevent the arrangement being carried out. He was aided by a priest, one Daudin, who had arrived from Quebec in September, 1753. The first we hear of him is in a petition of the inhabitants of Grand Pré and Pisiquid, in which it is said that he would return to Canada if the oath was demanded. In 1754 he was at Annapolis. Murray, then in command at

* A word still current in the province of Quebec for a glass of liquor.

fort Edward, had engaged the habitants to bring in wood for the use of the garrison, when Daudin arrived and the supply was stopped. Eighty-six of them appeared before Murray with a written paper, to the effect that their oath of allegiance did not force them to furnish wood. Daudin himself went to the fort and said, that had he been present not a stick would have been delivered. Lawrence ordered that five of the inhabitants with Daudin should proceed to Halifax, to give an account of their conduct. Daudin began to feel uncomfortable, and in one of his letters to Le Loutre he fears that his letters were read and he was betrayed. He asked to see Murray: the latter, knowing his insouciance, was afraid to trust himself in an interview. Outside the fort Daudin gave way to his passion in abuse. He again asked Murray to receive him. The request was granted. He related that 300 Indians were "come to the country" to kill every courier and that 3,000 of the inhabitants were considering how they could attack the garrison. As Daudin declined to go to Halifax, Murray arrested him, and sent him there with four of the inhabitants under a strong guard. Brought before the council he gave in a written paper; it contained nothing for his justification. He was sternly reprov'd and threatened with an order to withdraw from the country.*

At a subsequent meeting of council, a petition was received asking for him to be sent back, as the inhabitants could not obtain another priest during winter. Daudin was permitted to return, having made submission, recanted his former behaviour, and promised to comport himself for the future dutifully to the government. After the removal of the Acadians, with the other priests he was directed to leave the province.

In the French garrison of Beauséjour the commissary of stores was Thomas Pichon, a Frenchman by birth, his mother, however, was English. He was a man of some ability, as the book which he subsequently published clearly established.†

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 227.

† "Lettres et Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire naturelle, civile et politique du Cap Breton depuis son établissement jusqu'à la reprise de cette île par les Anglais en 1758." [1760.]

His letters shew much power. He afterwards took his mother's name of Tyrrell. He had been engaged in a secret correspondence with Scott when he was in command at fort Lawrence; it was now continued with Hussey, who had succeeded him.* The latter had doubts of its value. Lawrence gave it implicit confidence. It is from this correspondence that we know what took place at Beauséjour. Pichon always speaks of Le Loutre as Moses, on the ground that the latter claimed to have led the Acadians to the promised land. We learn that the Acadian refugees were dissatisfied, and sent representatives to Quebec to obtain authority to return to their lands. Daudin's affair caused some commotion at Beauséjour, the news having been brought from Annapolis. The following Sunday Le Loutre preached one of his violent sermons, full of abuse of the refugees, as being the cause of the detention of this holy man. "What," he asked, "had they to expect from the English?" If they returned to the other side they would have neither priest nor sacrament. His vehemence was such that he became exhausted, and had to pause in his denunciations. He returned to the subject and summoned them to appear at the commandant's. They had to be forced to attend, and de Vergor threatened to put them in irons if they did not move more quickly. We learn that de Vergor stuttered, so Le Loutre was his spokesman in the abuse of these poor people.

The following Sunday Le Loutre was equally violent. From the altar he called upon the eighty-three signers of the petition to retract, and to efface with spittle their marks to the paper, or they would have no paradise to go to, or sacraments to receive. The Acadians who went to Quebec to wait upon Duquesne obtained but little encouragement. Duquesne wrote and thanked Le Loutre for his zeal and warmly advocated war being carried on by the savages: to de Vergor he suggested that he should find some "plausible pretext" for Indian attack. "I think," said Duquesne to Le Loutre, "that

* 14 October, 1764, addressed to captain Scott as "Sir and my very dear friend." N. S. Archives, p. 229.

the two rascals of deputies whom you sent me will not soon recover from the fright which I gave them, notwithstanding the emollient that I administered after my reprimands; and I since told them that they were indebted to you for not being allowed to rot in a dungeon."

While Duquesne approved of Le Loutre's pretended negotiations for peace, he trusted that he would be on his guard. He related how he had himself encouraged the Canadian Abenakis to strike. "I regard these savages," continued Duquesne, "as the mainstay of the colony; and in order to keep alive this spirit of hatred and revenge we must remove every occasion of allowing it to be bribed."

Bishop de Pontbriand did not view the conduct of his grand vicar with the same complacent spirit. He pointed out that the clergy should be careful in interfering in secular disputes; that the Acadians could not escape misery, and the blame of their suffering would be cast upon the priest. At the same time, the bishop had an imperfect idea of political rights when he recommended, that in the demand of the Acadians for religious freedom, the priests from Quebec should be independent of the provincial governor; and that every five years, the bishop of Quebec should make a visitation of the parishes. He condemned Le Loutre for refusing the sacraments as he had done. He himself was desirous that the Acadians should abandon their lands under English rule; but the act should only be a matter of conscience on their part.

Every circumstance tended to establish in the mind of Lawrence that the French were only waiting the opportunity to attack Nova Scotia, and he could not but feel that when made in force, it would be with every prospect of success. It was evident that the determination was formed to get possession of the eastern portion of the province, in order to obtain uninterrupted connection between Cape Breton and Canada. This territory once possessed, an attack of the western portion would assuredly follow. There was no means of resistance against a powerfully organized attack. In the absence of the English fleet, Cape Breton could send out a force in a few

hours to overrun the country. Little thought need be given for provisions ; the Acadians were there to furnish them. A force gathered at Saint John could attack the province from the north, and every Acadian was looked upon as ready to drive the British from the country in the cause of his race and religion. It was estimated that in forty-eight hours 1,500 Acadians could be gathered at fort Beauséjour. Lawrence had no means of opposing any such vigorous attack. There were the slender garrisons of fort Lawrence, of Annapolis, and of fort Edward, with the troops at Halifax and what few militia could be there obtained, and disciplined. The small outlying garrisons would be immediately destroyed, and Halifax ran the risk of being forced to surrender from fear of starvation.

It was not only Nova Scotia which was included in this danger ; New England, the object of attack for nearly a century, was equally threatened. With Acadia once more French, Cape Breton regained its pre-eminence, and Boston, with every town on the sea board, was exposed to destruction. While in the campaign in Nova Scotia the French could easily obtain supplies, and in the same degree the British garrisons would be deprived of all support, except what came by sea. The conduct of the priests in fomenting the spirit of disloyalty, and in influencing the Acadians in no way to accept their position as British subjects, joined to their own extravagant conduct, furnished the plainest proof that these fears were not visionary. The Acadian population, disciplined and led by French officers, would become a formidable body ; especially such as had been induced to abandon their farms and join the French force in the isthmus, and who in want and privation felt the strongest yearning to return to their old homesteads.

Prominent in the threatening aspect of affairs stood fort Beauséjour, daily being strengthened by the working parties, and its garrison increased, owing to the religious terrors put in practice to urge the unfortunate population to proceed thither. So long as the fort remained in strength, it extended great encouragement to French designs. Lawrence was fully

impressed with the danger of its existence, and earnestly wrote to Shirley on the subject, urging that an effort should be made to drive the French from the fort and from the north of the bay of Fundy. Shirley had already corresponded with the home government on the subject, and had obtained a qualified assent to his acting in connection with Lawrence, if it were possible, to undertake the enterprize without danger to the English colony.

When the council of governors was held at Alexandria, the attack on fort Beauséjour was included as part of the campaign. Lawrence himself wrote to Braddock,* but previously orders had been sent to Monckton to attack the fort.† Shirley's energy had anticipated the situation by bringing the proposed attack in secret session before the provincial assembly; the sense of danger, to which Massachusetts was herself exposed, led to the co-operation of that province. Shirley had received authority from Sir Thomas Robinson to raise 2,000 men for the expedition; he needed no other encouragement. Monckton had been sent by Lawrence to Boston, to aid in the organization, with authority to draw upon two Boston merchants for the money he required. The recruiting was placed in the hands of John Winslow, a man of military tastes and instincts, of strong good sense, with courage and a high sense of duty.‡ Some of his spelling may be criticised, to some extent the fault of his time; but there is a natural strength and vigour in his letters to exact attention, and he always writes like a gentleman. He was personally popular, doubtless owing to his genial and kindly manner. His family was of the highest respectability. He had seen some service, having been present in Cuba, in the expedition of 1740, and he had commanded the troops on the Kennebec, when Shirley constructed fort Halifax.

Shirley retaining for himself the position of colonel-in-

* 10 May, 1755.

† 19 April, 1755.

‡ This journal has been published by the Nova Scotia Historical Society. Vol. III., 1882, 1883. Winslow died in 1774, leaving behind two sons Pelham and Isaac, both attached to the royal cause.

chief, the two regiments were placed under the direct command of Winslow and Scott, as lieutenant-colonels. The troops had been assembled at Boston, where they were detained some weeks, waiting for muskets and accoutrements to arrive from England. Finally, the fleet of transports with the troops sailed on the 22nd of May, convoyed by three small frigates under the command of captain Rous. There were thirty-three vessels of various tonnage, and on the evening of the 1st of June they anchored within twelve miles from Beauséjour.

De Vergor was early informed of the appearance of the fleet, and he could form no other conclusion than that the design was to attack him. He summoned the men from the adjoining settlements on the rivers Chipody, Petitcodiac and Memramcook on the north of Chignecto bay ; likewise the men from the south of his own neighbourhood and from the bay Verte. They appeared in accordance with the demand, but they had little desire to fight under the conditions before them. Those who had left British territory asked to be forced by threats to take arms, so that if made prisoners they could plead that they had been driven into the position of hostility. The women and children about the fort were sent into the woods ; the men joined the defenders.

The works had been planned by M. Jacan de Piedmont. Fort Beauséjour was constructed with five bastions mounted with thirty-two small cannon and one mortar. There were eight 18-pounders not mounted. The garrison consisted of one hundred and fifty men and fourteen officers of the marine regiment. The defences were incomplete. Le Loutre had received 50,000 *livres* for the construction of an *aboiteau* in the neighbourhood to drain the lands of which he held control.* All the strength derivable from the presence of the refugees had been directed to the work. It had always been looked upon as possible that the fort might be attacked, and those

* The term applied to a dam containing a sluice so formed that it allows the discharge of surface water at low tides ; but self-acting, it remains closed to the passage of water at high tides.

in command were desirous of completing the defences ; but Le Loutre's influence diverted to the work of his *aboiteau* all the labour available and the fort had been neglected.

De Vergor established out-pickets ; he brought within the walls the provisions which were outside ; he despatched a messenger to Drucour, the governor of Louisbourg, to ask for aid ; he informed Duquesne of the danger of his position ; he notified de Villeroy at bay Verte of his own insecurity. There was a small fort on the Missaquash at Pointe à Buot which he caused to be destroyed.

On the 4th of June the New England troops marched to cross this stream ; their passage was disputed. An entrenchment had been thrown up, and was defended by four hundred French and Indians. On the attack being vigorously made the Indians were the first to run, and a panic led the example to be imitated. The force crossed the Missaquash and established itself within a mile and a half of the fort, upon which orders were given by de Vergor for the church and the buildings in its neighbourhood to be burned.

A bridge was thrown over the Missaquash to maintain communication with fort Lawrence. Parties were sent out to bring in cattle, and the guns and material for the siege were moved forward. The weather was unfavourable ; it was not until the 10th that the site for the construction of batteries was determined. Two days previously an English officer named Hay, who, at break of day, was leaving fort Lawrence for the front, was taken prisoner by some Indian scouts. They wished to kill him, but de Beausoleil, in command of the party, intervened to protect him, and promised his captors an equivalent as his ransom. Hay was, however, stripped of what he wore. On his arrival at the fort the French had to furnish him with clothing, he was treated with courtesy, and permitted to write to his wife and to the general.

Great efforts had been made in this interval to complete the defences. The casemates had been cleared of the provisions they contained, to find room for the Acadians. Le Loutre in

his shirt sleeves with a pipe in his mouth encouraged the Acadians in their labours. Many, however, deserted; in the narrow limits of the fort they regarded themselves as unduly exposed to danger. De Vergor had applied for aid to père Germain at the Saint John; the priest answered that he was himself in danger and could give no help. Care was taken to cheer the garrison with the favourable reports, that troops had arrived at Louisbourg; and three French frigates would shortly appear to drive away the English. In the meantime the works had been strengthened, and the garrison increased by a small reinforcement of Indians and *habitants* from bay Verte. On the 12th a sortie was attempted by two hundred men under de Vanne. The column left at two in the morning and returned at eight without having fired a shot, a failure which was the cause of much ridicule.

The New England troops completed a road and moved their artillery into position within seven hundred feet of the fort. On the 13th, the tenth day after the commencement of operations, the bombardment was commenced. It was of little effect, and the fire from the fort to disturb the besiegers was equally futile. On Saturday, the 14th, de Vergor received a letter from Louisbourg. Drucour informed him that it was impossible to send him aid; an English squadron cruising in front of the harbour prevented the frigates from getting out to sea. De Vergor called a council of war; the opinion was expressed that the situation should be concealed from the Acadians and the defence continued as long as possible. The bad news, however, became known.*

The consequence was that on the following morning the *habitants* expressed a desire to return to their homes. On the preceding evening many of them had made an attempt to leave, but were captured. For several hours no shots had been fired by the besiegers; they had been strengthening their

* The fact has been attributed to the unsoldierly breach of confidence of some officers despairing of their condition. It is also stated that a servant of de Vergor remained in the room during the conference. This man was allowed much license; general scandal ascribed the cause to the circumstance that his wife, although by no means attractive, was de Vergor's mistress.

works and bringing heavier guns into position. In the afternoon several shells were thrown into the fort. Early on Monday a shell fell on one of the casemates killing four who were within it, including the English officer Hay, and wounding two others. It was plain the place was no longer tenable. The Acadians had lost all courage and were prepared to desert on every occasion. No help was to be looked for. De Vergor had only one hundred and fifty men to oppose the large besieging force, and was without guns to return the fire of the enemy's heavy artillery. A surrender was proposed; a small party desired to prolong the defence, but the majority had no hope of a successful resistance. Le Loutre talked of burying himself under the ruins of the walls; it will be seen how he carried out his purpose.

Accordingly, de Vergor sent de Vanne to Monckton requesting forty-eight hours' suspension of arms. Monckton replied by stating the terms of surrender he would grant. Several messages were interchanged. Finally Monckton made the notification that if not surrendered by seven o'clock he would bombard the place. The conditions offered by him were accepted, and it is only justice to de Vergor to say that he had little else left open to him than the course he followed. The terms of surrender were, that the commandant, officers, staff and others, with the garrison, should march out with arms and baggage, and drums beating; the garrison to be sent to Louisbourg by sea at the expense of the king of England, with sufficient provisions to last until their arrival; the garrison not to serve for the space of six months. As to the Acadians, as they had been forced to bear arms under pain of death, they were to be pardoned.

It is narrated that during the negotiations the stores and provisions at the fort were carried away, and that many of the officers participated in the pillage; and that the officers sent to the English camp to negotiate, on their return shewed that they had drunk more than was becoming. At seven o'clock the fort was occupied by the English. The Acadians had mostly left; many in schooners.

A party of three hundred men was sent by Monckton, to offer the same conditions of surrender to fort Gaspereau on bay Verte. They were accepted. Thus in Nova Scotia the French were removed from the northern territory, in which they had for months held their threatening position.

Before the surrender Le Loutre had fled in disguise to the Saint John, whence he made his way to Quebec.* He remembered the long reckoning against him of his treacheries and plots, and feared to fall into the hands of the conquerors. It was the blow which crushed him. From high political power and position, from ecclesiastical station, and from affluence he was for the future to experience poverty and disgrace. Although distrusted at Quebec, he had been too unscrupulous and useful to be left unemployed, and he had possessed plenary power to dictate alike to priests and commanding officers. He had been entrusted with large sums of money, which he had dispensed as he had seen fit. Having the appointment of vicar-general under the bishop of Quebec, he was supreme in ecclesiastical matters, and he could mould them to the political form he desired.

He was received at Quebec without any shew of favour. Duquesne, the governor who had encouraged him, had retired from all active control of the government; de Vaudreuil, if not arrived, was hourly expected. He could have no words of favour for an ecclesiastic under the censure of his bishop. The policy of Le Loutre had been condemned by M. de Pontbriand when everything was in its favour. It now was without the prestige of success, and he was received by his superior with reproach and blame. He determined to return to France to appeal to the minister by whom he had been countenanced. His ill-fortune pursued him, for the ship on which he had taken passage was captured by the frigate "Ambuscade." He assumed the name of *de la Rivière*, and bore with it a load of disgrace and blame. He headed the retribution which it would bring. This is the letter from him

* "Se travestit et sortit du fort avant sa reddition et se fit conduire à la rivière St. Jean, d'où il se rendit à Quebec." *Mémoire*, etc., 1749 à 1759, p. 59.

to the abbé de l'Isle Dieu,* in which he says that he had been conducted to Plymouth; as he had not been permitted to land he could not tell what was to become of him, and he asked for money and his release. His address, he writes, was "*M. Dupres, pris par la frigate l'Embuscade.*" †

The last mention of Le Loutre's name is in a despatch of lord Egremont to sir Jeffery Amherst, ‡ in which he is told to be watchful over the conduct of the priests, and not to allow this dangerous man in Canada. Of his after career in France nothing is known, he lived and died in obscurity.

On the surrender of the fort the commissary desired to obtain a list of the munitions to be given over, but the French officer in charge stated his inability to furnish it, owing to the stores having been plundered. De Vergor gave a supper to the English and French officers on the night of the surrender. From the good manners and self-possession shewn on both sides, it would have been difficult to have discovered under what circumstances the meeting was taking place. Whatever fires were smouldering beneath, the unruffled demeanour of those present betrayed neither exultation nor depression. It was a brief period of *camaraderie*, for a few hours to silence the passions which were again to be called forth, to remain in activity and vigour for the succeeding seven years.

* 22nd September, 1755.

† Le Loutre remained eight years in confinement in Jersey castle; and was released at the peace. Much of his imprisonment was painful from its terrors; on one occasion he was recognised by a soldier on guard, who identified Le Loutre as having ordered him to be scalped. The soldier endeavoured to run him through with his bayonet, and was with difficulty restrained. So embittered was the man and his determination to obtain satisfaction so loudly expressed, that he was transferred from the garrison.

‡ N.Y. Hist. Doc., X., 540.

CHAPTER VII.

The events which followed the taking of Beauséjour led to the forced expulsion of the Acadians, a painful episode, but whatever its character, it must be fully placed on record. We have sufficient facts for its history to be impartially narrated, and it is a subject not to be approached with sentiment and prejudice, but to be judicially and calmly examined. When it took place in 1755, forty-two years had elapsed since the treaty of Utrecht; accordingly, every Acadian who had reached middle life had been born a British subject. I have endeavoured to describe the policy followed by the Acadians during this period, for a narrative of these events is indispensable to a correct estimate of the position of the government of Nova Scotia. The time equally calls for consideration: it was a period of war, and it was strongly felt that it was the final struggle, to determine which of the two European powers should remain possessors of the continent. Canada, divided from British North America by the great lakes and the river Saint Lawrence, and protected by a vast extent of wilderness, was almost impregnable against attack from the English colonies. The French province was assailable only at two points: at Quebec by a strong naval force, and to a limited extent by an advance through lake Champlain. The refusal of the New York legislature to engage in any powerfully organized expedition, placed this attempt beyond the pale of probability. The one vulnerable point was Quebec, and it was so recognised by the French governors.

The contrary was the case with New England. The Indians, controlled by their religious sentiments for nearly a century, had devastated the British American territory of the sea-board. The effort of the Canadian government was to

prevent settlement, by extirpating the inhabitants when not looking for attack ; and large bands of Indians, with whom Canadians were intermingled, unshrinkingly persevered in this harassing warfare. A place was sacked ; many killed even in cold blood, and the prisoners given over to the Indians as slaves. The same policy was attempted in Nova Scotia. The Indians, excited by the priests, waged war on the British garrisons, to cut off stragglers and couriers. With the Acadians even moderately loyal to the government, Indian enmity would not have been dangerous. One active campaign would have extirpated the Micmacs, or they would have been driven back, for their aggressions to cease. It so proved in the destruction of Norridgewock, whence Rasle issued his orders ; for although the Canadian Abenakis from time to time ravaged the northern frontiers, the resident Indians became less aggressive. All that was needed in Nova Scotia for the Acadian population to rise *en masse*, was a favourable occasion, and the bidding of an ecclesiastic. The ignorance of the Acadians made them incapable of judging what was the true situation. Taught little more than to say the prayers of their church, with no conception of the legitimate functions of a religious teacher, they were led to look upon their priest as an unfailing monitor of the extent and character of their obligations to a government, which they regarded as heretical, and which they were persistently led to believe was only temporary. They had no intercourse with the outer world. Their amusements lay in their religious observances, diversified by quarrels among themselves, which were interminable, and by the petty scandal to be heard in all small illiterate communities. Their wants were easily supplied ; their only commerce was the sale of their produce, and the purchases to supply their limited requirements, which their farms could not satisfy. The one use they made of money was to hoard it. This primitive population, unadorned by any of the graces of life springing from knowledge, were perfectly at the bidding of a cunning, unscrupulous man of the type of Le Loutre ; who, to attain his purpose, would falsify all that took place, and all that was

proposed; and who laid down for their guidance false theories of duty, and misrepresented to them their own position.*

Controlling the distribution of the money and goods given by the king, and holding ecclesiastical rank from Quebec, the will and utterances of Le Loutre became indisputable. They were re-echoed by the clergy subordinated to him. With this inimical population, devoted to the power with which the country was at war, a war to be carried on with great energy, and as past experience suggested, with every resource France could bring into the field, the inevitable consideration came to the surface, how this hostile population should be treated. There were garrisons at Halifax, fort Edward Windsor, Annapolis and Beauséjour. No communication could be made between them except by parties in force. Every Acadian was a spy to give intelligence of any movement. We have seen how a party of eighteen under lieutenant Hamilton, leaving fort Edward, was surprised and made prisoners by three hundred Indians and Acadians. Such attacks were only what might be looked for in the future. It had been established that the fort of Beauséjour had been constructed by Acadian labour, and had been defended by Acadians in arms. There was no hope of a peaceful settle-

* In 1751-52 Cape Breton and Acadia were visited by Franquet, a French officer of Engineers, whose duty was to examine into the condition of the fortifications. Subsequently he arrived in Canada. He informs us that in 1751 the abbé Le Loutre had induced 178 families to abandon their homes and proceed to Beauséjour, where they were receiving rations from the king." The total number of souls was 1,111, consisting of 178 men, 171 women, 762 children. He included in his report a description of the people. "The Acadians," he writes, "are strong, robust, and vigorous, all using the axe, and accustomed to cultivation of their lands, nevertheless, somewhat indolent, making little effort but for the indispensable wants of existence. They multiply greatly. The families, one with the other, may be considered as consisting of five or six children. They are zealous for religion, even somewhat superstitious. They love money, and in their whole conduct have their interest alone in view. The two sexes indifferently shew such recklessness in their conversation as suggests a worthlessness of character. (*Sont indifféremment des deux sexes d'une inconsideration qui dénote de la méchanceté.*) The women work at stuffs fit for clothing, and generally they all make linen, so that they have no need of any foreign aid to supply what is necessary." Parl. MS., Parl. Lib., Franquet, Vol. I., p. 34.

ment. The question resolved itself into this consideration : should the enemy scattered along the country by which the communications were to be maintained, be permitted to carry on the hostile practices pursued by them for forty-four years ?

We all know the course taken in a besieged town. Anyone thought to be disloyal is held to furnish bail for his good conduct, or is forced to leave the place. Any body of men, whose fidelity is considered doubtful, is at once ejected from the number of its defenders. Nova Scotia could only be considered a huge garrison, and those, entrusted with its defence in that critical hour, could not look with an eye of sentiment on the duty they had to perform. They had to protect the interests entrusted to them, and save from spoliation the land they were sent to defend.

Some writers have affirmed that the resolution to expel the Acadians was suddenly acted upon owing to the news of Braddock's defeat. I cannot entertain this view. That the misfortune did not lessen the determination is possible ; but in my humble opinion there is no ground for the belief that it even hastened it. It had long been seen that some decided policy was called for, and the only question was what policy should be pursued. The time had come when the answer could not be postponed. Cornwallis and Hobson had been governors in time of peace. The exigencies of war now made the solution unavoidable ; doubt and evasion were no longer possible.

In August, 1754, Lawrence pointed out to the lords of trade that the Acadians had hitherto affected neutrality, and it had been imagined that the mild treatment they received from the English government would gradually "have fixed them in our interest." The lenity had had no effect. They had no intention to take the oath. Many had gone to Beau-séjour. He had accordingly issued a proclamation calling upon them to return. "They have not for a long time," he said, "brought anything to our markets ; but, on the other hand, have carried everything to the French and Indians, whom they have always assisted with provisions, quarters, &

intelligence ; and, indeed, while they remain without taking the Oaths to His Majesty (which they never will do till they are forced), and have incendiary French Priests among them, there are no hopes of their amendment. As they possess the best and largest Tracts of Land in this Province, it cannot be settled with any effect while they remain in this situation, and tho' I would be very far from attempting such a step without your Lordship's approbation, yet I cannot help being of opinion that it would be much better, if they refuse the Oaths, that they were away."*

The government answered this appeal at an early date in plain language† :—" As to those of the District of Chignecto who are actually gone over to the French at Beau Sejour, if the Chief Justice should be of opinion that by refusing to take the Oaths without a reserve, or by deserting their Settlements to join the French, they have forfeited their Title to their Lands, We could wish that proper Measures were pursued for carrying such Forfeiture into Execution by legal Process, to the end that you might be enabled to grant them to any persons desirous of settling there where We apprehend a Settlement would be of great utility . . . but it appears to Us that every Idea of an English Settlement at this place would be absurd, but upon a supposition that the French Forts at Beau Sejour, Bay Verte, &c., are destroyed, the Indians forced from their Settlements, and the French driven to seek such an Asylum as they can find in the barren Island of Cape Breton and St. Johns, and in Canada."

The Acadians, however, precipitated the adoption of active measures against them. Early in June, before the attack on Beauséjour was known, the inhabitants of Mines and Pisiquid sent an insolently written petition to the governor, although clothed in official language. It claimed that the inhabitants had been loyal, and fulfilled their duties, and gave assurance

* Nov. Scotia Archives, p. 213. The above has been misrepresented by a modern writer in the following form, " They possess the best and largest tracts of land in the province. I cannot help being of opinion that it would be much better, if they refuse the oaths, that they were away."

† Nov. Scotia Archives, p. 237.

of unshaken fidelity "provided that His Majesty shall allow us the same liberty that he has granted us." * They demanded to pass by water in their canoes to what place they saw fit, and to retain their arms, which they had been called upon to deliver to the authorities.

In fourteen days they heard that Beauséjour had surrendered. Accordingly, they sent a second petition stating that if there should be found any error, or want of respect towards the government, it was contrary to their intention; and they asked to be allowed to explain.

In forwarding the first petition, Murray commanding at fort Edward, reported that until a late period the "French inhabitants had behaved with greater submission and obedience," but on the delivery of the memorial "they had acted with great indecency and insolence." He surmised that they had heard some news to lead to this conduct; "it being notorious that they discovered an insolent, inimical disposition, when they have had the least hopes of assistance from France."

The deputies came before the council fifteen in number, the original signers were twenty-five; those who did not attend were unavoidably absent. Their first petition was gone through paragraph by paragraph. They acknowledged the justice and lenity of the government: they were called upon to notify one act of service rendered by them: they were told that they had assisted the king's enemies, and for the future must practice greater fidelity: that they asked for the use of the canoes in order to carry provisions to the enemy: that their guns were not wanted for defence, and that their insolent paragraph on the subject was without excuse. Finally they were called upon to take the oath. They replied that they had not come prepared on that point. They were told that they had evaded the oath for six years. They asked that they might return and consult the body of the people. They were told such a course could not be allowed. An hour was given them to consider their determination. They offered to take the oath previously administered. The council replied that the oath

* Nov. Scotia Archives, p. 247. Mines, 10 June, 1755.

must be unconditionally taken. The deputies were allowed until the following morning to consider the demand. In the morning they replied that they could not take the oath without consulting the body of the people. They were then informed that they could not be regarded as British subjects but as subjects of the king of France. Murray was instructed to obtain the election of fresh deputies, who should bring with them a report of the resolution to which the inhabitants had arrived. He was likewise informed that those who would at this time refuse the oath, would not hereafter be admitted to take it. The fifteen deputies were informed of this decision and ordered into confinement.

It was determined without delay to take active proceedings in accordance with this resolution; and a council was called on the 15th of July, to which admiral Boscawen and vice-admiral Mostyn were officially invited. The record of the decision made is so brief that it may be given verbatim. "The Lieutenant Governor laid before the Admirals the late Proceedings of the Council in regard to the French Inhabitants, and desired their Opinion and Advice thereon. Both the said Admirals approved of the said Proceedings, and gave it as their Opinion, That it was now the properest Time to oblige the said Inhabitants to Take the Oath of Allegiance to His Majesty, or to quit the Country."* It was likewise resolved to retain in pay the 2,000 New England troops under Monckton at Chignecto.

Lawrence also communicated Rous' report, that on his appearing before the fort at Saint John the French had retreated, after burning it. Rous had sailed with three 20-gun ships and a sloop, having heard that two French frigates of 36 guns were in the harbour. No ships, however, were present. In the morning the Indians had appeared with strong professions of friendship, which could not have been accepted as genuine.

The scene described of what took place, when the deputies from Mines and Pisiquid first appeared before the council, was re-enacted with those who came from Annapolis, and

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 258.

with the newly-chosen deputies of Mines, Pisiquid, and the river Canard. In all cases, those present peremptorily refused to take the oath, and were made prisoners.

The policy of the Nova Scotia government was definitely determined at the meeting of council on the 28th of July, when the resolution was carried to distribute the Acadians among the several colonies, and that vessels should be hired with all possible expedition.* On the 31st of July, Lawrence communicated the resolution to Monckton, giving him instructions for his guidance. The news of Braddock's defeat only reached Halifax on the 7th of August. These dates establish that the policy was formed independently of the disaster on the Monongahela; a fact important in the narrative of the event. Otherwise the determination, deliberately and earnestly considered, would be regarded as dictated by fear and desperation, under the overwhelming influence of painful news, whereas it was foreshadowed and carried out in belief of its unavoidable necessity.

Lawrence, in his letter to Monckton, stated that the oaths had been generally refused, consequently it had been determined to send the people from the country, and orders for the transports to take them on board had been given. The necessity of secrecy was enforced, and it was suggested to him by stratagem to seize the heads of families. The cattle and corn being forfeited to the crown, no one was to be allowed to make any purchases of them. Regulations were laid down as to rations. Orders were given to destroy any vessels lying at Tatmagouche, a harbour on the eastern coast.†

When the news arrived of Braddock's defeat, it was communicated by Lawrence to Monckton in language to establish that the event had had no influence on the decision. Monckton was told to be on his guard; that the transports would soon be with him. As there would be difficulty in securing the French inhabitants in the neighbourhood of his fort, he was to burn the villages to the north-west of the isthmus and

* Nova Scotia Archives, p. 268.

† County of Colchester, Nova Scotia.

to distress those who sought refuge in the woods. Particular instructions were given that no one should take possession of the lands rendered vacant, except under authority of the government.

The Acadians captured and sent from the country amounted to about 6,000 souls.* They consisted of the few prisoners who were at Halifax; those gathered at Windsor by the orders of captain Murray; those collected by major Handfield at Annapolis; those brought together by Winslow at Grand Pré, and the number which Monckton was enabled to place on shipboard from Beaubassin.

Winslow has left us a diary of his proceedings. We may read how unwillingly the duty was performed by all concerned. Nevertheless, there is no appearance of doubt or hesitation suggested by the feeling that the stern and harsh policy was uncalled for. On the contrary, it is plain that on all sides the feeling was strong that no other course was possible.

In the middle of August, Winslow with 313 men of all ranks was ordered to Grand Pré. He took possession of the church and priest's house, in the neighbourhood of which he encamped his force, and enclosed the ground with a picket fence for protection. At that date four hundred of the *habitants* had been collected at forts Lawrence and Beauséjour by Monckton.†

* The following may be accepted as a detail of those placed on shipboard :—

	Souls.
From Halifax; the deputies confined	50
" Windsor; by Captain Murray	1,100
[Nov. Soc. Arch., III., p. 183.]	
" Annapolis; by Major Handfield	1,664
[Ib., III., p. 186.]	
" Grand Pré; by Winslow, 3 Nov., 1755.	1,510
[Ib., III., p. 188.]	
" Grand Pré; by Osgood, 18-20 Dec., 1755 ..	580
[Ib., III., p. 188.]	
	2,090
" Fort Cumberland; by Monckton	1,100
[Ib., III., p. 177.]	
TOTAL	6,004

† Winslow to Shirley, 22 August.

Winslow received full instructions from Lawrence: he was told to confer with captain Murray at fort Edward. Between the two a kindly feeling arose, as their letters testify, and they acted together with entire cordiality.

After the establishment of the troops in the locality they marched through the adjoining country, nominally to examine and report upon its character. Doubtless to make their presence known and felt. The captains, under an oath of secrecy, were notified of the policy to be enforced; ammunition was served out, and precautions taken to face any contingency which might arise on the day of meeting.

On the 2nd of September Winslow summoned the male inhabitants of the neighbouring districts; the old and young men, with lads of ten years of age, were requested to attend at the church on Friday the 5th.

Four hundred and eighteen men of all ages appeared. Mounting upon a table Winslow addressed them. He told them that for half a century they had had more indulgence granted them than any subjects in the king's dominions; "what use you have made of them you your Self Best Know," he added. He then plainly stated the orders which he had received, which it was his duty to obey. He continued, "your Lands & Tennements, Cattle of all Kinds and Live Stock of all Sortes are Forfitted to the Crown with all other your Effects, Saving your money and Household Goods, and you your Selves to be removed from this his Province: Thus it is Peremptorily his Majesty's orders, That the whole French Inhabitants of these Districts, be removed, and I am Throh his Majesty's Goodness Directed to allow you Liberty to Carry of your money and Household Goods as Many as you Can without Discomemoading the Vessels you Go in. I Shall do Everything in my Power that all Those Goods be Secured to you and that you are Not Molested in Carrying of them of, and also that whole Familys Shall go in the Same Vessel and make this remove which I am Sensable must give you a great Deal of Trouble as Easey as his Majesty's Service will admit, and hope that in what Ever part of the world you may Fall

you may be Faithfull Subjects, a Peasable & happy People."*

A similar course was pursued by Murray at fort Edward, who relates that he had secured 183 persons. At Annapolis a number escaped to the woods; many subsequently surrendered.

There was no attempt at disturbance, as Winslow expresses himself; the inhabitants never believed the threat would be carried out. Each day twenty by turns were allowed to go to their homes; the provisions were furnished by their families. Winslow, however, fearing that under this quiet behaviour an escape might be attempted, resolved to place on shipboard some of those he thought might prove refractory. Five vessels only were present; their appearance had in the first instance occasioned surprise, but the masters had received the cue to be silent concerning the object to be carried out. Winslow determined to embark fifty on each vessel. The men were accordingly formed up; the unmarried men on the left. When the order was given to those selected to march towards the ships, for a moment there was hesitation. A squad advanced with fixed bayonets, and Winslow seized the ringleader who appeared the foremost in disobedience. The resistance ceased; 89 married and 141 young unmarried men were placed on board the vessels. Some short time elapsed before the arrival of the other transports, and Winslow hired fifty men a day, of those remaining in the church, to bring in the harvest, for which service he made payment.†

Matters had not gone on so quietly to the north. On the 28th of July, major Frye had been sent to the settlements on the rivers Chipoddy and Petitcodiac on Chignecto bay, to arrest what women and children were to be met with, so that they might be sent on board ship. The houses were to be set on fire. Twenty-three persons were only found. Two hundred and fifty-three houses were burned. A small party was subsequently sent to destroy a village and a small church on a tributary stream. The men became separated, having

* Winslow's Journal. Nov. Soc. Arch., III., p. 94.

† Winslow's Journal, p. 126.

straggled among the buildings. A Dr. March took with him ten men, and was busy burning the church, when they were attacked by three hundred Indians and Acadians under de Boishébert. March, with six men, was killed. The remainder retreated, but eleven were wounded,* among the number a lieutenant; sixteen were made prisoners. Owing to the rapidity of the tide, Frye could not come to their assistance; the wonder is that any escaped.

The vessels still remained absent, and it was not until the 8th of October that the embarkation commenced. By the 28th 1,510 were placed on board ship. Four vessels at this date came up from Windsor containing 1,100 souls. The remaining 580 of Winslow's charge were only dispatched by one of his captains, Osgood, on the 20th-22nd of December. Handfield's vessels sailed from Annapolis on the 8th of December; they contained 1,664 souls.†

Every endeavour was made to perform this painful duty as humanely as it could be carried out. Families were kept together, and the rations with water were served out with attention. Property was respected. Setting aside the greater act of force in the compulsory expatriation, no bad treatment, no unnecessary harshness was permitted. Two of Winslow's men were even punished for wrong-doing in this respect.

The Acadians were landed at Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia. It has been stated that some reached Louisiana, and that to this day there is a colony claiming to be descendants of the expatriated Canadians. Such as these could only have reached Louisiana by the way of Canada, the lakes, and the Mississippi. It is scarcely possible that any could have made their way from Georgia by land. No vessel which sailed along the Atlantic coast was chartered to Louisiana.

Each master of a vessel received with his sailing orders a circular letter to the governor of the province to which he was directed. It contained a short history of the events which had

* The whole subsequently recovered from their wounds, p. 140.

† Winslow, p. 186.

led to the step being taken, as one indispensable to the security of the colony, and as a preservation against French encroachments; and each governor was called upon to receive those who were in the vessel, and to prevent their reunion with others similarly disembarked elsewhere.

In the southern provinces this appeal was met by the Acadians being re-embarked and sent to England. In some instances permission was given to return to Nova Scotia; in such cases boats were obtained, and the men coasted along shore. They were stopped at New York and Massachusetts. The lords of trade informed Lawrence that several hundred had been sent from Virginia and South Carolina to England; they had been ordered to be maintained by the commissioners of sick and hurt seamen.*

In Boston they were not unkindly received; but Massachusetts demanded repayment of the expense incurred in their sustenance. In Philadelphia they were cared for and maintained, and the house of assembly called upon to provide for them. In 1756 they petitioned to be considered as French prisoners of war; they were told that they could only be looked upon as refractory British subjects.

One of the vessels sailing from Annapolis was carried into the Saint John, the crew overpowering the guard of eight men.

The policy of the removal of the Acadians was approved in England, as required by painful necessity. Attention was, however, drawn to the word *pardonné* which appeared in the capitulation of Beauséjour as applied to the Acadians who were known to have been armed on the French side. Lawrence explained that the meaning was, that they should not be called to account for their behaviour on this occasion. They had been among the number who had refused to take the oath of allegiance, and who would give no pledge of future fidelity, and therefore had been included in the expatriation with the general population.

* Phips to governor Lawrence, 6th August, 1756. Lawrence to Lords of Trade, 3rd November, 1756. Lawrence's circular to governors on the continent, 1st July, 1756. Nova Scotia Arch., p. 302-3. N.Y. Hist. Doc., VII., p. 125.

About forty families, some one hundred and fifty souls, established themselves at cape Sable.* Instructions were given to the New England troops returning home to seize them and carry them to Boston. These orders for some reason were not carried out. They subsequently petitioned governor Pownall, of Massachusetts, expressing their willingness to take the required oaths and to join in the war against the French. The matter was referred to Amherst, who was willing to transfer them, at the expense of the crown; but he was of the opinion that Lawrence should receive them. They were subsequently sent to saint George island in Halifax harbour, and embarked on vessels for England.

In 1759 a party of Acadians established themselves on the coast of the present province of New Brunswick. They obtained some vessels, which they were enabled to fit out and arm, and make war on small coasting craft. Being without any commission, the act was regarded as one of piracy. They plundered as many as sixteen or seventeen small schooners, some of them containing cargoes of value. The attention of admiral Saunders was directed to them, and we hear no more of the matter.†

After the fall of Quebec the Acadians who were on the upper waters of the saint John, and those who had returned to the Petitcodiac, together with those scattered on the New Brunswick coast, surrendered to the British government.

The recollect father de La Corne, to whom was applied the name of "Capitaine Jean Barthe," and who is described as having only the dress of his order, was in charge of the colony at Miramichi. He passed to and from Quebec to carry on his commercial operations in a schooner of his own, and made a large sum of money. He returned to France, and under the plea of illness abandoned his religious duties. He kept an equipage, and went into female society. Eventually, he

* July 8th, 1756. N. S. Arch., p. 300.

† The writer of the "*Mémoire sur le Canada, 1759-1760*," p. 88, relates that de Vaudreuil authorized one Bronard dit Beausoleil to arm a small privateer in the bay of Fundy, with which he took some prizes.

managed to get himself secularized. He was succeeded by père Ménac, who had been an instrument of Le Loutre at bay Verte. It was his influence which led to the submission of the Acadians at Miramichi, and an authorized person, Mr. Muir, was sent by Murray to Mirigonish to conclude the treaty. In 1761 Ménac was in Halifax, and made himself remarkable by the trouble he caused, and he was sent a prisoner to England. We hear of him in 1763, when he desired to come back to Miramichi, and he is spoken of as having been in his previous career negligent of all decorum.*

We have only a painful history of those who found their way to Quebec. The writer already quoted† tells us: "In vain they asked that the promises they had received should be kept, and they pleaded the sacrifices they had made for France. All was useless. The former necessity for their services had passed away. They were looked upon as troublesome people, and if they received assistance they were made to feel that it was granted from pity. They were almost reduced to die of famine. The small quantity of food they obtained, its bad quality, their natural want of cleanliness, their grief and their idleness, caused a great number to die. They were forced to eat boiled leather during the greater part of the winter, and to wait for spring, in the hope that their fate would be better. On this point they were deceived."

The same writer‡ tells us that in 1756 many from Miramichi arrived at Quebec. In place of obtaining assistance, on all sides they only experienced calamity and misery. Cadet allowed them no bread and only horseflesh. Several died, or fell ill, and few escaped suffering. A few of the number willing to work received *concessions*§ on the seigneurie of Madame Péron near Quebec. Others obtained land on the seigneurie of Vaudreuil on the Ottawa, the property of the governor. Provisions were given to such as these, and to

* Nova Scotia Arch., pp. 319, 340. Memoire 1749-1760, p. 174.

† *Ib.*, p. 62.

‡ *Ib.*, p. 69.

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judge by this writer's comments, not out of regard for the Acadians, for he adds, "while the greatest difficulty was felt for the subsistence of the troops, the *habitants* obtained provisions in Montreal which were carted for them gratis."

The Acadians presented a petition to de Vaudreuil asking for aid. It pointed out that their attachment to France was the cause of their suffering. Their desire was to have arms placed in their hands, and they prayed, at least, that food should be given them. They dwelt on the fact that their constant refusal to obey the English should speak in their favour. At that date 3,500 were established at Miramachi, and provisions were indispensable for they were starving. They hoped eventually to be established in Canada. They complained bitterly of the Micmacs, who seized the provisions which had been sent, and inflicted greater misery on them, than they had suffered from the English.*

Pouchot describes the sufferings of the Acadians at Quebec. "They were reduced to four ounces of bread a day, they sought in the gutters of Quebec to appease their hunger. Such was the fate of men 'whose attachment to their mother country was equalled by her indifference.'"† We can also read in the History of the Ursulines of Quebec‡ of the privations they underwent. Want caused many to die. To add to their suffering the smallpox broke out among them. No assistance could be given: entire families were destroyed, many bodies being buried in one grave. Their misery must have been very great.

De Bougainville likewise describes them as dying in great numbers owing to the indifference generally felt towards them. One individual received an allowance for the maintenance of those who were placed with him. He gave them insufficient food; and they suffered not only from hunger but from cold. He had been assigned the duty that he might obtain money to pay a debt due to some person of influence. By these

* Memoire, p. 81.

† English translation, p. 136.

‡ Vol. II., p. 300.

means he succeeded. "*Quel pays ! Quel Meurs !*" exclaims de Bougainville.

Those who read the narrative of the forced expatriation of so large a number of men, women, and children cannot fail to be struck with the misery and suffering it called forth. It is this terrible consequence which has been placed in prominence when the story has been told. The blow fell on many who were innocent ; but in a greater or less degree by the conditions under which we live, we must profit by the prosperity, or suffer by the misfortunes of those on whom we are dependent. There is no greater prompting motive in life than the consequence of our actions upon others, which, with rightly constituted minds, tends more to effort or induces greater abnegation. As it is a pervading principle affecting all family relations, so it acts equally on a community, and in a modified degree on a nation. Great privations were experienced, and much suffering felt ; but that is not the only side of the question to be examined.

We may pity the malefactor about to undergo the extreme sentence of the law ; but the majority of men, living in civilization, know that punishments have to be exacted in the common interest. And in this case, our judgment must not be bewildered by our sympathy with misery. We have to ask : was this measure tyrannically enforced without mercy, or without giving those affected, the chance of avoiding it ? Whether the situation of those responsible for the defence of Nova Scotia, justified the retention in the province of a large inimical population, ready at the first promise of success mercilessly to attack and, if possible, outroot the English race ? We have in *la petite guerre* of the French colonist on the American continent a long detail of the unshrinking destruction of all who stood in the way of French possession of territory. Men and women were killed or thrown into slavery, their children reared as savages. Those who committed these acts are still spoken of with admiration. There could be no illusion on this point with the English inhabitants of Nova Scotia, many of whom had learned in New

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England what they might look for in adverse days. Since the foundation of the city of Halifax every straggler, who could be slaughtered with safety to the assailant, had been destroyed, every courier intercepted and killed. The Acadians had been agents or participators in these outrages, and this conduct had been followed during a term of peace. It was now the condition of war. Nova Scotia stood between Cape Breton and Canada; the resident savages urged into activity by mischievous priests; the Acadian population singularly ignorant, their passions and prejudices kept at fever heat by religious terrors, and in a" directions taught to nourish an undying enmity to British authority. For forty-two years the French settlers had experienced only gentleness and forbearance. They had been relieved from all taxes, and in no way had contributed to the support of the state, a policy followed out towards them in the hope, that their feelings of hostility would die out, and that another generation would accept the conditions under which it had been born, and become loyal and prosperous subjects. It was plain that there was to be no realization of this expectation. The hatred was transmitted from father to son with increased magnitude. The feeling had been encouraged that the English dared not interfere with the Acadian population; that a remonstrance was a mere threat to pass away, as had happened with other menaces, when the oath had been refused; and that they had to be patient and bide their time, and at the proper hour French succour would undoubtedly come, when they would return to the rule which they had been taught to love with unfailing devotion; when there would again be the national recognition of a religion which they looked upon as the only passport to heaven; and freed from interference by those who were considered heretics unworthy of christian treatment.

Can we wonder that the authorities took the one course open to them, that of calling for an oath of allegiance and a pledge of fidelity, and not obtaining them, that they should take steps to remove a population which not only presented a

constant threat, but was always an active enemy? Those who, at the bidding of the priest, had voluntarily abandoned Acadia for the north of the isthmus, or for Prince Edward island, still looked forward to regain their farms. They were taught that the English would in a few months be driven out, when they would enjoy their own again, with the glory reflected from the sacrifices they had made. It would have been poor policy to have sent out of the country to join these refugees, those that remained on their lands, to increase the fighting force which in a few months France would bring against the British colonies. It was reasoned that by separating the Acadians among the British provinces they would be removed from the influence of France, not to increase her army, and that they themselves would have a wider field for future effort, to become useful in their new sphere of action. If we concede to the rulers of Nova Scotia, the right of expatriating this inimical population, we must recognise the wisdom of the course taken by them, in distributing those they expatriated among the other colonies. Without any desire to underrate the misery arising from this forced expulsion, it may be affirmed that it was conducted with as much forbearance and consideration for those concerned, as in the difficult and trying circumstances was possible.

Few readers of Canadian history can refrain from the thought that it would have been happier had it been otherwise. It is a painful chapter to read. The event, however, must be looked upon and judged according to the circumstances under which it took place. We must consider that no material sacrifice was asked from the Acadians, and that the demand to be loyal to the government under which every man forty years of age had been born, cannot be looked upon as a wound to sentiment. This duty, on the part of the authorities, was persistently met by subterfuge and evasion. The Acadians refused to give this proof of loyalty. The one feeling was hatred of the government, and every Acadian was ready and willing to aid in the destruction of those not of his race and faith. He unhesitatingly followed the dictates of

French leaders, intent on repossessing the territory which France had ceded nearly half a century previously. When these established facts are dispassionately weighed, the question pertinently presents itself: what other policy could be followed than to insist on one of the two alternatives, that they should either become loyal subjects and abandon their threatening attitude, or submit to the measures which the authorities held to be expedient. Few can refuse to recognise that a decisive policy could no longer be delayed. In view of self-protection the removal of this population became a necessity. The decision had been long formed, but its execution had been deferred, in the hope that a better feeling would arise and render it unnecessary. The "blast of war" conveyed no uncertain sound: it proclaimed that hesitation was no longer possible, and that immediate action was necessary and inevitable. It was a stern and remorseless policy, in every way disastrous and crushing to the Acadians; painful to all concerned in its execution, but it was unshrinkingly adopted and consummated, from the conviction that it was an act of self-defence, unavoidable in an emergency of persistent, threatening disloyalty.

CHAPTER VIII.

The vessels which carried the reinforcements to Canada reached Quebec at the end of June. The new governor-general, M. de Vaudreuil arrived with them to replace M. Duquesne, who is represented as having asked for his recall to re-enter the naval service. Duquesne's government had been characterized by ability and devotion to his duty, but his haughty manners had made him unpopular. If his affability could be called in question during the three years of his government, his judgment and energy exacted respect. The cause of his return to France is not established; for he complained that the operations of the year were entrusted to de Vaudreuil and not to himself.* The letters from France of the previous October do not contemplate his retirement: but in February of 1755 Duquesne was notified that a reinforcement of 3,000 troops would be sent under a *maréchal de camp*, subject to the governor-general's order; and that M. de Vaudreuil would embark with the commandant in the squadron, which was to leave Brest in April. Bigot who had been absent in France to give explanations with regard to the expenditure, was to leave a month earlier. One of the first pieces of information which de Vaudreuil received was that an attack on fort Duquesne might be looked for. It had been communicated to Duquesne by Drucour from Louisbourg, and the preparations made to meet the emergency were communicated to the newly arrived governor-general.

Pierre François marquis de Vaudreuil-Cavagnal was son of the former governor-general of that name who had died in 1725. He was born at Quebec in 1698, and was fifty-seven years of age: his mother was the daughter of the seigneur de Soulanges, a woman of great ability. He was the one

* N.Y. Doc., X., p. 305. Duquesne to de Macrault, 15 July, 1755.

governor whose feelings might be described as French-Canadian, in contra-distinction to sympathies strictly French. His appointment was therefore cordially welcomed as a recognition of what was due to the native born Canadian. With a class of writers, no governor is spoken of with greater admiration, and they place his name in prominence for capacity and energy. He had the misfortune to be the last French governor-general; and there are many who even maintain that it was only because his policy was not followed, that the province was lost to France.

He had seen some service in Europe, and had been appointed governor of Three Rivers in 1733. Ten years later he was raised to the governorship of Louisiana. Appointed in spring to succeed Duquesne, his commission was only put on record in the "*conseil supérieur*" on the 10th of July, 1755.

His memory is not stained as participating in the corruption which prevailed during his government; but in the letters of the time he is described as being cognizant of it. He was included in the trial of those arraigned as guilty of the system of organized plunder, and was acquitted of every charge made against him. He was patriotic, desirous of performing his duty, industrious, and not wanting in energy. His constant activity in the trying events of the succeeding four years attests his devotion to Canada. But his understanding was narrow, his nature petty and mean. He had the sensitiveness regarding his position which is the accompaniment of mediocrity. He was the passive instrument of flatterers. The ability of Bigot and the deference paid by that able and unscrupulous man to de Vaudreuil, caused him to accept the views of Bigot and those around him as his own; and being but the tool, he came to be considered as the accomplice of Bigot's peculations. Bigot's energy and capacity made him indispensable to de Vaudreuil, for whatever dishonesty attended his administration of the finances, his power of resource and his unceasing zeal and activity are undeniable.

It cannot, however, be denied that de Vaudreuil shewed

much jealousy of the men of ability who did not take this course, and that his want of determination and his non-possession of the higher qualities of manhood can unmistakably be traced up to the hour when he signed the capitulation of the province.

The commandant of the forces was baron Dieskau; he had been appointed by a commission dated the 1st of March, and had accompanied the troops from France. He was by birth a Saxon, and had served with distinction under marshal de Saxe; his selection to this position had been made from his military capacity. His career in Canada was equally short and unfortunate, but the impression he made was favourable, for his second in command, the chevalier de Montreuil, wrote to France that he appeared to be a good general and an excellent soldier. Subsequently the chevalier wrote of his chief with less approval.

The first design contemplated had been the attack of Chouaguen, Oswego.* Two regiments had been ordered to fort Frontenac, to be in readiness to proceed on the expedition, the battalions of Guienne and Bearne: the regiments of La Reine and Languedoc had also started from Montreal for lake Ontario, but were recalled to proceed to Crown Point.

The papers of Braddock, which fell into the hands of the government at Quebec after his defeat, and the reports which were forwarded to de Vaudreuil, from Varin, then at Saint John's, had convinced him that Crown Point was immediately to be attacked. The two regiments were countermanded to assist in the defence of this fort, and Dieskau received instructions to assume command of the force proceeding to lake Champlain.

One of de Vaudreuil's earliest acts was to leave Quebec, ten days after he assumed office, and proceed to Montreal. On his arrival he ordered three hundred farmers to be sent from Quebec to gather in the harvest, as every man available for service in the neighbourhood had been sent to the front. It was from Montreal that he communicated the news of Brad-

* New York Doc., X., p. 308.

dock's defeat. His letter, however, did not reach France. We learn that the ship, "le Pierre-Alexandre," was overhauled by an English man of war on the 17th of August, and that the captain threw overboard the bag of Canadian letters.* The news of the defeat reached France by the way of England,† on the 5th of September; and at that date the intelligence had not been confirmed from Canada.

The plan of the attack on Crown Point had originated with Shirley. The presence of a large French force on lake Champlain was equally a threat to New England as it was to New York. From the difficulties which had presented themselves in the appointment of a commander, Shirley had given the rank of major-general to Johnson. In the view of his command being acceptable to the Six Nation Indians, and otherwise not open to objection, the nomination was approved by Braddock.

Johnson had hitherto lived on the Mohawk in charge of the property of his uncle, sir Peter Warren, who had married a lady of New York. Warren had been induced to purchase a tract of land on the Mohawk, in the view that in no long period this territory would attract attention, and the land become of value. Johnson was forty years old; he was born at Meath, in Ireland. His place of residence was at Mount Johnson, about thirty miles from Albany; but he had arrived in New York some years previously. He had learned the Mohawk language to speak it as one of the tribe. After the death of his wife, who belonged to a German family in the neighbourhood, whom he had married somewhat late in their relationship, Molly Brandt, sister of the celebrated chief, took her place; it does not appear as a second wife. He had courage, energy and determination, and creditably played a prominent part during the events of the succeeding five years.

He had seen no service, and could know little of war; nevertheless, he was placed in charge of these operations. Massachusetts had raised 4,500 men; New Hampshire, 500;

* N.Y. Doc., X., p. 313.

† Ib. X., p. 314. De Machault to de Vaudreuil.

Rhode Island, 400 ; 800 were to be furnished by New York ; making a total of 6,200 to take part in the enterprise.

The troops were recruited from all conditions of men. Except that they were accustomed to the use of firearms, they were without preliminary training. Some of the officers had seen service at Louisbourg. The second in command was colonel Phineas Lyman. One regiment only was uniformed. The men had no bayonets, but each man carried an Indian axe or tomahawk in his waist-belt. In the first instance, they were assembled at Albany. Eventually, the greater number was moved to the "Carrying-place," where the portage commences to reach Wood's creek, which has its outlet at lake Champlain ; or to pass to what was then known to the French as "Lac du Sacrament," in a few weeks to receive its modern title of lake George. Lyman commenced a fort on the eastern bank of the Hudson, which for a short time was called after him, but afterwards became better known as fort Edward, after one of the grandsons of the king ; the name which the town on its site still retains.

The first intention was to descend by Wood's creek to lake Champlain, but the design was abandoned and a road fourteen miles in length was made to the head of the lake. Two thousand men proceeded thither to clear away the forest and to construct what was afterwards known as fort William Henry. The stores, bateaux, and guns were carried on wagons, a work of difficulty and labour. Three hundred Mohawks joined the camp. The whole force was actively engaged in establishing itself, the work of fort Lyman proceeding at the same time.

Johnson's career is sometimes mentioned with disparagement ; but the difficulties with which he had to contend were great. The provisions, guns and stores could be carried by water from Albany to fort Lyman : forty-five miles with a few *portages*. It was on landing at the east bank of the Hudson that the trouble commenced. The country was a wilderness, and it was at this place that the plan of the campaign had to be determined. It was not until July that the provincial troops

were encamped at Albany. Six weeks only elapsed before the attack of Dieskau. These dates establish the energetic conduct of Johnson: they show that in this short period he accomplished a great deal. Injustice has been done Johnson in this respect, and it would not be easy to point out in detail in what respect he failed.

Dieskau unwillingly abandoned the attack on Oswego, but he was under the orders of the governor-general, and his duty was compliance.* The original design was that Dieskau should proceed up the Saint Lawrence with 4,000 men, and he was on the point of starting when intelligence was sent from Saint John's by Varin, a "*commissaire*" attached to Bigot's department, that Johnson, at the head of 3,000 men, was within two days' march of Crown Point. Dieskau questioned the intelligence, as no report had been sent by the commandant. De Vaudreuil, however, insisted that the Choueguen, Oswego, expedition should be postponed, as he attached much weight to the reports of Varin.

Dieskau, on his arrival at Crown Point, found what little cause there was for alarm. Within the last ten days Johnson had arrived at the head of the lake with an army of untrained militia, drawing his subsistence from fort Edward, fourteen miles distance. The force of Crown Point consisted of 3,573 men, including 700 regular troops, 1,600 Canadians, the majority having been called away from their farms, and several hundred Indians. Among the latter were 300 belonging to the missions of the Sault and the lake of the Two Mountains. Dieskau complained that for fifteen days he could obtain no information. Previous to leaving Montreal he had expressed to de Vaudreuil his doubts of their fidelity; but the governor general would not listen to his representations.†

On the 27th of August, a Canadian named Boileau came to the camp, informing him that 3,000 English were encamped

* "Dialogue entre le Maréchal de Saxe et le Baron de Dieskau aux Champs Elysées." *Le Canada sous la domination française* par L. Dussieux, p. 261. This paper, although taking this form, was evidently written from the information given by Dieskau, and is a narrative of the campaign.

† Dieskau to d'Argenson, 14 Sept., 1755. Dussieux, p. 256.









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at fort Lyman, and that the fort was being rapidly completed. Dieskau accordingly determined to establish himself in a position from which he could intercept the enemy in their march; or, if expedient, proceed to attack them. He advanced his force to Carillon, and there encamped.

This place is better known as Ticonderoga, nine miles to the south of Crown Point. At this spot lake Champlain becomes narrowed in width, and in all respects it is an important strategical position, being the commencement of the carrying place past the falls of the stream by which lake George descends to the Hudson. The *portage* around the falls is about three miles, whence lake George is reached. The lake is about thirty miles in length of the most romantic scenery, being the distance to the site of Johnson's fort.

The Abenakis brought in a prisoner to Ticonderoga. Some misunderstanding arose as to the information given by him. He is reported in the first instance to have stated that 500 men only were present at fort Lyman; on the second examination, he said that colonel Lyman was to follow with 2,400 men. The opinion was rapidly formed that the fort contained only 500 men in an exposed situation. Dieskau accordingly determined to attack it, if possible to take it by surprise, to cut off the supplies of the English at the lake, and to fall upon their rear.

He formed a column of 1,500 men, consisting of 220 soldiers of the regiment of La Reine and Languedoc, 680 Canadians and 600 Indians. Provisions for ten days were to be carried, the troops to march in light marching order.

On the 2nd of September Dieskau started to ascend lake Champlain, leaving a detachment at the spot known as the "Two Rocks," the commencement of the marsh, which, with the English, bore the name of the "drowned lands." Finally, he encamped at the large sheet of water at the end of the marsh, South bay. Here he left his boats and baggage under a guard of one hundred and twenty men. From this point it was estimated that there were four days' march to the fort on the Hudson. The men carried eight days' provisions. On

the evening of the 7th of September, after two days' march, they reached the road cut by Johnson to lake George. They had not been long at the spot when a mounted man galloped by. He was a messenger sent by Johnson, bearing a letter to the officer in command at fort Lyman. He was shot, and his despatch obtained.

An Indian scout had seen the trail of Dieskau's force, evidently directed to the fort, and the messenger had been sent to give notice of a probable attack. Shortly after some waggoners appeared on the road. They were attacked; some escaped, some were killed, and two were taken. From these the fact became known that 3,000 men were at the fort. This number in no way changed the plans of Dieskau. He had been encouraged in a belief of the utter valuelessness of the English provincial troops, an opinion which the defeat of Braddock confirmed. The Iroquois in the first instance declined to join in the attack, but they afterwards agreed to do so. Dieskau's desire was to take the fort by surprise after sundown. The Iroquois undertook to lead the way. Whether by design or not, they abandoned the trail and came out in the road, three miles to the north of fort Lyman. It was now night, and it was not thought advisable to proceed to the assault.

In the morning Dieskau submitted to the Indians, whether they would attack fort Lyman or advance against the fort at the lake. They stated their preference for the latter, and the force marched northwards. They were eleven miles from lake George. It was the 8th of September. After a march of some hours, about ten o'clock, the scouts informed him that a body of men about a thousand in number was advancing along the road towards them, and a prisoner, who was shortly afterwards taken, confirmed the news.

Dieskau directed the Indians to lie down in ambush on the left of the road, the Canadians some paces behind them on the right, so that the advancing force, when taken in flank by the Canadians, could be attacked in rear by Indians. The French were to await them in front. Had the plan been carried

out, the probability is the force would have been exterminated, not one of the provincial troops escaping alive.

The waggon drivers, who had fled back to the lake on the preceding evening, brought back the news of the presence of the French force. On the alarm being given, a council of war was held. There were in the camp 2,200 men, with 300 Indians of the Six Nations, and it was resolved that as it was plain the attack was designed against fort Lyman, a reinforcement of 1,000 men should be sent, which should fall on the rear of the French troops. The detachment started the following morning, accompanied by the Mohawk Indians, their chief, Hendrick, who was somewhat stout and no longer young, being mounted on a horse belonging to Johnson. The column was under the command of colonel Williams. As might be expected on the part of men without experience in war, no scouts were thrown out, no precautions were taken for there was no thought of immediate danger. The troops were marching forward in perfect carelessness within the folds of the ambush which Dieskau had prepared. They were entering what in our common parlance is a blind alley; in the expressive French idiom into the bottom of the sack.*

As the English column came in view, some of the Christian Indians rose from the ground to observe who were present, and on noticing in the van the Iroquois, in some cases their own relations, the word to that effect was passed round, and some shots were fired in the air. The presence of the enemy was thus revealed. There could no longer be cause for waiting to make the surprise more complete, and the attack was generally commenced. The column, unprepared, could only halt and hurriedly return the fire; and on a direct assault, the front ranks were forced back on the advancing files. They became, to use Dieskau's expression, folded together as a pack of cards.† The fire from the Canadians proved very destructive. There was a momentary stand, when a panic followed, and

* "De sorte que ma disposition avait la figure d'un cul-de-sac dans lequel je comptais d'attirer les Anglais." Dialogue, &c., &c., aux Champs Elysées.

† "pliés comme un jeu de cartes."

the force turned and fled. The pursuit was continued to within three-quarters of a mile from the camp. At this spot Dieskau called a halt. The Indians had not accompanied the detachment. The Abenakis had seized some Mohawk prisoners, and the Christian Iroquois had insisted that they should be released. The consequence was, that the Indians had not gone forward with the regular and Canadian troops.

The English troops had scarcely left the camp an hour, when firing was heard, and as by degrees the report of the musketry became more distinct, it became known that the detachment was in retreat, and that the enemy was advancing towards the lake. The effort was immediately made to barricade the camp with waggons, *bateaux* set on their sides, and fallen trees placed as *abatis*. At the same time a detachment was sent out to aid their retreating comrades. The bushes in front of the camp were cleared as far as possible; three cannon were placed to command the road, and one piece was placed in position on the hill. An hour and a half had scarcely passed since the first firing was heard, when the fugitives commenced to pour into the camp. As they had to pass over three miles of ground the panic must rapidly have followed the attack. They came in without order, perfectly broken, some of the wounded being carried.

An attack on the position was immediately to be looked for, and provision was taken to meet it. Some detachments were placed to guard the flanks; the remainder were scattered behind logs and fallen trees, and what constituted the barricade. As all the men were accustomed to the use of fire-arms, it was a dangerous force for an attacking column to face, if the heart of the defenders did not fail them. There was, perhaps, a second or two of irresolution, but the feeling passed away, to be succeeded by the fixed determination of resolute defence.

They had not long to await the assault. Dieskau unhesitatingly marched his troops forward. In the short skirmish the French had experienced a serious loss in the person of Legardeur de Saint Pierre. He was the officer who had been

sent to the North-West in the place of de La Vendrye,* the same who received Washington at fort Le Bœuf two years previously. He was in command of the Indians, an experienced, able leader; and his death removed the controlling force, so necessary in operations in which they were concerned.

Dieskau led forward his regular troops against the camp, as he says, expecting the Canadians and Indians would join in the assault. He found himself alone with this small force, the latter having scattered among the trees and commenced firing from the protection they had obtained.† The general, with two hundred troops of the line, was advancing unsupported.

It is plain that Dieskau's only chance of success was a well-directed, concentrated attack in full force. The Canadians were firing on the camp from the spots they had themselves chosen. The Indians had halted a short distance behind. The regular troops advanced to the barricade with courage, but the artillery, well served by captain Eyre, broke their ranks. Their number was too few to supply the losses, and they were driven from the road to seek cover in the bush. The fight assumed the character of a skirmish. However expert the Canadians, they found in their front a resolute enemy accustomed to this character of warfare, in which every protection was sought. Dieskau, gathering up his force, endeavoured to assault the right of the defence, and when calling upon the Canadians to advance, he was hit

* Ante p. 413.

† Dieskau was afterwards reproached for exposing himself unnecessarily. De Montreuil wrote on the 10th October, [Dussieux, p. 271]: "M. Dieskau étoit un vrai grenadier il n'a eu que moi à l'accompagner." It was a constant matter of reproach by the French troops against the Canadian militia that on all occasions they followed the tactics of "la petite guerre," and fought behind some protection. They would not advance in the open to fight, even when necessary to do so. On this occasion Dieskau says: "Je m'aperçus que les Canadiens au lieu de marcher de leur côté au retranchement s'éparpilloient à droite et à gauche, faisant le coup de fusil à la sauvage, et que les sauvages n'avançoient point." [Dussieux, 266.] I refer the reader to a letter of de Montreuil. [Ib., 277.] Also to a "Mémoire sur l'état de la Nouvelle France," by de Bougainville on this point. [Margry Relations et Mémoires inédits, p. 65.]

nearly at the same time by three separate shots. One struck his left knee, and he fell to the ground. De Montreuil, who was with him, placed him in security against a tree. Dieskau gave orders to de Montreuil to take the command, and if necessary order the retreat, and asked that two men should be sent to carry him from the field. Two Canadians attempted to fulfil this duty; one was shot dead, to fall across Dieskau's legs. The other left to obtain assistance but never returned. "Shortly afterwards," says Dieskau, "I heard the retreat sounded."

"It was now four o'clock," the English report tells us, "when the enemy began to slacken their fire, gave way, and fled."*

The success of the defence may be attributed to the artillery, which was admirably served, for the English did not leave their entrenchments until the French were in full retreat. The loss of the provincial troops in the skirmish on the road, and in defence of the fort, was 120 killed, 80 wounded, 62 missing. Of the Indians 38 were killed and 12 wounded; among the former was the Mohawk chief, Hendrick. It is related that his horse was shot under him, and that when attempting to rise he was killed by the thrust of a bayonet. Of the provincial troops 17 officers were killed and 12 wounded. Johnson himself was wounded in the hip, and had to be carried away from the action.†

A second skirmish took place in the afternoon. Some New Hampshire and New York troops, under captain Maginnis, were out on a reconnoitring party, and hearing the firing at fort George they marched towards the spot. Between four and five they reached the scene of the skirmish, which had taken

* Captain Wraxall to lieutenant-governor Delancy. The despatch is dated "Lake George, 10th September." It may be assumed the first occasion, when the present name was given to the lake. [N.Y. Doc., X., p. 1003.] In the record of the meeting of council of the 22nd August [Ib., X., p. 1000], the description given is "Camp at the Great Carrying Place."

† The third Massachusetts' regiment being in the van in the morning attack greatly suffered. Their loss was forty-one killed, including the colonel and eight officers, twenty-six wounded, three missing; their losses were upwards of one-fourth of the total casualties. Wraxall's report, N.Y. Doc., X., p. 1007.

place early in the day. They came upon some three hundred Canadians and Indians, engaged in removing some baggage, in scalping and plundering the dead. A fight ensued, in which the latter were beaten off with some loss. Of the provincial troops two were killed and eleven wounded, with five missing. Captain Maginnis, the commander, was brought into the camp severely wounded, to die two days afterwards.

Dieskau in vain looked for the assistance which was to carry him from the field. It is disgraceful to the French that he was abandoned unaided, for he might easily have been removed. De Montreuil endeavoured to explain his conduct,* by saying that he left to conduct the attack, and had sent the general's servants to him. It is not in this form that a gallant officer cares for a wounded general, unable to move from a bullet through the knee. The desertion of Dieskau is a reproach to the memory of de Montreuil, reflecting on the whole French force which he commanded.

The misfortunes of the general did not cease. After the retreat of the French, the New England troops left their defences. One of them was taking aim at Dieskau, who threw up his hand to stop the shot. The man, however, fired, and the ball passed through both thighs; he was a French deserter, who had been ten years with the English. Dieskau reproached him for firing on a wounded man. He answered that Dieskau might have had a pistol, and it was better to kill the devil than be killed by him.

At the request of the wounded general, he was taken to the commanding officer, to whom he declared his rank. Johnson, himself wounded, received him in his own tent in all courtesy. The Iroquois, furious at the loss of Hendrick and the others of the tribe, were desirous of burning Dieskau, as was the custom with their enemies taken in battle. Johnson was firm in preventing this proceeding; by his tact and judgment he succeeded in quieting them. There were other attempts to carry out this purpose, but Johnson was unflinching in his opposition. Finally the Iroquois accepted his views without

* 12 June, 1756. Dessieux, p. 277.

angry dissatisfaction, and Johnson was further gratified by their continued adherence to his fortunes.*

The French had 120 killed and 123 wounded.†

The affair itself, which was no more than the repulse of a surprise by a force without artillery, owing to the general having been made prisoner, became magnified in England as a great victory. Happening too so soon after the defeat of Braddock, it was to the interest of the government to give it the character of being a counterpoise to that disaster. There had been no want of gallantry on the part of the provincial troops, but there was little ground for the extravagant praise expressed on the occasion. Had Dieskau been carried from the field, the affair would scarcely have obtained mention. On the other hand, it had the effect to some extent, of depressing the operations of the provincial forces. It made known the force of the French, and the energy with which it could be brought into the field. It led to the fact being better understood at lake George, that the attack on Crown Point called for strength and generalship, and was not to be undertaken at hap-hazard.

In England, the retreat of the French received the praise due to a victory. The change of name of the lake to lake George, in honour of the king, and the two forts being called respectively after his two grandsons, William Henry and Edward, added no little to the favourable opinion formed of the affair. Johnson received a baronetcy and £5,000. Personally he rose into prominence to play a leading part in the war. His courage and judgment caused him wisely to use his opportunity. Few men have been more favoured by circumstances; but his merits were of a high order. He possessed force of character, ability and determination, and was never found wanting in any one of the difficult positions in which he was placed.

* Dieskau was sent to New York, and thence to England, remaining there until the peace of 1763. [N.Y. Doc., X., p. 340] He never thoroughly recovered from his wounds. He died at Suresnes, the 8th September, 1767.

† N.Y. Doc., X., p. 354.

He has been censured for not attempting to cut off the French in their retreat; it is plain that Johnson's men considered themselves fortunate in having been able to hold their own. The French, although driven back, were in no way disorganized, and were in such force, that pursuit could only have been undertaken by a powerful detachment; and to have weakened the garrison in the camp would have exposed it to attack from Ticonderoga. Moreover, the English force was unprepared for an expedition of this magnitude, and was without the discipline by which such an attempt could be successfully made; the French were likewise but a short distance from their canoes; and on rejoining them, their strength would have been increased.

Reinforcements were sent to the camp, and at the end of October there were 3,600 men gathered there. Some writers conceive that with this force an attempt should have been made at Ticonderoga. It could not have been by water, for there was not transport for the troops. It would have been madness, with scarcely six weeks of weather fit for operations, the men being unprovided with warm clothing, or any of the necessities for a campaign, towards the end of autumn, to have attempted to cut a road by the lake side, a wilderness. The fact cannot be concealed, that the emergencies of such an expedition were unknown, and no preparation had been made to meet them. The French were in possession of Ticonderoga, Dieskau having established his position there on his advance up the lake. Johnson complained of want of waggons, as if he had anticipated to march by land.

Under these circumstances a council of war was held,* in the middle of October, when it was decided that it was inexpedient to make any attempt on Crown Point. It was, however, resolved that a garrison selected from the several regiments should be left at the fort during winter. In January governor Hardy wrote to the lords of trade,† recommending that this fort should be one of those maintained on the frontier

* Governor Hardy to Lords of Trade, N. Y. Doc., VI., p. 1021.

† *Ib.*, VII., p. 4.

as a protection against future encroachments and invasions by the French. It was not until the end of November, that the remainder of the troops marched out and were disbanded, to be sent to their homes. The Indians had left in the month of September.

During these events governor Shirley had proceeded to Oswego, with the design of attacking fort Niagara, an operation included in the plan of campaign agreed upon at the council of governors, held by Braddock at Alexandria. The capture of Braddock's baggage, at the disaster on the Monongahela, had revealed the secret of the projected expedition. In consequence fort Frontenac had been reinforced, with the view of protecting Niagara, and with the design of attacking and destroying Oswego. Information, of the action of the French on lake Ontario, was only imperfectly obtained in the British provinces. The preparations of the French were not known at Albany; and the organization which Shirley had commenced, with the purpose of attacking Niagara, was completed, unaffected by them, so that in July the whole force was assembled.

The Mohawk was to be ascended. It was the route by which lake Ontario could be reached, the one opening by which the northern colonies could obtain access to the western waters. In all other directions the route was barred by the Alleghanies. The Mohawk led to the water shed, where the sources of the waters running into lake Ontario take their rise; thus opening a communication with a territory regarded by the French as their own, as one on which no foreign flag should be seen. It was the feeling of what they held to be an intrusion, which led them to regard the English settlement of Oswego with such intense hostility.

The Mohawk falls into the Hudson seven miles north of Albany; with some interruptions the river is navigable for vessels of light draft for 116 miles, to what was then called the carrying place; where now stands the busy city of Rome. In a previous volume I have described this route in the account of the unsuccessful attempt made by major McGregor in 1686,

to engage in trade with the western lakes, when commissioned by some Albany traders.* Although it had been known for a century, it was only on the foundation of Oswego in 1724 that it became of importance.†

The settlement on the Mohawk was unimportant. Schenectady had long been established. Sir William Johnson was to be found some twenty miles further on. Above him a Palatine population had been established under governor Hunter, thirty-five years previously. When Shirley ascended the river, the last sixty miles were known only to the Indian and the trader; they were in the condition of the original forest. Two forts had been constructed at the commencement and end, of the carrying place: fort Williams on the Mohawk, where the city of Rome stands; fort Bull was constructed on Wood's creek, leading into lake Oneida. It contained a store-house and a barrack, enclosed with a palisade.

Shirley advanced with 1,500 men, provincial recruits, newly levied. Two regiments were paid by the crown, Shirley's, the 50th, and Pepperell's, the 51st, but although called royal regiments, the material which composed them did not differ from that of the other troops. His *bateaux* and stores were hauled to Wood's Creek, and the descent commenced to lake Ontario. The news of Braddock's defeat was here learned, to exercise a depressing influence; many of the non-combatants even abandoning the expedition.

On arriving at Oswego, Shirley employed his men to complete the fortifications. The settlement still remained, a collection of traders' buildings protected against the Indians. Although the importance of securing the possession of Oswego had been recognised by many, Clinton had in vain appealed to the assembly, to extend and permanently establish the fortifications. But its leaders were unable to

* In modern times the Oswego canal, in connection with the Erie canal, is the route taken by produce from the western states to New York. It is carried in vessels of large tonnage through the Canadian Welland canal, connecting lakes Erie and Ontario, and is transhipped to canal boats at Oswego. Ante, II., p. 74.

† Ante, II., p. 514.

enter into a well-conceived policy for the future benefit of the commonwealth. They could not appreciate the commercial or political importance of securing the opening to the western lakes, with the design of holding the carrying place to lake Erie. The possession of Niagara did not give the French the only approach to the upper lakes. There was the route by the present city of Hamilton to the Grand river followed by Dollier de Casson and de Galinée.* But the distance by this route was much increased and the difficulties greatly multiplied.

When Shirley arrived at Oswego, he learned for the first time that forts Niagara and Frontenac had been reinforced. At the latter there were 1,400 regulars and Canadians, with several vessels and *bateaux* for their embarkation. In the event of Shirley advancing towards Niagara, he would leave Oswego exposed to destruction from an attack from Frontenac. Shirley's supplies would then have been cut off, and the enemies' force established in his rear. Provisions were also scarce with Shirley. There was an insufficiency of proper vessels to navigate the lake, and the *bateaux* were considered unsafe to meet the bad weather to be anticipated at that season, the end of September. A council of war was called, and the abandonment of the expedition was determined upon. Leaving seven hundred men to complete the fortifications, Shirley with the other forces returned to Albany.

It is not my duty to enter at length into the consequences which Braddock's defeat entailed on the frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania. Some mention of these events is, however, indispensable. Dumas replaced de Contrecoeur in command at fort Duquesne. He found the Indians ready to his purpose. They had lost all confidence in British power, and consequently they made full submission to the French. The tribes, domiciled in the valley of the Ohio, were also made hostile by the recollection of neglect and ill-treatment on the part of the English provinces. The western Indians, always devoted to the French, appeared on the scene. Hordes of

* Ante I., p. 384.

these savages in organized bands were turned loose on the English settlements to devastate them. It was the introduction of *la petite guerre* of the Abenakis from the frontiers of New England. The policy of surprise of the scattered settlers; to kill those who resisted, and after the fight to carry into captivity the prisoners, with the women and children. Dumas wrote in July, 1756, that every Indian village was full of prisoners, and that the losses of the English in the year which had passed since the fight, had been greater than the loss of the 9th of July. The whole frontier was thus desolated for the affirmation of French supremacy.

Virginia made some effort to protect those exposed to the danger, but it was insufficient. To a regiment of 1,500 men under the command of Washington was assigned the duty of guarding a frontier of three hundred and fifty miles. This provincial force consisted of a rough class of men, difficult to control; nevertheless, the house of burgesses would pass no law to enforce discipline. Moreover, the action of even this limited number of troops was paralyzed by fear of a rising of the slaves, and the regiment did not advance far beyond the populous parts of the province.

In Pennsylvania there was a disregard of every law of humanity and duty. The house of representatives would take no step to protect the frontier. The one effort of the members was to obtain a political triumph, and they acted as if led by the belief, that the scalped corpses of the frontier settlers offered the opportunity, of successfully insisting on a tax being placed on the proprietary land. They refused all assistance for the protection of the frontier, unless their conditions, under which they would vote money, were accepted. Franklin endeavoured to explain away this disgrace attached to his state.* His work was published in England to remove the prejudice which the conduct of the house of assembly had created.

* An historical review of the construction and government of Pennsylvania, &c., &c., Griffiths, 1759. The title page contains this extraordinary sentence:

"Those who give up *essential liberty* to purchase a little *temporary safety*, desire neither *liberty* nor *safety*."

But it is a passage of history no special pleading can justify. The dispute was finally settled by the proprietors agreeing to give £5,000, contingent on the house voting the same sum; this proposal was accepted. The records of that date shew that little was wanting to impel the abandoned frontier men to march upon Philadelphia. Many in the city sustained their cry of indignation. Had these infuriated borderers attacked the contemptible members of the legislature, and wreaked their vengeance upon the sleek citizens, who had looked upon the slaughter of their countrymen with cold-blooded indifference, who to-day would say that it was not a righteous retribution? Fears arose in this direction, and the compromise was made. Franklin's conduct in this emergency shews his utter want of scruple when he had a point to gain. He acted disgracefully.*

* I refer my reader to the detailed narrative of Mr. Parkman [Wolfe & Montcalm, I., p. 336-350], which, in a few pages, lucidly sets forth the whole question. It is indeed a judicial summary of the dispute, so that it can be thoroughly understood.

CHAPTER IX.

Owing to the great scarcity of provisions, much misery was felt in Canada during the winter months of 1755-6. As bread was difficult to be obtained the government intervened and furnished flour. Upon certain days crowds attended at the bakers' shops, where there was a struggle to be served, and those failing to obtain bread were mostly women. The issue was limited to a pound each person; to be reduced to half a pound. Towards the end of the winter there was no beef, and only horse-flesh was eaten. Trade languished; in Montreal it had almost ceased. Many of the *habitants* having been called out for service, their farms had been left uncultivated, and the English cruisers had made the transport of provisions almost an impossibility. Notwithstanding this distress the subsistence of the army was imperative if the colony was to be defended. The troops had to be fed and the distant posts supplied. There was a scarcity of money. The card money, then the currency of Canada, had fallen in value, and it was plain the depreciation would increase.

The second issue had been introduced by de Beauharnois in 1729, to the value of 400,000 *livres*:* a subsequent issue to the extent of 200,000 *livres* had been authorized.† No embarrassment had been experienced so long as this limit was observed. At the close of the navigation card money was exchanged for bills of exchange on France, which had hitherto been regularly paid. No further ordinance was issued with regard to this currency.

Shortly after Bigot's arrival in Canada, in September, 1748, the public expenditure exacting more money than he possessed, on his own responsibility as intendant, he issued *ordonnances*,

* Edits et Ordonnances, I., p. 522, 2 March, 1729.

† Ib., I., p. 544, 2 May, 1733.

which may be described as treasury notes.* The precise date when they first appeared cannot be established: probably in 1750. They were readily accepted in trade as promises of future payment by the intendant. When drafts payable in France were given in Canada, the card money obtained the preference; the *ordonnances* issued on the credit of the colony were subordinate to the currency established by royal edict. If the appropriation for the issue of bills of exchange was not sufficient to include the *ordonnances*, a bond was given payable twelve months after date in card money. In 1754 the arrangement was changed; both issues were received on equal terms and settled by bills, some payable on demand, others being only due in 1755 and 1756.

The pressure with regard to money was very strong, and the war expenses could not be retrenched; as necessity exacted, a fresh issue of *ordonnances* appeared. The expenses were yearly increasing more and more. In 1749 the outlay had been 1,700,000 *livres*. In 1754 it had risen to 6,000,000, and in the last year of the war it increased to 27,000,000 *livres*. Money was from time to time sent from France, but insufficient to meet the emergency. Paper money fell twenty-five per cent. in value; and the depreciation increased with the new issues. At the period of the conquest, independently of the card money, forty-one million *livres* of *ordonnances* had been issued, which, with bonds for seven millions of card money, was all due in Canada.

There are always men ready to profit by the public distress; rarely has this purpose been more shamelessly carried out than in Canada at this time. The two leading personages

* The printed portion of these *ordonnances* was as follows: "Colonies, 17.— Dépenses générales. No. —. Il sera tenu compte par le Roi au mois de . . . prochain, de la somme de . . . valeur en la soumission du Trésorier restée au bureau du contrôle. A Quebec le . . ."

The date and amount were filled in in writing. When issued at Montreal the word "Quebec" was erased and Montreal substituted. The note was signed by Bigot.

This MS. correction is another proof of the absence of a printing press in Canada.

exercising control on finance were M. Bigot, the intendant, and M. Bréard the controller of the marine ; both were engaged in trade operations, and profited by the disorders in trade and the scarcity of provisions. The treasurer Imbert was connected with them. There was a sub-clique acting under their instructions, who, while furthering the designs of their superiors, were to a greater extent fraudulently advancing their own interests. In this number prominently must be mentioned Péan, Descheneaux, Cadet, and Varin.

Hugues Péan was the husband of the lady who had gained the favour of Bigot. He was born in Canada, being the son of an officer who had been *aide-major* of Quebec, town adjutant. He was of ordinary capacity, and owed his advancement to Bigot. His position gave him influence and opportunity to enrich himself.

Brassard Descheneaux was the son of a poor cobbler, who had been taught to read and write by a notary living in his father's house. Subsequently, he obtained employment in the office of Hocquart, the intendant. He attracted the notice of Bigot, who, recognising his capacity, promoted him, and finally made him his private secretary. To his ability he joined a nature cringing to meanness, and unfortunately for Bigot obtained his confidence. Many of Bigot's faults have been attributed to this man's false representations, and by his successful abuse of the trust reposed in him. His passion was to amass money ; he is accredited with saying that he would take it even from the altar.

Cadet was the son of a butcher, and the first experience of his youth was looking after the cattle of a rich *habitant* of Charlesbourg. Afterwards he was himself a butcher ; finally, he acted as a contractor to furnish meat to the troops, and in this position became acquainted with Descheneaux. The latter was enabled by his position to bring Cadet to the notice of Bigot. Cadet knew well the trade he was following, he was otherwise a man of ability, industrious and energetic, and early obtained the reputation of satisfactorily performing his duties, but he never lost the vulgarity of his early life. He

was a man of generous impulses, and lavish to excess with his easily acquired money.

Bigot, in the general distress, was called upon to buy a large quantity of wheat independently of the ordinary requirement of the service, and Péan received authority to make the purchase. He had already gathered a large sum of money, and a further amount was advanced to him from the treasury to carry out this duty. Péan was thus enabled to make large purchases on his own account, and as shortly afterwards the price of wheat was established by ordinance, his profits were very great. He now enlarged his operations, and built several schooners, which were constantly employed by the government at a high price.

In this emergency he entered into partnership with Cadet. A man named Clavery was admitted into the confederacy. Cadet went among the *habitants* and purchased wheat, which was ground at a mill below Quebec belonging to Péan on his seigneurie. It was shipped from this place to the West Indies, and these vessels brought back goods which were landed at the mill. They were sold at the store of which Clavery was placed in charge, and to keep up appearances, miscellaneous articles were retailed to the people. Clavery was also clerk to one Estebe, keeper of the royal stores. Bigot's duty was annually to send to France a list of the articles required; what he failed to order had to be purchased in the colony. Such articles were obtained at this store at a high price. The truth became known, indeed, its concealment was scarcely possible, so the building was christened, from these swindling operations, "La Friponne."

As wheat could not always be bought, it was represented to Bigot, that the *habitants* were keeping it concealed in order to raise the price. It was accordingly considered advisable for visits to be made to the country parishes, and to save the population from dying of hunger, each *habitant* was taxed a contribution, for which payment in *ordonnances* was made. The duty was assigned to Cadet, who, with his usual energy, passed through the country, and with his assistants

gathered more than the necessary quantity. His proceedings, frequently arbitrary and high-handed, led to great discontent ; so that several who felt aggrieved came to Quebec to complain to the intendant. Descheneaux was on the ground to intercept any complaint unfavourable to his friends. He represented, that those who asked for the interview were rebels to authority, and the parties whom the intendant received were summarily silenced by him. The same treatment was experienced by the poor women, who appealed to him in the difficulty that they were without bread. He gave them no relief, and he was himself living in luxury.

At Montreal the same scenes were being enacted ; if there was not the same scarcity of food, commerce had almost entirely ceased. The leading personage there was François Victor Varin.* He described himself as a near relative of Joseph Varin, an engraver at that date rising into eminence, the son of the artist known as having produced the busts of Louis XIII. at Versailles. The fact is denied. Varin is spoken of as a Frenchman of low origin, as being vain, a liar, arrogant, capricious, and obstinate. He was small in stature, and not otherwise of a prepossessing appearance ; licentious in his life, with little education. But he had great ability, and was fertile of resource ; he was especially versed in the intricacies of finance, and was industrious. He associated with himself one Martel, originally from Port Royal, who came to Quebec, and owed his start in life to his brother, a jesuit. The latter had been engaged in commerce, and had in subordination some clever knaves, among whom was Pennisseault, who was placed in charge of a building of the same character as that at Quebec, which likewise became known by the expressive name of "La Friponne." Varin had the duty of supplying the various outposts west of the lakes with goods and provisions, and was able to direct matters to his profit and benefit.

One of the changes subsequently made by Bigot which created astonishment, was the appointment of Cadet as com-

* This name has been mentioned as exercising influence over de Vaudreuil, to direct the expedition of Dieskau to Crown Point. Ante p. 527.

missary general; an act of consideration which Cadet repaid by subsequently becoming Bigot's accuser. The wits of the day called it the transformation of a butcher's knife into a sword. Bigot advocated the appointment on the ground that in consequence of the distress that had prevailed, he had been forced to buy provisions for the colony; and as they were distributed at a lower price, a loss was entailed which the king had to suffer. He acted on the theory that supplies being obtained in France, the intendant would not interfere with the production of the colony, and would not be held responsible for any scarcity of provisions, the outposts being furnished by the commissary and his deputies.

Among those employed was one Corpron, Cadet's financial agent. In a few years he became very rich. The supply of the outer posts was given over to Pennisseault and Maurin. Pennisseault's wife, the daughter of a Montreal merchant, was a woman of beauty and wit. She had become the mistress of Péan, but her grace and sprightliness attracted De Levis. As Péan had permitted his wife to accept the protection of Bigot, so he patiently saw his place taken by De Levis. The conduct of the latter has not escaped the censure of the chronicler; he was constantly with this woman, and dining at her table, met men of inferior rank and character: agents and participators in the frauds against the government. The fascination of the lady was by no means temporary, for De Levis was so attached to her, that on his return to France she accompanied him.*

De Levis' presence amid this circle did not take from its strength. But society at that time was not delicate. As has been, as will always be the case, money asserted its power, and those who possessed it, became personages of the hour. Madame Varin received, and everybody went to her rooms. There was much social attraction to be witnessed. Mont-

* Dussieux tells us that Mme. Pennisseault was able to obtain the pardon of her husband by the influence she had obtained over de Choiseul. After Pennisseault's condemnation to nine years' banishment from Paris, a fine of 500 *livres* and the restitution of 600,000 *livres* she obtained for him letters of justification, and liberty to retain his fraudulently acquired wealth. (p. 244.)

calm, as called upon by his position, was liberal in his hospitality. De Levis entertained as became his rank. Bigot daily saw his house full of guests; his rooms were almost always open to company. In his profusion he eclipsed the governor-general himself.

Maurin, another of the set, is described as the most deformed man in Canada, humpbacked, with a repulsive expression of countenance; but he possessed capacity, and was industrious and on occasions ostentatiously lavish. His master passion was to obtain money. No man, more capable of furthering the views of Cadet, could have been found. It was to these two men, Pennisscault and Maurin, that the supply of the government of Montreal and the posts of the upper country were entrusted.

Notwithstanding the privations of the winter of 1755-56, and the depression which they caused, de Vaudreuil resolved to strike a blow which, while it would give confidence in the distress which was being experienced, would likewise be a step towards the realization of the policy, he ardently desired to carry out, the destruction of Oswego.

It has been pointed out, that at the end of the navigable waters of the Mohawk, which were followed in the line of communication with Oswego, at the point where the carrying place commenced, the modern city of Rome, a fort had been constructed for the storage of supplies. A second fort, known as fort Bull, was at Wood's creek, the western end of the portage. It was a block-house with storehouses, surrounded by a palisade fence as a protection against Indians. De Léry was sent from Montreal to surprise these forts. He left Montreal in the middle of March, 1756, and ascended the Saint Lawrence to La Presentation, Ogdensburg. He thence crossed the country in a difficult march of about one hundred and ten miles. His force numerically consisted of 311 men: 93 of the marine regiment, 166 Canadian militia, and 82 Indians. The intention was to destroy both forts if possible. As the detachment arrived at the road between them, some waggon drivers were captured, from whom information of their

strength was obtained. De Léry learned that fort Williams was defended by four cannon and four hundred men. The second fort was guarded only by a few soldiers. French accounts give the numbers at sixty, English writers at thirty. Moreover, it was believed that Johnson was hastening to reinforce the garrisons; he had summoned the Indians immediately to appear. Fort Bull was also of importance from the amount of supplies stored there, and de Léry was but a short distance from it.

When the waggoners had been taken, a negro had escaped to give the alarm, so the garrison was on the alert. The Indians were left behind, and de Léry with the troops hurried forward with the intention of making a rush through the open gate. But the defenders had time to close it. De Léry summoned the garrison to surrender, promising them life and protection. The answer was a volley of musketry and an attack of hand grenades. The gate was soon beaten in, and the defenders were killed, "five only escaped,"* among them one woman. Much of the powder was thrown into the river. By some means the fort caught fire, and one of the magazines blew up. De Léry had barely time to remove his troops to escape the explosion. The entire fort, with the provisions, was destroyed. The loss of the French is stated at two killed and five wounded. The prisoners, consisting mostly of the teamsters taken in the morning, were carried to Montreal. They are represented as thirty in number.†

At this date the village of Saint Regis, opposite the town of Cornwall, on the south of the Saint Lawrence, was settled by some Iroquois families from the Sault Saint Louis. It was regarded as the first of a series of posts between Ogdensburg and Montreal, to impede the descent of the river by a hostile force. An attempt was also made to strengthen the French possession of the south shore of lake Ontario. De Villiers

* Doc. Hist. N.Y., I., p. 511.

† The *New York Mercury* of the 12th of April, relates that firing being heard in the morning, a party was sent out from the fort to aid the teamsters, and that, those constituting it, did not return: a fact which explains the number of prisoners.

had been sent in April with 800 men to Rivière au Sable, a stream now known as Sandy Creek, discharging itself about thirty-five miles east of Oswego. From this spot, attempts were made from time to time to harass and distress that garrison, and to cut off its supplies. Oswego was too weak to attempt any enterprise to dislodge this force. There was likewise much sickness, owing to neglect in sending provisions, and the troops were without bedding and sufficient blankets. Many deaths had taken place, and the men suffered from privations, which care on the part of those, entrusted with the duty of sending supplies, could with no great labour have averted. The consequence was, that on the arrival of spring many of the garrison were from weakness unfit for duty. The blame of this neglect has been cast upon Shirley by his enemies; it may rather be supposed to have been the fault of the executive officers, entrusted with the duty of supply.

On lake Champlain, the fortifications at Ticonderoga had been energetically continued; at the end of May 2,000 French troops were in position there; the regiments of "La Reine" and Languedoc. Niagara had also been reinforced by the battalion of Bearne. Two vessels had been constructed on lake Ontario of fifteen and twenty guns, to maintain the connection between forts Frontenac and Niagara. Except from the privation arising from the want of provisions, French interests in all directions were becoming affirmed, promising that in the next campaign success would be found on the side of Canada. What added to the general encouragement was the return to Canada of the chevalier de Rigaud, a younger brother of the governor. He had been taken prisoner the preceding year, and on being sent to England was released. He was the bearer of the important news that a fleet was leaving France with strong reinforcements, bringing a supply of food and munitions, and what was equally indispensable, a large sum of money.

The fleet arrived on the 11th of May, 1756, to within a few miles of Quebec, when its further progress was impeded by

the descent of large masses of floating ice, and from the lateness of the season in the opening of navigation, the city could not be reached. The new general, the marquis de Montcalm, landed and drove to Quebec. The reinforcements consisted of the battalions of La Sarre and Royal Rousillon; at the same time large stores of provisions and munitions of war with 1,300,000 *livres* in specie had been sent; in all respects a material aid to the colony.

Among the vessels was "Le Leopard." Shortly after the landing of the troops it was apparent that many were suffering from a pestilent fever contracted in the vessel. Three hundred, prostrate with this disease, were at one time in the hospital; many of the nuns caught the infection. It penetrated into the city, where several of the inhabitants suffered from the attack, and many became victims to it.

The new commander-in-chief was Louis Joseph, marquis de Montcalm-Gozon de Saint V6ran. In history he is simply known by the name of Montcalm. He was born at Condiac, near Nimes, in February, 1712: he was in his forty-sixth year. He had entered the army at the age of fifteen, and had seen much service; in his early years he had had the advantage of being carefully educated by a natural son of his grandfather. His studies had been turned in the direction of classical literature, for which he ever retained a strong admiration, and he never lost his love of letters. He had many of the tastes of a simple country gentleman, and his letters suggest, that he would willingly have retired to his estate, to improve and develop his property. He was in his twenty-third year when he succeeded to his title, sustained by an estate of some value, but weighted by debt. He had married a lady of good family with some property, Mademoiselle Talon du Boulay. Ten children were born from this union, two of whom only were sons; if anything ever crossed the affection which Montcalm bore for his home, it was the thought of provision for his daughters, but his elastic mind at once recovered from the depression. As is frequently the case with men of genius, his mother is recorded as possessing great force of character, and to the last retaining

influence over her son. He had been twice severely wounded. Early in his career he was distinguished by his gallantry and ability. From his rank and capacity he obtained a high position in the army, and being well known in military circles, he reached that prominence which in modern times is described as "the coming man." He was selected by d'Argenson, not from court influence. It was evident that a soldier of high character and determination was called for in Canada, to resist the force which would be brought into the field against France; and Montcalm was looked upon as fulfilling these conditions.

The fact is curious, but it is indisputable that Montcalm's name is not held universally in reverence by the French Canadians. A majority assign the first post in popular estimation to de Levis; that such is the case admits of explanation. At that date there were two parties in the province, and the feeling which distinguished them cannot be said to have passed away, although the succeeding one hundred and thirty years have given birth to events powerfully to modify it. The constitution of the forces in the province, to some extent caused a divergence of sentiment, between the governor-general and the general in command. The land forces, so called because they were under the minister of war, constituted the troops lately arrived. They were regiments retaining the distinguished reputation gained in many of the great battles of the past sixty years, during which, excepting the intervals of peace, war had been carried on. They were regarded as the force to be relied upon in great operations, and as might be supposed they looked upon their own general as their natural leader.

The colonial force, although generally officered and recruited in France, contained many Canadians in its ranks. One theory in the enlistment of men was the inducement to settle in Canada. From being under the control of the minister of marine, it was known as the marine force. De Vaudreuil himself belonged to this branch of the service, and his sympathies were with it. Personally, he was disinclined to welcome any general officer of rank, whose presence was a

limit to his powers, however theoretical his own superior position. Moreover, he desired to retain control of all operations, and in his reports to the minister he was careful to place himself in prominence as directing the campaign, never hesitating, in case of failure, to throw the blame elsewhere.

DeVaudreuil was a native Canadian by feeling as by birth. For some years he had looked forward to his fortunes being assisted by his rank in the marine corps, and he was jealously sensitive of what was due to his position. The colonial feeling was beginning to assert itself. French manners and ideas were not those of the colonist, and there was a quiet assumption of superiority of the metropolitan over the provincial. There was much in colonial life in which the former was at a disadvantage. On the other hand, in the more cosmopolitan influences on character, manners and general education, the provincial could not but feel that he had no little to learn. In both the English and French colonies there was this want of accord, and however kept in subordination by good sense and good feeling, it did not always tend to a good understanding. It is pertinent to ask, although greatly modified, if the sentiment to-day is entirely extinct?

The second in command was Francis Gaston, chevalier de Levis. Born in 1719, he had entered the army at sixteen, so he had twenty years' service. He had been present at Dettingen in 1743. He lived to attain the highest rank, dying in 1787 as duc de Levis. He brought with him a high reputation; his military training, his ability, his indefatigability and courage at once obtained recognition.

De Bourlamaque, a colonel of infantry, who acted as an officer of engineers, was the third in command; perhaps somewhat pedantic, but possessing experience, and of good talents. He obtained the entire confidence of Montcalm, who wrote to him without restraint.

The chief aide-de-camp was de Bougainville, who had been highly educated for civil life, and had passed from the law to the army. In after years he entered the navy, to be the first

of French navigators to sail round the world, leaving behind him a memoir of his voyage.

With the troops lately sent to Canada, French power possessed formidable strength. In view of the end to be attained, and the autocratic character of the government, which could enforce unity of purpose; in view of the extraordinary ability of the military leaders, and the facility with which troops, stores, and guns could be moved on the water communications, Canada might be considered to be almost irresistible by land. So long as the limit of the proposed operations was observed, and her large disciplined force was only opposed by the undisciplined provincial troops, commanded by officers without experience and without knowledge of war, Canada could set the British provinces at defiance. It was no question of personal gallantry; the operations in the field called for generalship and combination, with the power of judging and acting with rapidity in situations of trial. The design of France was to hold lake Champlain as French territory, and to regain full possession of lake George; to drive the English from Oswego, and to command the entire waters of lake Ontario. With Niagara in undisputed possession to make transit to lake Erie impossible to English commerce, and what was held even of greater importance, to command the southern communication to Louisiana by the Ohio, New France, extending from the lakes, could be held intact with the capacity of expansion to the east or west of the Mississippi.

There were three thousand regular land troops in Canada, and fourteen hundred at Louisbourg; two thousand of the marine corps, equally well drilled and officered. The militia included every man from fifteen to sixty. The native Canadian received no pay; his services were called out as was held expedient. His arms and accoutrements were furnished him and he served for his rations. The force was admirably fitted for scouting and fighting in the woods; the species of war in accordance with Canadian traditions. These expeditions had been remarkable for endurance, patience, and courage, which

had been shewn. But the Canadian militia could not be relied upon for movement in the field, when perfect and firm discipline ensure the unshrinking steadiness by which so many fields have been won. The number appeared large upon paper, but the *habitants* could not in numbers be called away from their farms, without causing distress by the non-production of food. They were therefore not present in the field in great force, except when called out, owing to some emergency. They scarcely ever exceeded one thousand under arms. A large number were profitably employed in the transport of stores, and when so engaged they received pay.

One great superiority of Canada lay in the control, which had been obtained over the Indians, by the French officers brought in contact with them. It was not simply attributable to the influence exercised by the missionary; although, that point of view can not be set out of consideration. Many of the western tribes, were indeed as little impressed by Christianity as in the days of de Champlain. It was owing to the conciliatory manner in which the Indian was treated, and by the care and forbearance exercised, that his devotion to French interests was maintained. The great majority of the tribes were ranged on their side. Except the Six Nations, which were kept under control by the tact and ability of Johnson, the Indians had embraced the French cause. On the western lakes there was no influence to interfere with the French. On the Ohio the disaster of Braddock had established a firm belief in the inability of the English to cope with France. The successful inroads on the villages of the Alleghanies by bands of Indians led by Canadian officers to destroy all settlement, with scarcely any opposition, had removed all the feeling once entertained of English prestige. There was, likewise, a powerful factor in the creation of this spirit of hostility in the want of proper consideration which the Indians had experienced from the provincial houses of assembly, and from the traders, when the interests of the Indian had come into question. It had been the great difficulty with which Johnson had to contend. Had not his appointment from the

home government made him independent of the house of assembly at Albany, and the traders who influenced it, he would have been unable to exercise the power which he obtained.

The events of the years 1755 and 1756 may be looked upon as clearly establishing that, in spite of the greater wealth and population of the British provinces, they would have been unable to act aggressively against Canada with any chance of success. They possibly would have prevented any advance into their own country ; but they would not have been able to push forward their frontier. No flag but that of France would have been seen on lake Champlain and lake Ontario. The Ohio would have remained closed to English settlement, and the Alleghanies would have formed the western boundary of the British provinces. It was alone the powerful intervention of England, directed by the genius of the great mind of Chatham, which led to the ultimate success of the British cause. It is the epitaph which history has written on his tomb.

By this date Ticonderoga had been fortified, and was now garrisoned. Reports, however, reached Canada of the large number of provincial troops gathered at the southern end of lake George for the purpose of attacking it. Chevalier de Levis had already proceeded to Ticonderoga in command, where he was shortly to be joined by Montcalm, when the operations for the ensuing year would be determined.

De Vaudreuil had kept constantly in view the design of destroying Oswego. The preparations, made for Dieskau to ascend to fort Frontenac, clearly shew that the expedition was set aside owing to the report of Varin that Crown Point was seriously menaced.* De Vaudreuil now reverted to that policy, believing that if Oswego were vigorously threatened the strength gathered for the attack of Ticonderoga would be diverted ; and at the same time, it was not impossible if an attack were made in force with artillery it would succeed. In

* Doc. Hist. N.Y., I., p. 472. De Vaudreuil to the Minister, Montreal, 24 July, 1755.

one of his subsequent letters to the minister he claimed much of the merit of the conquest, and spoke highly of the conduct of his brother and the Canadians;* but it is not possible to doubt that the operation was organized by Montcalm in the form which assured its success.

A council was held at Albany at the close of 1755, when it was resolved to attack forts Frontenac and Niagara, to take possession of Crown Point, and to cause a diversion, by sending a party up the Chaudière valley for the attack of the parishes near Quebec; likewise that a second expedition should be organized against fort Duquesne. As Pennsylvania and Virginia declined to contribute men or money, that part of the campaign was abandoned. There was no great alacrity in the northern provinces in acting upon the decision. It was foreseen that a great expenditure must be incurred, and a large force of men called into the field. The knowledge, however, that the house of commons had voted £115,000 to be divided among the colonies, changed this policy; the troops were raised, and preparations actively commenced.†

Shirley retained his position as commander-in-chief, but he was experiencing difficulty and opposition. He had not borne his honours with modesty, and had interfered with Johnson's position, to create a strong feeling of enmity to himself. Delancey had influenced the governor of New York, sir Charles Hardy, to write unfavourable reports of Shirley to England; and his failure of the preceding year had given ground, for distrust of his capacity to lead troops in the field. He could take a wide comprehensive grasp of the political situation, and his courage led him to face the solution of any difficulty. Different qualities are, however, required in the efforts and complications of war, to those which can conceive an end to be accomplished. Shirley was without the experience, by which men learn to act in trying circumstances, and he never shewed the natural ability in this direction by which

* De Vaudreuil to d'Argenson, 20 August, 1756. N.Y. Doc., X., p. 472.

† N.Y. Doc., VII., p. 34.

the disadvantage may be overcome. Nevertheless, he resolved to retain command at Oswego. The operations at fort William Henry he placed under Winslow.

As early as February sir Charles Hardy was informed that the earl of Loudoun was appointed commander-in-chief; at the same time notification was made that Johnson was appointed agent for Indian affairs.* In March these appointments were officially communicated to the governors of provinces, with the information of the vote of money by the British parliament. Loudoun did not however appear until the end of July; the letters were brought by colonel Daniel Webb, who arrived with general Abercrombie early in June, in command of a reinforcement of troops.

During the period that Shirley remained in command he continued to organize the forces. He rebuilt fort Bull, destroyed by de Léry in March, and he gathered supplies to be forwarded to Oswego. Winslow's troops had been first quartered at the Half-Moon, north of Albany, at the junction of the Mohawk. There was a fort at Stillwater, higher up the stream; and the old fort of Saratoga on the east bank of the Hudson had been re-established. The stores were sent up the Hudson to fort Edward and thence forwarded to lake George. Winslow, with the force under his command, was quartered at fort William Henry, where he commenced building whale boats to carry the troops to Ticonderoga, with three sloops for cruising on the lake.

Supplies had also to be sent to Oswego; for this purpose Shirley organized a force of New England men, who had been engaged in the whale fisheries. They were 2,000 in number, armed with a gun and hatchet, and told off into companies of fifty men, and placed under the command of colonel Bradstreet. He had seen some service at the first taking of Louisbourg; and as a captain in sir William Pepperell's regiment he had remained in the garrison, until the fortress was given over to the French. When hostilities broke out he

* 17 February. N.Y. Doc., VII., p. 37.

offered his services, and had been made by Shirley his adjutant-general.*

De Villiers still remained at Sandy creek with a force of sufficient strength to harass stragglers from Oswego; and his scouts were always active in obtaining information. His presence was known; the place where he was encamped being not far from Oswego. An active commander would have recognised the necessity of exterminating this swarm of hornets, continually inflicting injury, stinging when least expected. During the winter the provincial troops at Oswego had been few in number, and suffered from sickness: a fact which explains their inaction. The men had now generally regained health, and reinforcements had arrived. A commander having enterprise would have made some effort to dislodge de Villiers, and prevent him being mischievous; but the Canadian leader was left without interference. Hearing that Bradstreet was engaged in taking up a large supply of stores and provisions, de Villiers, with about seven hundred men, determined to intercept him. Bradstreet had moved forward rapidly and safely delivered his charge. De Villiers finding that he was too late to assault him, awaited his return on the downward journey.

Bradstreet had divided his boats into three divisions, and was ascending with the first division. He had reached a distance of nine miles when he came into the ambush. There were about three hundred men with him,† who received the full fire from the concealed enemy. Several were killed or wounded, some endeavoured to reach the opposite shore, others less fortunate were taken. Seeing that a part of the French force was endeavouring to cross under the protection of an island, Bradstreet with a few men reached it before them, and drove back those in front, and being reinforced, entirely prevented de Villiers from carrying out his purpose. At this time Brad-

* Bradstreet served with distinction during the war. Subsequently he obtained a commission in the regular service. He died a major-general in New York, in 1774.

† Doc. Hist., New York, I., p. 482.

street heard that the second division had arrived, and he sent them orders to defend the river where they were. Higher up the stream the French had succeeded in gaining the western bank, and had established themselves in a pine swamp. After an exchange of shots, Bradstreet charged and drove the French into the river; many were killed; others were drowned in the attempt to reach the opposite shore. There was a ford some distance up stream, and it was taken by the remainder of de Villiers' force to support those who were engaged. They in their turn were driven back with loss. Shortly afterwards reinforcements arrived from Oswego; but it was too late to follow the retreating enemy. The following day it rained so hard that nothing could be done. Bradstreet's loss was twenty killed and as many missing, twenty-four slightly wounded. He brought back eighty French firelocks to Schenectady. The loss of the French was set down at one hundred killed and wounded. The affair took place on the 3rd of July, 1756.

Abercrombie had been accompanied by 900 regular troops of "Otways," afterwards the 35th regiment. On their arrival Shirley resigned his command, and went to New York, to meet lord Loudoun, and to report what had been done. If this nobleman's name ever for a moment is mentioned in history, it is in connection with his utter insignificance, and his abortive attempt against Louisbourg. It was his mistaken policy in removing troops from the northern frontier which exposed fort William Henry to the attack of Montcalm the following year. Franklin has preserved the witticism of a Pennsylvania agent in New York, that Loudoun was like Saint George on the sideboard; always on horseback, but he never moved on. His incompetence only extended over two years, when he was recalled. He was a man entirely destitute of all resources, and the record of his service is that of continual failure, and incapacity of understanding what was necessary to be done.

One difficulty not of his own creation he had to contend with; the orders that in all operations, when imperial troops were joined with provincials, provincial officers, whatever their

rank, should take their place only as captains. The order was objectionable both by its arrangement and its injustice. The remedy to this imbecile regulation was plain : when necessary, to give local rank to an officer to command in the field. Loudoun endeavoured to arrange matters, and Winslow, with his good sense, did the best he was able to assist him ; the order, however, prevented the united action at the time of the home and provincial troops.*

It was not on lake Champlain that activity on the part of the British provinces was called for. The attack against Oswego was resolved upon, and Montcalm was summoned to Montreal to organize and conduct it. The regiment stationed at fort Niagara was brought to fort Frontenac. There were accordingly three regiments of regulars, some companies of the marine force and the Canadian militia, with two hundred and fifty Indians assembled there. The whole amounted to 3,000 men, well supplied with artillery ; some of the guns being those taken from the unfortunate Braddock.

The forts in Oswego had been reconnoitred, and they had been pronounced to be untenable. It was known that they were garrisoned by recruits, and by a force which, during the past winter, had suffered from sickness.† The main fort on the west of the river was protected by earthworks and mounted with cannon. The defences had been completed against the south and west, but to the north at the lake there was no protection. It had been considered that the second fort, Ontario, on the east of the river, rendered such defences unnecessary. It was in the form of a star, composed of timbers upwards of a foot in thickness, flattened and secured together. It furnished a defence against musket shot, but was of no protection against artillery of weight. A few well-

* N.Y. Doc., VII., p. 121.

† There is a remarkable letter from the interpreter, John Van Seice, to Sir William Johnson, 6 March, 1756 [N.Y. Doc., VII., p. 74], in which he states that ten soldiers had been seized a mile from the fort by Oswagatchie Indians. Seice continues : " He [Mercer] writes me that his people are dying very fast, and no provisions for the men. . . . He says, Sir, that if there does not come Provisions to him against the 25th of March, they must give it over."

directed shots would destroy the structure. The garrison consisted of 370 men, recruits who had lately joined Pepperell's regiment. There was a third unfinished fort about a mile on the west side of the river, fort George, which from its recognised want of value, had been christened by the men "fort Rascal." It had hitherto been occupied as a cattle pen. Since de Villiers' raids 150 of the Jersey provincials had been stationed there.*

The engineer McKellar, who had been sent up to complete the defences, had found that the works were incapable of development; indeed, their weakness was well known. The garrison was composed of newly-enlisted men, without discipline, further than they were acquainted with the use of firearms. When the siege operations commenced, the sailors, artificers and labourers who lived outside, on the appearance of Montcalm's force took refuge within the walls. Although the garrison generally was in good health, the winter's sickness in the fort had not wholly disappeared.

Montcalm's preparations at Frontenac were completed by the 4th of August. A few days previously de Rigaud had proceeded to Niaouaré bay, Sackett's harbour, to take command of the force which had been moved from Sandy creek to this place. Under the command of de Villiers, it had suffered from sickness, and from losses in the expeditions he had undertaken. This spot had been selected as the point where the assembly of the troops should be made, and at which the organization should be completed for the advance.

Montcalm left fort Frontenac on the night of the 4th and reached Wolfe island, masking his expedition by remaining on the Ontario shore. The distance, following the land of the south shore to Sackett's harbour, is about twenty miles; Montcalm on the night succeeding moved his force thither.

* The fort on the west side was situated on what is now the corner of Van Buren and Water Streets, on the east of the river Onondaga. The second fort, Ontario, stood at the Corner of West Sixth and Van Buren Streets, on the ground occupied by the house of Mr. Edwin Allen. I am indebted for this information to the kindness of Mr. B. B. Burt, of Oswego, who has paid great attention to the early history of the city.

A day later he was joined by the second division, bringing the provisions, guns and stores. All was now ready to proceed. On the 9th, de Rigaud with his force marched along the shore through the forest, while the boats followed. He thus furnished protection against any surprise by land, and assured an unopposed landing. There was no attempt at interference. The garrison lay in supposed security; no scouts were sent out from the forts; no attempt to learn if enemies were lurking in the neighbourhood; it may be assumed that no attack was thought possible.

At midnight of the 10th the French landed about a mile from the fort. The disembarkation was made without interruption. Early in the morning, however, the expedition was discovered by a canoe which had left Oswego, and the alarm was given. Two armed vessels were sent to cannonade the force on the shore, but the heavier guns of the troops soon drove them off.

Steps were taken to commence the attack, and at early dawn Descombes, the French engineer, was sent forward to make a *reconnaissance* of the ground. He was shot by mistake by one of his own Indians, and captain Pouchot, of the regiment of Bearne, was directed to perform his duties. The loss of the principal engineer depressed Montcalm, as the second engineer was without experience; a fact which must have been made plain to Montcalm, for it was not until the 12th that Pouchot was appointed. Some intercepted letters revealed to Montcalm that the garrison was perfectly unprepared, and it was resolved to complete the surprise of the enemy by opening the trenches the same evening.*

The Canadians and Indians hung round the eastern forts, keeping up a distant attack. During the night the first parallel was constructed. The commander of the western fort was colonel Mercer; knowing that fort Ontario was not tenable against artillery, and seeing that the guns were about to be placed in position, he signalled to the men to abandon their post, and join him on the western side. They did so

* N.Y. Doc., X., p. 442. Pouchot Mémoires sur la dernière guerre, &c. (translated), p. 64.

without interruption. On the second night Montcalm commenced his entrenchments, continuing the parallel to the river side, in which twenty heavy guns were carried, to be placed in position *en barbette*. Pouchot tells us that the precaution had not been taken to build platforms, so the wheels of the guns were forced into the ground, which, owing to a heavy rain, was soft, and they were difficult to move. The battery was much exposed, and only eight guns were mounted. The defenders of the fort fired with spirit; "more brisk"* than the guns of the attacking force. Montcalm, judging that the enemy could not hold out for twenty-four hours, and seeing the bad position they would be placed in, if their entrenchments to the rear were assailed vigorously, detached de Rigaud, with the Canadians and Indians, to cross the stream at the upper ford. The movement had been perceived by Mercer, and he ordered colonel Schuyler, with five hundred men, to advance and dispute the passage. Proceeding to the battery to give orders about eight o'clock, of the morning of the 14th, he was shot dead. The artillery officer, captain Hind, was also killed. The command fell on lieutenant-colonel Littlehales. There had been an attempt to defend the unprotected part of the fort by placing pork barrels, three-tier deep, three high, piled one upon the other, with embrasures. The movement to prevent the march of the Canadians and Indians was not made, or it failed, for the French force appeared at the outskirts of the wood, firing at a distance with the usual noise and shrieks.

The spirit which had urged on the garrison ceased with the death of colonel Mercer, who had hitherto animated the defenders with his own courage. A feeling of terror must have at once taken possession of the troops, their confidence not being increased by the cries and lamentations of a hundred women, the wives of soldiers, and of the artisans who lived outside the fort, for on a council of war being called, a surrender was agreed upon. A white flag was held above the temporary entrenchments, and the garrison capitulated.

* Montcalm, N.Y. Doc., X., p. 443.

The terms granted were that the troops should lay down their arms as prisoners of war, the officers and soldiers to retain their property; the forts to be surrendered, with the munitions of war, shipping, and other property uninjured; the arms to be deposited in a store with the flags, drums and officers' arms. Montcalm granted permission to the non-combatants to leave immediately.

The prisoners were 1,640 in number, 120 of whom were women and children: 5 standards, 6 large barques carrying 52 guns, 200 barges, 113 cannons and mortars, with full supply of powder and bullets, a large quantity of provisions, biscuit, pork, flour, wine and spirits, three boxes of silver, with the military chest containing £18,000, became the property of the victors. The standards were subsequently placed by de Vaudreuil in the churches at Montreal, where they remained until the conquest.

The forts were demolished. Oswego was thus destroyed; it ceased to exist. When the demolition was accomplished, the French forces returned to forts Frontenac and Niagara with the spoil: the prisoners were carried to Montreal, in a few months to be exchanged.

It was a success which could not fail greatly to elevate the confidence and spirit of aggression of the whole of Canada. It gave the command of lake Ontario to the French, and placed the forts of Niagara and Frontenac beyond the reach of attack, so that the troops quartered there were available for operations in other directions, the forts themselves requiring but a small garrison. English power on the north of the continent, to many must have been looked upon as having been destroyed by this blow. The weak defence, which had been made, shewed the utter ignorance of all rules of war, the want of discipline among the English colonists, and the manifest incapacity of their leaders.* The same success in future operations was confidently hoped for. Many

* Montcalm spoke contemptuously of their courage. He wrote to D'Armenon, 28th August, 1756, "Il faut croire que les Anglais transplantés ne sont plus les mêmes qu'en Europe."

difficulties and privations were foreseen ; the scarcity of provisions and the limited number of troops for defence were known. Nevertheless, New France felt herself secure against future aggression, when so moderate an effort on her part had only been necessary to attain this success. There was not a single impediment to the occupation of the whole territory, extending to fort Duquesne. The Canadians and Indians with slight interference were devastating the frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania. The prowess of French troops against the imperfect fortifications of the English had been made manifest. Everything tended to shew that a time had come, when a limit was to be placed to British pretension.*

Colonel Webb had been instructed to advance with reinforcements to Oswego. His force was composed of what remained of the 44th after Braddock's defeat, and some companies of the corps of Bradstreet's boatmen. He arrived at the carrying place, when the news reached him that the place had been taken and Montcalm was advancing with a force of 6,000 men to invade the province. Making every allowance for the difficulties of his position and the meagreness of his force, his conduct shewed a want of firmness and courage, which added to the general depression. He made no attempt to obtain precise information. A few hours of patient determination would have established his own position.

* Montcalm felt it necessary to excuse his conduct in undertaking this enterprise as being at variance with the true principles of war. In a letter addressed to the minister, of the 28th of August [Dussieux, p. 155], he says, " The disposition which I followed against 1,800 men is so strongly at variance with the ordinary rules [of war], that the boldness which has marked this enterprise must in Europe pass for temerity, but I beg of you, Monseigneur, in full of your favour (*pour toute grâce*), to assure his majesty that if ever he desire to employ me in his armies, as I hope he will do, I will act upon different principles. . . . It is, perhaps, the first time, that with 3,000 men, except artillery, that 1,800 have been besieged who might have been promptly assisted by 2,000, in whose power it was to oppose our landing, having also the superiority of the naval force on the lake. Our success has been beyond all expectation. [*Je succès a été au delà de toute attente.*]" The news of Montcalm's triumph reached France on the 9th of October, by the way of London and Ostend.

He would have learned with the amount of Montcalm's force, the assurance of his own safety by the embarkation of the troops; the object of the expedition having been accomplished. A calm consideration, of the difficulties of an invasion by the Mohawk, would have led him to recognise its impossibility. But the commonplace mind of Webb led him to listen to his fears. His duty was plain: to have remained where he was, ready at a moment's necessity to descend the Mohawk, and to have asked for reinforcements to sustain him. In his terror and dismay he filled Wood's creek with fallen trees to prevent the French advance, and burnt down the two forts on the Mohawk and at Wood's creek; having thus passively shewn his unfitness for his duties, with his force he retired down the Mohawk to the German flats, a distance of fifty miles.

A report was sent to Loudoun of the reverse which for a time had destroyed the hold of the colonies on lake Ontario, with the loss of guns, ammunition, provisions and stores, and of the greater disgrace that upwards of sixteen hundred prisoners were being carried to Montreal. It must have fallen on him, with the same crushing force as on the rest of the community, for he immediately sent orders to Winslow not to act on the offensive, but to take measures to defend his fort against attack from the French.

The disaster throughout the whole of the northern colonies was heard with sorrow and emotion. There was no denying the extent of the injurious consequences, in the loss of prestige and the important political complications which might be created. The end was not seen. The objects of the war with many were imperfectly understood, and in every direction there were the most painful surmises of what the future would bring forth.

This depression of feeling is a curious record of a date but three years previous to the taking of Quebec. No more expressive evidence can be found to establish what the genius of Chatham accomplished in a few months; or can place in more striking language the debt which the British provinces owed to the mother country, for permanently removing the

dread of French aggression, by gaining at the cannon's mouth the undisputed control of the northern continent for the British race.

END OF VOLUME III.

MONTCALM AT OSWEGO.

It is difficult to determine the truth of the statement made by contemporary writers, that the capitulation was not fully observed; that in the presence of the large force of French troops, the Indians were allowed to rob and ill-treat both officers and men, killing numbers of them. The sick in hospital are stated to have been murdered and scalped, among them Mr. de la Court, a lieutenant. Moreover, that the Indians were allowed to take twenty prisoners to replace their losses in the expedition. Such is the narrative of Smollett [chap. XXX., sec. 34], and he wrote from the information he obtained; his history was published in 1763-65. In the "Journal of Sir William Johnson's proceedings of the Indians" [N.Y. Doc., VII., p. 199], it is stated "that the Indians got drunk with the great quantity of Rum found in the Forts, and in their liquor fell upon the English prisoners, murdering one hundred of them." On the other hand, the governor of New York, sir Charles Hardy, on the 5th of September, writes that "the garrison was well used." He describes the dead as colonel Mercer and captain Hind, with eight or nine private men. Subsequently he reported the killed at twelve or fourteen men. [N.Y. Doc., XI., p. 169.]

In the journal of the siege transmitted by Montcalm [N.Y. Doc., X., p. 443], his own loss is reported at thirty: "that of the English about one hundred and fifty, including several soldiers who, wishing to escape across the woods, fell into the hands of the Indians." There is a letter from a French officer present (Ib. X., p. 456), in which the enterprise is greatly magnified. He describes the English losses as unheard of. He tells us that "the Canadians and Indians had a very considerable slice of the cake. The latter have supped full of horrors, and have massacred more than one hundred persons, who are included in the capitulation." An official account [Ib., p. 460] says: "They have lost one hundred and fifty-two men, including some soldiers killed by the Indians in attempting to escape into the woods." Montcalm, in reporting the capture to d'Argenson (Ib., p. 464), says: "I shall not conceal from you that there has been a little plunder, which it was even necessary to tolerate. We are not in Europe, and it is very difficult to prevent 300 Indians and 1,500 Canadians regaling themselves (*faire une cure*). Moreover, this is the custom in the colonies on one side or the other, but the property of the English officers, as well as the munitions of war and provisions, have been saved." Désandrouins, the surviving engineer of the expedition, in his account (Ib., X., p. 466) remarks: "I do not make any mention of the horrors and cruelties of the Indians. The idea entertained thereof in France is very correct. It is a misfortune to make war with such people, especially when they are drunk; a condition in which nothing stays their fury." De Vaudreuil (Ib., X., p. 47) describes the English loss at "45 killed; of these 12 lost their lives in action; the remainder were killed in the woods by our Indians whilst trying to escape."

One fact is certain, that a Mr. de la Court at a later date was colonel of the 61st regiment.

The letter of de Vaudreuil to M. de Machault, Minister of Marine, 23 Oct.,

1756 [Dessieux, p. 282], complains of the restraint exercised by Montcalm over the Indians, and of his harsh treatment of both Indians and Canadians. "Sans mon frère les sauvages qui se voyoient obligés d'abandonner leur petit pillage à l'avidité des grenadiers auroient pris un parti très contraire aux intérêts de la colonie." He also states that the Indians had waited upon him to say: "Qu'ils ne pouvoient supporter les vivacités de M. de Montcalm." The letter is marked throughout by exaggeration.

If any opinion as to this contradictory evidence has to be expressed, it is not possible to refuse our belief that excesses and cruelties were committed by the Indians, to what extent it is not possible to determine; and that they were repressed by Montcalm as much as possible. The consideration of Montcalm's conduct on this occasion is important in view of what followed, in 1757, on the capture of fort William Henry, lake George, when the Indians massacred the prisoners of war.

The following ballad was composed at the time, and may be accepted as the general feeling in Canada on the news of Montcalm's success. It is contained in a letter of the Rev. Clair de Godfroy Coquard to his brother. N.Y. Doc., X., p. 533.

It also appears Quebec Doc., IV., p. 21, with some slight variation and many misprints. "Loudon" is called "London." I have followed the N.Y. Doc.

I.

Célébrons tous du Grand Vaudreuil,
La sagesse et la gloire,
Toute l'Angleterre est en Deuil,
Au bruit de sa victoire.
Chouaguen n'est plus... nos soldats
L'ont forcé de se rendre,
Et ses murs ne sont plus qu'un tas
De poussière et de cendre.

II.

En vain Loudon, de ses Guerriers,
Il rassemble l'élite,
Montcalm avide des lauriers,
N'y vole que plus vite.
Bellone lui prête son char
Et sur de la fortune,
Des trois choses que fit César,*
Il n'en omet aucune.

III.

Deja je vois de nos heros,
Une troupe intrepide,
S'avancer au travers des flots
D'un périlleux rapide.

* Veni, vidi, vici. [*sic.*]

Plein d'ardeur le fer a la main,
 Rigaud marche a leur tete—
 L'ennemi tremble et Chouaguen
 Devient notre conquête.

IV.

En fin les voilà dans nos fers,
 Ces hommes redoutables,
 Ces braves qui domptent les mers,
 Sur terre sont traitables.
 Leur bravoure imbecile,
 S'acharne et vient dans nos prisons,
 Demander un asile
 Des le premier coup de canon.

V.

A Carillon l'on dit pourtant,
 Qu'ils auront leur revanche,
 Au tant en emporte le vent,
 Ils soufflent dans la manche.
 Les Canadiens leur font peur,
 Et Loudon est trop sage,
 Pour oser contre leur valeur,
 Mesurer son courage.

VI.

Mais de tous ces exploits brillants,
 Qu'elle est l'ame secrète,
 On la connoit par ses talents,
 Faut il d'autre Intreprete ?
 Oui, c'est elle qui des vainqueurs,
 Soutient le bras terrible,
 Et fait circuler dans les cœurs,
 Cette force invincible.

FRANQUET'S JOURNEY—QUEBEC TO MONTREAL, 1753

There is a curious record of the manners of the time in the journal of Franquet, the officer already named sent to inspect the fortifications. Franquet arrived in America in 1751, and made the tour of Cape Breton and Acadia, particularly turning his attention to Louisbourg. He visited fort Beauséjour and the bay Verte; I have alluded to his presence at these places, and have recorded his impressions of the people he met there.* He also visited Prince Edward island, and finally arrived in Canada in 1752.

Franquet's duty was to visit Three Rivers, the Saint Maurice forges, the Abenaki settlements of Saint Francis, and Bécancour, the Indian villages of the Sault and the Two Mountains, with the forts of Chambly, Saint John's, Crown Point, and Ticonderoga. The journey which Franquet relates must not be confused with events of a later date. It took place in 1753, during the government of Duquesne, seven years before the taking of Quebec, and previous to the frauds being developed to the system which they subsequently attained.†

Franquet had the best opportunity of judging the character of the people he met in Canada, and he has given us a description of the men and women of the period. He represents the inhabitants as all taking part in commerce with the Indians; even the officers were concerned in it. Most of them had a store in their house; accordingly, they were in good circumstances, and when detached at the posts they thought more of their own profit than of the interest of the service. The ease in which they lived made them negligent of their profession. They were useful for war with the Indians, and could bear the fatigue of such expeditions. They were generous and kindly, but for the most part insubordinate. They were fond of idleness and show. They were strong, vigorous, sufficiently endowed with capacity, but deficient in education. Well instructed, they could master knowledge and become useful in the administration of the state. He gives us also his impressions of Canadian womanhood. He represents them "as rather pretty than handsome, with a good constitution. The leg well made, with not much bust. They walk well, and are graceful in their movements. They are superior to the men in intelligence, with which generally they are well endowed. They speak pure French, without the least accent. They are fond of dress, are generous, but are characterized by some slight affectation. They are open to the suspicion of coquetry: at least, their manner of dress seems so to suggest. They are always neat in the feet. Their *jupon* is short and tight at the waist. In place of a gown they wear a mantle, fitting the figure perfectly, which only reaches to the hip. It is easy to conceive that with this costume their movement is full of animation. When in the least assisted by looks of blandishment, they easily make a conquest. Nevertheless, they are much attached to their husbands and

* Ante page 504.

† Franquet's *Mémoire* and *Journal* in MS. are contained in two volumes in the parliamentary library, Ottawa.

children. They are fond of pleasure, and are also delighted in showing politeness to strangers.*

We learn from Franquet that it was customary for the governor-general to leave Quebec in January to proceed to Montreal, and remain there until August. During these months changes were made in the different western posts. Where necessary, new officers were appointed to the commands; the strength of the detachments determined; the transport of the troops and supplies arranged; the quantity of provisions and ammunition necessary for the sustenance and defence of the ensuing twelve months considered. Licences to trade were granted the number of persons permitted to leave the colony established, so that those who were absent could be known. As early after the opening of the navigation as possible, the chiefs of the western tribes arrived at Montreal to pay their respects to the governor, to receive the presents granted to them, and to give pledges of their fidelity.

In consequence of the determination to take possession of the valley of the Ohio, Duquesne had named the 14th of January for his departure from Quebec to complete the preparations for the expedition. He was to be accompanied by some officers, who were appointed to it, captains Marin, Péan, de Vergor, Saint Ours, and La Martinière; the junior officers were Saint Laurent, le chevalier de la Roche and le Mercier. Bigot offered to accompany the party to Pointe-aux-Trembles, there to entertain them at supper and to see the governor start in the morning. A few officers were invited to be present, and some ladies joined the party, Mesdames Péan, Marin, de Lotbinière, de Repentigny, and du Simon. The weather was bitterly cold when the start was made at ten; there was a cutting frost, and a snowstorm known in Canada as a *poudrée* dashed in the travellers' faces. They reached the village about three, when the governor was received by a guard of twenty-five of the militia. The intendant established himself at the Congregational nunnery, occupied by only two *religieuses*. At five the company assembled to amuse themselves until supper. The pastime was play, and we learn from Franquet that the game was *faro*. It was an age when everybody who made a pretence to fashionable life indulged in play, and large sums

* It is only an act of justice to the *beau sexe* to allow Mr. Franquet in their case to be allowed to speak for himself. "Les femmes y sont de figure plus jolie que belle, y sont d'une constitution forte, ont la jambe bien faite, peu de gorge, marchent bien, et on (*sic*) dans leur port bonne grace, elles l'emportent sur les hommes pour l'esprit, généralement elles en ont toutes beaucoup, parlent un français pur n'ont pas le moindre accent, aiment aussi la parure, sont polies, généreuses et même manières je leur soupçonnerois un peu de coquetterie; au moins leur façon de se mettre semble l'annoncer. Elles sont ordinairement bien chaussées, portent le jupon fort court, sont serrées à la ceinture, et vêtues en lieu de robe d'un mantelet des plus propres qui ne leur pend que jusqu'à la taille, il est aisé de se représenter que sous un tel habillement, tous leurs mouvements sont marqués et que pour le peu qu'ils soient soutenus de regards flatteurs, elles captivent aisément les cœurs, elles sont néanmoins attachées à leur maris, et à leurs enfans, aiment le plaisir, et s'en font un sensible, de prévenir de politesses les étrangers."

were staked. The *mémoires* of these times shew that men of rank and family took every possible advantage. They played to win, and did not hesitate to cheat. In England and on the continent gambling was a recognised habit, even to within the last half century among certain sets. In French Canada, from the want of books and the absence of the intellectual impulses experienced in large cities, it became the chief recreation of those holding position. Late hours were not kept; as a rule, the company separated at ten. On this occasion supper was at seven, play followed, and at ten every one retired.

In the morning the governor started, attended by Duchesnay, the captain of his guard, his secretary, and servants. Some *carioles* were sent before him to break the way. The intendant proposed that the other members of the party should pass the day where they were. The invitation was accepted. There was dinner, supper, and heavy play.* The following day the intendant's party returned to Quebec.

This trip was preliminary to a second journey, which took place a few days afterwards. As a rule the intendant did not proceed to Montreal until March; but owing to his presence being indispensable to the organization of the Ohio expedition, Bigot arranged with Duquesne that he would be in Montreal about the 13th of February, and he had to start some days previously to keep this engagement. Some officers of the garrison were to accompany him, and several ladies desirous of joining their husbands were included in the invitation. Mesdames Daine, Péau, de Lotbinière, de Repentigny, Marin; the wife of an ensign, doubtless a relative of the captain of the name in command of the expedition, and du Simon, wife of a merchant. Franquet, whose duties took him to Montreal, was one of the number; during the journey Madame Marin was assigned as his *compagnon de voyage*.

The baggage was sent to the intendant's palace six days before leaving, so that it could be leisurely forwarded, the travellers taking only what was required for the journey. Franquet describes the court yard on the morning of the 8th, when the start was made. The *carioles* of the guests had two horses; they were driven in tandem fashion, the roads being too narrow to admit any other arrangement. It, indeed, would have been impossible, on two sleighs meeting, for two pairs of horses to have passed in the deep snow. The *carioles* of the servants had one horse; there was a full staff of attendants with a complete *batterie de cuisine*.

An early dinner was given at the palace, with all the deliberation and ceremony, as if no start was to be made. On the first afternoon they reached Pointe-aux-Trembles, a drive of nineteen miles. Here Bigot gave supper, and after supper there was faro. They started at seven the following morning, having taken coffee, with some biscuits. At cap Santé, twelve miles distant, they breakfasted, and made a halt of two hours: in the afternoon they reached Saint Anne de La Parade; the day's drive was twenty-six miles. Bigot was again the host for supper, with the attendant amusement of play.

The start was made betimes the next morning, for the distance was long. Madame Marin was the sister of Madame de Rigaud, wife of the governor of Three Rivers, whom she desired much to see. She therefore proposed that her

* "l'on y joua beaucoup" (p. 216).

sleigh should stop at Three Rivers, for the party proposed to drive through the place without stopping. Franquet assented, and they were followed by Madame Daine and M. de Saint Vincent. Madame Marin found her sister indisposed and confined to bed. She, however, ordered dinner for her guests, and afterwards they went to her room for coffee, and to chat an hour. As they were at dinner they heard the guns fired in honour of the intendant as he was passing onwards. They left Three Rivers at three. Bigot had determined to make the halting place at Yamachiche, fifteen miles to the west of Three Rivers, and the horses were changed at the cap de la Madeleine, nine miles to the east of the town. Franquet calls the place Ouachis. It had been an unusually long journey, forty miles. There was, however, supper and play, as usual.

The 11th was Sunday, so the party went to early mass. Madame Daine made the collection.* After breakfast they started, and took to the ice at lake Saint Peter, passing the villages of river du Loup and Maskinonge. The shore was again followed at Ile au Castor, and the journey continued to near the Ile de Dupas, which must have been about Berthier.

They had met together, and were taking some refreshment before commencing play, in which they were to engage until supper, when they were agreeably surprised by the appearance of the governor, M. Duquesne, with the husbands of the two ladies, Péan and Marin, and two Canadian officers, Duchesnay and le Mercier. The distance was about fifty-five miles from Montreal; with good sleighing the drive may be looked upon as an ordinary matter. Until the days of railways, in modern times it was not unusual to drive twenty-five or thirty miles to a ball, and the appearance of the party from Montreal need create little astonishment.

Madame Marin was suffering from headache, and was lying down. It was thought by her *compagnes* that the presence of her husband would restore her to health. This was not the case, and she was absent from the supper and faro. Whatever the cause, the party retired at nine.

On the following day they drove to Pointe-aux-Trembles, forty-five miles from Berthier. The journey was broken at Saint Sulpice, twenty-nine miles distant, where they made a halt of two hours and took breakfast. From Berthier Duquesne took possession of Madame Marin, and Franquet was left alone.† They selected a house for supper, but as there was no room large enough for the party to meet, some partitions were removed. Faro followed the supper, and as it was the last night they were to be together, they played later than usual.

The next morning, having only ten miles to reach Montreal, they did not leave until two. They arrived at Montreal early; and with the exception of Madame Marin, they were all received at the intendance. On this evening the supper was given by Duquesne.

The journey reads as if it had been a more serious matter than it really was. There was no distress in the colony; it took place before the war broke out, when provisions were cheap and plentiful. Most of the officers were proceeding on duty to Montreal, and it was by no means the last occasion in Canada when an official tour has been made one of pleasure. The objectionable feature is, that the

* Madame Daine quëta, et fit 21 livres.

† "Le general m'avait amené la malade," p. 206.

additional expense was at the king's cost. It is included in this history from the light it throws on the habits of those in good position. The French Canadians long retained their ancient gaiety, and in modern times those whose memory takes them back a few years may recollect such trips, although not made on the same scale.*

It likewise reads formidable that the servants should have proceeded with bedding and cooking utensils, with the necessary commissariat. We must remember that at that date there were no inns, and out of the cities of Quebec, Three Rivers, and Montreal, life was somewhat primitive. Those who desired comfort in such circumstances, had to provide it for themselves.

* I append a memorandum from one whom, I am certain, can only state what is true, which shows that the custom prevailed to within half a century back. Canada has changed since those days in many respects.

"One bright frosty day in January, 1843, a party of young people between the ages of 18 and 22, most of them connected, started in sleighs to Chateau Richer, about 15 miles below Quebec, to visit a near relation, the seigneur of the place. He was a widower, left with a large family of sons and daughters, who were all present, the elder sons having come from different parts of the province to attend. The brother of the seigneur assisted him in receiving his guests; he had aided in bringing up his seven sons, for the mother had died at the age of thirty-six, leaving him with ten children, and he had never again married.

"On our arrival we took off our winter wraps and prepared ourselves for dinner. We had the good appetite of youth, sharpened by the wintry air of our two hours' drive. After warming ourselves at the large stove, we were ushered into the dining hall, in which was spread a long table, covered with viands of all kinds. Pig in all shapes was served up, as *Porc-frais, boudins*, sausage, in fact, in every form to be imagined. We did ample justice to the good things. Tea and coffee followed, and dinner being over, we put on our wraps again, and started on a snow-shoe tramp across the fields and over the cliffs; we also tobogganned down the hill. The weather continued bright, and we enjoyed the glorious sunset, remaining out until after five o'clock, when we returned to the house, and arranged ourselves for tea, which was as plentiful as the dinner, and we all enjoyed it as well. We adjourned to a large drawing-room, where we spent the time in round dances and games. There was no piano, so we sent for the village orchestra, two *habitant* girls to sing for us while we danced *cotillons* and *contre dances*, which they did untiringly for a couple of hours. This we continued until eleven o'clock, when all retired to rest. We returned to Quebec next day. I am not without experience of balls, with all the accessories of music, lights, and fine music; but I never recollect to have passed a more pleasant evening. We all knew one another, and we brought to our entertainment cheerfulness, geniality, good manners, and youth. Two of the ladies are now the wives of retired generals in England.

MÉMOIRES SUR LE CANADA.

Frequent reference has been made in the previous pages to a work described under the title of "*Mémoires du S— de C— contenant L'Histoire du Canada, durant la guerre, et sous le gouvernement Anglois.*" It was first published by the historical society of Quebec in 1838, under the title, "*Mémoires sur le Canada depuis 1749 jusqu'à 1760,*" the events narrated closing with the surrender of Montreal to Amherst. In the introductory remarks, it is stated that the MS. was given to the society by a person of fortune and consideration resident at Montreal. He had received it from a connection of general Burton, who served under the orders of Amherst, and after the conquest was appointed commandant of the district of Montreal. The text is described as written in the handwriting peculiar to the French *bureaucratie* of that date, and is accompanied by plans and maps, neatly drawn, the volume being appropriately bound. The opinion has been formed that there was an intention of publishing the volume, and that it is not improbable, from general Burton having formed an acquaintance with the author, the MS. was placed in his hands for this purpose.

It is plain, from the identity of the language of the MS. in question with passages in the history of Mr. Smith, that he had access to it. It is stated that he obtained a MS. from Mr. Dunn, then holding high official rank in Canada. This MS. was subsequently obtained and collated with the volume from which the issue of the historical society was printed. Although some minor variations were found, the two *mémoires* were essentially the same.

Mr. Faribault, the writer of the introduction in the published volume, expressed the opinion that in all probability the author was attached to the service of the *Marine Française*, and that it was possibly M. de Vauclain, who is mentioned in its pages.

I cannot myself see any ground for this opinion. M. de Vauclain is certainly mentioned, but in language not to be considered admissible from one writing of himself. He tells us that M. Murray admired the bravery of de Vauclain, and loaded him with politeness, and caused him carefully to be tended.*

The general tone of the text by no means suggests that the author would so write of himself.

The name of the chevalier Johnstone has also been suggested. There is, however, a *mémoire* published by the Quebec historical society, which is attributed to him. The original was found among the war archives in Paris by Mr. Morin in 1855, and a copy obtained for the Canadian government. Written in English the MS. is described as not remarkable for orthography, or purity of diction.

* "M. de Vauclain faisoit sa retraite en combattant, afin de protéger l'embarquement de quelques effets que l'on faisoit ; mais pressé, il voulut se jeter, à la côte— les bâtiments Anglais le prévirent ; ce fut alors que lui et son second, rappelant toutes leurs forces, et le courage que leur avoit fait faire de grandes actions, combattirent de nouveau ; M. de Vauclain presque resté seul, et blessé en différents endroits ; M. Murray, qui admira sa valeur le combla de politesses, et le fit soigner avec attention" (p. 185).

Either Johnstone must have forgotten, or have never thoroughly known his language. Johnstone was a jacobite, and after the events of '45 found his way to France. He acted as aide-de-camp to chevalier de Levis during the campaign in Canada. The unfavourable opinion expressed with regard to de Levis in many parts of the *mémoire* does not suggest that it was written by his aide-de-camp. Johnstone, in the paper attributed to him, alludes to M. de Vauquelin, spelling the name differently to the form of the MS., which is "Vauclain."

One name has suggested itself to my mind as that of the author; Franquet, who has been previously mentioned as present in Canada for the purpose of inspecting the fortifications. His *mémoire* in the parliamentary library is furnished with maps of such finished excellence, as to suggest that as an engineer officer he would never have given anything so ridiculous as map No. 1, page 6, "Baie Fondy and Baie Verte." Except from the execution of the maps, there is more probability of Franquet being the author, than any other prominent personage of that time. He had an intimate knowledge of the events which took place in Nova Scotia, so evident in the early pages of the *mémoire*. He was personally acquainted with the people he describes. He had been thrown into contact with Duquesne, whose character he penetrated.*

Since the perusal of Franquet's diaries, I have again read the *mémoire* with the theory that he was possibly the author. There is one point worthy attention, the consideration shewn Bigot, although with no desire to hide his peculations. Franquet had partaken of Bigot's hospitality and was impressed with the good side of his character. Undoubtedly he intimately knew the society so graphically described. The professional career of Franquet as an engineer officer would lead him to consider the maps given, as indispensable. On the other hand, it is plain that the writer desired to conceal his identity, and the very imperfect condition of these maps may have been one of the means taken, to preserve an incognito.

The importance of the MS. warrants this enquiry as to its authorship. There can be no doubt as to its value as an historical document, and it is generally considered trustworthy.

When the marquis of Dufferin and Ava was at St. Petersburg, his attention was directed to a MS. in the Russian archives referring to the events of this date, knowing its importance, he caused a copy to be made, which he sent to M. l'abbé Verréault at Montreal. It was one of the documents obtained during the revolution of 1789 in Paris by a Russian named Dubrowski, and by him taken to St. Petersburg. There is some unimportant variation of text with the printed volume, but it may be looked upon as identical with it.

The Quebec historical society, from the service it has rendered to the study of Canadian history, deserves well of the community; but among its many valuable contributions, there is no one more important than the *mémoire* in question.

* The readers of the preceding note may remember that Duquesne relieved Franquet of the society of Mde. Marin (ante p. 575) in the journey to Montreal. The description of Duquesne in the *mémoire* might have been prompted by this incident: "Il étoit d'une taille au dessus de la médiocre bien fait, et avoit de l'esprit; il étoit fier et hautain, et ne souffroit pas qu'on manquât impunément à ses ordres: sa fierté néanmoins cédoit au sexe, dont il se fit aimer; on ne s'est point aperçu que l'amour lui eût fait faire des fautes considérables." pp. 57-8.

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